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ABSTRACT 
 
This dissertation aims to understand (1) the transformation of the trade regime from 
GATT to the WTO within the context of the world order, and (2) the roles of 
transnational corporations (TNCs) in this transformation. It provides a neo-Gramscian 
framework for analysis to fill a void in mainstream approaches in IR/IPE literatures on 
international regimes, which suffer from inadequacies in capturing the 
‚intersubjective‛ nature of regimes and non-state actors’ roles in global politics. For 
neo-Gramscian scholars, international regimes are intersubjective entities that are 
amalgamations of ideas and power configurations inherent to historical structures. 
Hegemony is a concept that ties together the social forces as  agents of historical change 
within international regimes and world orders. Hegemony refers to the translation of 
political power to legitimate authority through obtaining the consent of subordinate 
actors, and is expressed in the consensual aspect of the exercise of power in a given 
world order. This dissertation primarily contends that the transformation of the trade 
regime can be characterized as hegemonic because it occurred in conjunction with the 
transformation in the world order from U.S. post-war hegemony to neoliberal 
hegemony. With the transformation into the WTO, the legal scope of the trade regime 
was redesigned, and its normative content was redefined to reflect the ethical 
framework of neoliberalism. These changes were reflected in the newly acquired 
recognition of the enhanced legitimate authority of markets vis-à-vis states and the 
acknowledgement of the necessity to create binding disciplines over governments. The 
dissertation analyses two cases to understand the roles of TNCs in this transformation 
process with a particular focus on their activities and abilities to set the regime’s 
agenda. The first case study examines the incorporation of services into the GATT 
regime before and during the Uruguay Round negotiations (1986-1994), which 
arguably resulted in a redefinition of the liberalisation and non-discrimination norms. 
The second case analyses the failed attempt to integrate investment into the WTO 
before and during the Doha Round that began in 2001. Ultimately, the dissertation 
argues that U.S. based TNCs proved to be the hegemonic agents of regime 
transformation and played the leading role in the inclusion of services into the GATT 
regime. This was achieved by pursuing a high profile agenda-setting campaign from 
the late 1970s on. Their campaign succeeded in paradigmatically modifying 
established patterns of thought about trade, the normative content as well as 
intersubjective meanings of the regime in line with neoliberalism. On the other hand, 
the investment case suggests the emergence of certain limits to hegemonic ideas, 
institutions, and forces from the early-1990s on. European TNCs failed in their 
endeavours to further the regime transformation by integrating investment into the 
legal and normative framework of the WTO. TNCs’ preferences and strategies to set 
the WTO agenda were constrained and shaped within the context of contested 
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neoliberal hegemony which was further influenced by the resistance and counter-
hegemonic cross-border campaigns emerged in the domain of civil society. The 
analysis in this dissertation is conducted through an interpretative assessment of data 
compiled from secondary and primary resources including government proposals, 
negotiation texts, minutes of meetings, and business statements using the qualitative 
instruments of discourse analysis. 
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ABSTRACT IN ITALIAN 
 
Tale lavoro è volto ad analizzare (1) le trasformazioni della regolamentazione del 
commercio mondiale dal GATT (Accordo Generale sulle Tariffe e il Commercio) al 
WTO (Organizzazione Mondiale del Commercio) nel contesto mondiale, e (2) il ruolo 
svolto dalle aziende transazionali (Transnational Corporations o TNCs) in queste 
trasformazioni. La tesi propone un quadro neo-gramsciano di analisi che si propone 
di colmare il vuoto esistente negli approcci dominanti della letteratura sulle Relazioni 
Economiche e le Politiche Internazionali, i quali danno conto in modo insoddisfacente 
della natura ‚intersoggettiva‛ delle regolamentazioni e del ruolo degli attori non-
statali nelle politiche globali. Per gli studiosi neo-gramsciani, i regimi internazionali 
costituiscono entità intersoggettive che sono delle amalgamazioni di idee e di 
configurazioni di potere inerenti a strutture storiche. L’egemonia è un concetto che 
unisce le forze sociali intese come agenti di cambiamento storico all’interno dei regimi 
internazionali e degli assetti mondiali. Il termine egemonia si riferisce alla traduzione 
di potere politico in autorità legittima attraverso l’ottenimento del consenso degli attori 
subordinati ed si esprime attraverso l’aspetto consensuale dell’esercizio del potere in 
un dato ordine mondiale. In questa tesi, si sostiene in primo luogo l’idea che la 
trasformazione del regime di commercio possa essere definita egemonica nella misura 
in cui essa si è realizzata congiuntamente al passaggio nel contesto mondiale da 
un’egemonia americana postbellica ad un’egemonia neoliberale. Con la 
trasformazione nel WTO, la portata legale della regolamentazione del commercio 
mondiale è stata rielaborata e il suo contenuto normativo ridefinito per riflettere il 
quadro etico del neoliberalismo. Questi cambiamenti sono visibili nel riconoscimento 
di un’autorità legittima dei mercati più forte rispetto agli stati stessi e nel 
riconoscimento della necessità di elaborare regole vincolanti al di sopra dei governi. In 
questa tesi vengono studiati due casi allo scopo di analizzare il ruolo delle aziende nel 
processo di trasformazione, ponendo particolare attenzione alle loro attività e alle loro 
capacità di influenzare le trattative. Il primo caso di studio esamina l’incorporazione 
dei servizi nel trattato del GATT prima e durante le negoziazioni dell’Uruguay Round 
(1986-1994), le quali portarono ad una ridefinizione delle norme di liberalizzazione e di 
non-discriminazione. Il secondo caso analizza il fallito tentativo di integrare gli 
investimenti nel WTO prima e durante il Doha Round iniziato nel 2001. La tesi qui 
sostenuta identifica nelle aziende transnazionali basate negli Stati Uniti i veri e propri 
agenti egemonici della trasformazione della regolamentazione in virtù del ruolo di 
leadership da esse ricoperto nell’inclusione dei servizi nel trattato del GATT. Tale 
situazione è stata realizzata attraverso un lobbying molto forte sull’organizzazione 
dell’agenda sin dalla fine degli anni ’70, il quale è riuscito a modificare in modo 
paradigmatico le correnti di pensiero sul commercio, il contenuto normativo nonché il 
significato intersoggettivo del regime affinché risultassero in sintonia con il 
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neoliberalismo. Inoltre il caso degli investimenti evidenzia l’apparizione di certi limiti 
per le idee egemoniche, le istituzioni e le forze dall’inizio degli anni ’90 ad oggi. Le 
aziende transazionali europee hanno fallito nei loro sforzi per continuare la 
trasformazione della regolamentazione integrando gli investimenti nel quadro legale 
e normativo del WTO. Le preferenze e le strategie delle aziende transnazionali nello 
stabilire l’agenda del WTO sono state ostacolate e si sono dovute inserire nel contesto 
in un’egemonia neoliberale sempre più discussa, influenzata dalla resistenza e dalle 
campagne transfrontaliere di lotta contro l’egemonia provenienti dalla società civile. 
L’analisi effettuata in questa tesi è stata realizzata attraverso l’interpretazione di fonti 
secondarie e primarie (proposte dei governi, testi di negoziati, minute di incontri e 
comunicati di aziende) utilizzando gli strumenti qualitativi dell’analisi di discorso.   
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ABSTRACT IN GERMAN 
 
Diese Dissertation hat das Ziel, zum einen die Transformation des Handelssystems 
von der GATT zur Welthandelsorganisation (WTO) im Kontext einer veränderten 
Weltordnung und zum anderen die Rollen von transnationalen Unternehmen im 
Rahmen dieser Transformation zu untersuchen und zu verstehen. Die Arbeit wird 
theoretisch vom Neogramscianismus angeleitet, da die etablierten Ansätzen in den 
Internationalen Beziehungen und der International Politischen Ökonomie nur 
unzureichend die intersubjektive Natur von Regimen und nicht-staatlichen Akteuren 
darstellen. Für Anhänger des Neogramscianismus sind internationale Regime 
intersubjektive Einheiten, deren Zusammenspiel von Ideen und 
Machtkonfigurationen historische Strukturen prägen. Die Hegemonie ist ein Konzept, 
das soziale Einflüsse als Agenten historischen Wandels in international Regimen und 
der Weltordnung zusammenbindet.  Mit dem Konzept der Hegemonie wird eine 
Machtsituation beschrieben, in der politische Macht in legitime Autorität übersetzt 
wird, indem die Zustimmung subalterner Akteure eingeholt wird. Hegemonie 
beinhaltet die konsensuellen Aspekte von Machtausübung in einer jeweiligen 
Weltordnung. Diese Dissertation argumentiert vor allem, dass die Transformation des 
Handelssystems als hegemonisch bezeichnet werden kann, da sie parallel mit der 
Transformation der Weltordnung von einer von den USA dominierten Nachkriegszeit 
zu einer neoliberalen Hegemonie stattfand. Mit der Transformation zur 
Welthandlungsorganisation wird der legale Rahmen des Handelssystems neu 
strukturiert und ihre normative Grundlagen neu definiert, wodurch der ethische 
Rahmen des Neoliberalismus reflektiert wird. Diese Änderungen werden in der 
neuartigen Anerkennung der legitimen Autorität des Marktes gegenüber 
Nationalstaaten und der Anerkennung von der Notwendigkeit von bindenden 
Disziplinen, die Regierungen übergeordnet sind, reflektiert. Diese Dissertation 
analysiert zwei Fälle, um die Rolle von transnationalen Unternehmen innerhalb diese 
Transformationsprozesses zu erklären. Dabei wird der Fokus vor allem auf die 
Aktivitäten und Fähigkeiten der Unternehmen gerichtet, die Ausrichtung des 
Handelsregimes zu bestimmen. Die erste Studie untersucht die Eingliederung von 
Dienstleistungen in das GATT Regime vor und während der Uruguay-Runde (1986 – 
1994) und argumentiert, dass diese Eingliederung zu einer Neudefinierung von 
Liberalisierung und Normen der Nichtdiskriminierung führte. Die zweite Studie 
analysiert den gescheiterten Versuch, ausländische Direktinvestitionen noch bevor 
und während der 2001 begonnenen Doha Runde in die Welthandelsorganisation zu 
integrieren. Letztendlich wird in dieser Dissertation argumentiert, dass transnationale 
Unternehmen, die in den Vereinigten Staaten ansässig sind, hegemonische Agenten 
der Regimetransformation waren und eine wichtige Rolle dabei gespielt haben, 
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Dienstleistungen in das GATT einzubinden. Und zwar gelang ihnen dies durch eine 
in den späten 1970er Jahren begonnenen Kampagne. Auf der einen Seite war die 
Kampagne darin erfolgreich, etablierte Denkstrukturen zu Handelsthemen 
systematisch im Sinne des Neoliberalismus zu verändern – und zwar sowohl 
hinsichtlich der normativen Inhalte als auch der intersubjektiven Bedeutungen des 
Regimes. Auf der anderen Seite deutet der Fall des Investitionsabkommens die 
Grenzen der hegemonischen Ideen, Institutionen, und Strömungen seit den frühen 
90er Jahren an. Transnationale Unternehmen, die in Europa ansässig waren, sind mit 
ihren Bemühungen gescheitert, das Regime weiter zu transformieren und das Thema 
Investitionen in die legalen und normativen Rahmenbedingungen der WTO zu 
integrieren. Die Prioritäten und Strategien der transnationalen Unternehmen, die 
Agenda der WTO zu beeinflussen, waren beschränkt und wurden im Kontext einer 
angefochtenen neoliberalen Hegemonie geformt, die wiederum von dem Widerstand 
und anti-hegemonischen Kampagnen der Zivilgesellschaft beeinflusst wurden. Die 
Analyse in dieser Dissertation wurde durch eine qualitative Diskursanalyse von 
Sekundär- und Primärquellen durchgeführt: Regierungsvorschläge, 
Verhandlungstexte, Konferenzzusammenfassungen und Statements von 
Unternehmen.  
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CHAPTER 1 - INTRODUCTION 
 
The Final Act of the Uruguay Round, which was signed in 1994 and consisted of 
several new accords similar to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), 
changed the face of governance in international trade. It led to the institutionalisation 
of the GATT with the establishment of the World Trade Organisation (WTO) -a much 
stronger structure with a court-like supranational Dispute Settlement Body (DSB) 
whose juridical decisions are binding on member governments. The Uruguay package 
contained a revised version of the GATT text, but also included agreements related to 
domestic regulations governing the production of goods including agriculture and 
textiles and clothing, as well as intellectual property rights and trade in services. The 
Uruguay Round embodied a number of significant changes in the trade regime that 
can only be defined as a transformation. The multi-dimensional nature of this 
transformation is unprecedented when compared to the coverage and functioning of 
the regime since its launch after the post-World War II negotiations. At the core of this 
transformation lies the readjustment of the normative fundamentals of the 
multilateral trading regime as well as the expansion of its legal scope. 
 
The GATT, initially signed by 23 governments in 1947, was the major authoritative 
accord regulating the rules of multilateral trade in goods until 1994. Its mandate was 
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to assure non-discriminatory application of certain border measures, such as tariffs 
and quotas, and to supervise their gradual reduction through multilateral 
negotiations among parties. The GATT was a product of the post-war economic 
system designed by the victorious powers orchestrated by the United States. 
Governance of international economic transactions by the Bretton Woods institutions 
and the GATT under American hegemony reflected a transatlantic consensus on the 
legitimate  involvement of the states in the markets. International economic regimes, 
as John G. Ruggie (2002: 62) argues, have an ‚authoritative basis‛ as expressions of 
certain legitimate ‚social purposes‛ of the constituting states that define state-society 
relations and state authority vis-à-vis the market. Collective social purposes are latent 
in the basic norms and principles or the normative content of intergovernmental 
regimes. Ruggie (2002: 62-84) calls the sui generis social purpose implanted in the 
norms of the post-war regimes embedded liberalism, which was a synthesis of the 
objective of economic liberalisation with the founding fathers’ social goals to realise 
domestic growth, social welfare and employment through state intervention. Hence, 
under the Pax Americana, certain state controls on trans-border mobility of goods and 
capital were regarded as legitimate in defined situations taking into account domestic 
policy priorities of the Western powers to materialize the post-war reconstruction. The 
liberalisation of cross-border movement of goods and money functioned under strict 
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state supervision as an expression of this legitimate purpose -to embed the free 
market operations within broader social objectives. 
 
Against this background, the GATT regime mirrored a delicate balance between the 
liberalisation of trade and the legitimate role of governments to employ protective 
border instruments in certain circumstances. The rules of the General Agreement and 
its exemptions were designed to regulate customs measures and provided the 
contracting parties with sufficient flexibility to resort to those instruments. Although 
the GATT evolved in time with the generation of new rules and instruments, the 
parties did not challenge the embedded liberal basis of the GATT regime until the 
Uruguay Round. In this respect, Ruggie (2002: 65) asserts that the changes in the post-
war economic regimes until the 1980s proved to be ‚norm-governed‛ in character; in 
essence they kept the underlying normative basis intact.  
 
Nonetheless, from the 1980s, the GATT regime underwent a metamorphosis which 
cannot be simply understood as an evolution of the regime within the embedded 
liberal normative texture. The most crucial dimension of the agreements signed at the 
end of the Uruguay Round (1986-94) has been the codification of a paradigmatic shift 
from borders towards domestic policies, which was characterised in the realignment 
of the regime’s normative content and contributed to the erosion of the embedded 
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liberal vision. The creation of the WTO is a manifestation of the consensus to displace 
embedded liberalism with a novel social purpose. This is apparent in the extended 
rules of the system which have minimised the protective exceptions for state 
regulations not only at the borders but also within the states, and in the broadening of 
the states’ obligations to protect market liberalisation and to ensure global economic 
integration. Within the expansive rules of the WTO, the new normative framework 
places state-led protectionist measures under stricter conditions while prioritizing the 
proper functioning and integration of domestic markets over other social purposes 
such as domestic employment and social stability. In this sense, the novel normative 
content purports to dis-embed markets from state-led social restrictions while putting 
new restrictions on governments. The new legal structure does not only cover various 
tariff and non-tariff issues, but it has also enlarged the scope of the GATT regime to 
new areas penetrating domestic realms. Signifying this diffusion, the General 
Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) and Trade Related Intellectual Property 
Rights (TRIPS) Agreement constituted the second and third pillars of the WTO’s legal 
skeleton. They entailed substantive provisions regarding domestic regulations with an 
aim to redefine the authority of the governments with respect to market agents, 
which, in addition to exporters in the conventional sense, also covered service 
providers and intellectual property right-holders. This normative readjustment and 
cross-border diffusion of the regime along a deeper market integration program was 
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ensured through a revisit of traditional GATT norms such as non-discrimination and 
liberalisation in the new agreements. A completely new institutional body came into 
existence, armed with judicial enforcement tools to ensure the compliance of the 
member states with new legal disciplines. In this sense, the metamorphosis of the 
GATT regime through the 1980s is the manifestation of a transformation, rather than an 
evolution of the trade regime.  
 
This shift has had a ‚norm-transforming‛ quality in contrast to a ‚norm-governed‛ 
change to define in Ruggie’s terms. In other words, it was the expression of a radically 
altered social purpose and a redefinition of the underlying ‚intersubjective meanings‛ 
of the regime (Ruggie 2002: 65; 95-6). Introduction of new rights and obligations for 
the states and markets within the new normative content of the regime redefined the 
meanings of trade, trader, and protectionism. This is evident in the case of the GATS, 
which encompassed the norms of liberalisation and non-discrimination and 
redesigned them for an application to services. The GATS created disciplines to 
ensure market access for the providers of financial, telecommunications, 
transportation, professional and other services both in terms of facilitating their 
operations in external territories and guaranteeing cross-border supply of these 
services to foreign consumers. Hence, the governments, to the extent they assume 
commitments under the provisions of the agreement, are obliged to provide access 
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and non-discriminatory treatment to service producers within their territories be it 
individuals or firms. They cannot create regulatory barriers that hinder trade in 
services or discriminate between the providers (in regard to whether they are of 
national or foreign origin). Infringement of those commitments through domestic 
regulations and practices are considered protectionism and are subject to the Dispute 
Settlement Mechanism of the WTO. In this regard, there is a radical difference 
between how the GATT and the WTO define trade and protectionism.  
 
Introduction of services and intellectual property rights (IPRs) to the agenda of the 
GATT in the early 1980s was a radical development and became particularly 
determinative in this normative transformation. Both issues were promoted by certain 
Transnational Corporations (TNCs). TNCs campaigned initially in the United States 
for a GATT framework that would ensure better worldwide enforcement of 
intellectual property standards and for the elimination of regulatory barriers to 
services trade and investment especially in developing country markets. When the 
United States first brought up these ‚new issues‛ in order to inject them into the 
GATT framework, it faced significant resistance from developing countries who 
deemed them as ‚non-GATT‛ issues. In fact, there were not many trade officials who 
believed in the tradability of services and that services could be liberalised through 
trade negotiations conducted upon GATT principles. It was only after contentious 
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debates and laborious negotiations that the Uruguay Round could be launched with a 
conditional mandate on the talks in services. Along the road to the Marrakesh 
Agreement (which concluded the round in 1994), services became a well-established 
trade issue and developing countries assumed a proactive role in hammering out the 
GATS. The GATS and its fundamental norms were built gradually throughout 
deliberations and bargaining in Geneva. The transformation of the trade regime 
around a new social purpose was a result of the consensus that emerged from the 
process that started in the early 1980s and concluded in 1994. This was certainly not 
the end of the story. 
 
Endeavours to further expand the normative and legal scope of the trade regime 
continued after the establishment of the WTO in 1995. The European Union (EU) 
proposed to launch a Millennium Round that would result in deeper market 
integration through market access in goods and services and rule-making in issues 
such as investment, competition and government procurement. A multilateral 
agreement on investment (MAI) was desired both by American and European TNCs, 
which joined forces for negotiations at the OECD. However, the talks for an MAI 
collapsed in 1998 because of the controversies between OECD governments and the 
politicisation of the process with rising NGO opposition. The WTO then became the 
preferred venue, especially for European TNCs who lobbied the European 
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Commission to push other WTO members, to launch the talks on investment. The 
proposed WTO accord on investment would create new market disciplines on 
governments for stronger protection of investors and non-discriminatory 
liberalisation of barriers to market entry and operations in foreign territories. 
Fundamental norms of the trade regime would further be refined for an application to 
cross-border movement of investment capital. Nevertheless, the story ended with a 
failure. Similar to the services case, there emerged intransigence from certain 
developing countries such as India who opposed the idea of the inclusion of 
investment to the WTO legal framework and, thus, the Doha Round which was 
initiated in 2001. India argued that ‚money falls in the category of neither goods nor 
services. The WTO is a trade-negotiating forum: it is neither a forum of bankers, nor 
of monetary economists‛ (India 2002a: 3). Yet, the demandeurs succeeded in inserting 
investment into the Doha Round with a mandate to discuss the implications of its 
incorporation into the WTO until the Cancun Ministerial Conference in 2003. In 
Cancun, the members would decide whether they would start negotiations in order to 
build a multilateral framework similar to the GATS. Cancun was a failure as the 
conference was adjourned without any decisions because of the impasse over new 
issues including investment as well as in agriculture. The Doha Round resumed 
almost a year later with a formal decision to drop investment and other new issues 
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from the WTO agenda. The story of investment evidences the fact that there are 
certain limits to the transformation of the trade regime.  
 
In this context, this dissertation aims to understand the dynamics of regime 
transformation within a broader historical context that takes into account both 
material and ideational conditions. It intends to conceptualize this historical context 
with a focus on its implications for the normative content and social purpose of the 
trade regime. Furthermore, it aims to analyse the roles of TNCs in the process of the 
transformation of the trade regime concentrating in their abilities and activities to set 
the GATT and WTO agendas in the cases of services and investment. To this aim, the 
dissertation adopts a neo-Gramscian theoretical framework which provides a holistic 
perspective to explore both regime transformation and the roles of TNCs without 
discounting significant historical conditions and factors. The remainder of this chapter 
provides an account of existing approaches to analyse international regimes and 
outlines the theoretical approach adopted throughout this work.  This is followed by 
an overview of the central research questions, arguments, and outline of the 
dissertation. 
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1.1. International Regimes  
 
The concept of international regimes was introduced into the IR/IPE literatures during 
the 1970s as a conceptual tool to probe inter-state cooperation and international 
governance of different domains. Expatiated during the 1980s, ‚international 
regimes‛ serve to explain why and how states cooperate. Regime theorists define 
international regimes as ‚sets of implicit or explicit principles, norms, rules, and 
decision-making procedures around which actors’ expectations converge in a given 
area of international relations‛ (Krasner 1983: 2). Scholars from different theoretical 
perspectives have highlighted multiple dimensions of international regimes. 
Hasenclever et al. (1997) distinguish three ‚schools of thought‛ studying regimes, i.e. 
‚power-based‛, ‚interest-based‛ and ‚knowledge-based‛ theories.  
 
In the power-based theories developed by neo-realist scholars, hegemony has proved 
to be a buzzword in narratives of U.S. leadership in building the post-war 
international order for the period between the World War II until the turbulent era of 
the late 1960s and the 1970s (Krasner 1976, 1979, 1983; Gilpin 1975, 1981;  Keohane 
1980, 1984). In an atmosphere filled with pessimistic predictions about U.S. power, 
economic order, and the future of post-war economic regimes, neo-realist scholars 
postulated the decline of U.S. hegemony as the prominent cause of economic 
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disorder.1 They initiated a long-run academic debate around what Keohane later 
labelled hegemonic stability theory. Hegemonic stability thesis presumes a linear 
causality among three variables, i.e. U.S. hegemony, economic order, and interstate 
cooperation or international regimes. The concept of hegemony in this conventional 
application defines a certain form of relationship among the states implicating 
leadership, predominance, dominance or domination of a particular state. Here 
hegemony rests upon a particular reading of power, which is traditionally attributed 
to the state agents in IR/IPE.2  
 
In this context, regimes and international order are understood as international public 
goods3 provided by a hegemonic state, which arguably shoulders disproportionate 
                                                 
1 For alternative views critical of the postulation of the decline of U.S. hegemony see for 
instance Strange (1987) and Russett (1985).  
2The concept of hegemony was employed in a systematic way in IR/IPE literatures to recount 
international domination of and power exerted by the United States in the post-war decades 
(Griffiths and O’Callaghan 2004, 137-9)  A parallel use of the concept to understand 
international political economy came from the World System theorists (Wallerstein 1974, 1983, 
and 1984). World System theorists ontologically prioritised the economic structure of the 
system as a context for hegemonic relations (between states). Within this context, hegemony 
of a state has been understood as an outcome of a global capitalist formation that serves to 
reproduce global capital accumulation in the world economy from the periphery to the core.  
Hegemony as a concept has been applied to define the domination of a certain state that takes 
lead within history, i.e. the Dutch, the British and the American. 
3 This is a natural consequence of adoption of Mancur Olson’s public goods theory which 
assumes the need of a central authority investing resources to sustain public goods (Olson 
1965). It has been influential on Kindleberger (1973) and other hegemonic stability writers.  
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costs for their creation and maintenance.4 The hegemonic powers are deemed as 
liberal in nature and promoters of the liberal economic system as demonstrated in the 
cases of British hegemony in the nineteenth century and American hegemony in the 
post-war era (Gilpin 1981: 144-5; Krasner 1976: 322). It is the dissemination of power 
which determines the outcomes and changes within regimes. Arguably, the rise or 
decline of hegemonic powers causes the strengthening or weakening of the regimes 
and shapes the liberal nature of the economic order. Economic openness is measured 
through quantitative indicators such as applied tariff levels and other restrictive 
instruments, international flow of trade or trade disputes among parties. The strength 
of the regimes is evaluated by observing the behaviour of the states and whether they 
comply with the liberal norms of the regimes or violate them. The hegemonic power 
and strength of the regimes are assessed and theories are tested through various 
scientific methods.5 Neorealist scholars interpreted the rise of new protectionism in 
trade in the 1970s and the collapse of the Bretton Woods monetary system as the 
weakening of trade, money and other regimes as a result of the decline of the U.S. 
                                                 
4 The liberal orders under British hegemony in the nineteenth century and American 
hegemony in the post-war world were arguably created by the provision of allegedly non-
excludable public goods of free trade and monetary regimes but inducted ‚free-riders‛ who 
exploited the benefits of open markets at the expense of hegemonic states, a situation which is 
called ‚hegemon’s dilemma‛ by Stein (1984). 
5 Keohane (1980: 91) concluded that after the decline of the U.S., the minimum change was 
recorded in the trade regime compared to monetary and oil regimes. Krasner (1976) used 
inputs such as tariff levels, trade proportions of actors, and territorial concentration of world 
trade, and concluded partial validity of the theory.  
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hegemony. In this context, Krasner (1979), in his article on the consequences of the 
Tokyo Round, suggested that the trading regime could be destroyed by an external 
shock in the absence of a hegemonic state. Following this line of thought, a few years 
later Gilpin (1984, 295-6) postulated: 
 
[n]or does it follow that the decline of hegemony will lead inevitably to the 
collapse of a liberal world economy, although the dominant liberal power’s 
decline does, in my judgment, greatly weaken the prospects for the survival of 
a liberal trading system.  
 
In examining state power, some hegemonic stability theorists adopted an agent-
oriented approach by examining the power resources of the states, while other 
authors prioritised the structural dissemination of power.6 Nevertheless, both flanks 
embraced a behavioralist approach focusing on policy outcomes as a reflection of the 
Weberian understanding of ‚power over.‛ This behavioural understanding was 
further developed and challenged by scholars such as Russett, Keohane and Nye. 
Russett (1985) criticised the automatic linkage between power basis and political 
outcomes and introduced a new category of power separate from the power-base 
                                                 
6 The latter understanding is the case in Krasner’s (1976) state-power theory, which assumes a 
direct relationship between openness of markets and hegemonic configuration of power, 
which is understood as one state’s aggregate national income and share in world trade and 
investment. He suggested that the structuralist perspective created an alternative ‚positive-
sum‛ opening through introducing a perspective of ‚tectonic plates‛ as opposed to the 
classical ‚billiard ball‛ (agent-oriented) model that considers IR as ‚zero-sum‛ relations 
(Krasner 1983: 355-56). 
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theory, i.e. state’s control over outcomes. He argued that despite the recorded decline 
in the U.S. power-base, its control over political outcomes was maintained owing to a 
number of reasons including its prevailing cultural hegemony. Keohane (1984) 
similarly called the conventional automatic translation of power potentials to policy 
outcomes in his terms of ‚basic force model,‛ while he alternatively suggested a 
‚force activation model.‛ His alternative perspective was based on an agent-oriented 
vision shifting the emphasis to domestic political processes of decision-making, 
political preferences and willingness of the hegemons to sustain international public 
goods.7 On the other hand, Nye (1990, 2002) formulated the concept of ‚soft power‛ to 
identify certain capacities of actors, such as persuasion and political agenda-setting, 
which would create a context in which actors determine their interests. In somewhat 
similar terms, Susan Strange (1997: 17-30) developed an alternative category of 
‚structural power‛ to understand interstate relations by marking the necessity to take 
into account the legitimacy of the exertion of power. She criticised conventional 
scholars for solely concentrating on the direct or behavioural aspect of power, calling 
it ‚relational.‛ According to Strange structural power of the state is disseminated in 
four different domains, i.e. security, production, finance, and knowledge. Although 
relational power does not need to be legitimised, structural power requires legitimacy 
                                                 
7 Snidal (1985) categorised hegemonic stability theorists according to their delineation of 
hegemonic states as ‚benevolent‛ or ‚coercive‛ actors based on their emphasis (or lack 
thereof) on coercive tools used by the hegemonic state, such as unilateral punishment to 
sustain openness of the system and the asymmetric costs they unilaterally paid. 
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and becomes authority owing to the perceptions of interacting actors, i.e. states, 
international organisations, firms, and people. In fact, these were valuable inputs 
towards expanding the scope of power analysis from within and out of the neorealist 
school and contributed to better conceptualization of the interaction between the 
states in the international system. However, power-based regime theories discounted 
the political power of non-state actors or they viewed it as a constituent of state 
power. This is primarily because of the ontological perspective regarding the states as 
unitary agents of power and welfare maximisation acting in the anarchical system 
(Haggard and Simons 1987: 499). 
 
The focus of analysis shifted from power to interests with new studies produced by 
‚interest-based‛ theories.8 Agreeing with, or at least not explicitly challenging the 
pessimistic depiction and presumptions of the hegemonic decline, neo-liberal 
institutionalists such as Keohane (1984) highlighted the possibility, importance and 
necessity of cooperation among states parallel to the decline of U.S. hegemony. 
Keohane’s explanation of economic disorder stressed the growing reluctance of the 
U.S. to stabilise the overall system, and the rising power and diverging interests of 
smaller states which helped to erode liberal regimes in money and trade through 
‚free-riding‛ (Keohane 1980, 91). Relying on methods of game theory and Prisoner’s 
                                                 
8 See for example Keohane 1980, 1984, 1989; Snidal 1985, Stein 1983, 1990, and Young 1977, 
1980, 1983. 
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Dilemma built upon a firm-state and market-states system analogy, neo-liberals 
proposed that regimes could be created and survive even in the absence of a single 
hegemonic power because of the preference of constituting states to produce public 
goods (Snidal 1985). For neo-liberal scholars, regimes resolve political market failure 
by reducing transaction costs of the states and supplying information about other 
states’ behaviour and their intentions. Thus, regimes help states to maximize their 
interests or utilities under the conditions of ‚complex interdependence,‛ 
notwithstanding sub-optimal outcomes from the regimes in the lack of a hegemonic 
state (Keohane 1984: 64-84). In other words, neo-liberal institutionalists contend that 
states presumably obey norms, rules and procedures of the regimes because doing so 
is to their benefit let aside the power exercised by a single hegemon. In both 
neorealism and neoliberalism, interests and identities of the states are considered to 
be determined a priori and considered exogenous to the analysis (Ruggie 2002: 13).  
 
On the other hand, growing attention to non-state actors led interest-based regime 
studies to focus particularly on the internal pressure groups in the process of 
governmental preference determination.9 However, these mainstream regime studies 
                                                 
9 Putnam is one influential scholar in studying the role of domestic interest groups on 
intergovernmental negotiations. He introduced the ‚two level game‛ metaphor. Studying the 
Uruguay Round negotiations in agriculture, he suggested that state negotiators determine 
national interests through a two-level negotiation process, one taking place at the 
international platform, the other domestically with internal pressure groups (Putnam 1988). 
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did not challenge or overcome the ontological prioritisation of the states since they 
have locked the interest-making process in the domestic level. Because of the atomistic 
treatment of the states and well-established domestic/international dichotomy, the 
interests and the influence of transnational actors such as business associations and 
TNCs on international regimes trespassing borders were discounted (Haggard and 
Simmons, 1987: 517). Non-state actors are deemed to influence the policies of the 
states only upwards.10 The power and influence of TNCs are generally studied by 
extending the Weberian vision of ‚power over‛ to the exertion of the direct forms of 
private power over governments by lobbying. Hence neo-liberals maintain the focus 
on the policy outcomes without taking into account other forms of power. However, 
as Gill and Law (2008) argue, transnational capital is able to exert both direct and 
structural forms of power over the states. Structural power as applied by these and 
other neo-Gramscian scholars is similar to Strange’s notion, but is associated with a 
peculiar application of hegemony which entails both instrumental and ethical 
dimensions of power. This point is further elaborated below and in the next chapter.  
 
                                                                                                                                                          
This perspective was applied to different cases and improved by a number of studies (See for 
instance Paalberg 1997 and Patterson 1997).   
10 Stopford and Strange (1991: 19-23) developed the notion of ‚triangular diplomacy‛  to 
emphasise that companies not only lobby their home governments but also host governments, 
while the interaction among actors is multiplied with state to state as well as firm to firm 
interactions. The diplomacy literature is dominated with works on state-state diplomacy in 
political issues, while scholarly production on economic diplomacy and various roles of non-
state actors on interstate diplomacy is scarce (Lee and Hudson 2004).  
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Today, the role of non-state actors in international politics is more extensively studied 
out of the regime literature as part of the works on globalisation and governance. 
Indeed globalisation, global governance and non-state actors replaced international 
regimes as new key words in IPE literature during the 1990s and 2000s. The 
discussion shifted from the question of if non-state actors play any significant roles in 
world politics to the conceptualisation of how they become influential (Josselin and 
Wallace 2001: 12). There is a growing academic literature on the transnational 
advocacy networks formed by civil society organisations since the release of a book by 
Keck and Sikkink in 1998 who argued that through these networks civil society 
organisations have proved effective in promoting certain values and norms on a 
transnational scale.11 Nonetheless, Ruggie argues that much of the IPE literature 
including the new line of research on non-state actors remains descriptive (Ruggie 
2004: 4). Furthermore, he maintains that this literature lacks the collective 
paradigmatic lenses to analyse the political activities of civil society actors 
independent from the states (Ruggie 2004: 5). 
 
Material-based studies that concentrate on power and interests of states have also 
discounted the role of ideational factors in shaping the preferences of actors as well as 
the normative content of the regimes. This crucial gap in regime studies was filled by 
                                                 
11 See for example Sending and Neumann 2006, Risse 2007, and Stone 2008.  
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the knowledge-based regime theorists (Hasenclever et al. 1997: Ch.5). Hasenclever et 
al. (1997) classify knowledge-based theories according to two categories—weak 
cognitivists and strong cognitivists on the basis of their methodological positioning 
vis-à-vis rationalism. According to this taxonomy, the weak cognitivists intended to 
complete rationalism of neo-realist and neo-liberal authors by bringing in knowledge 
and ideas as another explanatory variable in understanding interstate cooperation. On 
the other hand, strong cognitivists challenged the rationalist studies from a 
methodological point that criticizes inherent positivism by offering a sociological 
alternative.12  
 
Weak cognitivist studies developed analytical schemes to incorporate the role of ideas 
on interest formation and behaviour of states to the frameworks developed by neo-
liberal scholars. To this aim, Goldstein and Keohane initiated a research program to 
explore the impact of ideas on state behaviour, suggesting that ‚ideas as well as 
interests have causal weight in explanations of human actions‛ (Goldstein and 
Keohane 1993: 4 emphasis original).13 Moreover, weak cognitivist contributions, in 
                                                 
12 According to this taxonomy, the works of Haas (1992) and Adler and Haas (1992) fall into 
the category of weak cognitivism, while Ruggie (2002), Kratochwil and Ruggie (1986), Wendt 
(1987, 1992) and Cox (1981, 1983, 1987) into the latter group. 
13 Goldstein and Keohane (1993: 8-10) categorise ideas as world views, principled beliefs, and 
causal beliefs. World views identify ‚the universe of possibilities for action‛, they are 
‚entwined with people’s conceptions of their identities, evoking deep emotions and loyalties‛ 
such as universal religions or modernist Western world view. Whereas principled beliefs 
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large part, served to supplement rationalism without challenging it by incorporating 
ideas into existing causal explanations as guidelines for policy-making and 
international cooperation (Bieler 2001, Goldstein and Keohane 1993). 14  Within the 
confines of rationalism, ideas are not treated as independent from the material reality 
but as an additional object of study to substantiate existing assumptions about states’ 
preferences. A more elaborate alternative to rationalism was produced by 
constructivist scholars within the strong cognitivist flank. These scholars challenged 
positivist epistemology and structural or unitary ontologies by proposing ideas as an 
autonomous structural environment within which actors interests, identities and 
interaction are formed (Neufeld 1995). Constructivism has proven particularly useful 
in understanding international regimes as intersubjective entities.  
 
As constructivists claim, intergovernmental regimes are institutional facts, which are 
only intelligible within an intersubjective social context. As intersubjective 
frameworks of meaning, international regimes are formulations of a generative 
                                                                                                                                                          
include ‚normative ideas‛ about what is right or wrong, causal beliefs are ‚beliefs about 
cause-effect relationships‛ recognised by certain authorities such as scientific communities. 
14 Goldstein and Keohane (1993: 6-7) acknowledge that they challenge rationalism to an extent 
to correct certain ‚empirical anomalies‛ came out of rationalist research program that could 
be overcome only when ideas are taken into consideration. Their goal is to explore the effects 
and influence channels of ideas not their ‚sources.’’ Another contribution came from the 
‚epistemic communities’’ school which focused on the role of certain scientific communities 
as institutional forums where decision-makers engage in collective-learning that inevitably 
influence their political decisions (Haas 1992). 
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grammar, i.e. the language of state action, which identifies the internationalisation of 
authority (Ruggie 2002: 63). International regimes contain both regulative and 
constitutive rules. Regulative rules coordinate state behaviour in a pre-constituted 
world. In contrast, constitutive rules are the sets of practices that make up any 
particular consciously organised social activity. Actors no longer think of them as 
rules (i.e. territorial sovereignty). The durability of constitutive rules rests on the 
collective intentionality of actors. Collective intentionality creates meaning and new 
rights and obligations (norms). International regimes contain analytical components 
such as actors’ expectations, norms and principles as well as certain sets of rules 
limiting states behaviour.15 The social purpose of international regimes is embedded 
in the constitutive rules which are expressed in the normative content of the regimes. 
Ruggie contends that neorealists concentrate only on power and discount the 
legitimate social purpose underlying regimes. He maintains ‚*t+he problem with this 
formulation is that power may predict the form of the international order, but not its 
content.‛ (Ruggie 2002: 64). Furthermore, rationalist theories are not able to capture 
                                                 
15 Kratochwil develops a useful differentiation among social facts or ‚worlds of social factity‛ 
(Ruggie 2002: 12-3, 90-1; Kratochwil 1989: 22-28). Upon this taxonomy, ‚brute or palpable 
observational facts‛ stand for the facts that exist apart from a shared belief of actors, such as 
population size, market share, or material capabilities, which are often treated as ‚objective 
facts‛ by positivists. The second category contains the facts of ‚intentionality and meaning‛ 
including not only intentions, but also all mental states like expectations, desires, and beliefs 
that only human agents can have. The final assemblage is the ‚institutional facts,‛ which 
comprise the world of rules including enabling or constitutive rules, and regulative and 
enforcement rules. In this triple categorisation, social institutions such as intergovernmental 
regimes fall into the group of institutional facts, which are only intelligible within an 
intersubjective social context.  
 34 
the constitutive nature of regimes since they are confined to brute facts, and regulative 
rules and practices (Ruggie 2002: 22-5). Finally, constructivist scholars do not deem 
interests as endogenous to the analysis of international regimes. Based on ongoing 
constructivist research, Ruggie (2002: 15) contends that ‚normative factors in addition 
to states’ identities shape their interests, or their behaviour directly.‛ Thus, to 
understand the changing meaning of trade and the social purpose of trade regime 
through the Uruguay Round, one needs to analyse the changes to the normative content 
of the trade regime and how different actors contribute to this change. 
Notwithstanding, this is a valuable contribution in understanding international 
regimes, as Bieler (2001: 94) argues, constructivist approaches under-conceptualise the 
association between ideas and material structure, which is crucial to comprehend the 
transformation of the trade regime and the role of TNCs in this process. This link is 
elaborated in detail by another flank of the strong cognitivist category, which is the 
neo-Gramscian school wherein lies the theoretical framework of this thesis. 
 
1.2. Theoretical Framework 
 
Hasenclever et al. (1997: 193) points out that, in contrast to conventional approaches to 
international regimes which are concerned with ‚the sources of stability of 
international institutions,‛ the neo-Gramscian school of thought has particularly been 
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interested in ‚the possibilities of historic change in international relations involving an 
unravelling of existing regimes.‛ Despite this fact, regimes have not been the major 
focus of neo-Gramscian scholars. However, as Gale (1998) argues, a neo-Gramscian 
approach is applicable to international regimes as this school of thought appreciates 
the intersubjective quality of international regimes. In neo-Gramscian approaches, 
international regimes or institutions are taken as intersubjective entities similar to the 
constructivist treatment; yet, their embeddedness in the material and ideational world 
is particularly highlighted.  
 
Neo-Gramscian scholars have challenged the rationalist mainstream in IPE to produce 
an alternative reading of world politics premised upon an intersubjective ontology 
and historicist epistemology. Robert Cox distinguishes the neo-Gramscian school of 
thought as ‚critical theory‛ in contrast to the conventional (rationalist) ‚problem-
solving‛ theories (Cox 1981: 87-90).  Critical theory, unlike the latter, does not take 
institutions and social power-relations for granted, but puts them into question by 
concerning itself with their origins and how and whether they might be changing 
(Cox 1981: 89). Historical change is understood as a reciprocal relationship between 
social forces and historical structures. Historical structures refer to broader historical 
patterns (longue durée of Fernan Braudel) within which certain regularities (gestes 
répétées) can be observed (Cox 1992: 149). Similar to international regimes, historical 
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structures are ‚socially constructed, i.e. they become part of the objective world by 
virtue of their existence in the intersubjectivity of relevant groups of people‛ (Cox 
1992: 149). They create a ‚framework of action‛ as reflective of a particular 
combination of social forces (Cox 1981: 97). Neo-Gramscian research program, 
according to Cox, aims ‚to reveal the historical structures and characteristics of 
particular eras within which such regularities prevail. Even more importantly, this 
research program explains transformations from one structure to another‛ (Cox 1985: 
53).  International institutions and regimes are regarded as amalgams of inherent 
constellations of power (material capabilities) and consistent ideas of a particular 
order (Cox 1981: 99). The emergence and changes of international regimes primarily 
depend on the shifts in the material basis and ideational texture of historical 
structures and world orders. Accordingly, the rise, fall and changes of international 
institutions reflect the changes in the world order which are indicative of the changes 
in dominant material and ideational configurations. For an analysis of the world 
order, international regimes and historical change, neo-Gramscian scholars have 
introduced a particular notion of hegemony.  
 
In contrast to the conventional use for the term, hegemony in its Gramscian use refers 
to the consensual reflection of supremacy in the exercise of power by ruling actors. 
The neo-Gramscian application of the concept to global politics signifies a form of 
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order based on consent penetrated into economic, social and political domains. The 
Gramscian concept of hegemony helps discern certain ‚breaking points‛ between 
hegemonic orders (Cox 1985: 55). A hegemonic world order is distinguished from a 
non-hegemonic one if the consensual aspect of domination is to the fore and if there is 
coherence between existing power configuration (material capabilities), ideas, and 
institutions (Cox 1981: 99; 104). Hegemonic orders entail distinctive ideological 
frameworks promoted by state and non-state hegemonic actors as well as 
international regimes that create an ethical context for authority relations at different 
levels. This framework penetrates international regimes and defines their 
intersubjective meaning or normative context. In this context, embedded liberalism as 
the social purpose of the post-war economic regimes was in fact an expression of the 
ideological framework promoted by the U.S. hegemony. As further discussed in 
Chapter 3, this ideological framework recognized the legitimate role of the states to 
regulate the markets for the purpose of social protection and employment. On the 
other hand, the neoliberal order that emerged from the late 1970s on created a new 
ideological framework that imposed market norms and strict disciplines over the 
states and acknowledged expanded legitimate authority of markets and market 
agents vis-à-vis states. This ideological shift was reflected not only in the policies of 
capitalist states, but also in the intersubjective frameworks of international regimes. In 
this vein, a neo-Gramscian inquiry of international regimes requires an analysis of 
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‚how governments create frameworks of intersubjective meaning‛ within the context 
of hegemonic formation (Gale 1998: 260). 
 
Secondly, the conceptualisation of a world order as hegemonic or non-hegemonic in 
connection with the existence of coherence between ideas, institutions, and material 
capabilities is somehow incomplete. Cox acknowledges ‚*w+hat is missing is some 
theory as to how and why the fit comes about and comes apart‛ (Cox 1981: 105). At 
this point, the theory is consolidated by integrating social forces into analysis.  Social 
forces derive from changes in economic production and they struggle for hegemony 
through promoting their ideas on social organization and ideological formation of the 
states and institutions. They engage in a long-run struggle within the civil society 
which Gramsci calls a ‚war of position.‛ This implicates the use of coercive tools of 
the states to gain the consent of subordinate actors, but more importantly it entails 
strategies to convince those actors. These strategies include alliance building through 
production and dissemination of certain policy formulas that are responsive to the 
needs and interests of societal actors. Producing hegemony may require the social 
forces to sacrifice certain short term interests. Thus, a hegemonic relationship is built 
through an intersubjective education process in which hegemonic groups engage in 
obtaining the consent of different layers of civil society on comprehensive formulas 
they promote. Different social forces may struggle for hegemony by developing 
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counter-hegemonic policy formulas. In this regard, hegemonic production is a 
dynamic process and is never complete. Social forces build alliances to produce 
hegemony with other social actors in the society. This is called an ‚historic bloc‛: an 
organic and ethical coalition around the ideological framework proposed. As 
suggested in the following chapter embedded liberalism was a perspective produced 
by the historic bloc that underpinned the American hegemonic order. On the other 
hand, neoliberal hegemony has been promoted by a transnational historic bloc 
constructed by TNCs which proved to be the hegemonic social forces derived from 
the globalisation of production as of the 1970s.  
 
Neoliberal hegemony was characterised by a reconfiguration of global political power 
inclusive of core capitalist states beyond the United States as well as the enhanced 
structural power of TNCs that has underpinned this reconfiguration. In fact, the 
neoliberal ideological framework promoted by TNCs was a reflection of this amplified 
structural power which has a normative dimension insofar as it purports stronger 
disciplines on the states. Stephen Gill’s concept of ‚disciplinary neoliberalism‛ 
captures this normative dimension which justifies the agenda-setting activities of 
TNCs towards locking in the privatisation of public authority and market disciplines 
on states through new constitutionalism, i.e. constitutional and institutional measures 
and quasi-constitutional regional and multilateral arrangements (Gill 2000a; 2008). In 
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other words, neoliberal hegemony not only facilitates and justifies the enhanced 
authority of market forces and TNCs’ agenda-setting activities towards limiting and 
shaping the role of the states in economy, but also projects a long term political-
juridical program towards guaranteeing enhanced rights accorded to the TNCs (Gill 
2000a: 11-12; Gill 2008: 138-42). In this regard, the changes recorded in international 
regimes from the late 1970s on should reflect this new authority configuration in their 
social purpose and normative content since they are expressions of the 
internationalisation of political authority in a constructivist sense. Finally, it should be 
noted that since the early 1990s neoliberal hegemony was contested by a growing 
number of actors which got mobilized within and across state borders. Even though 
these actors did not produce an alternative ideological framework, they have 
challenged the legitimate authority of neoliberal institutions, ideas and TNCs.  
 
From a neo-Gramscian perspective, TNCs’ roles on the changes in intergovernmental 
regimes can be understood within the context of hegemonic formation. To this aim, 
one needs to explore their activities towards shaping the agendas of the governments 
interacting within the intersubjective context of the regimes. TNCs are able to produce 
policy formulas and promote them to the states not only through upward lobbying 
but also by waging wars of position through building coalitions within and across 
borders with business, government and civil society actors. The penetration of their 
 41 
policy formulations into the intersubjective frameworks of the regimes can be tracked 
by looking into the elements constituting those formulations and changes in the 
intersubjective and normative frameworks of the regimes.  
 
1.3. Research Questions, Arguments, and the Outline of the Dissertation  
 
This dissertation aims to apply a neo-Gramscian theoretical framework to understand 
the transformation of the trade regime from the GATT to the WTO. At its heart lies the 
question of ‚how can we conceptualize the transformation of the trade regime within 
the context of world order?‛ Such an analysis requires contextualizing the regime 
transformation within the historical framework of material and ideational changes in 
the world order. Since international regimes reflect inherent constellations of power 
(material capabilities) and consistent ideas of a particular order, changes in the world 
order must be observed in the ideational texture of the regimes, i.e. their normative 
content. The GATT regime was a product of the post-war U.S. hegemony, and 
arguably its transformation into the WTO -through significant changes to its 
normative texture throughout the Uruguay Round- can only be understood in the 
context of the transformation of the world order from U.S. hegemony to neoliberal 
hegemony. In this regard, this dissertation argues that the transformation of the trade 
regime can be distinguished as hegemonic since it took place in association with the 
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transformation of the world order. To support this argument, the dissertation 
concentrates only in the changes in the normative content of the GATT regime during 
the Uruguay Round. It demonstrates that the legal scope of the trade regime was 
redesigned, and its content was re-defined in this process in a way that is reflective of 
the new neoliberal ideological context thereby creating a constitutional framework 
towards disciplining the states. This dissertation puts the creation of the GATS in the 
spotlight since this framework was instrumental in redefining fundamental norms of 
the GATT, i.e. non-discrimination and liberalisation to regulate trade in services. 
Through such redefinition, this transformation altered the intersubjective meanings 
intrinsic to the trade regime including the notions of trade, trader (i.e. exporter and/or 
importer), protectionism and barriers to trade. It changed the meaning of trade which 
has for centuries meant a cross-border exchange of commodities. Today trade 
encapsulates both exports and imports of goods and services. The hegemonic 
transformation has also redefined the authority of the states and market actors vis-à-
vis each other by de-legitimizing certain domestic regulations which turned to be 
defined as non-tariff barriers, and by according new rights to foreign service 
producers who got the status of traders.  
 
On the other hand, the emergence of and changes to international regimes take place 
in the context of hegemonic formation, which determines the limits to the regime 
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transformation. In this regard, it is further argued that the transformation of the trade 
regime has been constrained by the challenges faced by the neoliberal hegemony in 
the form of counter ideas leveraged by social forces contesting neoliberalism. This 
argument is supported with evidence drawn from the analysis of the second case, i.e. 
investment. The business case for a multilateral investment framework under the 
WTO intended to generate further disciplines upon member states through provisions 
on investment protection especially against various forms of expropriation, 
investment liberalisation and settlement of disputes between investors and 
governments. The proposed framework would further transform the normative 
content of the regime by according new obligations to the states and extending the 
legal rights of investors vis-à-vis governments. Depending on the standard that would 
be adopted during potential WTO negotiations, the normative content of the regime 
would expand the scope of the norms of non-discrimination, liberalisation as well as 
transparency to ensure a larger space for the operations and cross-border mobility of 
capital. Hence, the intersubjective meanings of the regime could even further be 
amended by redefining trade towards encompassing cross-border movements of 
selected forms of capital as well as the meanings of barriers and protectionism 
accordingly.  
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Secondly, this dissertation aims to bring an answer to the question of ‚what are the 
roles played by TNCs in the normative transformation of the trade regime?‛ Based on 
its theoretical framework, the dissertation suggests that TNCs have been the major 
social forces to take part in the construction of the neoliberal world order and the 
transformation of the trade regime. The focus here is the involvement of TNCs in 
setting the trade regime’s agenda. It is argued that TNCs engaged in the redefinition 
of the fundamental norms of the trade regime through pursuing particular agenda-
setting strategies, including both coercive and consensual dimensions. Agenda-setting 
is defined in Chapter 2 broadly to include state and non-state activities before and 
during intergovernmental negotiations. Both state and non-state actors engage in 
agenda-setting by building cases and coalitions. TNC activities may take the form of a 
‚war of position‛ by developing and disseminating their case as a policy formula 
addressing the needs and preferences of a broad set of actors. Any changes to the 
trade regime require the agreement of governments including weaker states since the 
GATT/WTO operates on consensus. Thus, TNCs need to influence the positions of the 
negotiating agents through leveraging available instruments that would include both 
educative tools to get the consent of subordinate actors and available coercive tools in 
the form of trade sanctions. It is argued that TNCs utilised different strategies in the 
cases of services and investment because their preferences and strategies were shaped 
within different contexts of hegemonic formation.  
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From the late 1970s, the case of services was built and promoted by U.S. based TNCs 
which engaged in a war of position with the aim of convincing initially the American 
government and later other actors in the tradability of services and the necessity of a 
GATT framework to eliminate the regulatory barriers inhibiting international delivery 
of services. This case was developed as a policy formula addressing the interests and 
needs of negotiating states. It was projected through coalition-building within and 
beyond the United States and included education activities to change the established 
mindset of ‚trade in goods.‛ They succeeded in getting the U.S. government on board 
followed by other OECD countries and finally developing countries (which were 
initially resistant to the expansion of the GATT agenda). Their campaign succeeded in 
putting services on the GATT agenda and in changing its intersubjective meanings. 
Parallel to the embracement of their case by European and developing country 
governments, they were also obliged to provide concessions along the road. Thus, the 
GATS was constructed as a flexible instrument that would achieve significant market 
opening only in the longer term.  
 
On the other hand, the investment case seems to prove the emergence of certain limits 
to the structural power of TNCs given that their preferences and strategies to set the 
WTO agenda were constrained by the challenges raised in the civil society in the 
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context of contested neoliberal hegemony. Beginning in the mid-1990s, a group of 
social actors who were critical of the neoliberal trade agenda, policies and institutions 
emerged and mobilized within and across the borders against a new round of talks 
under the WTO. This dissertation argues that these forces became influential in setting 
domestic and multilateral trade agenda through activating policy-makers as well as 
other non-governmental organizations (NGOs). European TNCs who were pushing 
for a WTO investment constitution failed to build a strong transatlantic business 
coalition for an ambitious agenda in the WTO. They remained low-profile in their 
agenda-setting campaign which entailed mainly the utilisation of their power by 
directly lobbying the European Commission. Growing concerns and moral attacks on 
TNC operations were culminated with the formation of an NGO coalition which set a 
counter war of position through a cross-border campaign aiming to prevent the 
launch of the talks in the WTO. This coalition became influential in the entrenchment 
and broadening of the block of countries by educating African governments about the 
potential negative impacts of a WTO investment treaty and facilitating their 
mobilisation. The failure of the Cancun Conference was a consequence of a clear 
repositioning on the side of least developed countries and consolidation of the anti-
investment coalition against the actors demanding the initiation of investment talks.  
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The remainder of the dissertation is structured in three parts. The first part develops a 
conceptual framework to understand the shift in the ideological framework from the 
U.S. to neoliberal hegemony (Chapter 2) and associated normative transformation in 
the trade regime (Chapter 3). The second part is devoted to the case of services. 
Chapter 4 analyses the emergence of the TNC coalition in the United States beginning 
in the late 1970s and business activities to build consensus in the U.S. and Europe. 
Chapter 5 explores the Uruguay Round negotiations in services and the role of TNCs 
in the construction of the GATS and its fundamental norms. The third part examines 
the case of investment. Chapter 6 outlines the pre-Doha Round deliberations, the 
architecture of international investment rules, and divergent transatlantic business 
preferences in the context of the OECD MAI negotiations. Chapter 7 studies the 
transatlantic business deliberations and European TNC campaigns for a WTO accord 
in the context of Doha negotiations, and the resistance and counter campaign of 
NGOs. Chapter 8 recapitulates the arguments and summarizes the findings of the 
dissertation.  
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Part I. Hegemonic Transformation and the Trade Regime: A Conceptual Framework 
 
 
 
CHAPTER 2: A NEO-GRAMSCIAN FRAMEWORK TO ANALYSE THE ROLE OF 
SOCIAL FORCES IN REGIME CHANGE 
 
Exploring the neo-Gramscian literature, this chapter intends to develop a theoretical 
framework to analyse the roles of TNCs as agents of the hegemonic transformation of 
the trade regime from the GATT to the WTO. The chapter starts by outlining the 
fundamental concepts used by Antonio Gramsci in his original historical materialist 
work. Secondly, the chapter  lays out the employment of  Gramscian concepts to the 
international realm with a focus on how the notion of hegemony is applied to the 
world order and international regimes. Thirdly, a neo-Gramscian reading of the 
hegemonic transformation from the U.S. post-war hegemony to the neoliberal order is 
provided. The final section discusses the application of this framework to the analysis 
of regime transformation and the study of the roles of TNCs in this transformation.   
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2.1. Hegemony, World Orders, and International Regimes 
 
2.1.1. Hegemony 
 
Antonio Gramsci, a former leader of the Italian Communist Party, developed a 
synthetic social theory of political power in capitalist societies. This theoretical 
framework was developed particularly in his work, Prison Notebooks, which was 
written while he was imprisoned by the fascist regime between 1929 and 1935.16 In 
examining political power, Gramsci applied specific notions to define the quality of 
power exercised by ruling authorities. A general notion of supremacy subsumes two 
dimensions: domination and hegemony.17 In general terms, supremacy refers to an 
aggregation of political power penetrated in the economic base, civil society and the 
state. To identify domination and hegemony as reflections of supremacy in exercising 
power, Gramsci (1971: 170) utilized Machiavelli’s image of the centaur -the mythical 
half-man, half-horse- the former entailing the ideological power of the dominator or 
the consent of the dominated whilst the latter refered to the element of physical power, 
                                                 
16 The primary resource of Gramsci’s original political analysis, i.e. philosophy of praxis is the 
selections from his Prison Notebooks which were published in English in 1971 (Gramsci 1971). 
This section follows the interpretation of Antonio Gramsci’s work by neo-Gramscian scholars 
such as Gill (1993), Cox (1993), and Rupert (1993) with references to his Prison Notebooks.  
17 For a distinction between supremacy, domination, and hegemony in Gramsci’s theory see 
Augelli and Murphy (1988).  
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coercion. The concept of hegemony helps to understand the translation of the dominant 
position of a class in the domain of the economic base into its supreme position in the 
superstructure (civil society and the state), which cannot be conceived as an automatic 
process. Gramsci (1971: 238) contended that in contrast to illiberal societies where civil 
society can be weak, in liberal societies an active consent of popular masses is pursued 
in civil society to legitimise the political authority of ruling classes. The prevailing 
position of the ruling classes in society may derive from their dominant status in 
economic production; however their legitimate rule is exercised in the domain of civil 
society (Gramsci 1971: 261-3). Having an essential role in the economic structure, a 
social group achieves hegemony in civil society when it can also sustain domination in 
the state by resorting to the legitimate use of force when deemed necessary (Gramsci 
1971: 57). 
 
Gramsci established a correlation between social order and the degree of hegemony. 
Although crude force is used in extreme cases by rulers, he believed that some degree 
of consent exists as a prerequisite of social stability. He defined two extreme ends or 
ideal typical situations. On one end rests pure domination, which refers to the 
exclusive use of force by ruling actors without seeking the consent of the dominated. 
On the other end, he conceptualised ethical hegemony, which is ‚intellectual and 
moral leadership‛ of the hegemonic classes (Gramsci 1971: 57). The extent to which 
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the dominated groups give their consent voluntarily, the more hegemony is ethical 
(Gramsci 1971: 160-1). Where the authority of hegemonic groups is widely questioned, 
dominant classes deploy coercion through state organs more frequently (Gramsci 1971: 
170 fn. 71; 280-1). In this framework, the criterion to assess the hegemonic nature of a 
given social order is the degree and ethical content of the consent of the general public 
to the authority of ruling classes and institutions. These dynamics are reflective of the 
organic unity of the polity such as the relationship between civil and political society 
(Gramsci 1971: 263).  
 
Gramsci extended his analysis to the domain of civil society to understand how 
certain social groups obtain hegemonic status. For Gramsci civil society is a political 
realm in which individuals engage in primary political acts and contacts. Hence to 
achieve hegemony, or to sustain an ‚intellectual and moral‛ leadership throughout 
society, a potential hegemon needs to develop a universally accepted political formula 
within civil society (Gramsci 1971: 181-82, 388). Such a formula should not only 
address the interests of the potential hegemonic actors but also respond to the 
expectations and aspirations of other groups, and suggest a coherent ideology that 
captures the wider public. Furthermore, to generate hegemony that reaches the mass 
public, this formula should be able to sustain the economic development of society as 
a whole (Gramsci 1971: 60-1; 181-82; 388). 
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Building hegemony is a long-run process and is realised through a war of position 
within civil society and entails strategic planning, engagement in sound alliances, and 
intellectual efforts to capture the ideological sphere. This process also requires 
inevitable sacrifices from immediate interests, and engagement with other groups in 
the form of alliances (Gramsci 1971: 119-20; 238-9). Gramsci introduced the term 
‚historic bloc‛ to define the organic and ethical alliance that is required for building 
hegemony. A historic bloc bridges economic, political and cultural realms around an 
ideologically coherent goal (Gramsci 1971: 330, 366, 377). To construct hegemony and 
historic blocs, hegemonic classes need organic intellectuals who can develop 
overwhelming political formulas consolidated with sophisticated theories that 
support a coherent world view (Gramsci 1971: 330). Thus, the war of position in civil 
society turns into a war waged on a philosophical level by developing plausible 
theories to conquer public common sense. It can only be successful if there is a belief 
that such domination is logical and ethical (Gramsci 1971: 60-1; 330). 
 
A hegemonic relationship is built upon an intersubjective education process in which 
hegemonic groups engage in acquiring consent of the different layers within civil 
society in regard to their comprehensive formulas. Using all available channels in civil 
society, such as media, publishing houses, and education, organic intellectuals work 
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to disseminate their formulas throughout society. Gramsci applied the analogy of a 
teacher and pupil to elucidate the cognitive nature of a hegemonic relationship:  
 
Every relationship of ‚hegemony‛ is necessarily an educational relationship 
and occurs not only within a nation, between the various forces of which the 
nation is composed, but in the international and world-wide field, between 
complexes of national and continental civilisations (Gramsci 1971: 350).  
 
To sustain not only intellectual but also moral leadership, this process is considered 
dynamic and inevitably reciprocal: ‚the relationship between teacher and pupil is 
active and reciprocal so that every teacher is always a pupil and every pupil a 
teacher‛ (Gramsci 1971: 350). If hegemonic classes fail to respond to the expectations 
of subaltern groups, and pursue their spontaneous interests at the expense of others, 
hegemony lacks its ethical content. In such a case, ideology morphs into a functional 
weapon, the reciprocal nature of the learning process is paralysed, consensus is 
gradually lost, and the authority of the hegemon is challenged. In other words, 
hegemonic production is an incomplete process that is inherent to the reproduction of 
capitalism and continues insofar as a capitalist class struggle exists. Hegemony can be 
challenged by rival classes through waging a counter war of position, by forming new 
historic blocs, and generating alternative organic intellectuals that can build counter-
hegemonic projects. On the other hand, social order may be jeopardised in the cases of 
‚authority crisis,‛ which Gramsci also called an ‚organic crisis.‛ This means the loss 
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of organic totality between civil society and political society and implies that the 
ruling classes are no longer able to play a role of intellectual and moral leadership and 
fulfil their ethical functions to respond to the expectations of the society. Organic crisis 
is in fact a ‚crisis of hegemony,‛ where coercion becomes the only tool of domination 
because of the absolute loss of the consent of masses (Gramsci 1971: 210).  
 
2.1.2. Hegemonic Orders and International Regimes 
 
Gramscian concepts were introduced into the IPE discipline by Robert Cox (1981; 
1983).18 As discussed in Chapter 1, Cox conceptualized historical change as a long-
term dialectical interaction between historical structures and social forces (Cox 1981: 97-
101). Social forces, world orders, and forms of states are in mutual integration with 
each other in making up historical structures (Cox 1981: 100, 101): 
                                                 
18 Gramsci’s ideas are further interpreted for the world context by scholars whose works 
constitute the neo-Gramscian literature in IPE. Starting with the works of Cox, authors such as 
Gill (1990, 1993), Augelli and Murphy (1988), and Rupert (1995) produced valuable 
contributions to the literature. Gramsci’s work also attracted attention of scholars in other 
schools and disciplines with some criticism to neo-Gramscian scholars. For instance, Burnham 
(1991), Germain and Kenny (1998), and Mittelman (1998) brought serious criticisms to Cox’s 
interpretation and method of utilisation of Gramscian notions. On the other hand, the works 
of Hall (1994), Laclau (2000) and Laclau and Mouffe (1985) took the analysis of hegemony 
beyond structural and class-based perspectives focusing on different cultural, ideological and 
sociological elements shaping hegemonic relations. This project does neither aim to apply the 
concept of hegemony beyond its utilisation in IPE or to respond to all those critiques as it is 
limited in scope. However, the dissertation follows the general approach developed by Robert 
Cox and other neo-Gramscian scholars within IPE to the extent that they allow for an analysis 
of TNC influence on regime change. 
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 The three levels are interrelated. Changes in the organisation of production 
generate new social forces which, in turn, bring about changes in the structure 
of states; and the generalization of changes in the structure of states alters the 
problematic of world order. *<+ Considered separately, social forces, forms of 
state, and world orders can be represented in a preliminary approximation as 
particular configurations of material capabilities, ideas, and institutions‛ (Cox 
1981, 100-101) 
 
Within this broad picture, hegemony becomes a form of order produced by social 
forces deriving from the economic base through obtaining the consent of various actors 
in global civil society with support of a carefully elaborated set of policy ideas. 
Therefore, hegemony originates in the material production process, but it cannot be 
confined to the material world. Following Gramsci’s formulation, Cox contends that 
social forces struggle for world hegemony in the domain of ideas through 
constructing historic blocs (Cox 1983: 131, 133). Although historic blocs have their 
roots in the domestic sphere, world hegemony proves to be an outward expansion of 
the hegemony established internally (Cox 1983: 137). A hegemonic world order differs 
from a non-hegemonic one in that the consensual nature of domination is at the 
forefront, whereas non-hegemonic orders global politics reflect power based 
confrontations (Cox 1981: 99). Based on the consensual aspect of their epochs, neo-
Gramscian scholars consider pax Britannica and pax Americana as two hegemonic 
orders. They consider the interwar period and the period that started in the late 1960s 
as non-hegemonic orders (Cox 1981: 102-4; 1983: 135-7). The nature of consensus in 
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each hegemonic epoch is determined by an ideological framework promoted by 
hegemonic forces and historic blocs. The Amsterdam School of neo-Gramscian 
scholarship has suggested the notion of ‚concepts of control‛ to conceptualize the 
ideological framework determining the ethical content of authority relations within 
hegemonic orders. Concepts of control, as the expressions of ‚general interest‛ of the 
society, are developed and promoted by hegemonic social forces to assure the 
sustainability of social order  (van der Pijl 1998, 3; Overbeek 2004: 118). According to 
van der Pijl, these concepts are produced by certain class fractions which gain 
prominence owing to the cyclical conjunctures of capitalism and maintain their 
economic dominance and sustain social stability (van der Pijl 1998: 53). They are 
generated within an intersubjective context, through a process in which corporate 
interests of a class or class fragment transforms into a universally acceptable world 
view in civil society through incorporation of other interests and by responding to 
expectations and aspirations of the society. In this regard, concepts of control in 
becoming ‚comprehensive‛ or hegemonic constitute the moral frameworks of their 
epoch. In van der Pijl’s words:  
 
what was ‘normal’ in one age, say, welfare state, is anathema in another. Such 
codes of normalcy in practice appear subject to change, along with the shifts in 
labour processes and modes of accumulation, the widening and/or deepening 
of commodification and the discipline of capital, the changing forms of 
state/society relations, world politics, etc. (van der Pijl 1998: 51) 
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The emergence of and changes in international regimes can be understood as a 
function of the world hegemony. To define an order as hegemonic, Cox requires the 
existence of a harmonious fit between social, political and economic domains, which 
can be observed in the existing coherence between the global configuration of power, 
ideas and international institutions (Cox 1983, 137; 1981: 104). Maintenance and 
changes of international institutions/regimes are associated with the production and 
reproduction of international hegemonies (Cox 1981: 99; 1983: 138). According to Cox, 
international institutions fulfill the following functions: 
 
(1) the institutions embody the rules which facilitate the expansion of 
hegemonic world orders; (2) they are themselves are the product of the 
hegemonic world order; (3) they ideologically legitimate the norms of the 
world order; (4) they co-opt the elites from peripheral countries; and (5) they 
absorb counterhegemonic ideas (Cox 1983: 138). 
 
Nonetheless, neo-Gramscian scholars have not found the rationalist regime studies 
compatible with their heterodox approaches. As Gale (1998) maintains, although the 
neo-Gramscian tradition generates an alternative meta-theory in IR/IPE, its potential 
has thus far been applied mainly to understand macro-level structures; whereas this 
potential offers also the possibility to examine meso-level structures like international 
regimes. The analysis can be based on the constructivist treatment of regimes since 
neo-Gramscian understanding of regimes shares the ontolological premises of 
constructivist scholars by treating international regimes as intersubjective entities. Cox 
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emphasizes the embeddedness of international regimes in historical structures 
through the penetration of two sets of ideas into institutions: intersubjective meanings 
and collective images. Intersubjective meanings are ‚shared notions of the nature of 
social relations which tend to perpetuate habits and expectations of behaviour.‛ These 
ideas are ‚durable over long periods of time‛ and ‚historically conditioned‛ (Cox 
1981: 98). Bieler (2001: 97) argues that this understanding is parallel to the 
constructivist treatment of ideas. However, neo-Gramscian approaches go beyond 
constructivism and intend to understand the ‚material structure‛ of ideas, i.e. their 
relation with the material world via social forces (Bieler 2001: 94). In this regard, Cox 
contends that if the world order is in change, the underlying intersubjective meanings 
are also subject to change (Cox 1985: 51-6; 1996: 145-7). To understand the changes in 
the ideational texture of international institutions in association with material 
changes, Cox’s second category of ideas is helpful, i.e. ‚collective images.‛ Unlike 
intersubjective meanings, collective images are held only by a group of people. These 
are: 
 
differing views as to both the nature and the legitimacy of prevailing power 
relations, the meanings of justice and public good, and so forth. Whereas 
intersubjective meanings are broadly common throughout a particular 
historical structure and constitute the common ground of social discourse 
(including conflict), collective images may be several and opposed (Cox 1981: 
89). 
 
 59 
The legitimacy of collective images supported within a regime is contingent upon 
their coherence with intersubjective meanings of historical structures. In Bieler’s 
words, ‚*s+trategies are likely to be successful in cases where the legitimising ideas of 
a hegemonic project correspond to the ‘intersubjective meanings’ of the structure, 
because they appear to be logical‛ (Bieler 2001: 98). Nevertheless, if the world order is 
in the process of change and world hegemony is contested, it becomes hard to 
legitimize those ideas. Because in non-hegemonic world orders, institutions turn to a 
terrain of clashing collective images as well as power (Cox 1981: 99-100). As Cox 
notes: 
the clash of rival collective images provides evidence of the potential for 
alternative paths of development and raises questions as to the possible 
material and institutional basis for the emergence of an alternative structure 
(Cox 1981: 99). 
 
To understand the role of social forces in the transformation of the trade regime  one 
needs to examine the collective images held by TNCs, whether these ideas were 
justified with references to the intersubjective meanings, and if these ideas had 
potential for alternative paths of development. As examined in Chapter 5, the idea of 
the tradability of services was promoted by certain TNCs and had a potential to 
change the very intersubjective meanings of the trade regime during the Uruguay 
Round. In fact, the counter-collective image held and promoted by developing 
countries, i.e. services was a non-GATT issue lost its validity in this process in tandem 
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with the spread of neoliberal hegemony. In this case, the trade regime underwent a 
transformation which re-defined its normative framework and altered the 
intersubjective meanings within the trade regime. On the other hand, as will be 
studied in Chapter 6 and 7, the idea of creating an investment accord under the WTO, 
which was promoted by a coalition of TNCs during the 1990s, was challenged by 
some governments and ultimately failed to become hegemonic. In fact, the success of 
the first case was directly related with the process of (neoliberal) hegemonic 
production. Conversely, the failure of the second was in association with the 
emergence of counter-hegemonic challenges to neoliberal hegemony. The next section 
will discuss the historical context for the two cases by exploring the transformation of 
the world order.  
 
2.2. Hegemonic Transformation 
 
2.2.1. U.S. Hegemony 
 
Scholars exploring domestic origins of the pax Americana that prevailed in material, 
ideological and cultural spheres after World War II point out that  U.S. hegemony 
came into existence after a certain domestic transformation in the production 
processes, in the class-based configuration of  American society, and state-society 
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relations in the United States.19 At the core of the pax Americana lay a historically 
constructed hegemonic bloc of social forces organically allied beyond their day-to-day 
interest perceptions, in line with a collective world view and supportive set of ideas 
(Rupert, 1995: 57; Murphy 1994: 10-11; 168-71). This historic bloc was initially formed 
by certain fractions of American capitalists from finance (money capital) and industry 
(productive capital), organically connected ruling elites, and organised labour (Rupert 
1995: 55-8). Neo-Gramscian scholars argue that the composition of the historic bloc 
was determined by a Fordist regime of capital accumulation which became the 
dominant form for most of the twentieth century (van der Pijl 1984: 8-20; Rupert 1995: 
171-3; 178-80). Van der Pijl introduces the term ‚corporate liberalism‛ to distinguish 
the ideological framework (comprehensive concept of control) of American historic 
bloc and hegemony. Corporate liberalism, arguably, was a synthesis of three 
ideological components that bonded the American historic bloc together. These were 
(1) Fordism, (2) Wilsonian universalism expressed as multilateralism, and (3) 
Keynesian economic understanding (van der Pijl 1984: 8-20; Rupert 1995, 57). This 
framework constituted an ethical context for class-based relations within and beyond 
the United States and for the relations between the U.S. government and allied states. 
                                                 
19 The three most representative works examining the domestic socio-economic origins of the 
American hegemony are Cox 1987, Rupert 1995 and van der Pijl 1984.  
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Corporate liberalism defined the hegemonic form of state and the ethical boundaries 
of authority relations in the Western world.20  
 
U.S. hegemony in the international realm highlighted multilateralism -the realisation 
of non-discriminatory trade liberalisation and monetary stability based upon currency 
convertibility-to achieve peace and stability. Yet, it also recognized the role of the 
states in domestic economies for sustaining welfare through a flexible understanding 
of Keynesianism that paved the way for strong welfare states and social democracy in 
Europe (van der Pijl 1998: 4). According to Cox (1981: 108), under the pax Americana 
international regimes functioned ‚to reconcile domestic pressures with requirements 
of a world economy.‛ In fact, this synthesis constituted the embedded liberal social 
purpose of the post-War economic regimes as distinguished by Ruggie. As per 
Ruggie, embedded liberalism defining the post-war economic order was dissimilar 
from ‚orthodox liberalism‛ or ‚laissez-faire liberalism‛ of the nineteenth century 
(Ruggie 2002: 65; Lang 2006: 86).21 Under embedded liberalism both the monetary and 
                                                 
20 Van der Pijl argues that during the post-war years, the corporate liberal form of state was 
well established in the U.S./North Atlantic region, whereas it was hotly contested by 
‚redistributive party-commanded‛ form of state in the Soviet block and ‚cartel state‛ form 
predominant in South European/American dictatorships (van der Pijl 1998: 85). 
21 According to Ruggie the post-war economic consensus emerged around the following 
description: ‚unlike the economic nationalism of the thirties, it would be multilateral in 
character; unlike the liberalism of the gold standard and free trade, its multilateralism would 
be predicated upon domestic interventionism‛ (Ruggie 2002: 73). 
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trade regimes that came out of the post-war negotiations gave sufficient economic 
instruments to the states to realise their domestic policy agenda for economic 
recovery, social protection and employment.  
 
The two post-war decades were a perfect manifestation of the Coxian fit between 
American material power, a supportive ideological structure shared by allied state-
society complexes, and the post-war institutions embodying the underlying 
constellation of power and ideas. The ethical content of American hegemony was firm 
in the Western world as far as its moral premises were the pillars sustaining post-war 
reconstruction, growth and stability. This could only be achieved with wide 
recognitiuon of the authority of hegemonic ruling power and institutions. 
Nevertheless, the hegemonic historic bloc and its ideological framework started to 
dissolve in the 1970s, a time of economic stagflation, the collapse of the monetary 
system, OPEC crisis and new protectionism. As ‚stagflation‛ characterised the rest of 
the decade the United States and the social forces underlying its hegemony ceased to 
be able to provide a coherent hegemonic perspective that would ensure economic 
growth, productivity, and welfare (Cox 1987: Ch 8). The conflicts arose at the levels of 
production, state and world order and caused an authority crisis that ended U.S. 
hegemony. Thus, the hegemonic consensus around the American historic bloc was 
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eroded in capitalist countries as the bloc itself disintegrated during the 1970s (Cox 
1987: 276-285).  
 
2.2.2. Neoliberal Hegemony 
 
Since the 1960s, global concentration of political power shifted from the U.S. to an 
extended constellation of social and political forces. Gill posits that the hegemonic 
powerhouse has geographically shifted from the United States to G-7 countries (Gill 
2002: 48). With rapid economic growth led by U.S. transatlantic investment, American 
aid and insurance for international monetary stability, Western Europe and Japan 
observed a rapid economic recovery with an increasing share of world production 
and trade during the 1950s and 1960s (Gill 1991: 90-3). Regarding the geographic 
centre of the new configuration of material capabilities, Gill and Law (1988: 355) point 
out ‚a group of capitalist countries led by the US.‛ Agnew and Corbridge (1995: 164) 
refer more broadly to ‚a powerful constituency of liberal states, international 
institutions, and what might be called the ‘circuits of capital’ themselves.‛  
 
Although there are different perspectives with regard to the scale, material and 
ideational basis of the neoliberal hegemonic order, neo-Gramscian scholars agree that 
this order emerged in tandem with the material transformation in the world economy. 
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The pax Americana had paved the way for two significant developments: 1) the 
internationalisation of production mainly through foreign direct investment (FDI) by 
U.S. based corporations, and 2) the internationalisation of the state (Cox 1981: 107-10).  
This trend continued parallel to the dissolution of the U.S. hegemony, with the 
emergence of a new form of capital accumulation which replaced Fordism and re-
energised the globalisation process in the 1970s. To distinguish social forces of 
globalisation, scholars put emphasis on the shift in the capital accumulation and 
production processes to a post-Fordist mode.22 During this process the nature of 
production changed with new patterns of manufacturing through networks and 
outsourcing and with diminishing costs of telecommunication, storage and 
transmission of information (Lairson and Skidmore 2003 128). TNCs have pursued the 
transnationalisation of production via foreign direct investment, subcontracting, 
global commodity chains, and worldwide alliances (Portnoy 2000, 160; O’Brian and 
Williams 2004, 185). Intra-firm trade increasingly constituted the major part of current 
international trade (Gill and Law 1988: 192). The world economy was gradually 
structured around networks of finance and production within which firms are able to 
move around the globe to avoid regulatory limitations of the states (Cox 1996: 22).  
 
                                                 
22 Because of the miniaturization of production and its non-tangible quality, and particular 
economies of time and space characteristics, Van der Pijl labels the post-Fordist mode of 
accumulation as ‚virtual mode‛ (Van der Pijl 1998: 57). 
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Neo-Gramscian authors contend that neoliberal hegemony was built upon a novel 
transnational historic bloc with new elements of transnational capital coalescing 
around productive TNCs, banks, skilled labour and governments (Gill and Law 1988; 
355-6; Gill 2008: 71).23 Gill (1994) calls the core of hegemonic power the ‚G-7 nexus‛ 
and points out  a shift of political economic decision-making to gradually mobilised 
‚globalising elites.‛ TNCs in knowledge and technology-intensive sectors as well as 
finance industries are argued to be the forces that shaped the ideological framework 
of the new world order (Overbeek 2004: 118; Rupert 2000, 49). Their active part in 
determining the hegemonic framework rests in the enhanced structural power of 
transnational forms of capital. Gill and Law point out that compared to different 
fractions of capital, other class or class fractions and states, TNCs representing large-
scale, globally mobile capital have been able to exercise their power directly and 
structurally on a larger scale (Gill and Law 2008: 107-115). The structural form of 
power rests on the rising mobility of transnational capital vis-à-vis other factors of 
production (Lairson and Skidmore 2003; 115). This enables TNCs’ ability to set policy 
agendas. As Fuchs (2007: 64) argues: 
 
                                                 
23 Rupert (2000: 49) argues that the historic bloc underlying neoliberal hegemony was in a 
sense a continuation of the Fordist historic bloc, the only difference being  that it was now led 
by finance capital rather than productive capital and its loss of allies in organized labour. 
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given the high degree of capital mobility in today’s globalized world, TNCs 
exercise agenda-setting power through their ability to punish and reward 
governments for their policy choices by moving investments and jobs. 
 
Gill and Law (2008: 104) assert that direct forms of power of transnational capital have 
been based on the TNCs’ possession of financial resources, their control over media, 
and intensive contacts with governments. Consequently, governments seeking 
financial resources and investment have become more responsive to the demands of 
TNCs. TNCs seek competitive advantage in world markets through corporate 
strategies. This is achieved by decreasing their costs with new production strategies 
and innovation, expanding their markets globally, and by increasing the quality of 
products applying new techniques and strategic alliances (Lairson and Skidmore 
2003: 197; Gill and Law 1988: 84-89). They also pursue political strategies to enhance 
their competitiveness, especially by pushing for competitive deregulation (Gill (2008: 
103).  
 
As frequently stipulated by different authors, as a consequence of the rise of the neo-
liberal order the authority, legitimacy and accountability has swayed away from the 
states in tandem with a redesignation of authority relations domestically (Cutler 1999, 
2001).24 Cutler claims that private corporate power enforces the norms of private 
                                                 
24 There is a scholarly production from different experts exploring the role of private authority 
in the global politics such as the edited volumes of Hall and Biersteker (2002) and Higgott et 
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international trade law or the law merchant (lex mercatoria) to expand corporate power 
at the global scale. In this context, she maintains that ‚public‛ nature of power -
embedded in the conventional Westphalian understanding- is no longer explanatory 
since it obscures the ‚private‛ authority within the global political economy (Cutler 
2003). Sinclair shows that private actors are authoritatively engaged in quasi-
regulative arrangements such as standard-setting and shape the policies of the 
governments as in the case of bond-rating agencies (Sinclair 1999).25 In other words, a 
particular consequence of the neoliberal hegemony is the privatisation of political 
authority and the enhanced legitimate role of markets and market actors to set policy-
agendas globally. Indeed, Susan Strange admitted that ‚the retreat of the state‛ was 
partially because of the given consent of different actors including the governments to 
the legitimacy of market actors to regulate the domains which were conventionally 
under the purview of the public authorities (Strange 1997: 12-4). In this regard, the 
structural power of capital has a normative dimension to discipline the states: 
 
Capital, and particularly the financial fractions of capital, may have the power 
to indirectly discipline the state. In so far as many of the top financiers have 
                                                                                                                                                          
al. (2000), and Cutler’s book (2003). More broadly, the rise of non-state actors and the role of 
social forces are explored by a number of scholars such as Josselin and Wallace (2001) and 
Bieler and Morton (2001). 
25 The authority of non-state agents is also recognised because of the technical nature of new 
issues, standards, and areas of regulation. Since knowledge-production and authority are 
associated, think tanks and epistemic communities enjoy determinative roles in the re-
configuration of authority (Haas 1992). 
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access to the government leaders, this indirect power may be supplemented by 
direct use of power, e.g. lobbying, and ‚gentlemanly‛ arm-twisting. However, 
such arm-twisting is secondary to what can be termed the ‚power‛ of markets 
(Gill and Law 2008: 106). 
 
In fact, as underlined by neo-Gramscian authors the ideological framework of neo-
liberal hegemony rests in this disciplinary dimension. In this vein, Gill (1995; 2003: 130-
131) introduces ‚disciplinary‛ in defining neoliberalism26 to underline the dominant 
‚socio-economic‛ form solidifying the ability of capital to discipline  states and 
influence public policies in order to ensure the capitalist market construction and to 
promote market norms, freedoms and mechanisms at a global scale. According to Gill, 
states are subjected to market disciplines and are obliged to prove their compliance 
with ‚the three C’s of the power of capital,‛ i.e. they need to produce public policies 
in ‚consistency‛ with investors’ expectations, in order to gain the ‚confidence‛ of 
markets and to sustain their own ‚credibility‛ (Gill 2000a, 4). Similarly, Overbeek puts 
the accent on the expansion of market norms and mechanisms under the neoliberal 
order: 
 
The dominant tendency under neo-liberalism is the extension of 
commodification and the application of market principles to new geographic 
zones of the global system, to new spheres of economic activity, and to new 
areas of human existence not previously subjected to the search for private 
profit (Overbeek 2004: 132). 
                                                 
26 Instead of neoliberalism, Cox prefers using the term ‚hyper-liberalism‛ to encapsulate the 
emerging policy synthesis in the early 1980s (Cox 1987: 285-98). 
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In this regard, it is argued that neoliberalism serves the acceleration of the markets to 
gain dominance over further social space (Rupert 2000: 42-54; Agnew and Corbridge 
1995: 164). Similarly, Cox (1996: 23) contends that globalisation has become an 
ideology that necessitates states and states system to serve the operation of ‚market 
logic‛ by providing stability and security for markets. In other words, neoliberal 
social purpose differs from corporate (or embedded) liberal social purpose as it 
recognizes enhanced legitimate authority of markets and market actors vis-à-vis states 
in the domains which were traditionally under government control. On the other 
hand it acknowledges the necessity to create binding constraints and disciplines over 
the states.27 
 
How does neoliberal hegemony operate in a receptive environment recognizing the 
enhancement of private authority? One dimension is the rise of the ‚neoliberal form‛ 
of states, situated primarily in the capitalist heartland, but also extended to 
developing countries and transition economies. Starting with the U.S. and Britain, 
states in advanced capitalist countries removed Keynesian interventionist tools from 
the policy repertoire and promoted a limited role for the government in the economy 
through deregulation and privatisation, tax and budgetary cuts, tight monetary 
                                                 
27 This perspective is similar to Harvey’s who argues that neoliberalism is a political project to 
‚disembed‛ capital from the constraints created by embedded liberalism (Harvey 2009:11).  
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measures, and measures to keep wages down (Harvey 2009: 25; Cox 1987: 286-288).  
Coercion and consent worked hand in hand in the spread of neoliberal hegemony to 
the Third Word. Integration into the global economy and production processes 
became a significant factor in developing countries’ adoption of neoliberal policies. 
Countries such as South Korea, Hong Kong, Singapore, Taiwan, as well as Brazil, 
Malaysia and Thailand, increasingly became competitive and developed productive 
capacities from labour intensive to capital and technology intensive production and 
integrated into the new international division of labour in the last decades (Bhagwati 
1993: 62-63; Mittelman 1996: 4). Cox and van der Pijl argue that neoliberalism was 
initially challenged by advanced developing countries such as Brazil and South Korea 
where ‚state-capitalism‛ had been pursued as a means for industrial catch-up (Cox 
1987: 292; van der Pijl 1998: 85-88). Nevertheless, these countries together with ‚neo-
mercantilist developmentalist states,‛ such as Mexico, India and former Communist 
states, underwent significant transformations and gradually adopted neoliberal 
reforms (van der Pijl 1998: 85-88; 96). As will be discussed in Chapter 3 and 5, 
developing countries became active participants in the trade regime as they actively 
adopted market-based development strategies.  
 
In addition to unilateral reforms and market-driven policies, neoliberal hegemony is 
also disseminated through certain international arrangements towards anchoring 
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governments to provide longer term guarantees to transnational capital. These 
arrangements include international constitutional and institutional measures and 
quasi-constitutional regional and multilateral arrangements to lock in the privatisation 
of public authority and market disciplines (Gill 2000a: 11-12; Gill 2008: 161-5). Gill 
(2000; 2008) defines this political-judicial dimension of neoliberal hegemony as ‚new 
constitutionalism.‛ New constitutionalism includes all set of measures to ‚reconfigure 
state apparatuses‛ and to ‚construct and extend liberal capitalist markets‛ to 
materialise economic globalisation (Gill 2000a: 11-14). In fact, it encapsulates both 
national measures such as constitutional changes (regardless of whether it is in 
connection with international arrangements), and institutional and legal measures 
taken to regulate rights of capital in foreign jurisdictions. These regulatory measures 
are often in the form of structural adjustment programs of international financial 
organisations and the disciplines of the WTO (Gill 2000a: 11-13).  
 
Having said this, neo-Gramscian scholars also point out a number of inherent 
contradictions produced by the neoliberal hegemony. They contend that 
institutionalisation of a self-regulating market program through commodification of 
social forms and nature has generated significant dislocations and resistance in global 
civil society in the 1990s. For instance, agreeing with Cox (1987: 253-265), Mittelman 
(1996: 7-11) contends that the state has become an agent of globalisation, facilitating 
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economic integration while accommodating itself to  new conditions through 
allocating resources for the needs of private actors to gain competitiveness in the 
world markets. Thus, as an agent of globalisation serving interests of transnational 
capital, the states became ‚accountable‛ to markets more than to society (Mittelman 
1996: 9). Similarly, Gill contends that disciplinary neoliberalism is imposed by new 
constitutionalism as a ‚top-down‛ project that isolates politics from economics, states 
from markets while institutionalising protection for TNCs and investors from 
democratic accountability and social control (Gill 2000a: 12).  In fact, the accountability 
problem creates a significant contradiction for the re-production of neoliberal 
hegemony. Gill lays out this contradiction in the following terms: 
 
[Neoliberal] reforms are largely imposed from above on populations, and are 
largely premised on the subordination of democracy to the pursuit of profit. As 
such, they lack substantive legitimacy and hegemonic appeal. This is one 
reason why the new constitutional reform project is not complete since it 
contains political and economic contradictions, and it provokes resistance from 
across the political spectrum, that is resistance to the projects of new 
constitutionalism and neo-liberal globalisation (Gill 2000a: 19 emphasis 
original). 
 
Indeed, the legitimacy of neoliberal states and institutions are being widely 
questioned within civil society. The 1990s observed harsh criticisms towards the IMF, 
World Bank and WTO for spearheading neoliberal disciplines and structural 
adjustment programs which have arguably had negative impacts on economic 
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development, income distribution, social, environmental and public health policies. 
This crisis of legitimacy turned civil society to a realm of vocal protests, which leads 
Gill (2000b: 135) to suggest that neoliberal hegemony entered the phase of ‚authority 
crisis.‛ This contested nature of neoliberal order was a significant factor in the failure 
of the investment case as argued in Chapter 7.  
 
2.3. Research Design and Analysis  
 
Robert Cox has been critical of the positivist epistemology underlying rationalist 
research programs and has suggested an alternative historicist epistemology for 
research. Cox admits that positivist epistemology can be explanatory within a 
historical structure wherein stable regularities can be sketched (Cox 1992: 147). 
However, in cases of historical structural change he suggests that the very ontology of 
rationalist scholars and positivist epistemology should be questioned because in such 
periods, ontologies may shift and certain problems cannot be solved through 
conventional methods (Cox 1992: 145). Whereas positivism deals with ‚description‛ 
using ‚data,‛ neo-Gramscian historicism tries to ‚understand‛ the human-made 
‚facts‛ rather than establishing certain causalities (Cox 1985: 51).  
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To be sure, this dissertation adopts a historicist epistemological approach and 
qualitative methodologies, and aims to understand the transformation of the trade 
regime within the context of the world order. The neo-Gramscian conceptual 
framework as outlined above intends to serve this purpose. The ideological 
framework of the U.S. and neoliberal hegemonic orders constitute the analytical 
background for an analysis of the trade regime’s transformation as conducted in the 
next Chapter. Although international regimes include both regulative and constitutive 
rules, Chapter 3 focuses on constitutive rules, i.e. the normative content of the trade 
regime. The analysis concentrates on the changes to the normative content of the 
GATT regime throughout the Uruguay Round (1986-94) with a view to illuminating 
the association of these changes with the shift in the ideological framework of the 
world order. To this aim, Chapter 3 contrasts the legal frameworks of the WTO with 
the GATT, and then focuses on the changes that ensued with the creation of the GATS 
to the principal norms of the GATT, i.e. non-discrimination and liberalisation. In this 
regard, the examination is based upon an interrogative reading to decipher the impact 
of those normative changes to the authority relations between the states and market 
actors. The legal frameworks and fundamental norms of the GATT and the WTO are 
examined through data compiled from relevant legal texts, and evaluated through 
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inference with the support of the authoritative interpretations provided in secondary 
resources in legal and economic disciplines.28 
 
The analysis of regime transformation and the roles of TNCs in this normative 
transformation is continued in Part II and III by looking into the intersubjective social 
context of GATT and WTO negotiations and the participation of TNCs to the process 
through their agenda-setting activities. Norm creation within the trade regime takes 
place in the context of multilateral negotiations called rounds. Norms and legal texts 
are built on a consensus basis through intergovernmental interactions in the form of 
written and verbal submissions, wherein actors aim to influence the outcome through 
argumentation. The negotiation process at the GATT and the WTO often starts with 
an official negotiation mandate agreed by all parties and continues in separable 
phases wherein parties incrementally agree on and narrow the parameters of rule-
making. Consensus-building starts with the pre-negotiation phase where parties agree 
on the mandate. This preliminary phase continues during the negotiation phase 
where parties deliberate and try to influence the intermediate and final outcomes with 
their inputs. To analyse the intersubjective context of international regimes, Ruggie 
                                                 
28 King et al. (1994: 46) defines inference as ‚the process of using the facts we know to learn 
about facts we do not know‛ which are ‚the subjects of our research questions, theories, and 
hypotheses.‛ According to Cox, inference is needed since ‚*t+he documents that can be cited 
as authority are themselves part of the action.‛ Therefore, the researchers should question 
them in a critical fashion ‚so as to make them reveal things they do not explicitly state, 
namely their meanings‛ (Cox 1980: 485). 
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suggests the use of narrative forms of explanation which may be either descriptive or 
configurative.29 Accordingly, this dissertation first creates an analytical narrative of 
the two cases in an interpretative fashion by deconstructing existing knowledge in the 
academic literature and reconstructing it upon the conceptual framework developed. 
In line with this narrative framework, the dissertation uses the qualitative instruments 
of discourse analysis.  
 
Following Hajer’s definition, discourse is taken broadly as ‚an ensemble of ideas, 
concepts, and categories through which meanings are given to social and physical 
phenomena‛ (Hajer 2006: 67). He identifies discourse analysis as ‚the examination of 
argumentative structure in documents and other written or spoken statements as well 
as the practices through which these utterances are made‛ (Hajer 2006: 66). For a 
narrative explanation of a phenomenon, Hajer suggests the use of ‚story lines‛ which 
encapsulates ‚the social-historical conditions‛ within which the argumentation takes 
place (Hajer 2006: 67). His method is compatible for an analysis of hegemonic 
production which entails a struggle for power through building coalitions around 
certain policy formulas. Hajer (2006: 70) utilizes ‚discourse-coalitions‛ to distinguish 
the alliances built around a shared narrative or story line for a period in time. These 
                                                 
29 According to Ruggie, descriptive narrative explanation ‚simply links ‘events’ along a 
temporal dimension and seeks to identify the effect one has on another‛ whereas 
configurative explanation ‚organizes these descriptive statements into an interpretive 
‘gestalt’‛ (Ruggie 2002: 94). 
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coalitions may become ‚dominant‛ in expanding their coalition if the ideas they 
promote are used by a larger group of people (‚discourse structuration‛) and if they 
are ‚solidifie*d+ into institutions and organizational practices (discourse 
institutionalisation)‛ (Hajer 2006: 70). When translated into the neo-Gramscian 
lexicon, a discourse coalition can be interpreted as a coalition of actors sharing a 
collective image and struggling to achieve hegemony. In this regard, certain collective 
images may become hegemonic (dominant) and can change the intersubjective 
meanings of the regime through ‚discourse structuration‛ and ‚institutionalisation,‛ 
assuming that these images are no longer questioned and become natural and self-
evident. In fact, like any multilateral institution, the GATT/WTO provides a forum 
where collective images may clash to become hegemonic. Actors adopt certain 
‚agenda-setting‛ strategies to influence the final outcomes, i.e. to solidify their ideas 
into the institutional and legal frameworks under negotiation. As Singh argues: 
 
Agenda-setting is a process variable leading to inclusion or exclusion of issues 
being negotiated. In the macro sense, it refers to the big issues included in any 
trade round: in the micro sense, to issues included or excluded during meetings 
as the round progresses as negotiating parties work toward formulas and 
frameworks. Contrary to a common misperception, agenda-setting takes place 
throughout a negotiation and not just at the beginning. It includes sets of 
practices used to include, exclude or keep the focus on issues (Singh 2006: 46). 
 
Agenda-setting takes place not only by argumentation, but also through an exercise of 
power that comes into play in the form of coercion applied outside of the 
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GATT/WTO. Singh (2006: 46-7) maintains that powerful actors such as the U.S. and 
EU are able to coerce weaker states through the use of trade and other sanctions, thus, 
forging consensus around their preferences. Singh’s observation is compatible with 
the coercive face of hegemonic relations, although coercion is deemed a secondary 
tool to get consent of subordinate actors. For this reason, the dissertation examines not 
only the negotiation processes but also external interventions with a particular focus 
on whether coercion came into play in the cases of services and investment and if 
TNCs leveraged certain coercive tools in their activities to set the GATT/WTO agenda. 
 
Secondly, the analysis of the negotiation process was extended to TNCs through an 
examination of their role in the agenda-setting process which is taken as an 
intergovernmental phenomenon by Singh. As hegemonic social forces, TNCs can 
engage in agenda-setting by waging a war of position that can include case-building, 
education, and coalition-building activities towards gaining support of actors on the 
policy formulas they promote. In this context, TNCs can leverage both their structural 
power and direct exercise of influence through lobbying as instruments of agenda-
setting. The analysis of the role of TNCs in the transformation of the trade regime was 
conducted through tracking the processes of production and dissemination of ideas 
that penetrated into intergovernmental deliberations on services and investment. In 
this context, the analysis focuses on the generation of ideational inputs in the form of 
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‚collective images‛ and TNCs’ agenda-setting strategies in order to project these ideas 
to other actors including the state agents. The analysis of these ideational inputs were 
carried out (1) through an examination of their discursive structure, i.e. how certain 
problems were defined and solutions were framed; and (2) by interpreting the 
discursive order, i.e. which sets of ideas were dominant in a specific time. The data 
were further assessed to determine whether these ideas were adopted by other actors 
including state agents (discourse structuration), and to what extent they were 
interjected into negotiation texts in the multilateral setting (discourse 
institutionalisation). Secondly, the data on TNC strategies were processed to identify 
whether TNCs disseminated their ideas through building discursive coalitions with 
other companies and non-commercial actors, and if they endeavoured to educate 
policy-makers and negotiators. The same research process was applied to analyse the 
influence of NGOs in the WTO agenda-setting in the case of investment.  
 
To create the story lines in the analysis of the incorporation of services and investment 
into the trade regime, data were collected from primary resources including 
government proposals, proposed and agreed negotiation texts, declarations, minutes 
of meetings, and secondary resources including academic literature studying the 
history of negotiations and trade politics. The narrative was constructed by assessing 
and categorising the data chronologically to distinguish ‚discourse coalitions‛ and 
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story lines and to identify phases and pivotal moments in GATT/WTO negotiations. 
Primary data were collected from two major resources. The first source is the WTO 
database, which provides an extensive collection of negotiation documents since the 
inception of the institution in 1995.30 On the other hand, the data for the Uruguay 
Round period were largely drawn from secondary readings of the negotiations. 
Depending upon the availability and necessity to verify and supplement certain facts, 
arguments, and negotiation positions, this secondary data were supplemented with 
primary documents provided from the GATT Digital Archive,31 which is operated by 
Stanford University. The data on TNC and NGO inputs regarding services and 
investment issues were compiled from official letters, position statements, and articles 
written by campaigners as well as secondary resources in IPE literature. 
 
Most of the study was conducted as desk research and document analysis to produce 
a chronology, structure concepts and ideas, and employ story lines. Semi-structured 
interviews were conducted with negotiators, TNC and NGO representatives in a 
supplementary way, either to understand the negotiation dynamics and prominent 
factors in consensus-building or to better capture certain key developments and 
                                                 
30 The WTO database is accessible at 
http://docsonline.wto.org/gen_home.asp?language=1&_=1 last accessed on September 12, 
2010.  
31 GATT Digital Archive is accessible at  http://gatt-archive.stanford.edu/  last accessed on 
September 12, 2010. 
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cognitive shifts.32 The interviews conducted primarily in Geneva fall into the first 
category and are pertinent to the case of investment. The second group of interviews 
were conducted with selected business campaigners and negotiators in relation to the 
services case. 
 
Conclusion 
 
This chapter outlined the fundamental theoretical assumptions of the dissertation 
within a historical perspective taking historical changes as a long-term dialectical 
interaction between social forces and historical structures. Hegemony in Gramscian 
sense, is applied as an analytical tool linking changing dynamics between social forces 
and historical structures as particular constellations of world orders. It is defined as 
the consensual aspect of the exercise of political power and the ethical framework for 
political action within a given world order. The coherence between power 
configurations, ideas and international institutions is determined by the hegemonic 
formation of the world orders. Social forces are argued to produce hegemonies 
through waging a war of position and shape ideational and material elements of 
hegemonic orders and associated international regimes. The chapter also laid out the 
main characteristics of the U.S. hegemonic order and neoliberal order with an 
                                                 
32 On structured and semi-structured interviews, see Wengraf (2001: 51-70). 
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emphasis on the distinct ideological framework of the two orders. The neoliberal 
order has been built upon structural and direct power of transnational capital, 
especially its financial fractions and knowledge intensive elements which ascended 
through the process of globalisation and emerging post-Fordist capital accumulation. 
Global configuration of political power is no longer concentrated in the U.S. but rather 
dispersed along the G-7 nexus as transnational capital has largely been condensed in a 
tripolar regional scope centred in the U.S., Europe and Japan. Since the early 1980s, 
the neoliberal hegemony has been produced through projects of new 
constitutionalism that have advanced a market-driven economic order limiting and 
revising the roles of states in economy and at the same time rescaling states’ authority 
vis-à-vis supra-state and sub-national actors and entities. Nonetheless neoliberal 
globalisation has generated significant dislocations and resistance in global civil 
society in the 1990s. There are clear signs of an authority crisis in global political 
economy since the mid-1990s which is expressed in the mobilisation of resistance to 
globalisation in different forms. 
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CHAPTER 3: HEGEMONIC TRANSFORMATION: FROM GATT TO THE WTO 
 
The post-war trade regime that emerged in 1948 evolved through the 1980s, with 
modifications to its regulative rules and practices until the launch of the Uruguay 
Round negotiations in 1986. Yet, the institutional structure of the GATT, the social 
purpose of the regime and its fundamental norms and principles did not go through 
radical changes until the Uruguay Round. The embedded liberal social purpose of the 
trade regime that emerged in the wake of World War II remained in place despite the 
fact that GATT norms and principles had evolved. The Uruguay Round, which was 
concluded in 1994, transformed the trade regime as it created a new comprehensive 
legal and institutional structure around the WTO. At the core of this transformation 
rests the displacement of embedded liberalism with a neoliberal social purpose that 
redefined the collective meanings about the regime through adjusting its very 
fundamental norms and the normative structure of the regime. Since the WTO was 
created in conjunction with the shift in the global historical structure from post-War 
pax Americana to the neoliberal order, the transformation of the regime can be 
described as hegemonic.  
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After outlining the historical process that gave rise to the GATT regime after World 
War II, this chapter explores the regime’s legal and normative frameworks and its 
transformation during the Uruguay Round. It focuses on the normative content of the 
GATT and the changes to liberalisation and non-discrimination norms with the 
General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS). The chapter closes with a section 
discussing the consequences of this transformation for the trade agenda and 
multilateral system as well as state-society relations.  
 
3.1. The emergence of the GATT Regime  
 
The trade regime came into existence in 1948 as a consequence of the post-War 
negotiations between officials from the United States, Britain and other European 
countries and developing economies. Although the GATT came out of this process as 
the sole legal and institutional instrument, it was initially meant to be part of a 
broader deal that would encompass an International Trade Organisation (ITO). Both 
the GATT and the Havana Charter that would establish the ITO were generated 
during post-war deliberations that enabled the convergence of dissimilar national 
interests around a collectively shared, ‚embedded liberal‛ social purpose which 
prioritised the erosion of protectionist trade barriers while allowing state intervention 
to sustain domestic growth and employment. The ITO compromise was a 
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consequence of laborious negotiations that took place among developed and 
developing countries in an environment shaped by economic reconstruction, and 
occurred parallel to the weakening of post-war optimism among policy-makers. In 
late 1946, the negotiations were launched officially in London by taking the American 
proposals as a basis. However, it was redrafted several times during the London, New 
York, Geneva and Havana talks to successfully build a consensus among 54 
signatories, which at that point in time represented a majority of UN membership.33  
 
Analysts point out that the negotiators of the ITO Charter and the GATT were not 
doctrinaire-free traders, but diplomats who concerned themselves with creating 
policy space for their governments to apply policy instruments for economic recovery 
and growth, and with alleviating the adjustment costs of liberalising their commodity 
markets (Dunoff 1999: 738; Diebold 1952: 152). As argued in the previous chapter, 
although embedded liberalism was a compromise reached in intergovernmental 
negotiations, it reflected the hegemonic ideological framework of corporate liberalism 
that initially emerged in the United States in the 1930s and 1940s as a synthesis of 
Fordism, Wilsonian universalism and Keynesian thought.  
                                                 
33 While initial discussions about the trading regime started after the U.S. released its Proposals 
for Expansion of World Trade and Employment in 1945; the official negotiations under the 
auspices of the UN ECOSOC took place over the American Suggested Charter for an 
International Trade Organisation circulated before the London Conference in 1946. The detailed 
discussions about these documents and the negotiations can be found in Wilcox 1947 and 
1949, and Reisman 1996.  
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The Havana Charter proved to be a consensus based text that deviated from the 
original American proposals which were prepared in the U.S. Department of State 
between 1943 and 1945. Initial U.S. proposals had set three key priorities (Wilcox 1949: 
38-43; Capling 2000: 2-7): (1) abolition of all trade distorting measures including 
quantitative restrictions and certain subsidies; (2) non-discriminatory application of 
all barriers to trade in addition to the dismantlement of discriminatory preferential 
and regional arrangements such as the British Imperial Preference System; and (3) 
liberalisation of trade through reciprocal negotiations that would reduce and bind 
tariff reductions multilaterally. The Havana Charter of 1948, contained nine chapters 
and 106 articles covering issues of commercial policy, and also included issues such as 
employment, economic development, restrictive business practices, 
intergovernmental commodity agreements, and institutional provisions on the 
settlement of disputes and functioning of the ITO (Wilcox 1949: 53-62). The Charter 
was far from satisfying American expectations that were laid out in the beginning of 
the talks.34 The text was a comprehensive legal package clearly connecting the rights 
and obligations of member states in the areas of international trade, industrial growth 
development, and employment policies. Discriminatory or defensive measures that 
                                                 
34 The draft Charter tabled by the U.S. was comprised of five chapters covering issues of 
commercial policy, employment, commodity policy, restrictive business practices, and 
organisation of the ITO (Capling 2000:  9). 
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restricted trade were allowed in the Charter with plenty of exceptions carved out for 
economic development, balance of payments problems, protection of domestic 
industries and sustaining employment (Wilcox 1949: 57-60). Quantitative restrictions, 
opposed by the U.S., became permissible for a list of difficulties (Wilcox 1949: 81-93). 
Most significantly, the Charter grandfathered existing preferential arrangements 
among member states and also permitted future preferential agreements, albeit within 
the confines of defined criteria (Wilcox 1949: 70-72). The compromise on commercial 
issues in the ITO talks largely fed into the text of the GATT, whereas detailed 
provisions in other pillars of the Charter -i.e. the positive commitments for full 
employment and industrial development- were never been put in force.   
 
While negotiations were already underway, the GATT was negotiated in 1947 as the 
early interim commercial chapter of the Charter to jumpstart the tariff negotiations 
before the overall package was concluded and ratified by the members. In fact, the 
creation of the GATT as an early harvest of the talks was because of the preference of 
the Truman administration to pursue a two-track approach. The Truman 
administration was induced to negotiate tariff reductions with key trading partners 
after the Republicans’ victory in the 1946 elections. Its authority to cut tariffs up to 
50% was going to expire the following year and it was at risk of renewal (Gardner 
1956: 349-61). Ultimately, the GATT text and initial tariff cuts were negotiated in 
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Geneva on a reciprocal basis and concluded between 23 countries in 1947 in parallel 
with the ITO talks. The agreement on tariff reductions (GATT) would later be 
incorporated into the final Charter, which was finalised in 1948.35 However, the 
Truman administration did not put it before Congress for ratification. The 
administration considered the GATT -which was never ratified by U.S. legislative 
body- as a sufficient tool to conduct multilateral negotiations for tariff liberalisation, 
and withdrew the ITO bill from the Congressional agenda following the Senate 
hearings in late 1950 without putting it to a vote (Gardner 1956: 371-8; Capling 2000: 
20). Hence, the GATT came into being in 1947 as a legal accord and as a ‚peculiar and 
entirely accidental international institution‛ (Finlayson and Zacher 1981: 562). It 
remained as the sole multilateral instrument to govern international trade until 1994. 
 
3.2. The normative content of the GATT regime  
 
The Bretton Woods institutions, the GATT and the UN were created under U.S. 
hegemony and reflected that particular hegemonic order, configuration of power and 
ideology. Having been generated in the same intersubjective deliberation process, 
both the Havana Charter and the GATT reflected the embedded liberal 
                                                 
35 The provisions of the ITO Charter dealing with commercial practices have largely been 
reflected in the GATT. Following the Havana Conference, the new provisions crafted for 
commerce were implanted into the GATT in 1948 (Finlayson and Zacher 1981: 562). 
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understanding. However, the Charter went beyond the General Agreement with a 
broader set of rights and obligations that would have created a further embedded 
economic order. By setting up a binding international mechanism with a dispute 
settlement system, the ITO Charter recognised and codified the rights and duties of 
the states vis-à-vis each other and regarding their citizens, well beyond the confines of 
‚embedded liberal‛ order. In Drache’s words: ‚Embedded liberalism was, at best, a 
second best option. It gave a more limited role to state interventionism and by 
contrast, a very large play to international market needs‛ (Drache 2000: 28). Positive 
commitments regarding full employment and development in the Charter were not 
transferred into the text of the GATT. The balance between trade liberalisation and 
state intervention was struck through basic commercial norms and principles for non-
discriminatory trade liberalisation, and the exceptions and safeguards which allowed 
state intervention to the markets. Until the radical transformation of the regime 
throughout the Uruguay Round, this normative content remained intact, but it 
evolved in time with changes to its regulative rules and procedures.  
 
The normative texture of the GATT has been analysed by scholars who developed 
different classifications regarding the GATT norms, principles and rules.36 Here the 
                                                 
36 The following works provide useful insights about the changing nature of the norms, rules, 
principles, and procedures in the trade regime: Dam 1970, Winham 1986, Kirshner 1996, 
Jackson 2002, and Wilkinson 2006. 
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dissertation follows Finlayson and Zacher’s (1981) approach which distinguishes the 
norms in the GATT regime as ‚substantive‛ and ‚procedural.‛ They consider the 
guidelines for decision-making such as ‛multilateralism‛ and ‚major interests‛ as 
‚procedural norms,‛ while enlisting the norms that set standards for state actions to 
engage in the trading system as ‚substantive norms.‛ The analysis here concentrates 
on the substantive norms as to states’ behaviours regarding international trade and 
the trading system. Especially important for this dissertation are the non-discrimination 
and liberalisation norms. Nevertheless important norms instrumental for 
understanding the functioning of the trade regime also include: reciprocity, safeguards 
and development.  
 
Non-discrimination and Liberalisation 
 
The preamble of the GATT explicated its two most fundamental goals as ‚substantial 
reduction of tariffs and other barriers‛ and ‚elimination of discriminatory treatment 
in international commerce.‛37 The non-discrimination norm was as important as the 
liberalisation norm for Americans and other developed and developing country 
negotiators who actively participated in the post-war negotiations (Capling 2000). 
Since the creation of the GATT this norm has taken an operational form in the 
                                                 
37 GATT articles and other WTO legal texts in the dissertation are cited from WTO 1999b.   
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principles of most favoured nation (MFN) and national treatment (NT). All privileges 
and advantages accorded by one country to another are required to be extended to all 
contracting parties as outlined under the MFN principle detailed in Article I of the 
GATT (WTO 1999a: 39-40). For instance, if country A cuts its tariffs for product X of 
country B, it must apply this reduced tariff level to all GATT signatories exporting 
that product. The privileges may not only take the form of tariff reduction, but also 
allocation of quotas. On the other hand, the national treatment principle outlined in 
Article III of the GATT applies to domestic and foreign goods within national borders 
(WTO 1999a: 40-41). It bans any discriminatory taxes, laws, regulations and practices 
that would unfavourably affect the supply of imported products in the internal 
market in comparison to ‚like products‛ of national origin. For example, once foreign 
product X clears the customs and enters the national market, it cannot be subject to a 
certain tax or fee which is unfavourably different from the taxes or fees charged on the 
same or similar products of national origin. 
 
From the beginning of the negotiations, the U.S. had sought ‚unconditional non-
discrimination‛ with minimum exceptions (Wilcox 1949: 21-4). However, the 
exceptions created through GATT articles weakened the unconditional status of this 
fundamental norm. One major loophole was opened in the system for preferential 
trade arrangements. As noted above, existing regional trade agreements including the 
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British Imperial Preferences were exempted (grandfathered) from the MFN principle 
in consequence of the resistance of the British and French governments during the 
ITO/GATT talks. Article XXIV of the GATT was hammered out during the Geneva 
talks in 1947 to elaborate the MFN exception for existing and future preferential 
arrangements (including customs unions and free trade agreements) with listed 
criteria intending to minimize their trade distorting effects for the third parties 
(Finlayson and Zacher 1981: 567). The article created a legitimate basis for future 
regional agreements such as the European integration that ultimately evolved into a 
comprehensive customs union after the creation of the European Economic 
Community (EEC) with the Treaty of Rome of 1957. It also allowed for the 
enlargement of the EEC, and preferential agreements between the EEC and former 
European colonies (Finlayson and Zacher 1981: 568). Moreover, with the rise of ‚new 
protectionism‛ during the 1970s, the scope of liberalisation extended from tariffs to 
non-tariff measures (NTBs) which included measures such as voluntary export 
restraints (VERs), technical barriers, and trade distorting state practices such as 
subsidies (Bhagwati 1993: 43-53). NTBs were put on the agenda of the Tokyo Round 
that concluded with a set of ‚plurilateral‛ disciplines or ‚codes‛ created to 
supplement the GATT.38 
                                                 
38 These codes included agreements on technical barriers, import licenses, customs valuation, 
subsidies and anti-dumping measures, public procurement, as well as sectoral arrangements 
for civil aircraft, beef and diary products (Jackson 2002: 76).  
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On the other hand, the liberalisation norm entailed the gradual elimination of border 
measures such as tariffs and quotas through negotiations among parties, which were 
later called ‚rounds.‛ The norm did not take primacy in the early years of the GATT 
as governments sought other domestic policy goals such as full employment, 
economic growth and development with the discretion created by GATT articles (i.e. 
Article XII) (Finlayson and Zacher 1981: 570). Although the liberalisation norm was 
supposed to apply multilaterally, in the first two decades tariff negotiations were 
conducted in a bilateral manner between the industrialised nations (Dam 1970: 61-4). 
With the exception of the United States’ cuts on its tariffs, liberalisation remained at 
low levels between the first multilateral round in Geneva (1948) and the Kennedy 
Round (1963-1967) (Hoekman and Kostecki 2001: 103). Four of the eight multilateral 
GATT rounds that took place in the first decade of the regime substantially reduced 
U.S. tariffs (Hoekman and Kostecki 2001: 101-3). The norm of liberalisation 
entertained the strongest endorsement in the late 1960s (Finlayson and Zacher 1981). 
Until the initiation of the Uruguay Round, tariff negotiations within the ambit of the 
GATT covered only industrial products other than textiles and clothing. Trade in 
textiles and clothing was excluded from GATT disciplines, and was governed by a 
separate regime codified by the Multi Fibre Arrangement (MFA) in 1974. The MFA 
contained provisions for sectoral quotas on the amount of trade between developed 
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and developing countries (Jackson 2002: 206-9). Agricultural products remained 
immune from the GATT disciplines from the very beginning. The exemptions granted 
to suspend the application of certain GATT rules to farming became permanent and 
consequently kept this sector largely out of the GATT ambit (Yeutter 1998: 61-2).  
 
Another GATT norm directly related to liberalisation was reciprocity. This norm did 
not become operational in the early years of the GATT because of the asymmetrical 
concessions given by the United States (Dam 1970: 58-64). As Japanese and European 
allies gained competitiveness in the 1960s with a rising share in world trade, the U.S. 
put stronger emphasis on reciprocal opening from other industrial countries (Dam 
1970: 64-76; Finlayson and Zacher 1981: 575-6). The norm did not become operational 
for developing economies that benefited from market opening with no proportional 
cuts in return.  This special status of developing countries was initially acknowledged 
with the insertion of Part IV on Economic Development to the GATT in 1965 parallel 
to the decolonisation process and the mobilisation of the Third World countries for a 
systemic reform (Dam 1970: 236-42). This amendment created a symbolic waiver 
justifying ‚non-reciprocity‛ for developing countries (Finlayson and Zacher 1981: 
575). ‚Differential treatment‛ and ‚non-reciprocity‛ for developing countries were 
further codified with the creation of another discriminatory leeway, i.e. the inception 
of the Generalised System of Preferences (GSP) and the ‚enabling clause‛ decision 
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taken in the 1970s. The GSP legitimised duty free or advantageous access of 
developing countries to the markets of industrialised countries in products essential 
to their industrial development with no reciprocal obligation (Jackson 202: 322-5). In 
the same vein, developing countries did not sign off on the Tokyo Round plurilateral 
codes (Finlayson and Zacher 1981: 575-8). In sum, Special and Differential Treatment 
(SDT) became the operational aspect of the development norm in time as it provided 
poor countries with exclusions from reciprocal liberalisation commitments (Jackson 
2000: 164, 324; Matsushita et.al. 2003: 385-8). Considering their negligible share in 
world trade, developing economies’ exemptions from reciprocal reductions in tariffs 
did not harm the interests of industrialised countries. Yet, from the 1970s on newly 
industrialised countries (NICs) gained greater competitiveness in certain 
manufactured products, became significant markets for developed country goods, 
and were gradually perceived as ‚free riders‛ (Paemen and Bensch 1995: 115). This 
norm would truly be institutionalised during the Uruguay Round largely as a result 
of the insistence of the U.S. and other OECD governments.  
 
3.3. Transformation from GATT to the WTO  
 
Until the early 1980s, the normative basis of the regime as well as the underlying 
embedded liberal social purpose remained intact (Ruggie 2002). The transformation of 
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the GATT regime throughout the Uruguay Round reflected the institutionalisation of 
the neo-liberal hegemony that replaced the pax Americana. This transformation 
codified a paradigmatic shift from borders towards domestic policies, and a radical 
redefinition of the normative content of the regime that also characterised the 
displacement of embedded liberal vision with a new social purpose reflecting 
neoliberal hegemony. Embedded liberalism was a state-led design allowing the 
pursuit of certain domestic social goals; yet, neo-liberal social purpose has proven to 
be a market-driven project that recognises the priority of markets in generating 
economic welfare while restricting or redefining the roles of the states to regulate 
economic operations. The new normative framework in the expansive rules of the 
WTO created strict disciplines for protectionist measures and prioritised global 
market integration over other social objectives.  
 
The launch of the Uruguay Round in 1986 was a radical turning point in the GATT 
history. The encompassing negotiation mandate encapsulated critical non-
conventional issues and significantly affected the future of the GATT regime and 
trade agenda. The outcome of the negotiations in 1994 was striking since the 
institution that came into existence was more comprehensive than the GATT in its 
legal scope, power and structure. The Final Act of the Uruguay Round signed in 
Marrakesh, contained several legal accords along with a revision of the GATT text. 
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According to Hoekman and Kostecki (2001: 413-8) the new legal scope was an 
expansion of the regime’s mandate from the regulation of ‚shallow‛ or negative 
integration (featured by the elimination of border protection) to a ‚deep‛ or positive 
integration (which governed domestic regulations concerning the operation of 
markets). The legal mandate of the GATT envisaged negative integration by 
concerning itself only with the elimination of external measures. It served a regulatory 
function to liberalise trade in Fordist sectors (Murphy 1994: 232). On the other hand, 
the WTO mandates member governments to take domestic regulatory actions to 
ensure the well-functioning of markets in both goods and services. The Uruguay 
Round generated accords for intellectual property rights, trade related investment 
measures and trade in services to regulate the liberalisation of trade and investment in 
knowledge intensive and service industries (Murphy 1994: 265). The sectoral scope of 
trade liberalisation was also broadened to agriculture and textiles and clothing. The 
Tokyo Round codes on anti-dumping, technical barriers, and subsidies and 
countervailing measures were reviewed to be strengthened and multilateralised 
(WTO 1999a: 71-2, 80-1, 90-1). Safeguard disciplines -an issue which could not be 
resolved during Tokyo Round negotiations- were finally hammered out during the 
Uruguay Round (WTO 1999a: 104). The WTO also introduced disciplines for domestic 
sanitary and phytosanitary (SPS) measures to constrain hidden protectionism taking 
different forms in agricultural and food standards (WTO 1999a: 62-4).  
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As a result of the Uruguay Round agreements, the GATT constitution, borrowing 
Jackson’s term, was institutionalised.39 With the creation of the Dispute Settlement 
Mechanism and the WTO as an institution encompassing a broad package of 
agreements, the regime went through a process of ‚legalisation‛ under a single 
multilateral framework (Goldstein et al. 2000). Compared to the ‚soft law‛ system of 
the GATT era which lacked a guaranteed procedure obligating the states to obey the 
rules of the regime, the WTO generated a ‚hard law‛ system with enforcement tools 
to secure the compliance of member states (Abbott and Snidal 2000).40  In this regard, 
the trade regime has eroded the autonomy of the states by creating effective 
disciplines and an enforcement mechanism (Dunoff 1999: 735). Chorev (2005) rightly 
contends that the WTO re-scaled political authority and empowered the regime vis-à-
vis member states by effectively restricting states’ authority to intervene in markets 
and by ‚judicializing‛ inter-state relations.  
 
                                                 
39 On the constitutional character of the WTO law competing visions can be found in the 
works of Jackson (1969, 2002), Hudec (1993, 1997), Dunoff (1999), and the edited volume by 
Kennedy and Southwick (2002). 
40 The dispute settlement procedure under the GATT system was largely based on diplomatic 
negotiations among disputed parties. Decisions as to disputes could not be taken without the 
consent of both sides. With the judicialisation of the system, the WTO turned decision-making 
regarding disputes into an automatic process with a clear timeline (WTO 1999a: 27; Jackson 
2002: 120-7).   
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The transformation of the trade regime throughout the Uruguay Round could become 
possible thanks to the consensus reached among developed and developing countries, 
which took a proactive role in shaping the content of the Final Act. While developing 
countries increasingly adopted market-oriented development strategies that 
conformed with neoliberal hegemony, they have constructively engaged in the 
negotiations to maximize the benefits from trade liberalisation. This new attitude 
contrasts with their conventional demands for non-reciprocity. According to Jane 
Ford (2002: 136-8) throughout the Uruguay Round developing countries increasingly 
adopted an identity of ‚reciprocal trader.‛ She contends that the identities are created 
within the social framework of a trade regime that allows ‚complex social learning‛ 
where actors’ perception of the ‚self‛ and their behaviour are determined by how 
others see them (Ford 2002: 121-3). During the GATT era developing countries 
established a collective identity of ‚Protectionist Other‛ vis-à-vis ‚developed country 
trading Self‛ parallel to the evolution of the development norm which was predicated 
upon exceptions and flexibilities through SDT and non-reciprocity. During the 
Uruguay Round they increasingly adopted the role of ‚reciprocal trader‛ alike with 
developed economies as the ‚single undertaking‛ became a significant feature of the 
negotiations that led to reciprocity in the bargaining process (Ford 2002: 123, 132).41 
                                                 
41 According to the single undertaking there would be no deal until a consensus was reached 
in all negotiation chapters (Croome 1995: 34).   
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This changing attitude, which was a consequence of the diffusion of neoliberal 
hegemony will further be examined in Chapter 5.  
 
Revision of GATT norms for the TRIPS Agreement and the GATS  
 
At the core of the hegemonic transformation of the trade regime lies the readjustment 
of fundamental GATT norms that extended the reach of the regime beyond 
commodities. These are the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual 
Property Rights (TRIPS) and the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS). The 
TRIPS Agreement obliges WTO member states to comply with the provisions of the 
Paris and Berne Conventions, which concern industrial property and copyright 
protection. The TRIPS Agreement envisages the global harmonisation of domestic 
regulations in IPRs to create a minimum standard for their protection with a view to 
creating a fair trading environment. The agreement sets minimum standards of 
protection in seven areas: copyrights, trademarks, patents, industrial designs, 
geographical indications, undisclosed information including trade secrets, and layout-
designs (topographies) of integrated circuits (Jackson 2002: 311-2). The standards of 
protection cover the availability, scope, and use of IPRs in these areas. Moreover, the 
agreement creates monopoly rights for the inventors, innovators, producers and/or 
performers for commercial use of their technological products, knowledge, ideas and 
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artistic works for limited periods of time. The enforcement measures differ from the 
GATT because they not only contain commercial tools, but also civil, administrative, 
and even criminal procedures and remedies as well as border measures (Matsushita et 
al. 2003: 431-3). Members are obliged to notify the changes to domestic regulations 
regarding the IPR protection to the TRIPS Council (Matsushita et al. 2003: 406-7). As it 
sets standards for the protection of IPRs, the TRIPS Agreement also redefines the 
norm of non-discrimination which was originally created for exportable products. The 
norm in the TRIPS Agreement envisages the prevention of discriminatory treatment 
among right-holders that encapsulates both individuals and enterprises (Matsushita et 
al. 2003: 425). In this vein, both MFN and NT principles are re-formulated to ensure 
non-discriminatory treatment between foreign and national legal persons who are 
supposed to be granted no less favourable and identical minimum rights in member 
countries.42 Hence, the accord functions to ensure that exclusive rights gained for 
ideational, intellectual and artistic creation are kept intact as components of certain 
goods and services when these products cross state borders.   
  
                                                 
42 Article 3 of the TRIPS Agreement on National Treatment states that ‚Each Member shall 
accord to the nationals of other Members treatment no less favourable than that it accords to 
its own nationals with regard to the protection of intellectual property‛. Article 4 of the 
agreement is on MFN treatment and notes that ‚With regard to the protection of intellectual 
property, any advantage, favour, privilege or immunity granted by a Member to the nationals 
of any other country shall be accorded immediately and unconditionally to the nationals of all 
other Members.‛ 
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On the other hand, the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) regulates the 
liberalisation of trade in services. Services comprise a wide set of economic activities 
including financial, telecommunications, transportation, and professional services 
such as business consultancy and architecture. The sectoral coverage of the GATS 
comprises all service sectors except for those ‚supplied in the exercise of 
governmental authority‛ (Art. I:(3)). In a nutshell, Part I of the GATS covers the scope 
and definition of the agreement; Part II sets out the general obligations and disciplines 
to be applied comprehensively to all members and industries. It also includes 
provisions on unfinished business such as future talks on emergency safeguard 
mechanisms and subsidies, and rules on economic integration and restrictive business 
practices. Part III lists specific rules applied only for the liberalisation commitments 
scheduled by the members. Part IV sets out provisions for future negotiations and 
schedules. Part V and VI outline institutional and other provisions (WTO 1999a: 163-
74). In addition, the agreement also contains a number of annexes designing the 
liberalisation of trade in financial services, telecommunications, maritime transport, 
and air transport. These annexes outline sector-specific principles and rules as well as 
provisions on the conduct of market access negotiations (WTO 1999a: 175-80). The 
agreement also has a separate annex on future negotiations on the movement of 
natural persons and an annex on MFN exceptions which outlines the conditions for 
members to exempt certain service sectors from general MFN treatment (WTO 1999: 
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164-6). Trade in services is naturally different from trade in goods since services are 
traded not only through cross-border movement of products, but also through other 
methods or ‚supply modes‛ including the temporary movement of natural persons 
and foreign direct investment (FDI) (WTO 1999: 63-5;  See Table 1 below).  
 
Table 1. Supply Modes of Services 
 
Mode 1. Cross-border supply (i.e. online banking, transportation, courier 
services); 
Mode 2. Consumption of services abroad (i.e. tourism services, education and 
medical services in a foreign country); 
Mode 3. Commercial presence abroad (i.e. foreign direct investment: services 
supplied by branches and subsidiaries of a company abroad); 
Mode 4. Presence of natural persons- temporary movement of labour (i.e. 
architecture services provided by employees of a certain company to 
consumers abroad). 
 
The GATS broadened the scope of protectionist measures through a reformulation of 
the norms of liberalisation and non-discrimination. The liberalisation of trade in 
services becomes possible through market access and national treatment provisions of 
the GATS. The agreement covers all governmental ‚measures‛ affecting trade (Art. I: 
(1)). The article on Market Access (Art. XVI) lists several measures which may restrict 
the supply of services including constraints on the number of service suppliers, the 
total value of service transactions, the number of service operations, natural persons 
to be employed, restrictions on the types of legal entity, and limits on the participation 
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of foreign capital. The non-discrimination norm is reformulated for ‚services‛ and 
‚service suppliers.‛ In Jackson’s words the GATS ‚went relatively far in embracing 
the traditional GATT concepts (MFN, national treatment, schedules of concessions), 
but clearly had to adapt those concepts for the new terrain encountered‛ (Jackson 
2002: 307). For instance, MFN treatment requires a WTO member to accord ‚no less 
favourable‛ treatment to other members than they accord ‚to like services and service 
suppliers of any other country‛ (Art. II).43 Likewise, NT requires members to accord 
‚no less favourable‛ treatment to foreign services and legal persons than they accord 
to their own ‚like services and service suppliers *...+ in respect of all measures 
affecting the supply of services‛ (Art. XVII).44  
 
Notwithstanding these modifications, non-discriminatory trade liberalisation in 
services is contingent upon members’ commitments (Matsushita et al. 2003: 246-250). 
Different from the GATT, the GATS separates members’ commitments into two 
categories as ‚general‛ and ‚specific.‛ General commitments outlined in Part II of the 
                                                 
43 Article II (1) maintains that ‚*w+ith respect to any measure covered by this Agreement, each 
Member shall accord immediately and unconditionally to services and service suppliers of 
any other Member treatment no less favourable than that it accords to like services and 
service suppliers of any other country.‛ 
44 Article XVII (1) states that ‚*i+n the sectors inscribed in its Schedule, and subject to any 
conditions and qualifications set out therein, each Member shall accord to services and service 
suppliers of any other Member, in respect of all measures affecting the supply of services, 
treatment no less favourable than that it accords to its own like services and service 
suppliers.‛ 
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agreement apply to all services excluding exceptions, whereas specific commitments 
detailed in Part III are applied only to service sectors and supply modes scheduled on 
a member’s concessions list (Matsushita et al. 2003: 240). Each member state has a 
different concession list created through intergovernmental bargaining in market 
access negotiations. In other words, the MFN principle is identified as a general 
commitment -together with transparency and procedural standards- as in the GATT, 
whereas national treatment and market access are applicable only to services listed by 
member states. This dual structure is a result of the Uruguay Round negotiations 
during which members adopted a methodology close to ‚positive list‛ or bottom up 
approach in lieu of a ‚negative list‛ or top down approach (Key 1997: 14-5). Originally 
proposed by the U.S. in conveying TNCs’ interests, the negative list approach 
envisaged the liberalisation of all sectors during the Uruguay Round talks with 
exceptions that would be negatively listed. The methodology adopted at the end of 
the talks basically weakened the NT principle when it became conditional upon 
member commitments (Matsushita et al. 2003: 247). Hence, trade liberalisation became 
contingent upon bilateral bargaining between trading partners through the exchange 
of requests and offers. Furthermore, even though MFN became a general principle, 
the GATS allowed members to take sector-wide exemptions for a limited period of 
time (WTO 1999: 166). Based on a general consensus during the negotiations that is 
outlined in a special Annex to the agreement, the air transport sector was completely 
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exempted from disciplines since international services in this sector are governed by 
bilateral agreements (WTO 1999: 175). Consequently, the negotiations in most service 
industries brought about a much less ambitious liberalisation at the end of the 
Uruguay Round than initially anticipated (Hoekman and Kostecki 2001: 252). As will 
be examined in Chapter 5, during GATS negotiations governments adopted a 
‚progressive liberalisation‛ approach which is codified in Part IV in contrast to the 
ambitious liberalisation perspective of the United States and TNCs. In this context, 
sectoral negotiations to liberalise basic telecommunications, financial services, and 
maritime services were left to post-Round talks (Matsushita et al. 2003: 252-8).  
 
The GATS has modified the ‚generative grammar‛ of the trade regime by bringing 
about a change in language for state action and new meanings for conventional trade 
notions. As outlined, similar to goods, the GATS treats services as tradable. This was a 
major innovation of the Uruguay Round talks. Prior to the Uruguay Round, trade was 
conventionally understood only as international exchange of physical goods. Traders 
under the GATS are not only exporters and importers of goods, but also ‚service 
suppliers.‛ This is a broad category that covers legal persons including individuals 
such as teachers, doctors and architects but also firms. The barriers to services trade 
are not tariffs, but government regulations created for a wide range of purposes. In 
this regard, it can be argued that this revised definition for barriers to trade has 
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widened the scope of protectionism. Although the GATS has exceptions for certain 
regulations functioning to achieve non-commercial objectives such as environmental 
protection and national security, domestic law or practices that affect non-
discriminatory supply of foreign services can be considered protectionism (depending 
on members’ commitments). With a redefinition of basic norms intersubjectively 
produced collective meanings were revisited in synchronicity with the shift in the 
legitimate social purpose of the trade regime. Drake and Nicolaidis highlight this shift 
in purpose in the following terms:  
 
[b]ecause tariffs were not the relevant impediments to trade, a boundary line 
between illegitimate NTBs [non-tariff barriers] and legitimate regulations was 
required. Wherever that line could be drawn, services liberalization would 
necessarily involve the extensive restructuring of what were once thought of as 
purely domestic regulations. This required a sea change in social purpose. Both 
the intellectual frameworks in which services industries were visualised and 
the vast array of social interest and institutions would now have to be judged 
according to the narrow commercial criterion of whether they impeded trade 
(Drake and Nicolaidis 1992, 63 emphasis added). 
 
 
Since the intersubjective meanings changed during the round, the arguments initially 
brought up by resistant governments, such as India and Brazil, against the 
incorporation of services and intellectual property could no longer be upheld as 
legitimate as the negotiations came to a close. The arguments premising that services 
was a ‚non-trade‛ issue beyond the scope of the GATT gradually seemed 
 109 
anachronistic and were withdrawn. The negotiation process is discussed in detail in 
Chapter 5.  
 
 
3. 4. Consequences of the regime transformation  
 
The transformation of the regime in line with a neoliberal social purpose has had 
major consequences for state-society relations, the trade agenda at different levels, the 
multilateral trading system and the WTO at the centre of this system. As a new 
constitutional body functioning to spread neoliberal hegemony, the WTO helped with 
the penetration of market norms and mechanisms into states and imposed disciplines 
impacting on domestic authority relations between the states and social actors 
including producers, labour and others. The WTO rules on subsidies put strong 
disciplines on governments with regard to their support to domestic producers of 
exported goods (Jackson 2002: 279-85). The WTO created standards for fair 
competition between market agents through disciplines on state actions in 
antidumping, and other trade remedies and various provisions in the TRIPS and 
TRIMS Agreements and the GATS (Hoekman and Koestecki 2001: 426). Through the 
GATS, trade norms were extended to public services such as education which were 
conventionally delivered by public authorities in many countries (Scherrer 2005; 
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Higgott and Weber 2005). The new disciplines restricted the legitimate space for state 
action in a broad range of domains including development policies (Ayala and 
Gallagher 2005; Dicaprio and Gallaher 2006). The diffusion of market norms has 
created controversies especially with regard to the fulfilment of social objectives such 
as environmental protection and labour standards. Starting with the infamous Tuna-
Dolphin case in the early 1990s which was lost by the U.S. who banned imports of 
tuna from some countries on the basis of insufficient protection for dolphins, a long-
standing debate started on the legitimacy of environmental measures in the context of 
the trade regime (Matsushita et al. 2003: 448-450). Similarly, the impact of the WTO 
agreements on social protection for labour has been at the forefront of the criticisms. 
Jean-Christoph Graz makes the following observation:  
 
The institutional framework of the WTO lies beyond a narrow definition of a 
world market of goods and services. In many ways it deals with a situation 
where states are accountable for the impact on the international trading system 
of social relations engendered by the articulation between the economic and 
political spheres. References to ‘raising standards of living’ and ‘full 
employment’ are made in the very first paragraph of the WTO preamble. 
However, instead of exceptions for effective interventions related to such 
states’ socio-economic functions, the Uruguay Round did not give much license 
to differentiated means to provide social protection. The issue of employment 
and welfare has now come back to the forefront of the WTO agenda (Graz 2004: 
605). 
 
The emergence of a market-oriented positive integration program in the trade domain 
with the inception of the WTO and expansive trade agreements such as the NAFTA 
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opened up a new line of political debate about the new trade agenda. Compared to 
the GATT era, when trade was a technical domain of bureaucrats and traders, the new 
trade agenda, as it affects regulations in areas of public health, food safety and 
environment, concerns a multitude of stakeholders (Graz 2004: 598; Dymond and Hart 
2000). Since the early 1990s the trade policy debate takes place with the participation 
of stakeholders such as environmentalists, labour unions, development NGOs, and 
health activists. As will be discussed in Chapter 7 for countries such as the U.S. where 
legislative bodies are heavily engaged in the process of trade policy-making, the 
decision-making on significant trade issues has been politicised and turned into a 
cumbersome process. The ratification of the NAFTA and the Uruguay Round Final 
Act, and the fast track debates in the United States were early signs of the crisis for 
trade policy-making in association with the challenges faced by the neoliberal 
hegemony in the early 1990s. The emergence of new actors and the politicization of 
the trade agenda have also created a new political context for the functioning of the 
trade regime under the WTO. Critical analysts argue that the new constitutional 
texture entailing a behind-the-border regulatory program resulted in a legitimacy 
crisis for the WTO (Howse and Nicolaidis 2003; Zürn 2004). While the WTO was 
accused of a lack of accountability as it was deemed to diminish the sovereignty of the 
states, its decision-making process was questioned for inherent ‚democratic deficit‛ 
(Marceau 2002; Kahler 2004; Verweij and Josling 2003; Capling 2003). The ‚green 
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room‛ process which is an informal way to forge consensus through bargaining 
between selected key countries contributed to the criticisms on the lack of 
transparency in the WTO decision-making (Jawara and Kwa 2003: 17-21; Schott and 
Watal 2000). Similar concerns about legitimacy were raised with regard to the Dispute 
Settlement Mechanism, wherein decisions are taken through a confidential judicial 
process where appointed judges work with members to the disputes and affected 
third parties (Steger 2005). These tensions made the WTO the target of anti-
globalization campaigns and facilitated what Wilkinson calls a ‚governance crisis‛ 
causing the deadlocks in its ministerial conferences in Seattle (1999) and Cancun 
(2003) in association with the inherent institutional asymmetries within the WTO 
(Wilkinson 2006). 
 
As studied in Chapter 6 and 7, the apparent reason for the breakdown of the Seattle 
Ministerial Conference in 1999 was the inability of member states to reach a consensus 
on the future legal scope of the WTO and the new trade agenda. The transformation 
of the trade regime created a legitimate basis for the arguments to extend the WTO 
agenda to new areas of further economic integration including investment and 
competition.45 Many developed countries supported a further expansion of the 
regulatory scope of the WTO to new trade related issues as these issues were seen as 
                                                 
45 On the extreme, some liberal constitutionalists called for a broadening of the agenda to fully 
limit states’ roles within economy for the realization of human freedoms (Petersmann 2002). 
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complementary to the existing legal framework and necessary for furthering positive 
integration. Alternative agendas for a market-oriented expansion of the WTO 
framework as well as for the creation of rules for labour standards and environmental 
protection were contrasted with developing countries’ concerns about implementing 
existing accords. What is strikingly different from the GATT era is the fact that 
consensus-making not only requires the consent of developing countries which are 
increasingly influential at the WTO but also of civil society actors mobilized 
domestically and transnationally. In this regard, the crisis of the WTO both with its 
governance and legitimacy aspects should be understood within the context of the 
crisis of neoliberal hegemony. The evolution of neoliberal hegemony with the rise of 
new social forces pro and against anti-globalization as well as emerging economies 
and their agendas are keys to understanding the limitations to transformation and the 
future evolution of the regime. 
 
Conclusion 
 
To sum up, the trade regime came into being as a product of the pax Americana and 
its norms reflected the underlying embedded liberal social purpose that deemed state 
intervention through border measures as legitimate tools to realise certain Keynesian 
social objectives. The GATT regime evolved through the 1980s until the launch of the 
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Uruguay Round negotiations in 1986 with changes to its regulative rules and practices 
while its fundamental norms such as non-discrimination and liberalisation remained 
intact. The trade regime underwent a hegemonic transformation parallel to the 
establishment of the neoliberal order. The emergence of the WTO through the 
Uruguay Round reflected the institutionalisation of the neo-liberal hegemony as it 
created an institutional and legal framework codifying the reconfiguration of global 
authority relations. The WTO emerged as a supra-national body with a strong dispute 
settlement body and created new rights and obligations constraining the authority of 
the states.  
 
The hegemonic transformation of the regime has created a new generative grammar 
that has re-drawn the ethical borders of state intervention in the economic realm 
through significant adjustments to its fundamental norms and principles and 
redefinition of the collective meanings about the regime, trade, trade barriers and 
protectionism, as well as traders. The most significant redefinition was registered in 
the non-discrimination and liberalisation norms especially in the TRIPS Agreement 
and the GATS. These redefinitions characterised a paradigmatic shift from borders 
towards domestic policies, and consequently eroded the embedded liberal vision. The 
transformation of the regime in line with a neo-liberal social purpose enabled the 
penetration of market norms and mechanisms into the states and challenged the 
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established mechanics of relations between states and social actors. The clash of 
market norms with non-market norms and the penetration of trade into social realms 
fuelled new political conflicts between a broad set of actors within civil society. The 
regime transformation opened up a crisis of legitimacy for the WTO that echoes the 
challenges to neoliberal hegemony evident in the debate on the future trade agenda.  
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Part II. TNCs in Setting the Agenda For the GATT: The Case of Services 
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER 4: BUILDING NORTHERN CONSENSUS FOR A GATT AGENDA ON 
TRADE IN SERVICES  
 
The services issue was initially brought up to the GATT by the United States in the 
late 1970s. Until the mid-1980s the U.S. remained the single demandeur of a 
comprehensive initiative that would treat services as tradable, consider certain 
domestic regulations as barriers to trade, and dismantle them through negotiations 
between governments. Consensus emerged in the early 1980s within the United States 
and later among OECD countries that services could be liberalised through trade 
instruments and negotiations. When the preparations to launch the Uruguay Round 
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started in Geneva in 1985, there was a firm Northern agreement, although some 
differences remained regarding the methodology on how to liberalize services under 
the GATT. The Punta del Este decision to launch the Uruguay Round in September 
1986 was a clear recognition of the tradability of, and applicability of trade norms to, 
services even though the issue of the GATT’s judicial competence was not yet 
resolved because of the intransigence of India, Brazil and some other developing 
countries.   
 
In fact, the major social forces that set the agenda of the GATT to handle services 
regulations as barriers to trade were a number of U.S. based TNCs which mobilized in 
the mid-1970s and engaged in an encompassing agenda-setting initiative. In the 
period between 1973 and 1979, a small coalition of TNCs arose to ensure the legal 
recognition of services as a trade issue. In 1979, under the leadership of business 
executives from the U.S. finance industry, TNCs launched a broad-based campaign 
which can be deemed as a ‚war of position‛ in the Gramscian sense. The campaign 
aimed to change the established mind-set of ‚trade in goods‛ with a new framework 
of trade in ‚goods and services‛ by building coalitions with other firms and policy-
makers, and through engaging in knowledge-production and education of 
governments and the general public. The TNC coalition’s case for services was 
disseminated accross Europe and elsewhere through new alliances, building a policy 
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network, supporting new academic research, and utilizing the media. Hence, the 
TNCs established a hegemonic mental framework that gradually changed the 
intersubjective meanings of trade and protectionism within the core capitalist nations 
who were supportive of these negotiations at the GATT.  
 
The first part of this chapter explores the engagement of certain TNCs in agenda-
setting for the GATT by examining their case-building for services through redefining 
and converging their corporate interests in trade terms and allying themselves with 
other firms. The second part focuses on their war of position towards consensus 
building in the United States and Europe by framing their case as a comprehensive 
formula responding to the interests of a wide range of stakeholders, and their 
activities to disseminate the new framework. 
 
4.1. Reframing Corporate Interests in Services Terms 
 
Until the policy debate during the 1970s, international transactions of services were 
not considered trade although such transactions were on the rise. The ideas of the 
tradability of services and the elimination of regulations restricting such trade by 
applying GATT principles and negotiation processes were primarily issues of 
academic debate until a business coalition would employ these ideas to influence the 
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legislative agenda in the United States. An early coalition of corporate interests 
emerged during the legislative process for the Trade Act in 1974 to lock in some 
benefits for U.S. based corporations  struggling to access foreign markets protected by 
domestic regulations restricting entry and operations.  On account of the 
constitutional amendments to U.S. trade law in 1974 and later in 1979, 1984 and 1988, 
services were recognized in equal terms with goods. As a result, service producers 
gained the legitimacy to raise their demands of market access in trade terms. This new 
way of framing corporate problems and interests within the services and trade 
contexts also created a basis for a broader coalition of TNCs to emerge and develop a 
longer term strategy to bring services to the agenda of the GATT in the 1980s.  
 
4.1.1. Trade in Services and Emergence of a TNC Coalition  
 
Until the policy debate during the 1970s, tradability of services was considered an 
oxymoron, while international exchange of services was taken as an ‚accounting‛ fact 
registered in the balance of payments sheets as ‚invisible transactions‛  (Drake and 
Nicolaidis 1992: 44; Feketekuty 1998: 81). The term ‚trade in services‛ first time 
appeared in the Report by the High Level Group on Trade and Related Problems 
drafted in 1973 by a group of eminent individuals chaired by Jean Rey, former 
President of the European Commission, to assess the systemic problems in the world 
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trading system in the run up to the Tokyo Round (OECD 1973; Feketekuty 1987: 298). 
The framing of services in the trade context, as outlined in the Rey group report, was a 
radically new perspective promoted in academia by few economists such as Hugh 
Corbet of the Trade Policy Research Centre (TPRC) in London (Feketekuty 1987: 
296).46 In fact, these early works were produced mainly by some Anglo-American 
economists who constituted the intellectual basis for a growing epistemic community 
that helped shape the policy debate in the United States during the 1970s and 1980s 
(Drake and Nicolaidis 1992). In this context, trade concepts and principles were for the 
first time systematically applied to services by Brian Griffiths of LSE in a cornerstone 
book entitled ‚Invisible Barriers to Invisible Trade,‛ published in 1975.  Nevertheless, 
aside from this early academic debate, international cooperation in services was 
restricted to sectoral agreements regulating intergovernmental technical cooperation 
in areas such as civil aviation, telecommunications and maritime.47 Although the 
Treaty of Rome envisaged free movement of services as well as goods within the 
European Community, specific rules on trade in services were not elaborated until the 
launch of the Single European Act, which would pave the way for the Maastricht 
                                                 
46 Hugh Corbet was an influential figure in the trade policy debate in Europe during the 1970s. 
Corbet was a consultant to International Chamber of Commerce in Paris and special advisor 
to the conservative opposition in Britain until 1979. TPRC established in 1968 would become 
the most significant non-U.S. body influential in the services policy debate from the mid-1970s 
on (Kelsey 2008: 79). 
47 The International Telecommunications Union, International Civil Aviation Organization 
and International Maritime Organization were the bodies where governments cooperated to 
set mutual standards in these sectors (Brock 1982: 236). 
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Treaty of 1992 (Drake and Nicolaidis 1992: 44-5). The idea of the tradability of services 
through applying trade norms and principles within the context of trade negotiations 
was taken from the academic context to the policy debate by a number of U.S. based 
TNCs facing significant regulatory barriers in their operations in foreign markets. 
 
Global economic transformations from the late 1960s brought about a competitive 
environment for U.S. based TNCs that eventually led to the consideration to utilize 
trade policy instruments to dismantle barriers. American TNCs operating 
internationally in different service sectors faced two particular sets of challenges 
especially in areas where European and Japanese firms built up productive capacities 
(Aggarwal 1992). The first set of challenges included market access difficulties, both 
for their cross-border sales abroad and their investments, especially in the Japanese 
and NIC markets. The second challenge was in the U.S. market as these companies 
faced an uneven and disadvantageous business environment compared to their 
foreign competitors because of the relative economic openness of the U.S. market. 
Thus, a coalition of interests emerged among U.S. service industries in the early 1970s 
to handle both sets of challenges by activating U.S. trade policy tools. The leading 
social forces that reframed different sets of corporate interests in the context of trade 
policy were the U.S. TNCs operating in the financial sector, especially in insurance 
and banking. 
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American TNCs in financial services were internationally competitive because of the 
large scale of their financial markets and the deregulation trend initiated in the early 
1970s. According to Susan Strange, domestic deregulations for financial operators and 
money markets in the 1970s and the scale of these markets and operators created a 
comparative advantage for U.S. based financial giants that were able to take relatively 
higher risks for profits (Strange 1988: 108, 131). The competitiveness of U.S. operators 
such as American Express would continue into the 1980s. According to Harry 
Freeman of  American Express, the company became a world-scale financial leader 
with $16 billion of market capitalisation in the mid-1980s, followed by American 
International Group (AIG) ($10 billion), and Citicorp (around $6 to 7 billion) (Freeman 
1987: 138). However, ongoing protectionism in financial markets was an important 
factor increasing costs of international business for banks and insurance companies 
(Bhagwati 1987: 211). In the early 1980s, markets were still highly regulated even in 
the OECD region. In most of the advanced economies, markets were closed to the 
entry of foreign insurance firms (Kennedy 1992: 2). In Europe, since the inception of 
the EC, this sector had undergone regional liberalization for investments while the 
market was still closed to cross-border trade (Shelp 1981: 137-142; 171). The EC 
deregulation in banking had yet to start to liberalize investments while trade opening 
was also in a planning stage in the early 1980s (Shelp 1981: 207). A comprehensive 
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regional deregulation agenda in Europe would be set off with the initiation of the 
single market program in the second half of the 1980s. The insurance market in Japan 
was also protected up until the 1980s while the market was dominated by domestic 
companies in the mid-1980s (the share of foreigners in domestic market was only 1 
percent) (Feketekuty 1988: 142; Shelp 1981: 157). 
 
On the other hand, financial deregulations in the U.S. had created pressures and 
incentives to build up international competitiveness in Europe and other advanced 
economies that led to the liberalisation of internal markets (Strange 1988: 131). Thus a 
deregulatory trend in finance was put in motion in the UK, Canada and other 
countries in the 1970s and 1980s, which ultimately pushed banks, insurance and 
securities firms to operate in a more competitive environment. This trend also 
generated counter pressure on the American financial sector for further elimination of 
domestic regulations on business operations (Freeman 1987: 140). The Japanese 
banking and securities firms, as well as French, German, British and Canadian 
companies, became more competitive with growing market share and annual 
earnings (Freeman 1987: 138).48 Similarly, large European insurance firms became a 
cause of concern as they enjoyed the ease of access to the U.S. market (Aggarwal 1992: 
                                                 
48 Harry Freeman notes that top four Japanese securities firms earned almost $3 billion in 
1986, which was equal to the earnings of twenty-five to thirty top U.S. firms in securities 
(Freeman 1987: 138). 
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40). While the maintenance of market shares domestically and internationally was 
crucial for U.S. TNCs, an equally important goal became to enter the lucrative but 
heavily regulated markets of NICs (Beder 2006: 127; Freeman 2000: 456). 
 
Similar concerns were shared by other American service suppliers in shipping, 
aviation, construction, and engineering. While U.S. trade policy had legal and political 
leverage to open markets to sectors operating in manufacturing, service industries 
lacked governmental assistance. Pan American Airways became the first U.S. 
company to concoct the idea of extending the purview of U.S. trade policies to the 
service industries during the policy debate around the forthcoming Trade Act of 1974. 
The company was excluded from international mail delivery services in some 
countries because of internal discriminatory regulations excluding foreign companies 
from operating in similar conditions with national firms (Feketekuty 1988: 299-
300/2010, interview). In its campaign to insert provisions for service suppliers Pan 
American Airways was joined by other corporations seeking the creation of policy 
instruments by the government to tackle regulatory barriers abroad. The campaign 
was orchestrated by AIG, a U.S. insurance giant. AIG was in difficulty to enter 
lucrative Asian markets and was concerned about the lack of sufficient policy tools to 
protect its investments in Third World markets (Freeman 2001: 184; Shelp with Ehrbar 
2006: 127). The leading figure who organized this intensive lobbying activity was 
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Ronald K. Shelp, who had been recently appointed to the position of vice presidency 
responsible for international relations of AIG (Feketekuty 1988: 300). Shelp’s 
conversations with U.S. government officials illustrated that insurance was not seen as 
an exportable value benefiting U.S. economy as were goods in engineering, 
construction and manufacturing industries (Shelp with Ehrbar 2006: 126-127). Shelp 
puts forward that  
 
Other companies had a prima facie case to begin with. AIG had to make a case. 
So AIG had to push doubly hard to persuade its own government that its 
overseas operations had any value (Shelp with Ehrbar 2006: 127). 
 
Shelp was familiar with the trade policy instruments and terminology owing to his 
previous career with the International Department of the U.S. Chamber of Commerce 
(Feketekuty 1988: 300; Shelp 2010, interview). He found out that the tradability of 
insurance was a ‚totally alien concept‛ for government officials, and together with 
other TNCs they argued that insurance, banking and credit card transactions and 
transportation constituted the same sectoral category of ‚services‛ which were 
tradable like commodities (Shelp with Ehrbar 2006: 127).  The campaign that was 
orchestrated by AIG before the legislation of the Trade Act of 1974 was, thus, joined 
by business executives with transportation, construction and other industries. These 
individuals gave testimonies about their problems in external operations during the 
hearings of the Senate Finance Committee and eventually secured a role in the 
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crafting of significant provisions for services in the 1974 bill (Shelp 1981: 153; 
Feketekuty 1988: 300; Kelsey 2008: 77). This early coalition of corporate interests later 
became the nucleus of a broader agenda-setting campaign to bring services under the 
purview of the GATT as of the late 1970s. Before turning to this wider scale political 
campaign it would be illuminating to explore the constitutional amendments in U.S. 
trade law from 1974 on that paved the way for TNCs in service industries to influence 
the trade agenda and policy-making.  
 
4.1.2. Constitutional Changes in U.S. Trade Law 
 
During the 1970s, U.S. Congress was under pressure from industries affected by 
economic recession and enhanced international competition. These included sectors 
demanding defensive and offensive tools of protection such as textiles and clothing, 
automotive parts, computer software, integrated circuits, chemicals, and 
entertainment. The legislative processes for important trade bills in 1974 and 1979 
created important opportunities for TNCs in services and manufacturing to yield clear 
benefits from U.S. trade policies (Cafruny 1989: 126, 9).  Consequently, the Trade Act 
of 1974 contained several provisions to address the needs of a wide range of 
industries. Most significantly it created a ‚fast-track‛ procedure delegating significant 
authority to the President in trade negotiations while maintaining legislative 
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supervision on trade policies as Congress retained its right to accept or refuse 
international agreements (Mundo 1999: 55-6; 114; Cohen et al. 203: 40, 151). On the 
other hand, the Office of Special Trade Representative which was established by the 
1962 Act was renamed as United States Trade Representative (USTR), and became a 
more autonomous body from the president with a direct mandate from Congress to 
deal with unfair practices in foreign jurisdictions (Mundo 1999: 115; Goldstein 1993: 
167). To this aim, the 1974 Act created the Section 301 giving the executive branch the 
power and instruments to address unfair practices including internal regulations 
discriminating against U.S. exports both in goods and services (Mundo 1999: 114; 
Feketekuty 1988; 197-8). Section 301 would later be strengthened with the Trade 
Agreements Act of 1979 and the Trade and Tariff Act of 1984 (Mundo 1999: 117, 120). 
The Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988 represented the hiatus of U.S. 
unilateralism in tackling unfair regulations and practices of trading partners with the 
creation of the Special 301 as well as a Super 301 provision, which granted the USTR 
with an aggressive mandate and authority to take unilateral legal action (Mundo 1999: 
121). 
 
For the service producers, the first concrete result of the constitutional amendments to 
U.S. trade law in the 1970s was the recognition of services as an area of trade policy 
that led to the incremental insertion of services into U.S. trade mechanisms. While the 
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Trade Act of 1974 acknowledged services in similar terms with trade in goods, its 
provisions germane to services authorized by the executive to negotiate non-tariff 
barriers in this area (Feketekuty 1988: 300). The 1979 Act further underscored services 
as an area of clear responsibility of the USTR (Cafruny 1989: 129). With increased 
mobilisation of service industries in the 1980s more concrete benefits could be secured 
in the upcoming trade acts. The amendments to the trade law in 1984 modified 
Section 301 and broadened the scope of actionable unfair trade practices of foreign 
states with detailed provisions explicitly covering services, trade related investment 
measures, and IPRs (Low 1993: 60). This would in practice mean the authorisation of 
the USTR to take the retaliatory action of levying tariffs on the goods of a trading 
partner which discriminated against U.S. service providers as for example in the case 
of blocking the licensing of a U.S. insurance company abroad (Shelp with Ehrbar 2006: 
128). Similarly, the 1988 Act which was enacted to increase U.S. competitiveness 
engendered additional instruments for IPRs and foreign practices in government 
procurement, and it contained counter measures against foreign practices restricting 
U.S. telecommunications goods and services exports (Low 1993: 65). Super 301 crafted 
in 1988 granted USTR the right to identify trading partners implementing ‚unfair‛ 
actions with greater discretion about what unfair practices would entail, and to 
initiate unilateral prosecution to investigate those measures (Krueger 1995: 64-67). 
Among others, the 1988 Act listed gaining market access for U.S. service exports and 
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the creation of an international regime of service agreements as the objectives of U.S. 
trade policy (Lang 2000: 1).   
 
In addition to reconfiguring the authority in trade policies between Congress and the 
Executive, as well as between the President and USTR, the amendments to the U.S. 
trade law also opened new legitimate channels for the TNCs to influence trade policy-
making. The 1974 Act mandated the president to establish an Advisory Committee for 
Trade Negotiations (ACTN)49 to get feedback from private sector executives in 
shaping American trade policy and positions in intergovernmental trade talks 
(Feketekuty 1988: 301; Walter 2000: 159). Additionally, the 1979 Act mandated the 
creation of a joint Industry Sector Advisory Committee on Services by USTR and the 
Department of Commerce with private sector representatives at the vice-president 
level, and the formation of a Services Policy Advisory Committee to USTR 
(Feketekuty 1988: 312; Kelsey 2008: 61). Consequently, the ACTN would top seven 
sectoral policy committees representing key economic sectors impacted by trade, and 
seventeen Industry Sector Advisory Committees (ISACs) including representatives 
from sectors such as energy, consumer goods, textiles and apparel, electronics etc. as 
                                                 
49 The ACTN was later renamed as the Advisory Committee on Trade Policy and 
Negotiations (ACTPN). 
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well as services.50 The establishment of private advisory mechanisms was one of the 
central issues of the campaign organized by AIG (Shelp with Ehrbar 2006: 128). As a 
natural result of this transformation in the U.S. state apparatus, the TNCs increasingly 
engaged in policy-making from the mid-1970s on. The campaigners became active in 
these advisory bodies that channelled individual and collective views to USTR and 
the President.  
 
Because of these constitutional amendments, service industries pushed the executive 
to take concrete measures addressing the problems of service industries. In advancing 
their case within policy and law-making bodies, the campaigners would pursue a 
‚balanced strategy‛ between ‚conservative‛ Congress, and ‚free trader‛ executive 
agencies like USTR (Mundo 1999: 130). The TNCs tapped into opportunities created 
by the legislative agenda, and took advantage of the checks and balances between the 
legislative and executive bodies (Zumwalt 1996: 3). Due largely to its dependence on 
the ‚fast track‛ authority the Executive and its agencies became more receptive to 
private sector demands as pressure from Congress amplified (Zumwalt 1996: 3). With 
these constitutional amendments, U.S. Trade Representatives such as Bob Strauss, 
William E. Brock, and later Clayton Yeutter would become very receptive to the 
                                                 
50 The sectoral policy committees included SPAC (Services Policy Advisory Committee), 
INPAC (Investment), IGPAC (Intergovernmental), IPAC (Industry), APAC (Agriculture), 
LAC (Labor), and DPAC (Defense). 
http://ustraderep.gov/Who_We_Are/Mission_of_the_USTR.html  accessed on April 25, 2008.  
 131 
inputs from the private actors (Feketekuty 1988: 321). As a first step, in 1975 a White 
House Interagency Taskforce on Services and Multilateral Negotiations was initiated 
to examine the problems of service industries (Feketekuty 1988: 302). The Task Force 
prepared a report in December 1976 that recommended the insertion of service 
industries’ concerns to the Tokyo Round negotiations on a ‚carefully selected‛ basis 
(Feketekuty 1988: 303). Despite this effort, the U.S. could only secure the interjection of 
some language on services into three Tokyo Round codes as it had difficulty to 
convince trading partners to embark upon a broader initiative that would tackle 
domestic regulations as trade barriers.51  
 
4.1.3. Further TNC Mobilization for Trade in Services 
 
The recognition of services as a trade issue and the creation of a legal mandate for the 
president and USTR during the 1970s resulted in a strategic re-orientation in thinking 
of corporate interests and strategies. The new conceptual framing of services in trade 
terms such as comparative advantage, market access, non-tariff barriers, and 
protectionism would provide TNCs with legitimate claims to pursue economic 
                                                 
51 These were the subsidies, standards and government procurement codes. Even though 
some wording on services was injected, these codes were not substantially extended to the 
area of service liberalisation. Nonetheless, the government procurement code mandated the 
contracting parties to consider its extension to services in 1983 (Feketekuty 1988: 304-305; 
Brock 1982: 230; Aronson and Cowhey 1984: 28-29). 
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strategies to access markets and political strategies to leverage U.S. trade policy to 
achieve their economic goals. From the late 1970s on, a stronger and wider scale 
business coalition for trade in services emerged in the United States with the 
mobilisation of TNCs operating in various sectors around a collective purpose to 
promote a coherent trade policy for service industries and eventually to put the issue 
on the GATT agenda (Freeman 2000: 456). At the core of the business coalition was the 
finance industry after American Express joined forces with AIG and Citicorp in 1978. 
 
American Express is a financial firm operating in a wide range of areas from banking 
to insurance. It was particularly competent in credit cards and travel-related business 
including travellers check (Yoffie and Bergenstein 1985: 129-130). Like other financial 
firms, the company encountered significant restrictions during the 1970s because of 
extensive regulations both in the United States and abroad (Yoffie and Bergenstein 
1985: 130). Its non-bank status was an acutely crucial challenge in accessing 
developing country markets, which were generally dominated by a few local banks 
(Freeman 2001: 184). In this regard, the interests of the country encompassed the 
interests in terms of conventional sectoral descriptions of banking, insurance and 
securities (Freeman 2001: 184). Defining company’s economic interests in ‚financial 
services‛ terms would create substantial benefits especially to dismantle foreign 
barriers to its operations in different areas (Freeman 2001: 184). Thus, the company 
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adopted a proactive strategy to turn the company to an ‚integrated service company‛ 
after the appointment of Jim Robinson as chairman and CEO of Amex in 1975 (Yoffie 
and Bergenstein 1985: 129). Robinson made the critical decision to create a broad 
business coalition including both financial and non-financial firms to pursue not only 
the ‚parochial interests‛ of Amex, i.e. opening financial markets, but also other firms’ 
interests by creating political pressure on the U.S. government (Yoffie and Bergenstein 
1985: 130; Freeman 2001: 184). According to Robinson’s deputy Harry Freeman, this 
strategic decision to amalgamate a wide range of forces behind a common cause was 
the ‚single most important decision‛ that was influential in the success of the business 
coalition in putting services on the GATT’s agenda (Freeman 2001: 184). In line with 
this new perspective, the company launched an aggressive and high-profile 
government relations initiative by restructuring its Washington office and launched 
efforts to expand the core TNC coalition to other corporations in financial as well as 
non-financial service sectors (Yoffie and Bergenstein 1985: 130; Freeman 2001: 184). 
 
Telecommunication firms were recruited to the services cause at an early stage. 
Thanks to technological innovations and growth of markets in telecommunications 
during the 1970s, international competition escalated both for service and equipment 
providers in this sector (Cass and Haring 1998: 83-106). An important constraint to 
international trade in telecommunications stemmed from the monopolistic character 
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of the service markets as they were dominated by few companies usually owned by 
the states. The competitiveness of U.S. TNCs in the world markets increased as a 
result of measures by the Reagan administration towards deregulating the domestic 
market in 1984. These measures dismantled the American Telephone & Telegraph 
Company (AT&T), the historical dominator of the internal market (Wada and Asano 
1997: 239). Furthermore, the 1984 deregulation also created a competitive environment 
both for service providers such as AT&T and telecommunications equipment 
suppliers including AT&T, IBM, and Motorola. While the competitiveness of 
American firms increased with lower prices and higher quality in services, these and 
other major telecommunication service providers, such as ITT and FDR Interactive, 
increased their pressure to the government for liberalization of foreign markets 
(Aggarwal 1992: 42). As the sector was brought under the purview of trade policy, 
sectoral leaders revised their offensive interests using trade terms. Thus major trade 
issues for the U.S. TNCs were crystallised as the access to especially EC and Asian 
markets including Japan and South Korea, restrictive government procurement 
procedures in these countries, and widespread governmental subsidies in these and 
other countries (Aggarwal 1992: 43). The immense pressure exerted by U.S. companies 
would result in governmental pressure on trading partners and lead to limited  
liberalization in telecommunication markets.52 While opening markets through the 
                                                 
52 For instance, Japan initiated a deregulation program in 1984. This paved the way for the 
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GATT became a priority for American telecom giants in the early 1980s, bilateral trade 
pressure was also institutionalized to have non-discriminatory access to targetted 
markets.53 The liberalization in telecommunication markets became a significant issue 
also for TNCs operating in other sectors. For many firms communication costs 
constituted the majority of expenses after staffing expenses. Non-discriminatory 
access to telecommunications networks and payment systems were specifically 
essential for daily operations of finance firms such as Amex (Freeman 1986: 573; 2001: 
184).   
 
Construction and engineering was another leading American industry that joined the 
ranks of services campaigners. U.S. construction companies had heavily been engaged 
in international construction projects in the post-war period. However, their 
domination diminished in time because of growing competitiveness of other OECD 
countries as well as NICs such as South Korea (Bhagwati 1987: 210).  An American 
advantage continued in engineering and design, yet developing countries such as 
                                                                                                                                                          
world’s largest privatization initiative in 1986. Japan began selling shares of the government-
owned NTT, even though foreign firms would not be permitted to purchase its shares until 
1992 (Wada and Asano 1997: 211-2). 
53 Bilateral trade agreements negotiated with Japan during the 1980s covered issues such as 
Japanese government procurement practices in computers, satellites, and construction 
services, and telecommunications standards, regulations and licensing procedures in 
telecommunications equipment, international value-added telecommunications services, 
third-party radios and cellular phones (Janow 1998: 176-177 and 199). 
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India, Brazil, Taiwan, Lebanon and South Korea also managed to grow their market 
share and build up competitiveness owing to cheap labour and enhanced technology 
transfer (Bhagwati 1987: 210; OTA 1987: 119). One additional factor that escalated 
international competition in the early 1980s was the shrinking supply of reserves in 
OPEC countries because of the fall of oil prices and the Third World debt crisis, which 
decreased the amount of large scale construction projects in the Middle East and other 
oil-rich countries (OTA 1987: 119). As they were challenged in international markets, 
U.S. construction firms also faced competition at home owing to their disadvantage in 
financial resources vis-à-vis the heavily subsidized firms of Europe, Japan and some 
emerging economies (OTA 1987: 119). Hence, American companies such as Bechtel 
and Caterpillar Mr. and the U.S. International Engineering and Construction 
Industries Council would become vocal actors before and during the Uruguay Round 
to influence U.S. trade policy and strategies by raising their concerns about heavy 
government subsidization in many countries, restrictive regulations as to the 
establishment and location of activity as well as investment rules for the use of local 
content (Aggarwal 1992: 46). As will be examined in the next chapter, major 
developing countries would warm up to the idea of trade negotiations in the 
construction sector at an early stage in the Uruguay Round because they perceived a 
comparative advantage in their labour intensive business activities. 
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In sum, the business coalition was built up under the leadership of U.S. finance giants 
such as AIG, American Express, and Citicorp, and included other companies 
operating in telecommunications and data processing, construction, tourism, 
professional services,  and film industry (Kelsey 2008: 78).54 While these companies 
came together with a collective interest in opening markets through trade policies 
they were not part of a national constituency that would raise mutual concerns vis-à-
vis policy-makers (Shelp 1986: 688). A significant step towards creating a single 
constituency and institutionalizing the coalition-building efforts was the creation of 
the Coalition of Service Industries in January 1982.55 Chaired by Harry Freeman of 
Amex, this coalition came into existence after dedicated effort and leadership of other 
key individuals including the CEOs of American Express (Jim Robinson), AIG (Hank 
Greenberg), and Citicorp (John Reed) and deputies of these CEOs including Freeman, 
Joan Edelman Spero (American Express), and Ronald Shelp (AIG) (Freeman 2000: 456; 
                                                 
54 The U.S. film industry represented by the Motion Picture Association of America, including 
firms such as the Walt Disney Company and MTV, was particularly concerned about the 
protections within the EC market as it imported more than half of U.S. exports in the 1980s. 
The market was largely controlled by national authorities and protected in countries such as 
France through limitations on foreign programs with concerns of cultural identity (Aggarwal 
1992: 44). Another trade concern for the U.S. film industry was the lack of or poor protection 
of intellectual property rights in many developing countries. The sector became an active 
constituent of both services and the TRIPS campaign with a leading role of Fritz Attaway, 
energetic Vice President and General Counsel of the Motion Picture Association (Sell 2003: 49, 
89). 
55 Among the founders were Bechtel engineering and construction, Sea-Land Corporation 
shipping, Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Company accountants, Merrill Lynch, Citicorp, N.A., 
ARA Services diversified management services company, Roebuck, and Beneficial 
Corporation financial services company (Sims and Rivers 1987: 13-4; Kelsey 2008: 78; 
Economist 25 December 1982). 
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Zumwalt 1996: 3-5). Especially Ronald Shelp and Harry Freeman played a proactive 
role in crafting collective business strategies and in generating an action plan to make 
services a priority for U.S. trade policies especially for the insertion of the issue into 
the GATT agenda. Harry Freeman secured substantial financial backing from 
American Express and Jim Robinson to support the joint campaign not only in the 
United States but also in Brussels, Tokyo, and Geneva to build a Northern consensus 
to liberalise service markets through trade negotiations (Freeman 2000: 456). 
Coalition-building included recruitments from within the U.S. bureaucracy. A key 
player in the services debate was Geza Feketekuty at USTR’s Office who spent 
enormous time and energies to activate U.S. trade machinery for service companies in 
cooperation with Ron Shelp and other campaigners. Before starting his career at USTR 
in 1974, Feketekuty had worked as an economist at the Council of Economic Advisers 
and Citicorp (Kelsey 2008: 80).56 In the late 1970s, he was the most informed person on 
trade in services within USTR’s office and played an invaluable role in shaping U.S. 
business and government strategies and educating American policy-makers.  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
56 Feketekuty was appointed Assistant USTR in 1978, Senior Assistant USTR in 1982, and from 
1985 to 1990 Counsellor to USTR (Kelsey 2008: 80). 
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4.2. TNCs in Agenda-Setting for the GATT 
 
Until the late 1970s, only a narrow circle of researchers and professionals, including a 
dozen business executives and government officials believed that international 
transactions in services could be considered as ‚trade‛, that certain regulations 
created obstacles to trade, and that liberalisation could be pursued through applying 
trade norms and principles (Drake and Nicolaidis 1992: 41-7). In other words, the new 
framing was a ‚collective image‛ in Coxian terms that was held only by a small group 
of people. Building a convincing case and promoting it through all available channels 
was crucial to upgrade the idea of trade in services to the status of an ‚intersubjective 
meaning‛ shared broadly by the trade policy community in the United States and 
other countries. The business leaders had to launch a ‚war of position‛ to change the 
established mindset of policy-makers and wider public from thinking trade only in 
goods to a mental framework of ‚goods and services.‛ Such a comprehensive 
education ‚campaign‛ as Geza Feketekuty called it, or service sector ‚movement‛ or 
‚crusade‛ as Harry Freeman labelled it, aimed to capture the intellectual and moral 
leadership within and beyond the business community. The services case was 
constructed as a comprehensive policy formula, i.e. as a public good responding to a 
wide range of interests beyond the parochial corporate interests of a dozen 
companies. Services were also promoted as the engine of U.S. economy, a source of 
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wealth and employment, and a cure for mounting trade deficits and the trading 
system, which was troubled by new protectionism.  
 
To this aim, from 1978 on Geza Feketekuty and other campaigners worked closely in a 
series of ‚mission delineation‛ meetings, to produce a long term ‚action plan‛ that 
would eventually set the GATT agenda for services (Freeman 1996: 19; Feketekuty 
1988: 306). The action plan included three components: (1) Construction of a new 
framework of thinking and a comprehensible policy formula acceptable to policy-
makers and wider public through engaging in the production and dissemination of 
data, knowledge, and analysis on services trade; (2) Expanding the core group of 
individuals believing in the tradability of services by new coalition-building and 
education activities targeting key decision-makers, trade experts and general public; 
and (3) The full activation of the U.S. trade machinery to leverage unilateral, bilateral 
and multilateral channels to open markets, resolve disputes, and forge international 
consensus over GATT negotiations on services. 
 
4.2.1. Promoting Trade in Services as a Comprehensive Policy Formula 
 
The business leaders launched an extensive communication campaign in 1979 to 
ensure the acknowledgement of the ‚trade status‛ of their activities by a wide range 
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of actors in the United States. To this aim, they adopted a strategy to communicate 
their activities, preferences and strategies through trade terminology. Ronald Shelp 
explains this in the following terms:  
 
So we *<+ learned a new terminology—trade terminology. Soon, we were 
constantly repeating a new word—‚services‛—and arguing that insurance, 
credit card transactions, transportation (airlines, ships), banking transactions all 
fell into this category (Shelp with Ehrbar 2006: 127). 
 
Part of this strategy was making terms such as ‚services,‛ ‚financial services,‛ and 
‚trade in services‛ widely established in daily use, especially in the media and among 
key policy-makers. Harry Freeman argues that the term ‚financial services‛ was 
coined by American Express in 1979 and became part of the trade lexicon in the 
coming two years as a result of an aggressive communication campaign (Freeman 
2000: 457). A similar intellectual effort was energized to make ‚goods and services‛ an 
established pattern in defining international trade.57  
 
Secondly, the service campaigners formulated the liberalisation of trade in services as 
a public good that would not only respond to their corporate interests, but also solve a 
number of pressing problems. TNCs built their case vis-à-vis policy makers not only 
by arguing that services were a significant source of employment, crucial to the U.S., 
                                                 
57 To this aim, Freeman claims to have written at least 1600 letters to newspapers to establish 
the phrase ‚goods and services‛ in the mainstream vernacular (Freeman 2000: 457). 
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world trade and the global economy but also by effectively highlighting that it was an 
area subject to regulatory restrictions which could be eliminated by trade instruments 
and negotiations (Drake and Nicolaidis 1992: 50). Business leaders in their public 
speeches, contacts with policy-makers and in their media appearances highlighted 
services as a major source of wealth and employment for the United States and other 
advanced economies. These actors consistently reiterated that services constituted 
‚from 60 percent to nearly 80 percent of gross domestic product and employment‛ 
(Freeman 1996: 19). To illustrate, in a speech, Ronald Shelp contended that 80 percent 
of 29 million new jobs created between 1970 and the mid-1980s were in services (Shelp 
1986: 687). Similarly, Jim Robinson underscored the fact that that 13 million of 14 
million new jobs created for the American female work force in the 1970s were in the 
service industries (cited in the Economist 25 December 1982). A representation of the 
services as a crucial set of economic activities vital to American wealth and 
employment became the standard business case for services to date.58 
 
Thirdly, the campaigners underscored that the U.S. was a top service exporter and 
that it was competitive in sectors such as financial services and telecommunications. 
The liberalisation of barriers to trade in services would not only increase exports and 
                                                 
58 The CSI’s mission statement starts with the following sentences ‚*t+he Coalition of Service 
Industries (CSI) represents the interests of the dynamic American service economy, which 
employs 80% of the workforce and generates 3/4 of national economic output.‛ 
http://www.uscsi.org/about/ accessed on December 15, 2010. 
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ease the problem of trade deficits, but would also address the problem of asymmetry 
in the openness of U.S. market vis-à-vis external markets (Aggarwal 1992; Freeman 
1987: 138; Shelp 1981: 157). In this regard, the services case was not only framed in a 
free trade discourse associated with the rising neoliberal understanding, but also in 
connection with the ability of the U.S. to respond to the decline of its hegemonic 
power and competitiveness (Cafruny 1989, 129).  To deal with the ‚free-rider‛ 
problem, the United States should have provided MFN based access to its service 
markets only if reciprocal opening were secured from regulated markets such as that 
of NICs (Freeman 1986: 575). Bringing services to the GATT would not only enable the 
United States to open external markets, but also address the systemic problems of the 
GATT regime. Considering the speedy growth of world trade in services59, and its 
direct association with trade in goods,60 it was essential to broaden the scope of the 
GATT to curb protectionism and to update the system to address the problems of the 
‚post-industrial revolution‛ (Shelp 1986: 688-9; Freeman 1986: 573). This narrative was 
in concurrence with the popular debate about the beginning of the ‚post-industrial‛ 
era with the decline of the old manufacturing base and the rise of service sector which 
                                                 
59 As per Freeman, the world trade in services was growing twice as fast of manufacturing 
trade as it increased from $85 billion in the early 1970s to an amount of $620 billion in the 
mid-1980s (Freeman 1986: 573). 
60 It was argued that trade in services in banking, insurance, accounting, travel, transportation 
etc. was intertwined with trade in goods as an ‚indispensable adjunct of every traded 
product‛ (Freeman 1986: 573; Arkell 1992: 24). 
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captured the largest share in domestic production in the U.S. and other industrialised 
countries (Mundo 1999: 290).  
 
The case of services -framed in trade terminology and presented along with the 
interests of the United States and the world trading system- was promoted through a 
proactive education campaign targeting key business leaders, policy-makers and the 
media. A significant channel to disseminate the business case for the GATT was in the 
advisory business bodies, which were created in the 1970s to inform U.S. trade 
policies. After its establishment, Jim Robinson of American Express would chair the 
Services Policy Advisory Committee (SPAC) on the advice of Harry Freeman (Kelsey 
2008: 78). Similarly, USTR Bob Strauss appointed Hank Greenberg of AIG to the 
presidential ACTN (Feketekuty 1988: 304; Kelsey 2008: 77). On the other hand, Ronald 
Shelp would head the Industry Sector Advisory Committee on Services in addition to 
his chairmanship of the services committee in the U.S. Chamber of Commerce 
(Feketekuty 1988: 308; Kelsey 2008: 78). Intensive contacts with government officials 
through these bodies and regular lobbying activities would create a loose business-
government coalition for trade in services in the United States that would expand in 
the early 1980s.61 
                                                 
61 Harry Freeman was succeeded by Joan E. Spero at Amex, who also worked actively for the 
services campaign and CSI. Spero was appointed as Undersecretary for Economic, Business, 
and Agricultural Affairs under the State Department by President Clinton in 1993. 
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The campaigners also engaged in conferences, interviews and articles in newspapers 
to establish the new pattern of thinking and to disseminate their case within civil 
society. Beginning in 1979, Jim Robinson as well as other campaigners gave numerous 
speeches in meetings they attended with academics, trade officials, members of 
Congress and other politicians (Yoffie and Bergenstein 1985: 131). They succeeded in 
drawing the attention of newspapers and the media. In March 1979, TPRC co-hosted a 
two-day conference with the Financial Times to discuss the multilateral trade 
framework for services liberalisation (Kelsey 2008: 79). Yoffie and Bergenstein (1985: 
131) contend that, top American Express executives engaged in the trade in services 
campaign were quoted on an almost weekly basis in 1982 in widely read publications 
such as The Economist, Fortune, and The New York Times (Yoffie and Bergenstein 1985: 
131). The issue would attract further attention as the Reagan administration embraced 
the case and started pushing the GATT agenda from 1982 on. ‚Drama‛ was created 
with the rise of resistance from India, Brazil and some other developing countries to 
the new issues before the launch of the Uruguay Round, which not only kept the issue 
in the news, but also stimulated additional requests for information from journalists 
(Feketekuty 1988: 311). By the mid-1980s the services issue became a well-discussed 
public topic in the United States media. In 1984, the Fortune magazine for the first time 
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published a list of top 500 companies for the services sector, as the counterpart of 
Fortune 500 list of manufacturing companies (Zumwalt 1996, 5).  
 
With the motive of producing a legitimate academic basis for their case, U.S. business 
executives also heavily engaged in the production of new knowledge and analysis on 
services through sponsoring research and studies, and supporting and participating 
in conferences.  Starting from the late 1970s U.S. and UK business leaders sponsored 
formal and informal meetings and conferences that gathered likeminded people from 
around the Atlantic and the world to educate policy leadership and extend the 
coalition for a GATT on services to experts, academics, journalists and government 
officials in other countries (Feketekuty; Shelp 2010, interviews). In the academic 
discussion and exchange of views, Hugh Corbet and the Trade Policy Research Centre 
(TPRC) played an active role especially through organising conferences, seminars and 
private meetings in different locations such as Ditchley Park (Oxford, UK), Wiston 
House (south of London), and the Rockefeller property in Bellagio (Northern Italy) 
(Feketekuty 1988: 310; Kelsey 2008: 79). The World Economy journal published by TPRC 
helped establishing the concept of trade in services in the academy (Feketekuty 1988: 
310). While some business leaders wrote in this journal to contribute to the debate, 
Ronald Shelp of AIG also wrote a book titled ‚Beyond Industrialisation, Ascendancy 
of the Global Services Economy‛ in 1981 examining the ways to apply GATT norms to 
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services liberalisation. On the other hand, several research institutes and think tanks 
in the U.S. and Europe joined the policy debate with conferences and panels they held 
and new publications they generated.62 In 1983, the International Association for the 
Study of Insurance Economics initiated a Programme for Research on the Service 
Economy (PROGRES) in Geneva to provide a venue for debate on trade in services 
and regulations (Kelsey 2008: 79).  
 
Active business engagement in the academic debate and production would have two 
significant consequences. The first consequence was the expansion of the core group 
of researchers, professionals and experts studying services as an expansive policy 
network or epistemic community. According to Dahan et al. (2006: 1573), policy 
networks are ‚self-organizing forms that coordinate a growing number of public 
(decision-makers) and private (interest groups) actors for the purpose of formulating 
and implementing public policies‛ and are ‚increasingly formed and accessed by‛ 
TNCs. In fact, the transnational policy network for services that would expand 
                                                 
62 Among others these included U.S. based organisations such as U.S. Council for 
International Business, Council of Foreign Relations, National Foreign Trade Council, 
Committee for Economic Development, the Conference Board, Center for Strategic and 
International Studies, American Enterprise Institute, German Marshall Fund of the United 
States, and non-U.S. institutes and think tanks such as the Trade Policy Research Centre 
(London), the UK Liberalisation of Trade in Services Committee (LOTIS), Centre for the Study 
of International Negotiations (Geneva), Centre for Transnational Corporations (New York), 
Atwater Institute (Montreal), Promethee (Paris), and International Chamber of Commerce 
(Paris) (Feketekuty 1988: 311; 2010, interview; Wesselius 2002). 
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through the 1980s took the form of an epistemic community which is a particular form 
of policy network, ‚a network of professionals with recognised expertise and 
competence in a particular domain and an authoritative claim to policy-relevant 
knowledge within that domain or issue area‛ (Drake and Nicolaidis 1992; Dahan et al 
2006: 1579; Haas 1992: 3). Drake and Nicolaidis (1992: 50) contend that the core Anglo-
American nucleus of the services epistemic community were experts inspired by 
classical liberal thinking believing in the potential across-the-board applicability of 
trade norms and principles to service liberalisation (Drake and Nicolaidis 1992: 50).63 
According to Kelsey (2008: 77), the new research helped ‚construct a new legitimising 
discourse that depoliticised the services issue and translated [..] it into an abstract 
conceptual framework and technicist language that was capable of becoming law.‛  
 
To recapitulate, as envisaged by the business action plan, the tradability of services 
and the belief in the applicability of GATT norms to liberalize service markets became 
ideas shared by a broader group of people from around the world. This would 
eventually contribute to the change of ‚intersubjective meanings‛ within the trade 
                                                 
63 Drake and Nicolaidis (1992; 39) note that the services epistemic community consisted of a 
two-tiered membership whose first tier was composed of the business, government and 
international agency representatives who worked for institutions with direct interest in policy 
options produced by the community. The campaigners initially in the U.S., from the late 1970s 
on also in Europe and Japan, were supported by the second tier of membership which 
contained academics, industry specialists, journalists and lawyers who were interested in 
trade in services purely from an intellectual perspective. 
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regime from a goods mental framework to a goods and services framework. 
Nevertheless, a transformation of the GATT regime would eventually come through 
only after fully convincing U.S. policy-makers, activating American trade bodies, and 
ensuring a consensus among OECD governments.  
 
4.2.2. Activating U.S. Trade Policy  
 
With the mandate created in 1974 and increasing pressure from TNCs through 
advisory channels and direct lobbying, the U.S. government took a number of steps to 
address the concerns of service industries in the 1970s. The U.S. government 
dedicated its efforts to produce data and information on trade in services. While the 
Commerce Department commissioned the first comprehensive study by Wolf and 
Company in 1976, the U.S. Chamber of Commerce launched a survey to determine the 
barriers to U.S. service industries abroad. This would feed into the U.S. national 
submission to the GATT in 1983, which became the most comprehensive compilation 
of data on world trade in services (Feketekuty 1988: 303, 319-10). In addition to 
bringing services issue to the Tokyo Round, the U.S. government also took the issue to 
the OECD to launch a policy debate and examine services from a trade perspective. 
Geza Feketekuty was representing the U.S. in the Trade Committee of the OECD 
where the issue was first raised by the U.S. delegation in late 1978 (Feketekuty 1988: 
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305; Kelsey 2008: 62). As Feketekuty argues, the initial debate in the OECD was on the 
‚desirability‛ of a study to examine trade in services because of ‚widespread 
scepticism whether there was such a thing as trade in services‛ (Feketekuty 1988: 314). 
Nevertheless, the United States continued persisting on the initiation of such a study 
within the Trade Committee with the goal of producing ‚generic rules‛ for the 
liberalisation of trade distorting regulations for a different set of industries (Kelsey 
2008:  63). The purpose was to evidence the common trade features of service 
industries and the barriers they face in international trade for the future deliberations 
on creating general principles applicable across the board. The Americans eventually 
convinced their counterparts to launch a generic study on trade in services as the 
concept was ‚normalised‛ among OECD trade officials (Kelsey 2008:  63). Although it 
would take a couple of more years to take all OECD members on board for a broad 
initiative at the GATT, a Northern consensus on the tradability of services and belief 
in liberalisation through trade norms and principles emerged in the early 1980s. The 
OECD study would be completed and published in 1987 with the title of ‚Elements of 
a Conceptual Framework for Trade in Services,‛ which would not only prove this 
consensus but also contain methodologies on the applicability of trade norms to 
services (OECD 1987).   
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The business campaign would yield more concrete benefits from 1982 on, especially as 
the Reagan administration found the business case concurrent with its neoliberal 
agenda. USTR William Brock’s following statement in 1982 indicates the receptiveness 
of the administration: 
  
International trade in services is critical to economic growth. It creates 
significant new job opportunities, stimulates gains in productivity and 
provides consumer benefits. It is essential to and inseparable from international 
trade in goods. (Brock 1982: 230) 
 
The Reagan administration, which was under pressure from domestic lobbies, and a 
protectionist Congress found the idea of services liberalisation through trade 
negotiations in line with its free trade program. The liberalisation of services was 
increasingly perceived as a cure for mounting U.S. trade deficits in goods. The U.S. 
trade deficit in goods stood at $31 billion in 1980, which increased five times between 
1981-85, and reached $170 billion in 1987 (Preeg 1995: 49; Paemen and Bench 1995: 93). 
As seen in the graph below, U.S. trade balance in goods continued to give deficit 
whereas U.S. services exports remained higher than imports through the mid 1990s. 
 
 
 
 
 152 
 
Graph 1: U.S. Trade in Goods and Services - Balance of Payments (BOP) Basis 
 
 
 
Source: U.S. Census Bureau, Foreign Trade Division (Value in millions of U.S. dollars). See the 
detailed figures in Annex 4. 
 
 
Opening service markets abroad would help attenuate the trade deficit without 
closing U.S. markets, create a competitive edge for American industries, and help 
fight protectionism at home and abroad. New research and studies were supportive of 
the idea that liberalisation of trade in services would respond to the decreasing 
competitiveness of manufacturing by helping to curb protectionism in goods, and it 
would create further economic gains for the U.S. and other economies (Drake and 
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Nicolaidis 1992: 51; Aronson and Cowhey 1984: 17-8; Kennedy 1992: 2). USTR 
updated the data compiled from service industries by the U.S. Chamber of Commerce 
to   reflect the scale of international trade and barriers faced by U.S. industries 
(Feketekuty 1988: 309). USTR Brock found the data convincing to pursue an ambitious 
plan at the GATT (Brock 1982: 237). Furthermore, USTR Brock also bought in the idea 
that services would complement existing GATT rules. He maintained: 
 
If the trend of increasing barriers to trade in services continues unchecked, 
trade opportunities could be markedly reduced and the international trading 
system could be seriously harmed (Brock 1982: 234). 
 
In this regard, services was increasingly viewed as a multidimensional vehicle to 
respond to trade deficits and declining competitiveness of the U.S., as an issue of 
systemic importance to fight rising protectionism, and as a public good to create a 
win-win situation for developed and developing countries. A Commerce Department 
official outlined the Reagan administration’s perception of services in the following 
terms:  
Services was perceived to be something we were relatively good at, something 
that the newly industrialised countries probably had a need for *<.+ The 
overall market-opening approach would work there, and would counter the 
market-closing approach here. It was based on a perception of real gains, but it 
wasn’t based on a lot of detailed microeconomic analysis. It was sort of a 
general perception: there was a philosophical dimension and a political 
dimension (Cited in Kennedy 1992: 3). 
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The administration was convinced about the applicability of GATT norms, principles 
and procedures to trade liberalisation in services ‚in spite of the diversity and special 
characteristics of trade in services‛ (Brock 1982: 238). Hence it brought the issue to the 
1982 Ministerial Conference of the GATT. The GATT was regarded as the primary 
multilateral instrument, which needed to be reinvigorated to open markets to the 
sectors where the US was advantageous. Services took part as the crown jewel of an 
ambitious American program for the GATT, which also included the liberalisation of 
international trade in agriculture and high technology products as well as dismantling 
barriers to foreign direct investment (Croome 1995: 11). Thus a new round would 
become a viable option, not only to resolve the ‚unfinished business‛ of the Tokyo 
Round, but also to integrate ‚new subjects‛ to the GATT structure, i.e. trade in 
services, trade related investment measures, and later intellectual property rights. 
Initiating a new round also had a political aspect as it would signify the ongoing 
leadership role of the U.S., which was now acting to curb international protectionist 
demands in the international realm (Preeg 1995:  22, 54). Nevertheless, the case for 
services was an ambitious, but premature initiative at the GATT in 1982. Given the 
opposition from the developing world and lack of support from the EC, the issue of 
services was postponed until the meeting of the Contracting Parties in 1984. Yet, it 
was decided that parties could submit case studies on national service sectors on a 
voluntary and informal basis to explore the matter (Croome 1995: 16). In the 
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meantime, services was further integrated in U.S. trade policy-making through the 
Trade Act in 1984. The U.S. put services on the agenda of the free trade negotiations 
with Israel, which created some provisions germane to services (Freeman 1996: 20). 
Similarly, the U.S. put industry-specific regulatory issues on the bilateral trade 
agenda. Bilateral talks with trade partners as well as forthcoming free trade agreement 
negotiations with Canada became the ‚dress rehearsals‛ for the multilateral talks 
(Feketekuty 1988: 313).  
 
4.2.3. Building a Northern Consensus for a GATT for Services 
 
Service campaigners not only built a loose alliance with government officials and 
networked with academics and journalists, but they also expanded the business 
coalition by recruiting other companies and business associations within the United 
States and abroad. As the issue occupied the trade policy agenda from the early 1980s 
on, sectoral business associations actively joined the debate to raise the preferences of 
their members on specific policy and negotiation topics defined within the trade 
framework.64 The perspectives generated in sectoral and cross-sectoral bodies through 
an exchange of views among companies generally reflected a balance of interests of 
                                                 
64 Among others, the International Insurance Council, U.S. International Engineering and 
Construction Industries Council, the Motion Picture Association of America, and the 
American Institute of Merchant Shipping were vocal sectoral bodies during the Uruguay 
Round (Aggarwal 1992: 45-7). 
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the membership. Within this picture, the Coalition of Service Industries, as the 
umbrella body representing pro-liberalisation TNCs, took the role of translating a 
wide set of business interests into a single U.S. business perspective. CSI members 
also took part in broader business groupings such as the Business Roundtable, the 
U.S. Chamber of Commerce and in other ad hoc coalitions emerged during the 
Uruguay Round. These gatherings/groupings allowed the campaigners to build cross-
sectoral alliances with companies in manufacturing and other sectors. These coalition-
building efforts helped create a sound domestic constituency in the United States in 
favour of the liberalisation of trade in services. Consequently, the tradability and 
importance of services for the U.S. economy became widely shared beliefs within the 
U.S. business community in the mid-1980s. On the other hand, as the business 
coalition became larger, the ambitious U.S. business vision faced a number of 
challenges from within the Northern block that would pave the way for an eventual 
compromise at the GATT for a flexible framework agreement to yield market opening 
in the longer term.  
 
From the late 1970s on, U.S. campaigners worked to get European companies on 
board for bringing services to the GATT agenda. The earlier business interaction 
served as a way to gather European support for the American initiative to examine 
the services issue at the OECD (Feketekuty 2010, interview). As the debate intensified 
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in the early 1980s, the U.S. campaigners worked to convince their European 
counterparts to create a constituency for trade in services domestically and at the 
European level. A services coalition identical to CSI formed in Britain in 1982. Already 
concerned about the elimination of international capital exchange restrictions since 
1968, the British Invisible Exports Council created the Liberalisation of Trade in 
Services (LOTIS) Committee as an intersectoral national coalition for the liberalization 
of trade in services (Arkell 2008, interview).65 In the establishment of the LOTIS 
coalition, British financial sector and especially Lloyd’s insurance company took the 
leading role (Feketekuty; Shelp 2010, interviews). Representing banking and financial 
firms of the City of London, the LOTIS Committee became an active European 
business player supportive of the services cause before and after the launch of the 
Uruguay Round.66 Following the U.S. and British examples similar coalitions would 
proliferate in different locations such as Sweden and Ireland as well as in Australia, 
Hong Kong, New Zealand and Argentina in a time span of less than a decade (El-
Etreby 2008). The U.S. and UK campaigners also interacted with business leaders in 
                                                 
65 The British Invisible Exports Council was originally created as the Committee on Invisible 
Exports by the Bank of England in 1968 and was renamed British Invisibles (BI) in 1990. It was 
redesigned as International Financial Services, London (IFSL) in 2001. From 1 June 2010 IFSL 
has merged its activities, staff and business membership into TheCityUK, the new 
promotional body for the industry.  
66 The difference of LOTIS from the CSI was that the former incorporated government 
representatives in its organization through a committee-based structure. The membership 
included representatives of the Department of Trade and Industry (DTI), Treasury, Foreign 
and Commonwealth Office (FCO), the Bank of England, and the Financial Services Authority 
(FSA) (Beder 2006: 138). 
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France, Germany, Portugal, Canada, and Japan67 for the establishment of similar 
domestic alliances for services (Arkell 2008). In addition to business mobilisation in 
key countries, European service campaigners also launched efforts to create a regional 
business alliance for trade in services. These efforts went hand in hand with the TNC 
mobilisation that rejuvenated European integration to create a single market from the 
mid-1980s on.  
 
The TNC mobilisation for a single European market started in 1983 after CEOs of 17 
leading companies created the European Roundtable of Industrialists (ERT) with the 
purpose of modernising the industrial basis of European production and enhancing 
their global competitiveness  (Van Apeldoorn 2001: 77; Cowles 1995).68 According to 
Van Apeldoorn (2001: 78-82), since its inception, ERT became the central force that 
promoted a neoliberal perspective for European integration. The single market 
program that emerged in 1992 was a synthesis of the ERT’s perspective with the neo-
mercantilist vision of protectionist forces in favour of defensive regionalism behind 
                                                 
67 In Japan no formal services-specific coalition was formed. Keidanren a country-wide 
business association that represents Japanese business interests in both services and 
manufacturing became the sole vocal voice to leverage the services case vis-à-vis the 
government from the late 1970s on (Arkell 2008, interview; Feketekuty 2010, interview). 
68 These businessmen were Pehr G. Gyllenhammar (Volvo), Karl Beurle (Thyssen), Carlo De 
Benedetti (Olivetti), Curt Nicolin (ASEA), Harry Gray (United Technologies), John Harvey - 
Jones (ICI), Wolfgang Seelig (Siemens), Umberto Agnelli (Fiat), Peter Baxendell (Shell), Olivier 
Lecerf (Lafarge Coppée), José Bidegain (Cie de St Gobain), Wisse Dekker (Philips), Antoine 
Riboud (BSN), Bernard Hanon (Renault), Louis von Planta (Ciba-Geigy) and Helmut Maucher 
(Nestlé) (Cowles 1995: 505-7).  
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tariff walls as well as the social democratic vision of Jacques Delors, president of the 
European Commission (Apeldoorn 2001: 75-6).69 In this context, while U.S. and British 
business leaders enabled the mobilisation of European TNCs for the services cause 
through regional business bodies such as ERT, the European formula for services 
liberalisation was shaped in an interaction of different social forces influential in the 
process of European trade policy-making (Arkell 2008, interview). In addition to ERT, 
the Union of Industrial and Employers' Confederations of Europe (UNICE) was 
another actice player in converging national business interests into a collective 
European corporate vision as to the EC’s Common Commercial Policies.70 On the 
other hand, as Cowles (2001: 159-168) argues, national industry associations in major 
European countries played a crucial role in influencing European trade policies 
through lobbying their governments at the capitals up until the institutionalisation of 
regional business interaction with European institutions in Brussels in the mid-1990s. 
In addition to cross-sectoral domestic and regional business bodies, European service 
industries also established an issue-specific regional business body to shape the 
                                                 
69 As a result of certain compromises among these forces during the course of the 1980s, the 
Maastricht Treaty of 1992 emerged as a synthesis over ‚embedded neo-liberalism.‛ This 
theoretical framework shaped the normative content of European regional order. Van 
Apeldoorn (2001: 83-8) argues that under the pressure of globalisation the 1990s saw a 
normative shift towards further neoliberalism with an emphasis on  global competitiveness. 
70 UNICE, the prominent business voice supporting European integration, has represented 
employers and industrial federations from around Europe since the 1950s. In 2007, UNICE 
changed its name into BusinessEurope (www.businesseurope.eu last accessed on November 
19, 2010).  
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European Commission’s agenda as services issue came to the GATT meetings in the 
early 1980s. Hence, in late 1985 they created the European Community Services Group 
(ECSG) which kept regular contact with the European Commission throughout the 
Uruguay Round (Arkell 2008, interview).71 UNICE, ERT and ECSG continued to be 
focal platforms shaping business opinions after the initiation of the Uruguay Round. 
Julian Arkell, who was a leading British campaigner with LOTIS between 1981 and 
1995 and a consultant with BI from mid-1985 till late 1992, chaired the services trade 
group of the UNICE and functioned also as the secretary of the ECSG. He became a 
bridge-builder to ensure that LOTIS, ECSG, and UNICE would ‚channel the same 
message‛ from service industries to the European Commission (Arkell 2008, 
interview).  
 
In this context, although the U.S. TNCs expanded their coalition to Europe and other 
OECD countries by recruiting new companies to the services cause, these pro-
liberalisation forces would face the challenge of protectionist forces from within the 
Northern block. The U.S. business vision for services was to halt the growth of non-
tariff barriers to services trade through a ‚standstill‛ decision at the GATT. Plus they 
called for an ambitious deregulation of barriers to trade and investment by an across-
                                                 
71 The ECSG was transformed to the European Services Forum (ESF) in 1998 with the 
encouragement of Lord Brittan, European Commissioner for Trade and External Relations 
(Arkell 2008, interview). 
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the-board application of trade norms such as conditional MFN and national treatment 
preferably through a top-down liberalisation method (Freeman 1986: 575; Freeman 
2001: 185). Nevertheless, the Northern consensus would emerge over a less ambitious 
liberalisation program. 
 
The first challenge arose with the involvement of non-commerce bureaucratic actors 
in the process of national preference-building as the services issue was put on the 
agendas of the OECD and the GATT. The OECD debate in the early 1980s revealed 
certain domestic sensitivities about the non-commercial functions of internal 
regulations by surfacing two sets of problems (Kelsey 2008:  64-66). The first set of 
problems was the challenge from non-trade officials who questioned the classical 
trade approach to eliminate arguably legitimate regulations put in force to fulfil 
certain social objectives. The second related set of problems arose because of the 
divisions within Europe in the early 1980s especially between different bureaucratic 
bodies in capitals, and between member states and the European Commission, who 
lacked competence and resources to develop an ambitious approach to liberalise 
services. Distinguishing non-tariff barriers from legitimate regulations serving non-
commercial purposes would become a thorny issue both for academics and Uruguay 
Round negotiators in Geneva (Drake and Nicolaidis 1992: 63). A remarkable example 
is the ‚prudential concerns‛ raised in the sectoral discussions on financial regulations 
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with regard to the integrity and stability of financial system (Key 1997: 18-20; Drake 
and Nicolaidis 1992: 77). Ironically, these non-commercial concerns were flagged not 
only by developing countries, but also by non-trade bureaucratic bodies within OECD 
governments such as the U.S. Treasury.  The U.S. Treasury, worried about losing its 
turf to trade bodies, took a position against the incorporation of financial services into 
a single multilateral accord under the GATT by highlighting those prudential issues. 
This was at odds with the request of the U.S. financial sector as well as USTR officials 
who were in favour of a generic approach to all service sectors (Key 1997: 18-9).  
 
Secondly, the activation of the European trade machinery for services took some time 
due to the complex decision-making process within the EC and involvement of 
protectionist bureaucratic forces in the process. First of all, the early European 
reaction to the U.S. initiative to launch a new GATT round received a cool welcome. 
The EC was unenthusiastic to take broad initiatives at the GATT, due largely to its 
concern to keep its CAP untouched, and the entrenched fear of erosion of its 
preferential trade with former colonies (Croome 1995: 11). Furthermore, the services 
issue was new to the European Commission, which lacked human resources and 
competence as noted above. Therefore, only after the gradual assessment of 
comparative advantages on the part of individual member countries such as Britain 
and France, the European Communities declared its official support for the new 
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round with services in March 1985 (Kennedy 1992: 4; Paemen and Bench 1995: 34). By 
1985, with both the Europeans and Japanese on board, the Northern consensus was 
forged to bring services to the GATT agenda. Nonetheless, as business interests were 
defined in trade terms and put on the GATT agenda, protectionist interests as well as 
pro-liberalisation preferences would emerge on both sides of the Atlantic. While the 
U.S. shipping industry had taken an active part in the business campaign to insert 
services into the U.S. Trade Act of 1974, during the 1980s the U.S. maritime sector 
turned adamantly against a GATT services agreement that would include 
liberalisation commitments for the sector (Feketekuty 1988: 300; Aggarwal 1992: 45). 
These anti-liberalisation forces were later joined by the French audio-visual 
opposition on the other side of the Atlantic in their lobbying for exemption from 
market opening. Consequently, it would become clear by the end of the decade that a 
top-down ambitious approach to liberalisation would not be possible with the EC 
favouring ‚progressive liberalisation‛ together with developing countries, and 
domestic business lobbies in the U.S. and Europe campaigning for exclusion from 
liberalisation. 
 
Conclusion 
The liberalisation of services within a trade policy framework was an idea discussed 
among a small circle of experts up until it was adopted and promoted by some 
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corporate leaders in the United States during the 1970s. The regulation of services 
trade and investment under the GATT was pushed by the United States in the early 
1980s, and services were inserted into the mandate of the Uruguay Round in 1986 
only after policy-makers in the OECD countries reached consensus over the 
tradability of services. This chapter argued that the leading social forces that set the 
GATT agenda on services were American TNCs especially in the finance sector, which 
mobilized companies operating in other service industries in the United States and 
Europe. The TNCs in a wide range of service sectors redefined their interests in trade 
terms and coalesced around an action plan from the late 1970s on to put services on 
the U.S. trade policy agenda and the GATT. The TNCs as hegemonic social forces 
engaged in a war of position to capture the intellectual and moral leadership by 
changing the established mind-set of ‚trade in goods‛ with a new framework of trade 
in ‚goods and services‛. Through building coalitions with other firms and 
government officials in the U.S. and abroad, and building a policy network of experts, 
the campaigners developed a policy formula reflective of interests of a broad range of 
actors. The new way of thinking, shared by a larger set of actors in the OECD region 
by the mid-1980s, would ultimately reach the status of intersubjective meaning within 
the trade regime after the launch of the Uruguay Round talks in 1986. The 
intergovernmental negotiations in Geneva are examined in the next chapter.  
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CHAPTER 5: BUILDING NORTH/SOUTH CONSENSUS FOR INTEGRATING 
SERVICES TO THE TRADE REGIME  
 
The Uruguay Round was launched in 1986 to resolve overwhelming challenges faced 
by the trading regime and to address economic recession and the needs of countries of 
different levels of development. The United States brought services to the GATT in 
the early 1980s within a package of issues that would arguably respond to a set of 
problems that the trading system faced. The U.S. proposals were challenged by 
developing countries united under the Group of 77 led by India and Brazil, who 
argued that the GATT lacked judicial competence to negotiate services since it was not 
a trade issue. However, the number of countries opposing a new round with services 
issue decreased to 10 in 1986. As the round and the talks in services commenced, the 
hardliners not only lifted their embargo on services, but also proactively engaged in 
the negotiations to defend their interests now framed within the trade framework to 
ensure that the GATS was hammered out as a development friendly instrument 
operating upon the principle of progressive liberalization. The case promoted by the 
Northern block was adopted by developing countries at an early stage in the talks, 
showing the paradigm shift among trade negotiators who gradually acknowledged 
services as a subject of international trade. Nevertheless, the case of the TNCs 
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regarding an across the board application of GATT rules to services had to be 
adjusted in the process of building the legal framework to liberalize trade in services. 
In this regard, while developing countries joined actively in GATS talks. The ability of 
TNCs to set the agenda diminished as the negotiations advanced.  
 
This chapter analyses the multilateral negotiations integrating services to the GATT 
regime by focusing on the consensus-building between the Northern and Southern 
governments, the engagement of developing countries to the agenda-setting and 
norm-building for the liberalisation of services, and the role of the TNCs in this 
process.  The first two sections explore the intergovernmental consensus-building at 
the GATT before and during the Uruguay Round. The third section concentrates on 
the changing attitudes of developing countries and their engagement in agenda-
setting as well as the TNC activities during the Uruguay Round in the context of 
hegemonic transformation. The last section sums up the role of TNCs in agenda-
setting by outlining their strategies.  
 
5.1. Towards the Uruguay Round  
 
The initiation of the Uruguay Round was a manifestation of the collective will of 
governments from the North and the South to reverse ongoing protectionism and to 
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revitalize world trade, which would energize the world economy suffering recession. 
In 1980, the annual growth rate of world trade had reduced to a level of 1% (Croome 
1995: 7). This trend continued in the subsequent years reaching a level of -2% in 1982 
(for the first time below zero since the 1930s) parallel to a -2% annual growth rate in 
world output (Preeg 1995:  2, 33). Policies affecting the flow of international trade 
were no longer simply tariffs and quotas, but also domestic regulations and various 
economic policies and practices. Global economic integration had not only linked 
finance, development, and trade, but also investment and technology transfer policies, 
which altogether were guiding the strategies of the governments as well as TNCs 
(Preeg 1995: 12-3). Consequently, the Uruguay Round was launched with an explicit 
recognition of the relationship between trade and other economic policies, which 
emphasised ‚the linkage between trade, money, finance and development‛ (See the 
Punta del Este Declaration in Annex 2). This linkage naturally brought domestic 
economic policies onto the negotiation table to stress their impact on trade policies, as 
summarised in the objective of the Punta del Este Declaration, to ‚foster concurrent 
co-operative action at the national and international levels to strengthen the 
interrelationship between trade policies and other economic policies affecting growth 
and development.‛ This declaration of September 1986 set the primary objective of the 
round as to ‚strengthen the role of GATT‛ and ‚increase the responsiveness of the 
GATT system to the evolving international economic environment.‛ The mandate 
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contained negotiations both in conventional areas of trade in goods and new domains 
such as intellectual property rights, services and investment. Hence, the round 
covered market access talks in agriculture, manufactured goods including textiles and 
high technology products, and negotiations to build up new disciplines on selected 
trade related issues such as trade distorting investment measures and intellectual 
property rights. The talks in services entailed both new rule-making to create a 
framework and market access talks based on the created framework.  
 
5.1.1. Launching the round  
 
It was not easy to build up intergovernmental consensus to embark upon such an 
ambitious initiative. The Tokyo Round ended with many unresolved issues . The 
major outcome of it, the plurilateral codes were negotiated and signed mainly by 
developed countries (Jackson 2002: 70). The American initiative to incorporate 
agriculture into the GATT had failed because of European intransigence, which 
emanated from political sensitivities within the European Community towards 
protecting the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) (Jackson 2002: 313-4). The round 
could not reform the malfunctioning dispute settlement system either as the disputes 
brought to the GATT made a record in 1980 with thirteen cases, ten of which were in 
agriculture (Croome 1995: 7). These outstanding issues from the Tokyo Round 
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constituted the work program of the Consultative Group of Eighteen, which was 
made by senior trade officials from eighteen developed and developing countries. To 
take the unfinished business of the Tokyo Round and other systemic concerns of the 
contracting parties, the Group of Eighteen proposed in June 1981 to convene the next 
GATT Contracting Parties meeting at ministerial level within the following year. 
Organising a GATT ministerial meeting was not a usual practice since the last such 
gathering was in 1973 to launch the Tokyo Round (Croome 1995: 12). In this regard, 
the decision signified the political importance attached to the existing problems and 
the willingness of the contracting parties to discuss possible ways to bring 
comprehensive solutions to systemic problems. The preparatory meetings for the 1982 
Ministerial revealed the fact that the governments had numerous concerns to inject 
onto the agenda, which had to be handled through a broad action plan. Although the 
idea of launching a new round was in the air, a political decision and building its 
mandate had to wait until the 1986 Punta del Este summit. 
 
The United States was the first actor proposing the idea of a new round as a 
comprehensive initiative to equip the GATT with instruments to respond to systemic 
and economic problems beyond conventional trade issues. The U.S. trade policy 
agenda of the early 1980s was set under the pressure of increasing competition from 
the EC, Japan and newly industrialised economies. As the world’s largest debtor, 
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losing its technological lead with a growing trade deficit, the U.S. was exploring new 
strategies to open markets and to tackle the surge of imports in industries 
incrementally losing competitiveness (Preeg 1995: 50; Mundo 1999: 119-20; Destler 
2005: 51-3). Nonetheless, the Reagan administration, which took power in January 
1981, adopted a free-market program in tandem with efforts to keep protectionist 
sentiments at bay, within which the GATT took a cardinal role to open markets to the 
sectors where the US was advantageous (Cohen et al. 2003: 41-2; Destler 2005: 82-90; 
196-7). Thus, the ambitious U.S. agenda for the GATT would include the liberalisation 
of international trade in agriculture and high technology products as well as 
dismantling barriers to foreign direct investment and exports of American services 
(Croome 1995: 11). Initiating a new round also had a political aspect since it would 
signify the ongoing leadership role of the U.S. in the international realm, now acting 
to curb international protectionist demands (Preeg 1995:  22, 54). As Preeg contends, 
the Reagan administration also saw the GATT as an ideological tool to impose 
neoliberalism as it promoted market-oriented trade policies as the only viable 
alternative to the import substitution option of the South and the planned economic 
alternative of the Communist block (Preeg 1995: 18-19). However, a GATT-based 
initiative required garnering support of other industrialised economies as well as 
developing countries.  
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As noted in the previous chapter, Europeans were defensive about the idea of an 
encompassing initiative at the GATT that would require adjustments to their 
Common Agricultural Policy and that would lead to the erosion of preferential trade 
with former colonies (Croome 1995: 11). French President Francois Mitterrand who 
was a former minister of agriculture, was especially vociferous in opposing any 
initiative that would bring agriculture under the purview of the GATT (Paemen and 
Bensch 1995: 32). On the other hand, the U.S. had been a long standing opponent of 
the EC’s agricultural supports and subsidies distorting international trade, and the 
Reagan administration was decisive in putting the sector on a GATT round (Yeutter 
1998: 64-8).72 Meanwhile, transatlantic trade relations were under the stress of 
transatlantic disputes in pasta, citrus fruit as well as steel (Golt 1988:  15). On the 
flipside, a GATT round might have created opportunities for the EC to address 
pressing issues such as the Japanese trade practices and surpluses, as well as the US-
Japanese sectoral bilateral arrangements which, arguably, distorted trade flows and 
world prices in specific commodities important to the EC (Golt 1988:  11, 15). To come 
to terms with a new round, the EC needed to see clear benefits, especially if farming 
was to be put on the table. Hence, the EC adopted a discourse of ‚balance of benefits‛ 
pointing out Japan’s trade practices, but also implicitly targeting NICs, which were 
                                                 
72 The ambition to include agriculture on the agenda of a new round was also related to the 
desire of the Reagan administration for a market-based domestic self-discipline (Paemen and 
Bensch 1995: 92). 
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perceived to benefit the advantages of open markets without granting reciprocal 
access to the European exporters (Paemen and Bensch 1995: 36-48, 95; Preeg 1995: 4). 
The EC warmed up to the idea of integrating ‚new subjects‛ into the GATT system 
only after assessing and identifying an offensive position in the areas of services, 
investments and intellectual property, but it still favoured a ‚go-slow‛ approach 
(Paemen and Bensch 1995: 35). The transatlantic consensus to launch the round was 
still a fragile one as French President Mitterrand continued to insist on keeping 
agriculture out of the forthcoming round at the G-7 summit of Bonn in May 1985 
(Preeg 1995: 53). 
 
Problems and expectations in the South were naturally dissimilar. Export interests of 
developing economies were to a large extent concentrated in labour intensive sectors 
such as agriculture and textiles. However, both sectors were effectively excluded from 
GATT disciplines. Textiles and clothing sector was governed by a non-GATT 
instrument, the Multifibre Arrangement (MFA) since 1974 (Jackson 2002: 207). The 
expectation of textile exporting developing countries was a betterment of the 
conditions within the MFA curbing their exports to major markets in the North 
(Croome 1995: 9). Under such conditions, the American proposal to initiate a 
multilateral round with new subjects did not receive a warm welcome from the South. 
In contrast, the initial American attempt to bring services to the GATT in 1982 was 
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negatively received by the Group of 77 (G-77), which denounced new subjects as a 
threat against developing country interests and even detrimental to the efforts to 
reform the GATT system (Croome 1995: 16). In addition developing economies were 
also worried about losing their privileged status under the GATT regime which was 
assured by special and differential (SDT) treatment provisions, allowing them to 
benefit from MFN access to the Northern markets without granting reciprocal access 
to their own markets (Croome 1995: 9; Jackson 2002: 164, 323). However, the lack of 
reciprocity was increasingly perceived as ‚free-riding‛ and considered as something 
‚immoral,‛ especially by the United States, but also by some other OECD countries 
(Paemen and Bensch 1995: 115). However, acquiring consent of all developing 
countries to the agenda of the round would require putting some concessions on the 
negotiation table. It was especially important to convince the ‚hardliners‛ such as 
India and Brazil who were historical leaders of the G-77. Hence the injection of textiles 
and agriculture into the negotiation mandate became critical to launch the round 
(Ricupero 1998: 13-6). Furthermore, developing countries were calling for ‚standstill‛ 
and ‚rollback‛ of the protectionist measures employed by developed countries, 
standstill signifying a decision to freeze the existing protectionist measures while 
rollback referred to their gradual elimination (Croome 1995: 34).  
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The Punta del Este Declaration included a mandate to negotiate new subjects, i.e. 
services, trade related investment measures, and intellectual property rights, as well 
as agriculture and textiles (See the Declaration in Annex 5). Market access talks in 
goods would focus on tariffs and non-tariff measures, agriculture, textiles and 
clothing but also tropical products, and natural resource-based products such as 
fishery goods. The inclusion of agriculture was a crucial success for many developed 
and developing countries.73 The Declaration contained wording on standstill and 
rollback, and established a surveillance body to report progress on the level of 
protectionist measures to the Trade Negotiations Committee (TNC). On the other 
hand, to reform the GATT system in order to better handle new forms of 
protectionism, the decision envisaged negotiations on existing GATT articles and 
codes with the goal of strengthening them. These included the provisions in 
safeguards, the revision of the plurilateral codes of the Tokyo Round, and multilateral 
trade negotiations (MTN) agreements, general functioning of the GATT system, and 
reforming the dispute settlement mechanism.  
 
 
                                                 
73 A coalition including agriculture exporters from both the North and the South took form 
before the Punta del Este summit in August 1986 with the request of creation of GATT 
disciplines to trade distorting border and domestic measures. The ‚Cairns Group,‛ as it was 
called, has been one of the most persistent coalitions in the GATT/WTO and included 
Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Fiji, Hungary, Indonesia, Malaysia, 
Phillippines, New Zealand, Thailand, Uruguay (Croome 1995: 31). 
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5.1.2. Injecting Services into the Uruguay Round  
 
Between 1982 and 1984, the developing countries block organized around the Group 
of 77 reacted to the U.S. proposal to examine the services issue within the trade 
regime on the basis that the GATT lacked legal jurisdiction and that contracting 
parties should instead have focused on more conventional issues such as agriculture 
and textile, which were crucial to their economies (Singh 2006:  57). Since many 
countries did not have knowledge and data to assess their interests in trade terms, the 
views on services within the Southern block reflected either ‚scepticism‛ or 
‚agnosticism‛ as they considered new domains a priori to the benefit of industrialised 
countries and their companies (Drake and Nicolaidis 1992: 65-6). According to S.P. 
Shukla, then the ambassador of India to the GATT, this strong negative attitude was 
partially because of the mistrust created by the ‚collective memory of the colonial 
past‛ as well as an assessment of threat to their development policies (Shukla 2000: 
15). The 1982 conference closed with an agreement that formally recognized services 
as a GATT issue, but allowed contracting parties to examine their own services sectors 
and then exchange national studies on a voluntary basis until 1984, at which point  a 
decision would be made on ‚whether any multilateral action *<+ is appropriate and 
desirable‛ (GATT 1982).  
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In the period between 1982 and 1984, the U.S. was joined by other OECD countries in 
support of the services case, while the developing countries block started to 
disintegrate. In May 1983 the U.S. broached the idea of a new round and soon gained 
the support of Japan (Shukla 2000: 15). The U.S. submitted its national study in early 
1984 based on the database regularly updated by the USTR with private sector inputs. 
The submission was followed by other studies notified by advanced economies 
(Stewart: 1993: 2347). Although they did not submit any national studies, developing 
countries recruited the UNCTAD Secretariat to explore services from a developing 
countries’ point of view. This decision resulted in the release of an encompassing 
UNCTAD report in August 1984 critical of the applicability of a generic trade 
approach to services deregulation (Kelsey 2008: 67). Despite the United States’ 
repeated calls for the new round including services during the GATT meeting in 
November 1984, the outcome became a decision to continue to review the results of 
national studies on an informal basis outside the GATT ambit (GATT 1984). 
 
However, new studies as well as informal debates in Geneva, led some developing 
countries to refine their interests and became more receptive to the idea of a GATT 
initiative on services. Some developing countries participated in an informal group 
created in 1983 by Felipe Jaramillo, Colombian ambassador to the GATT, to examine 
the trade aspects of services (Singh 2006: 57; Kennedy 1992: 3-4). While in May 1984 
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developing countries were still united under G77 arguing against the legal jurisdiction 
of the GATT to negotiate services, the block was reduced to 24 countries the following 
year, and 10 in 1986 (Shukla 2000: 16). The ASEAN countries declared their 
willingness to launch the new round in July 1985 with South Korea and Chile 
revealing that they would not oppose the inclusion of services to its agenda (Croome 
1995:  25). At the same time India submitted a proposal opposing new issues and 
garnered support of 24 developing countries. The proposal outlined the concerns of 
developing countries regarding protectionism in textiles and agriculture, and called 
for a decision on standstill and rollback (Croome 1995: 24).  
 
In the meantime Arthur Dunkel, the Director General of the GATT, commissioned a 
group of eminent persons to prepare a report to address the problems in the trading 
system and produce recommendations (Golt 1988: 12; Croome 1995: 18-20). The group 
was chaired by Fritz Leutwiler, chairman of the Swiss National Bank and President of 
the Bank for International Settlements. The Leutwiler Group was composed of public 
and private professionals in the financial sector, as well as trade in manufacturing.74 
                                                 
74 The following individuals were the members of the Leutwiler Group: Mario Henrique 
Simonsen of Getulio Vargas Foundation and former Minister of Finance of Brazil; Bill Bradley, 
U.S. senator, member of Senate Finance Committee; I.G. Patel, Director of London School of 
Economics and former Governor of Reserve Bank of India; Guy Ladreit de Lacharriere, Vice 
President of the International Court of Justice; Sumitro Djojohadikusumo former Minister of 
Trade and Industry and Minister of Finance of Indonesia; and Pehr Gyllenhammar, Chairman 
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The report of the group entitled ‚Trade Policies for a Better Future,‛ published in 
March 1985, was supportive of the linkages between trade and the trading system 
with other realms in the global economy: ‚*t+he health and even the maintenance of 
the trading system, and the stability of the financial system, are linked to *<+ better 
international coordination of macro-economic policies, and greater consistency 
between trade and financial policies‛ (GATT 1985: 49). Unsurprisingly, it also put 
emphasis on ‚services‛ by pronouncing that ‚*g+overnments should be ready to 
examine ways and means of expanding trade in services, and to explore whether 
multilateral rules can appropriately be devised for this sector.‛ (GATT 1985: 45). 
Notwithstanding, the controversies on services continued in the Preparatory 
Committee, which was established in November 1985 to set the agenda of the 
forthcoming round. 
 
The declaration that initiated the Uruguay Round was an outcome of informal talks 
between three coalitions that emerged right before the Punta del Este summit 
scheduled for September 1986. A group of moderate developed countries led by 
Switzerland including EFTA countries, Canada and Australia, excluding the U.S. and 
EC, formed the G-9. This coalition favoured an ambitious new round, but also 
recognized the needs and certain considerations of developing countries (Singh 2006: 
                                                                                                                                                          
of AB Volvo. The project was financed from private non-profit resources, largely the Ford 
Foundation.  
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58; Croome: 1995: 29). The second coalition was comprised of hardliners led by Brazil, 
which submitted a joint proposal in June 1986 sponsored by ten developing countries 
including India, Yugoslavia, and Egypt. The G-10 proposal suggested a limited 
agenda for the new round including a decision on rollback and standstill while 
excluding the new issues (GATT 1986a). In parallel, a group of likeminded moderate 
developing countries such as Uruguay, South Korea, Colombia, Chile and Jamaica 
created another coalition distinguishing themselves from the hardliners as they 
supported the launch of negotiations on trade in services while emphasising the needs 
of the South (Croome 1995: 29). The consensus in Punta del Este emerged from 
dialogue between the coalitions of moderate middle powerhouses from the North and 
the South, which were orchestrated by Colombian Jaramillo and the Swiss 
Ambassador Pierre-Louis Girard (Kennedy 1992: 7-8). Consequently, a Swiss-
Colombian ‚café au lait‛ proposal was jointly submitted to reflect the concerns of both 
developed and developing countries with clear wording on new issues, textiles, 
agriculture, and standstill and rollback (GATT 1986b).  
 
After laborious negotiations between the United States and hardliners, the consensus 
was forged upon a revised version of the café au lait proposal. Until the eleventh 
hour, the hardliners insisted that the GATT lacked legal competence to negotiate an 
agreement on trade in services and opposed any legal action within the GATT. The 
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impasse in services would be overcome with a solution proposed by ambassador 
Jaramillo that would allow the launch of the talks, but on a separate track from 
negotiations in goods (Croome 1995:  23-4; Kennedy 1992: 9-10). Accordingly, the final 
Declaration was designed in two parts (See Annex 2). Part I clarified all details of 
negotiations in goods including intellectual property rights with great substance, 
whereas Part II on ‚Negotiations on Trade in Services‛ outlined the mandate in 
services in a few paragraphs. The language in the two parts was expressive of the 
nature of consensus: whereas Part I was noted as a decision of the GATT ‚Contracting 
Parties‛, Part II began with ‚Ministers also decided.‛ This was to satisfy the 
hardliners insisting on preventing any official recognition of the legal competence of 
the GATT to negotiate services. Trade in services would be negotiated on a separate 
track within a Group of Negotiations on Services (GNS) whereas all other negotiation 
chapters would be carried out under the Group of Negotiations on Goods (GNG). Yet, 
both groups would report to a Trade Negotiations Committee (TNC). This procedural 
two-track solution would keep services integrated to the round, but it did not legally 
recognize services as part of the GATT system. The negotiations would be conducted 
upon ‚single undertaking‛, i.e. there would be no deal until the negotiations in all 
chapters including services were concluded. According to the Swiss-Colombian 
working draft, negotiations on services would focus on building up a ‚framework of 
principles and rules‛ before the contracting parties would make a decision on ‚its 
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incorporation in the GATT system‛ (Golt 1988: 18). However, the final Declaration 
omitted language on the relationship of the final framework with the GATT and 
simply stated:  
Negotiations in this area shall aim to establish a multilateral framework of 
principles and rules for trade in services, including elaboration of possible 
disciplines for individual sectors, with a view to expansion of such trade under 
conditions of transparency and progressive liberalization and as a means of 
promoting economic growth of all trading partners and the development of 
developing countries. Such framework shall respect the policy objectives of 
national laws and regulations applying to services and shall take into account 
the work of relevant international organizations (Punta Del Este Declaration, 
full text given in Annex 2). 
 
This outcome was parallel to the arguments of the demandeurs claiming services as a 
tradable domain of activities. It also recognized the applicability of GATT procedures 
and practices to negotiate and liberalise trade in services. However, the result was far 
from the ambitious expectations laid out in the U.S. proposals (Kennedy 1992: 9-11). 
According to the mandate, the negotiations would lead to the expansion of services 
trade through ‚progressive liberalisation‛ and ‚transparency‛ to sustain ‚economic 
growth‛ and ‚development of developing countries‛. Reference to ‚progressive 
liberalisation‛ and ‚development‛ and the sentence ‚*s+uch framework shall respect 
the policy objectives of national laws and regulations applying to services‛ reflects the 
compromise that took on board developing countries as well as the EC. This carefully 
crafted mandate shaped the agenda of the services talks for the rest of the round and 
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enabled a constructive dialogue between the Southern and Northern actors towards 
creating the GATS framework. As Ambassador Shukla noted, this outcome was 
clearly ‚a further milestone on their march toward the goal of transforming GATT‛ 
(Shukla 2000: 18). 
 
5.2. Negotiating the GATS  
 
According to the Punta del Este Declaration, after two years of negotiations the 
ministers would re-convene for a mid-term review, and the round would be 
completed in four years. The mid-term meeting was held in Montreal, Canada in 
December 1988 as scheduled. However, the round took more than four years because 
of the controversies and impasse in issues other than services. The Brussels Ministerial 
Conference in December 1990 collapsed due largely to the deadlock in agriculture. 
The round would end in late 1993 and the Final Act was signed in the Ministerial 
Conference held in Marrakesh, Morocco in April 1994. The GATS was negotiated in 
three phases divided by Montreal and Brussels Conferences. The following three sub-
sections outline the negotiation process with a focus on the negotiation of the 
fundamental norms and principles of the agreement, especially non-discrimination 
and market access.  
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5.2.1. From Punta del Este to Montreal 
 
Between the launch of the negotiations in Punta del Este and Montreal Ministerial 
Conference in December 1988, GNS meetings focused on the conceptual issues and 
helped trade negotiators converge around the earlier Northern consensus in principle 
on the applicability of a trade framework to services liberalisation. The negotiations 
structured along a work program produced in January 1987 (GATT 1987: 25). The 
work program was comprised of five agenda items: definitional and statistical 
matters; application of GATT concepts such as MFN, national treatment and 
transparency to trade in services; sectoral coverage of the negotiations; examination of 
existing international arrangements and disciplines; and making up an inventory of 
measures and practices constituting barrier to services trade.  
 
Discussion on the definition of services revealed the fact that services could be 
categorised not only according to individual sectors, but also through their common 
ways of international delivery that makes international trade possible (Singh 2003: 19). 
The debate on the sectoral coverage showed that almost every country had some 
sensitive sectors that would preferably be kept out of liberalisation commitments in 
future for economic or political reasons such as maritime services in the U.S., banking 
in India and many other countries, and the audio-visual sector in the EC (Croome 
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1995: 126). The conceptual discussion on the trade norms and principles for services 
revolved around the notions of progressive liberalisation, international competition, 
transparency, disciplining state-sanctioned monopolies, and non-discrimination. 
Particularly significant was how to identify non-discrimination, i.e. most favoured 
nation and national treatment for trade in services (Croome 1995: 125). Considering 
the non-tariff nature of barriers to trade in services such as domestic regulations or 
administrative measures, and different modes of delivery these norms needed to be 
revised for an application to service suppliers of foreign origin. In the access to foreign 
markets, national treatment was more crucial in services than trade in goods since 
most of the access problems were because of the discriminatory treatment to foreign 
services or service providers compared to domestic producers (Croome 1995: 125).75  
 
The United States was impatient about the progress in the round. It declared its hope 
for an ‚early harvest‛ in Montreal, at least on issues of concern such as agriculture, 
services, IPRs, and TRIMS (Golt 1988: 51). Early U.S. proposals ambitiously proposed  
drafting a framework agreement as soon as possible with full coverage of all service 
sectors and general commitments of national treatment and transparency, and the 
start of liberalisation talks during 1988 (Cafruny 1989, 129; Golt 1988, 45-7; Raghavan 
                                                 
75 An examination of existing horizontal agreements in maritime, telecommunications, and 
civil aviation showed the fact that these accords contained provisions of national treatment 
and transparency, but not MFN treatment because of their bilateral nature (Croome 1995: 
127). 
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1989).76 On the other hand, EU proposals were less advanced than those of the U.S., 
but the EU primarily stipulated a careful sector-based examination before hammering 
out the framework (Raghavan 1985a). Similarly, developing countries were in favour 
of further examination of the five agenda items, especially on definitions and statistics 
as well as impact of liberalisation on their economic development (Golt 1988: 45). 
Their major problem proved to be the lack of sufficient data on the scale and 
competitiveness of their services exports (Raghavan 1985b, 1987b, 1994). All in all, the 
debates in GNS proved productive as parties agreed to produce a consensus 
document for the Montreal summit summarizing five items of the talks including a 
list of fundamental concepts that were to be used in the framework agreement (GATT 
1989b: 38-41).  
 
The Montreal decision in 1988 was a turning point as it showed the gradual shift in 
the approach of the hardliners to the incorporation of services into the trade regime. 
At this point there was a clear agreement on the applicability of basic trade norms to 
services and on different modes of market access including the cross-border 
movement of labour (Singh 2006: 64). The listed concepts in the Montreal text for a 
framework agreement comprised of transparency, national treatment, most-favoured-
                                                 
76 According to Chakravarthi Raghavan of the Third World Network developing countries 
interpreted the initial American proposals as a challenge of TNCs to ‚territorial sovereignty‛ 
of states (Raghavan 1989).   
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nation, market access, increasing participation of developing countries, safeguards 
and exceptions, and regulatory situation. The text identified national treatment 
according to the rights of domestic service providers, which should also be given to 
foreigners.77 On MFN the text only noted that the framework agreement was to 
contain a provision to be later crafted. Finally, the text noted that market access would 
be provided by governments to foreign exporters ‚according to the preferred mode of 
delivery‛ (GATT 1989b: 40). The course of the talks made it clear that an ambitious 
program of liberalisation might not be pursued as expected by the TNCs since most 
parties put emphasis on the concept of ‚progressive liberalisation‛ (Drake and 
Nicolaidis: 1992: 77-9). However, the Montreal text also underlined that ‚the adverse 
effects of all laws, regulations and administrative guidelines should be reduced as 
part of the process to provide effective market access, including national treatment‛ 
(GATT 1989b: 39).  This was indicative of the willingness of developing countries to 
take action against certain regulations which could be considered protectionist. 
Ministers at Montreal agreed to continue negotiations to reach a framework for the 
broadest sectoral coverage, but also noted that ‚certain sectors could be excluded in 
whole or in part for certain overriding considerations.‛ The issue of the sectoral 
                                                 
77 The text defined national treatment in the following terms: ‚the service exports and/or 
exporters of any signatory are accorded in the market of any other signatory, in respect of all 
laws, regulations and administrative practices, treatment ‘no less favourable’ than that 
accorded domestic services providers in the same market‛ (GATT 1989b: 39). 
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coverage of the framework accord remained unresolved until the very end of the 
round.  
 
5.2.2. From Montreal to Brussels  
 
According to the work programme of the Montreal text, the negotiations continued on 
definitions and statistics, and examination of existing international arrangements. 
Parallel to the conceptual work, parties were also engaged in initial sectoral testing 
exercises to evaluate the applicability of new principles discussed before Montreal. 
Conceptual and sectoral examinations continued until late 1990.  
 
Sectoral examination during 1989 covered professional services, telecommunications, 
construction, transportation, tourism, and financial services (Stewart 1993: 2372-3).  It 
confirmed the plausibility of a trade framework to liberalisation as the TNC-led 
coalition argued, however it also illustrated the difficulty to apply GATT-based norms 
and principles to the heterogeneous realm of services (Croome 1995: 244). It would be 
necessary to modify some GATT norms, create new specific rules, and provide for 
exceptions addressing sector specific features and concerns (Drake and Nicolaidis 
1992: 81-2). The exercise also further crystallised the sensitive sectors that parties 
 188 
would be willing to exempt from liberalisation. 78 As non-trade officials were involved 
in sectoral talks they raised various issues and concerns as to the deregulation of 
particular domestic measures (Singh 2003: 22). New sector specific rules were needed 
either to take into account non-commercial objectives such as the prudential concerns 
in financial services or to achieve meaningful liberalisation as in telecommunications, 
either in the form of sector specific provisions or as separate annexes (Croome 1995: 
244, 250). Agreement emerged to maintain certain regulations for safety, quality, 
sanitary or other non-commercial purposes (Drake and Nicolaidis 1992: 82). At this 
stage there was no agreement on the sectoral coverage of the proposed agreement 
(Croome 1995: 245). 
 
The Montreal text had also mandated ‚to assemble the necessary elements‛ for a draft 
framework agreement until the end of 1989. There was consensus on application of 
certain principles such as transparency as a ‚general commitment‛ to take effect with 
the framework agreement. Yet the debates continued with no agreement on the status 
of the principles such as market access and non-discrimination, i.e. whether they 
                                                 
78 As noted in the previous chapter, financial institutions from different countries engaged in 
the negotiation process and kept raising the necessity to address the integrity and stability of 
the financial system through allowing governments to take prudential measures in cases of 
necessity (Key 1997: 18-20). U.S. Treasury continued its concerns about the incorporation of 
financial services into a single multilateral accord during the Uruguay Round. Treasury 
officials were taken on board as they attended the negotiations on banking and other financial 
services while USTR handled insurance (Hills 2010, interview). 
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would be accorded across-the-board to all sectors and parties or if they would only be 
given to sectors listed by the governments (Croome 1995: 244-9). On the other hand, 
the discussions revealed that there were  differences of interpretation of the mandate 
if it contained only negotiating a framework agreement as interpreted by the 
hardliners or also initial sectoral negotiations of market access as advocated by the 
U.S. and other OECD governments (Croome 1995: 246). USTR, with anticipation to 
conclude the round in four years in 1990 and under pressure from domestic 
protectionist pressures, demanded ‚immediate‛ liberalisation for a wide coverage of 
services including tourism, transportation, construction and telecommunication 
(Drake and Nicolaidis 1992: 85-7). It was also not willing to give the MFN principle a 
general commitment status owing to the concerns of free-riding (Croome 995: 249). 
Paemen and Bensch (1995: 132-3) argue that the EC’s understanding of free-riding and 
reciprocity was distinguished from the Americans’.  The EC anticipated ‚effective 
market access‛ to American and Japanese markets, while it was ready for a 
‚proportional‛ contribution from developing countries through gradual liberalisation 
as part of SDT provisions to be injected into the agreement. While Japan was also 
ready to admit a limited degree of SDT compared to the EC, the U.S. was adamantly 
against any deviation from MFN based fast liberalisation for interested parties, which 
would even mean an agreement among OECD and a few newly industrialised 
countries (Paemen and Bensch 1995: 132-3). Along these lines, the U.S. proposals were 
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also the most ambitious regarding the market access methodology as they suggested a 
negative list or top down approach to market liberalisation with limited exceptions 
(Stewart 1993: 2371). Following the US submission in late 1989, developing countries 
joined the talks proactively tabling their draft proposal frameworks for the GATS. The 
first complete proposals came from Latin American countries, Afro-Asian countries, 
Switzerland, EC and Japan (Croome 1995: 247-8). In contrast to the U.S. approach, 
developing country governments took a clear position in favour of an incremental 
approach to deregulation based on a bottom up approach while favouring first 
concentrating on crafting a framework agreement that would take into consideration 
development concerns and undertaking sectoral negotiations in the longer term on a 
selective basis (Stewart 1993: 2371, 2379-81; Singh 2006: 68-69).  
 
Notwithstanding contested opinions and harsh debates, the GNS managed to produce 
the first concrete result in services talks in the final weeks of 1989 by compiling a 
document which contained fundamental elements of the framework agreement 
(GATT 1989a). Replete with square brackets reflecting differences, the text contained 
sections on the definition and scope of the agreement, the concepts, principles and 
rules. The GNS started drafting the framework agreement in the summer of 1990 to 
prepare it for the Brussels ministerial conference. The division of perspectives among 
countries led the chair of the negotiation group, Felipe Jaramillo, to table a first 
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tentative draft of the GATS on his own authority (GATT 1990a). The text became the 
primary document for the rest of the negotiations until the end of the Round and the 
basis of the actual GATS. It outlined six sections for the framework agreement 
including scope and coverage, general obligations and disciplines, specific 
commitments, and progressive liberalisation, and sections on institutions and final 
provisions for the time without any content. It also included a model schedule list 
illustrating how a liberalisation commitment would be made according to sectors and 
modes of supply to grant national treatment and market access to the trading 
partners. The draft stated that the agreement would cover trade in ‚all‛ sectors. The 
revised Jaramillo draft for the Brussels meeting coupled MFN as a general 
commitment with other principles like transparency, domestic regulations, increasing 
participation of developing countries, and exceptions, although there was still no 
consensus on whether MFN would be a general or a specific obligation (GATT 1990b: 
328-382). On the other hand, market access and national treatment were placed 
separately under ‚specific commitments.‛ To outline the application of GATS norms 
and principles as well as special rules for a number of sectors, the text also contained 
special annexes for maritime, inland waterway, road and air transport, basic 
telecommunications, telecommunications, labour mobility, and audiovisual services. 
Negotiations over Jaramillo’s draft left no time before the Brussels Conference to 
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negotiate specific market access commitments as expected by the U.S. and other 
developed countries.  
 
5.2.3. The Final Stage: Towards Marrakech 
 
After the Brussels Conference, which was adjourned due to disagreements on 
agriculture, the work of the GNS concentrated on the resolution of the status of the 
MFN treatment, final formulation of the GATS text and its sectoral annexes, and 
sectoral bargaining to produce the initial schedules of national commitments. The 
discussion on the MFN treatment continued throughout 1991 and into 1992. Many 
countries declared that they would prefer to exempt certain sectors from MFN 
treatment, while others argued that this would lead to the over-use of exemptions 
(Croome 1995: 314). In tandem with the debates within the GNS, Arthur Dunkel took 
initiative and compiled the first draft of the final act of the Uruguay Round including 
the texts for different negotiation chapters and a revised draft for the GATS improved 
by Chairman Jaramillo (GATT 1991). Even though no agreement was reached on 
sectoral coverage and MFN, the draft GATS left no sectors out of the framework treaty 
and kept the MFN principle as a general commitment.79 As before, market access and 
                                                 
79 Chairman Jaramillo also kept MFN exemptions as a temporary condition by limiting them 
in his text to ten years. At the end of this period, exempted sectors or sub-sectors would fully 
be covered by MFN treatment. This procedure was injected into the final accord.    
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national treatment were identified as specific commitments. The draft agreement also 
included a part on ‚Progressive Liberalisation,‛ which laid down an in-built agenda 
for ‚successive round of negotiations‛ and would begin at a point in time after the 
round to be determined in the final bargaining. Plus, the same part of the text 
reiterated that ‚[t]he process of liberalization shall take place with due respect for 
national policy objectives and the level of development of individual Parties, both 
overall and in individual sectors.‛  
 
Since sectoral coverage and MFN issues continued unresolved, the market access talks 
started at a very late stage of the round and the outcome would be far from ambitious. 
Although American negotiators accepted the MFN principle as a general obligation 
after Brussels, exemption of financial services and telecommunications remained on 
the table with American concerns on free-riding and anticipation of reciprocal 
concessions (Croome 1995: 313). By April 1992, only 47 market access offers were 
received, which increased to 54 offers from 67 countries by the end of the year (Singh 
2003: 25). This request-offer practice continued during 1993 parallel to the resolution 
of sectoral coverage issue. Controversies continued through the end of the round in 
telecommunications, financial and maritime services, movement of labour issues, and 
audiovisual services. Finally, on telecommunications parties decided to ensure the 
right of service providers to use public networks and services while they left market 
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access negotiations to post-round talks with an additional annex (Drake and Noam 
1997: 29-34; Cass and Harring 1998: 191). Similarly a sector specific annex was drafted 
for financial services creating a ‚prudential carve-out‛ to allow member states to take 
measures to protect the integrity and stability of their financial systems (Key 1997: 20-
1). Also in financial services and maritime transport, sectoral negotiations were 
postponed to the post-round talks (Croome 1995: 376-8). This was parallel to an 
agreement to please India and Pakistan that postponed negotiations on the movement 
of natural persons after the round (Croome 1995: 377). The EC unsuccessfully 
attemptted at the eleventh hour to create  a provision in the GATS or a separate annex 
recognising cultural identity concerns as an excuse to maintain certain protective 
restrictions in audiovisual services (Paemen and Bensch 1995: 234). In the final 
endgame, the GATS was formally incorporated into the system of the newly emerging 
WTO. 
 
5.3. North-South Consensus-Building and TNCs 
 
Between the U.S. initiative to bring services to the GATT platform for multilateral 
examination in 1982 and the signing of the GATS in 1994, developing countries’ 
attitudes toward services changed in a radical manner. While initially there was a 
consensus in the South that services were a non-GATT issue, the resisting developing 
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countries block dissolved before and during the Uruguay Round. Developing 
countries proactively participated in the services talks and agenda-setting in the GNS 
and enabled the final framework to become a flexible tool for gradual liberalisation of 
trade in services. In this shift in attitude, the most significant factor was a re-
assessment of the interest perceptions of developing countries as they gradually 
recognized the benefits of services liberalisation and framed their preferences in 
services within trade and the negotiations context. Developing countries actively 
engaged in the services talks and successfully shaped the negotiation agenda and 
norm-building process. Thus, they contributed in the hegemonic transformation of the 
trade regime as they adopted the hegemonic ideas elevated by the TNC coalition and 
as they constructively engaged in the process endeavouring to shape it according to 
their evolving interests. On the other hand, the United States lost its enthusiasm in 
services talks as the course of the negotiations moved away from its ambitious 
outlook laid at the outset. The U.S. then tried to shape the outcomes through tactics 
turning the MFN principle into a bargaining chip. This was a result of increasing 
sectoral pressure from TNCs concerned with assuring reciprocal access to highly 
regulated markets.  
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5.3.1. Intergovernmental Consensus-Building 
 
As noted above, from 1984 on the number of hardliners fell initially to 24 and then to 
10 countries. As understood by some observers, this was an outcome of the amplified 
American pressure.  According to Kelsey (2008: 68), the U.S. played ‚hardball‛ to split 
the intransigents’ block through ‚threats, incentives and disinformation to leverage its 
influence bilaterally in Latin America and South East Asia.‛ Similarly, Ambassador 
Shukla (2000: 16) emphasises the impact of American coercion in the weakening of 
opposition to services, especially through the Reagan administration’s bilateral 
pressure and threats that Americans would initiate alternative bilateral and regional 
trade arrangements if progress was not recorded in the GATT. The U.S. took an 
aggressive position a week before the Punta del Este conference with USTR Clayton 
Yeutter’s repeated statements that the U.S. would even walk out of the GATT system 
altogether (Kennedy 1992: 9-10; Golt 1988, 14). In the change of attitude on the side of 
developing countries, Ford (2002: 133-4) also stresses the impact of the changing 
trading patterns especially in the NICs which had gained competence in producing 
certain capital intensive goods and services to the Northern markets as well as their 
escalated need for foreign finance after the initiation of the debt crisis in the early 
1980s. Similarly David M. Kennedy proclaims: 
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With many developing countries fearful that stubborn blocking tactics would 
threaten both their export markets and the goodwill of the developed countries 
on rescheduling their debts, the hard-liners’ bloc had broken, and a new round 
became inevitable. (Kennedy 1992: 5)  
 
In this context, the U.S. strategy concentrated on dividing and isolating the hardliners 
and building a constituency within the GATT to open the round with an aggressive 
mandate on services. Joining the game to split the rejectionists’ coalition, the EC used 
its ‚development card‛ in contrast to the American stick as the Community lacked 
similar punitive instruments (Paemen and Bensch 1995: 133). The U.S. was more 
coercive, putting textiles and agriculture on the table as part of a ‚trade off‛ with new 
subjects; whereas the EC took a softer position to convince developing countries about 
the benefits of liberalisation of services for their development (Paemen and Bensch 
1995: 39). Although external pressure was a variable in the repositioning of 
developing countries, its weight should not be given too much credit.  
 
A significant factor in forging consensus to initiate the talks and constructing the 
GATS was the changing perceptions of developing countries about trade, the 
multilateral trading system, and protectionism. The integration of developing 
countries to the trading system with enhanced responsibilities had become a collective 
target of industrialised economies orchestrated by the U.S. due to their concerns of 
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free-riding (Paemen and Bensch 1995: 115). However, advanced developing countries 
were also increasingly concerned about protectionism in the Northern markets and 
were ready for reciprocal concessions by opening their markets. As discussed in 
Chapter 2 this was partly because of the transformation of their production basis 
which made the access to the world markets a higher priority, and partly owing to 
ongoing neoliberal reforms. These reforms led to a deregulatory wave, privatisation, 
and displacement of import substitution model with free trade policies as well as the 
adoption of the market disciplines (Ford 2002: 128-30; 133-4). For the case of services, 
the major problem of developing countries in the early 1980s was the lack of 
intellectual tools and data either to assess their comparative advantage in services or 
to judge the competitiveness of their service industries and the probable impact of 
liberalisation on their development (Drake and Nicolaidis 1992: 52, 56, 64).  
 
The Jaramillo group discussions, the conceptual debate in the GNS and new studies 
helped the hardliners to revise their interests and adjust their arguments. Such change 
of perception would be significant for the U.S. to divide the block of G-77 and to 
launch the Uruguay Round on an acceptable ground. Newly industrialising countries 
quickly embraced the new way of thinking and started to assess comparative 
advantage in sectors such as construction, data processing, telecommunications, and 
transportation (Preeg 1995: 56; Singh 2006: 57). The two track approach was a solution 
 199 
to satisfy gradually outnumbered hardliners who could only raise the argument of the 
legal incompetence of the GATT to justify their concerns. After the decision in Punta 
del Este, their arguments centred on a narrow interpretation of the negotiation 
mandate that the talks envisaged only building a legal framework that would allow 
liberalisation on a selective basis through negotiations in the longer term. The general 
trend naturally was a go-slow approach and they found allies in the North that would 
join them in highlighting ‚progressive liberalisation‛ and significance of certain 
regulations for development and other social objectives, and in demanding in-depth 
sectoral examinations before engaging in building the legal framework (Stewart 1993: 
2378-81). The EC reportedly interacted with the hardliners behind the doors at the 
Punta del Este summit and reached an agreement on progressive liberalisation and 
worked to craft a better compromise in agriculture—this particular compromise was 
due mainly to the French dissatisfaction with the language in the Swiss-Columbian 
text (Preeg 1995: 5; Shukla 2000: 17). Similarly, according to Paemen and Bensch (1995: 
132), the Montreal compromise was also an outcome shaped by the behind-the-scene 
talks between India, Brazil, Egypt, Jamaica, Argentina, Sweden and the EC in line 
with the Community’s ‚mediating‛ strategy entailing bridge-building between the 
hardliners and the U.S. With the reassessment of competence, especially in labour 
intensive sectors and crystallisation of different modes of delivery, developing 
countries formulated their proposals to sustain symmetry between mode 4 in 
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exchange for mode 3, which was crucial for developed countries in the pursuit of 
investment opportunities in other countries in sectors such as banking and insurance 
(Paemen and Bensch 1995: 114; Raghavan 1987a). On the other hand, to prevent future 
commitments which could disadvantage domestic regulations in sensitive areas, 
developing countries also stressed the language in the Declaration to take into account 
other policy objectives including development (Stewart 1993: 2379-81). In this vein, 
NICs argued for creating a prudential caveat for financial services to protect their 
immature financial services (Stewart 1993: 2391). In sum, the arguments brought by 
developing countries changed within the context of the negotiations as the talks took 
place within the borders defined by the agenda, which was determined within the 
GNS at subsequent stages towards building the GATS. The ideas of the legal 
incompetence of the GATT and that the mandate did not envisage the talks for market 
access negotiations were no longer legitimate as the negotiators submitted their offers 
and requests for market access,  and gradually agreed on the fundamental norms of 
the framework and its integration into the GATT system. On the other hand, from an 
early stage in the talks, developing countries engaged in the process with the 
increasing number of submissions as they took a position based on evolving interest 
perceptions.80 In this regard, developing countries actively negotiated to ensure that 
the GATS to become a flexible instrument. 
                                                 
80 The list of government submissions to the GNS in Stewart 1993 (2642-7) shows that almost 
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As argued by some scholars, integration of services became a critical juncture in the 
GATT history as it induced a pro-active involvement of developing countries to the 
regime also through engaging in new types of coalitions. Amrita Narlikar suggests the 
following: 
 
the services sector precipitated unprecedented challenges as well as potential 
opportunities for developing countries and thereby necessitated innovative 
attempts at viable coalition formation, hence the much more active 
participation of developing countries in the GATT since the 1980s. [It] 
delivered a deathblow to the old type of coalition diplomacy of developing 
countries in the GATT but also spawned new coalition types (Narlikar 2003: 
34). 
 
The café au lait coalition is a prime example since it was formed by middle powers 
from the North and the South which marginalized the hardliners and paved the way 
for the launch of the talks (Drake and Nicolaidis 1992: 66; Narlikar 2003; 44-51). The 
‚café au lait effect,‛ as Singh defines it, resolved the deadlock in Punta del Este thanks 
to the emergence of a moderate wing of developing countries which saw substantial 
benefits in services liberalisation (Singh 2006: 75). The hardliners also coalesced with 
the EC and succeeded in shaping the agenda of the talks collectively along 
progressive liberalisation. In this regard, Singh (2006: 50) challenges the power-based 
explanations of negotiation outcomes by shifting the focus to the very social and 
                                                                                                                                                          
half of 61 proposal came from non-OECD countries.  
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cognitive process of multilateral interactions which encapsulated an evolution of 
interest perceptions of developing countries. He argues that developing countries 
gave fewer concessions in the services talks than in the TRIPS negotiations. This was 
because they were actively involved in agenda-setting and coalition-making parallel 
to an evolution of their national interests through intergovernmental interactions 
within the multilateral platform (Singh 2006: 41, 49). In this regard, he maintains: 
 
Power structures do not predetermine outcomes *<+, if they did, the North 
would have gained more in services than in intellectual property. Power 
structures might predispose negotiations toward a set of outcomes but 
negotiation interactions themselves shape interests and outcomes, and 
therefore, the exercise of power (Singh 2006: 43). 
 
Having said this, it would be misleading to attribute changing attitudes, interest 
perceptions, and agenda-setting solely to intergovernmental interactions. As already 
discussed, the evolution of developing countries’ interests and attitudes is also 
associated with material and ideational changes on the ground. Since these changes 
within the states and institutions are reflective of the broader hegemonic 
transformation, this analysis would be incomplete if social forces that underpin this 
transformation are not brought back to the discussion. To put it differently, before and 
during the Uruguay Round developing countries gradually adopted the ‚collective 
image‛ of tradability of services which was projected by the TNC coalition within the 
context of a policy formula shaped and disseminated through a war of position. In the 
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process of the interjection of this collective image and the very intersubjective texture 
of the trade regime, the TNCs took the primary agenda-setting role by crafting a new 
mental framework that was gradually embraced by a wide set of actors. The TNCs 
influenced the ideational context within which developing countries revisited their 
preferences and negotiation positions. Julian Arkell, a leading European business 
campaigner for the services case puts this cognitive aspect of the TNC campaign in the 
following terms: 
 
There was a long learning process, perhaps still going on in some capitals: 
officials had to be convinced that the law of comparative advantage *<+ also 
applied to services. It took much hard work by private interests to convince 
governments that services lie at the heart of national competitiveness, and have 
a crucial role in the economic growth of developing countries (Arkell 1992: 25). 
 
However, as highlighted above the state actors from the North and the South did not 
become passive learners but also active shapers of the ideas and agenda that 
eventually built the GATS. There is no need to remind that building hegemony is an 
‚active and reciprocal‛ education process through which ‚every teacher is always a 
pupil and every pupil a teacher‛ (Gramsci 1971: 350). Therefore, the emergence of 
developing countries as ‚reciprocal traders‛ and their active role in setting the agenda 
of services talks can both be understood within the context of hegemonic 
transformation. Yet, building hegemony also requires concessions and sacrifices to be 
given by hegemonic forces. Throughout the process of bringing services to the GATT 
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and building the GATS, the TNC coalition had to concede to the flexibilities and 
carve-outs created for social and development objectives and sector specific 
arrangements. In this regard, although TNCs accomplished the goal of changing the 
paradigm of trade from a mindset of goods to one also encompasses services as they 
outlined in their action plan, the GATS became an accord reflective of the needs and 
interests of a wide set of actors.  
 
5.3.2 TNCs in Agenda-setting During the Uruguay Round    
 
TNCs continued their war of position after the launch of the Uruguay Round by 
further enlarging their policy network with educative activities in Europe and 
developing countries. In addition to active participation in the GATT summits 
beginning in 1982 U.S. TNC executives concentrated their activities in Geneva 
(Freeman 2000: 456).81 In 1986, a Services World Forum was formed in Geneva to 
facilitate interactions with negotiators and international institutions taking part in the 
negotiations (Kelsey 2008: 80). To educate the negotiators unfamiliar with trade in 
services, American Express distributed the publications of the American Enterprise 
Institute in Geneva (Drake and Nicolaidis 1992: 75). The campaigners also continued 
sponsoring international conferences that gathered businesses with experts and 
                                                 
81 Harry Freeman (2000: 458) claims that during the final negotiations the U.S. private sector 
was present in Geneva with more than 400 lobbyists.  
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policy-makers from different parts of the world. These informal summits took place 
almost on an annual basis and were hosted by the U.S. CSI, LOTIS as well as newly 
formed coalitions in Europe and developing countries. 
 
Table 2: Conferences organised by service coalitions82  
 
1986 February US CSI / LOTIS Ditchley Park, near Oxford, UK 
 June  Swedish CSI  Stockholm, Sweden 
1988 January  Keidanren  Mount Fuji, Japan 
 July  LOTIS   Geneva, Switzerland 
1989   US CSI   Vevey, Switzerland 
1990   Australian CSI  Sydney, Australia 
1991   Hong Kong CSI Hong Kong 
1992   UDES   Buenos Aires, Argentina 
1993   New Zealand CSI Auckland, New Zealand 
1995   Irish CSI  Dublin, Ireland 
1996   US CSI   Geneva, Switzerland 
1997   US CSI   Geneva, Switzerland 
1998   US CSI LOTIS Ditchley Park, UK 
 
 
A major consequence of the services campaign became the proliferation of service 
coalitions on the model created by the U.S. CSI. Services coalitions emerged in 
different locations including developing countries such as Hong Kong and Argentina, 
creating constituencies for liberalisation (El-Etreby 2008). Taking different forms at 
                                                 
82 The information was provided by Arkell (2008, interview). 
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national and regional levels the business mobilisation continued to create a global 
business network which would ultimately be formalised in the 1990s.83  
 
However, after the launch of the talks, the TNCs’ agenda-setting influence diminished 
as the intergovernmental interactions and simultaneous bargaining in different 
chapters of the Round determined the course of the talks. This was partly because of 
the expansion of the policy network whose revised collective vision diverged from the 
ambitious outlook promoted by TNCs and the Anglo-American analysts, and partly 
because of the ‚bureaucratisation‛ of the policy debate which limited the space for 
intellectual intervention and innovative thoughts (Drake and Nicolaidis 1992: 64; 76). 
As the debate was shaped within the constraints of the negotiation texts and 
dynamics, and dominated by negotiators from different parts of national 
bureaucracies, including those of developing countries, the TNC coalition started to 
lose its coherence with rising sectoral dissatisfaction. Freeman of Amex notes that: 
 
When the Uruguay Round negotiations actually started at the end of 1986, the 
outlook for a strong deal in any of the service areas, including financial 
services, was bleak at best. It went from bad to worse when the GATT model 
                                                 
83 Services coalitions from different countries decided to establish a Global Services Network 
(GSN) in April 1998 as a regular business forum to develop strategies for service sectors, 
monitor the implementation of international accords, and provide information and 
knowledge to the private sector. http://globalservicesnetwork.com/aboutus.htm accessed on 
June 21, 2010.   
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for such an agreement shifted from a ‚top down‛ to a ‚bottom up‛ approach 
(Freeman 2001: 185). 
 
While the TNC’s ability to set the GATT agenda diminished, they influenced the 
norm-building process through the instrumental use of power in the form of sectoral 
lobbying that turned MFN principle into a ‚bargaining chip‛ utilized by the United 
States for assuring reciprocal access (Ahnlid 1996: 78). U.S. TNCs in the financial 
sector took the lead in creating a sectoral pressure group by establishing the Financial 
Services Group (FSG) under the U.S. CSI with the objective of lobbying ‚solely in the 
financial services area‛ (Freeman 2001: 189).84 As the negotiators converged around a 
flexible framework agreement that would operate upon a negative list method 
through member states’ concessions, the U.S. CSI and sectoral lobbies in finance and 
telecommunications intensified lobbies to ensure reciprocal access to external markets. 
While pro-liberalisation sectors were concerned about reciprocal opening, anti-
liberalisation sectors such as the U.S. shipping industry voiced its opposition to 
liberalization commitments (Aggarwal 1992: 45..).85 On the other hand, the Office of 
                                                 
84 In 1996, FSG led the creation of a Financial Leaders Group (FLG)—a transnational business 
coalition that would become highly influential in the post-round financial services talks with 
other TNCs from Europe, North America, Japan and Hong Kong with companies such as 
Barclays, Chase Manhattan, Goldman Sachs and the Bank of Tokyo-Mitsubishi (Beder 2006: 
140). In fact, the influential FLG model inspired Leon Brittan, the then European 
Commissioner for External Relations who spearheaded the creation of the European Services 
Group which replaced the European Community Services Group in 1998. (Beder 2006: 140-1).  
85 The U.S. shipping industry enjoyed a privileged status in domestic markets as a result of the 
Jones Act and, thus, opposed the incorporation of the sector into the framework agreement. 
U.S. shipping companies and the Maritime Industry Coalition, which represent interests of 
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Technology Assessment of U.S. Congress released a comprehensive study in July 1987 
indicating that although the U.S. was still ahead in telecommunications, its national 
competitiveness was declining in banking, engineering and construction (OTA 1987). 
Under close Congressional monitoring and domestic pressure from sectoral lobbies, 
USTR took a more aggressive stance with repeated statements before the Brussels 
summit that it would not concede to the MFN principle becoming a general 
commitment. Many countries reacted to these subsequent declarations (The Economist: 
September 22 1990; Croome 1995: 250). Although the Bush administration softened its 
position after Brussels accepted MFN as a generic rule, it importuned to exempt 
mentioned sectors from this general principle (The Economist:  3 August 1991: Stewart 
1993: 2394). The U.S. insisted on a sufficient level of offers in national treatment and 
market access not to exempt financial services and telecommunications sectors from 
the MFN principle (Ahnlid 1996: 82). The result was leaving sectoral talks in those 
sectors to post-round negotiations which resulted in a satisfactory opening for U.S. 
TNCs. 
 
The Round concluded with a legal framework on trade in services and was a 
significant success for U.S. pro-liberalisation industries; however, substantial opening 
                                                                                                                                                          
maritime service providers, argued that U.S. maritime sector would not be able to compete 
against foreign carriers in case of liberalisation and the collapse of the industry would 
threaten American national security (Aggarwal 1992: 45).  
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in major sectors were left to post-round negotiations. Service campaigners worked 
hard to influence the U.S. position and to create public support for the conclusion of 
the talks and ratification of the Marrakesh accords in the U.S. Congress. A Multilateral 
Trade Negotiations (MTN) coalition was established by major TNCs in May 1990 to 
support USTR when the Uruguay Round negotiations entered a critical phase. While 
major service TNCs took part in this initiative, Harry Freeman of Amex assumed the 
role of the executive director of the coalition (The Baltimore Sun, May 16, 1990).86 As the 
Round came to a close, a similar business block emerged, the Alliance for GATT Now, 
representing  services and other sectors supportive of the ratification of the Final Act 
of the Uruguay Round by U.S. Congress (Rupert 2000: 63). 
 
5.4. TNCs as Agenda-Setters for the GATT  
 
The creation of the GATS was the outcome of a long-term campaign successfully 
conducted by a business coalition converging TNC interests around a policy formula 
reflective of their corporate interests, and addressing the needs and preferences of 
different actors. TNCs also became active in pushing the issue of intellectual property 
                                                 
86 The MTN coalition was chaired by former USTRs William Brock and Robert Strauss, and 
supported by business and trade associations representing 13,000 companies in addition to 
TNCs such as General Motors, American Telephone & Telegraph, General Electric, 
International Business Machines, American Express, the National Association of 
Manufacturers, the National Federation of Independent Business and the American Farm 
Bureau Federation (The Baltimore Sun, 16 May 1990).  
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rights to the GATT which became another significant pillar of the trade regime during 
the Uruguay Round negotiations. The TRIPS Agreement was the outcome of a 
campaign conducted by another coalition of TNCs which amalgamated copyrights, 
patents, and trademarks interests for a trade-based IPR agenda. In both the services 
and IPR cases, TNCs, as agents of regime transformation, successfully engaged in 
agenda-setting for the GATT. The case of services has certain peculiarities as well as 
similarities with the IPR campaign in terms of corporate strategies towards shaping 
policy agendas. The following section outlines major characteristics of TNC strategies 
in the services campaign with a recap of their agenda-setting activities to build 
consensus over their case.  
 
Strategic Leadership  
 
Neither IPR protection nor services were significant elements of the trade agenda and 
policy making before the 1970s. Companies facing regulatory barriers in services and 
problems regarding counterfeiting and IPR protection in external markets were 
without offensive governmental tools. This situation changed when companies were 
strategically directed to achieve a collective goal, i.e. enhanced international IPR 
protection and deregulation of barriers to service industries through leveraging U.S. 
trade policies. Both campaigns became successful on account of the strategies crafted 
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by leading individuals that helped the mobilization of other business executives and 
government officials, in the U.S. and abroad, around a common cause. In the services 
case, the TNC strategies were crafted by strategic thinkers such as Harry Freeman, 
Ron Shelp, Julien Arkell as well as government officials like Geza Feketekuty who 
garnered full support of CEOs such as Jim Robinson, Hank Greenberg, and John Reed 
who actively participated in the campaign.87 They orchestrated a business crusade 
through building a case which aggregated corporate and public interests in a new 
trade framework. The GATT was a strategic choice of the business leadership for both 
campaigns. For services, the GATT became the preferred venue as it had a successful 
record in eliminating barriers to trade in goods and resolution of disputes, whilst for 
the case of IPRs, this choice came about as a ‘‘forum-shifting’’ strategy because of the 
lack of sufficient enforcement tools for IPR protection in other fora such as the World 
Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) (Braithwaite and Drahos, 2000: 566; Sell 
and Prakash 2004: 154).88  
 
                                                 
87 A similar leadership role was assumed by Edmund Pratt, John Opel and Jacques Gorlin in 
the IPR case. Edmund Pratt of Pfizer Pharmaceuticals and Opel of IBM led the IPR campaign, 
whereas Gorlin, who was an industry lobbyist, economist and consultant to the ACTN, 
provided a strategic roadmap to the IPR coalition (Sell 2003: 48-9). 
88 The World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) is the UN agency responsible for 
intergovernmental cooperation in IPRs through international accords on patents, copyrights 
and trademarks. However, the WIPO lacked mechanisms to guarantee the enforcement of 
domestic IPR protection (May 2002: 67). The deliberations to empower the WIPO with 
enforcement mechanisms failed in the early 1980s because of strong opposition from 
developing countries (Ross and Wasserman 1993: 5-11). 
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Case-building and Education  
 
The success of both coalitions rested on a well-crafted education campaign targeting 
U.S. policy-makers, civil society and private sector representatives, as well as policy-
makers in other OECD and developing countries. The idea to treat these new issues in 
the context of trade policy-making and negotiations contrasted with the conventional 
thinking until the 1970s. The campaigners crafted strategies to build a policy formula 
to solve a number of economic and systemic problems in concurrence with the 
normative context of neoliberalism. The cases were projected as a source of wealth 
and employment both for U.S. industries and home markets.89 Business built their 
case and capitalised on the mounting U.S. trade deficits which was associated with the 
declining competitiveness of the U.S. industries vis-à-vis rising powers. The 
campaigners highlighted the IP-based goods and services as a way to maintain high 
technology innovation and prevent free-riding through ensuring reciprocal market 
opening and equal protection to IPRs.90 The U.S. government came on board as the 
                                                 
89 A framing of IPRs in association with free trade was not commonplace in the United States 
until the early 1980s. The understanding of patent rights as ‚grants of privilege‛ in a manner 
antithetical to free trade was well established while the patents as monopolistic privileges 
were subject to the U.S. antitrust law (Sell and Prakash 2004: 157; Sell 2003: 51-2, 72-4). The 
business coalition formulated its case for a stronger IPR regime in line with neoliberalism 
with strong emphasis on the linkages between IPR protection and individual 
entrepreneurship, property rights and market norms (Sell and Prakash 2004: 154).  
90 The United States’ loss of the technological lead was framed as a major determinant of the 
decline in competitiveness. Accordingly, the solution offered better enforcement of IPR 
protection abroad (Sell and Prakash 2004: 154).  
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policy formulas were perceived in concurrence with national interest. The neoliberal 
discourse and free trade rhetoric did not persuade developing countries because they 
took services for granted from a defensive point of view. Developing countries 
adjusted their attitudes both as a consequence of the gradual establishment of 
neoliberal hegemony domestically and as they framed their national interests within 
the new framework promoted by the TNCs. Nonetheless, their active involvement in 
agenda-setting, together with European governments, resulted in a compromise 
which moved away from the neoliberal outlook promoted by the campaigners. In any 
case, the TNCs succeeded in disseminating their case for the tradability of services 
and upgrading it from a collective image to an intersubjective meaning through 
agenda-setting and influencing norm-creation.  
 
While the U.S. government was receptive to the cause of both campaigns, trade 
bureaucracies in the U.S. and elsewhere lacked expertise and knowledge to handle 
negotiations in these domains. This was both a challenge and an advantage for the 
business coalitions. The challenge was the difficulty in educating bureaucracies on the 
economic benefits and trade linkages of both areas. In addition, the involvement of 
bureaucracies from non-commercial areas in the services debate and negotiations 
brought social objectives to protect certain regulations and decreased the impact of 
TNCs in agenda-setting. Conversely, the advantage was that the trade bureaucracy 
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was dependent on the expertise of the private sector and the data provided by 
companies and business associations on services barriers and IPR violations abroad, 
including the loss estimates (Sell and Prakash 2004: 155). Trade officials needed to be 
educated on certain technical details in services and IPRs, especially as the Uruguay 
Round negotiations delved into sectoral issues and technical details.  
 
Coalition-building  
 
Both cases were built by a coalition of TNCs. While it was U.S. banking and insurance 
sectors that mobilised other firms around a services coalition, the IPR case was built 
upon separate coalitions organized around copyrights, patents, and trademarks issues 
(Sell 2003: 96, 101-3; Sell and Prakash 2004: 156). Both coalitions were 
transnationalized through interactions with business leaders in different countries.91 
The interactions of the services coalition had a broader scope as business leaders also 
engaged in an aggressive public education campaign, particularly through a policy 
network including academics, experts, journalists and other professionals. Strategic 
options for a trade-based approach in services were discussed in the broader context 
                                                 
91 Similar to the services coalition, the IPR coalition was transnationalised after interactions 
with British, German and French business groups, as well as with the Union of Industrial and 
Employers’ Confederations of Europe (UNICE) and Japanese Keidanren. These interactions 
produced a dialogue that would ensure a commitment to pressure home governments to 
work together at the GATT until achieving their mutual objectives (Sell 2003: 53-4).  
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of an epistemic community, whereas IPR the campaign was streamlined and 
centralised around the Intellectual Property Coalition (IPC) which was established in 
March 1986 by CEOs from twelve TNCs. This was because of a major challenge faced 
by the services TNCs non-existent in the IPR case, i.e. the absence of a theoretical 
framework and a body of international legal order for intergovernmental cooperation 
in trade in services. First of all, the service campaigners needed to re-frame service 
sectors as an object of trade negotiations in a coherent theoretical framework, which 
would then feed into the policy debate and the GATT agenda. In this respect, the 
coalition for services was heavily dependent on academic production and research to 
create a trade framework for deregulation. Furthermore, key TNC representatives also 
developed expertise as members of the epistemic community together with 
government officials and academics, and intensively used the knowledge produced 
by the academics to advance their private agenda. 
 
The difference in the nature of coalition and network building had two major 
consequences regarding the content of the final accords, i.e. the GATS and TRIPS 
Agreement. The first difference was in the coherence of the Northern business-
government coalition and the consensus over the IPR issues compared to services. The 
business-government coalition for IPRs in the OECD countries continued to be firm 
during the round with a minimum level of disagreements that concentrated on certain 
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details negotiated in the final trade-offs. As Gorlin argued, the IPC got 95 per cent of 
what it wanted at the end of the round (Cited in Sell 2003: 115, and Sell and Prakash 
2004: 160). On the other hand, the demandeurs for services faced business resistance 
within the OECD zone to exclude certain sectors from liberalisation such as U.S. 
maritime or French audio-visual industry, but they also saw a strong resistance from 
the bureaucracies arguing for maintaining regulations for different purposes. The 
second difference was in the nature of North-South consensus. Developing countries 
bought into the arguments on the gains through a services framework and they gave 
their consent with less coercion than in the case of the TRIPS negotiations during 
which they faced a strong pressure in the form of unilateral U.S. actions. 
Consequently, developing countries gave fewer concessions in services than in IPRs 
and proactively joined in the paradigm shift in the trade regime that re-identified 
intersubjective meanings such as trade, barriers, and protectionism.  
 
Use of U.S. Trade Machinery 
 
Unilateral measures by the U.S. government became a major factor in getting the 
consent of hardliners for the TRIPS Agreement. Services created a stronger Southern 
reaction in the early 1980s than IPRs since it became a ‚take-it-or-forget-the-round‛ 
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issue for the U.S., whereas IPRs were a secondary priority (Singh 2003: 2).92 However 
in the late 1980s, IPRs became a contentious North/South issue because the U.S. and 
other OECD countries pursued an expansive agenda. This occurred in conjunction 
with the loss of enthusiasm on the side of the U.S. as the GATS was built to produce 
limited economic outcomes in the short term (Singh 2003: 7). In this context, U.S. trade 
machinery was crafted as a strong enforcement instrument and used more proactively 
and coercively to get consent of the hardliners to the TRIPS Agreement. TNCs 
aggressively resorted to the U.S. trade machinery for IPR enforcement abroad after the 
amendments to the U.S. trade law in 1984 that modified Section 301, which was 
further strengthened in 1988 together with the creation of Super 301. The 
investigations under Section 301 targeted the hardliners as well as other partners who 
had insufficient IPR protection (Sell 2003: 109-110).93 The direct association of stronger 
IP protection with unilateral trade preferences made U.S. unilateralism more 
influential in achieving modifications to foreign practices (Sell 2003: 85, 90, 103). 
Developing countries came on board for the inclusion of IPRs within the GATT 
framework by late 1989 with the hope that this multilateral instrument would ease 
U.S. unilateralism (Sell 2003: 109-111). 
                                                 
92 The U.S. agenda for the GATT on IPRs was limited to the counterfeiting issue until the mid-
1980s. The U.S. administration came on board to launch the round, not only with a mandate 
on counterfeited products, but also other IPR issues following  directions from the IPR 
coalition (Sell 2003: 49).  
93 Between 1975 and 1990, Section 301 cases were mostly initiated against the EC, Japan, 
Korea, Taiwan, Argentina, and Brazil (Low 1993: 90). 
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On the other hand, even though the constitutional amendments to the U.S. trade law 
provided U.S. service industries with a menu of remedies including unilateral 
measures, they were not used extensively for consensus-building at the GATT. Before 
it expired in 1990, Super 301 was used by USTR under the leadership of Carla Hills 
against Japan, India, and Brazil through cases initiated for ‚unfair‛ practices in the 
service industry (Low 1993: 92).94 On the other hand, in January 1989 Korea and the 
EC were also identified as priority countries for their discriminatory practices against 
U.S. telecommunications products and services under new Section 301 provisions 
(Low 1993:  92). As discussed before, developing countries faced U.S. pressure in 
different forms before the start of the Uruguay Round, but coercion was not needed 
once talks in services were on track with active developing country involvement. In 
fact, this supports the argument that the Southern consent was secured as these 
countries’ perceptions of interests in services evolved as they gradually appreciated 
services as a trade issue. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
94 The cases included government procurement practices of satellites and supercomputers in 
Japan, and the protection for insurance market in India (Low 1993: 92). 
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Conclusion 
 
The integration of services to the GATT was an outcome of a long-term war of 
position under strategic leadership and guidance of key individuals who mobilized 
firms and governments through agenda-setting strategies including coalition and 
network building, education, and activating U.S. trade policies. The TNCs built a case 
in the form of a policy formula responsive to the needs and interests of governments 
in the North and the South. Their case was bought to developing countries whose 
interest perceptions evolved parallel to their exposure of the ideas disseminated by 
the TNCs. However, the GATS reflected a hegemonic compromise between the 
neoliberal outlook promoted by the TNCs and the protectionist concerns of 
governments pronounced in the form of development and social objectives of 
domestic regulations. As the policy debate moved to Geneva, TNCs’ agenda-setting 
influence was constrained by the negotiation dynamics. This led the GATS to take 
shape upon the principle of progressive liberalisation and a bottom-up approach. 
Consequently, the TNCs intensified lobbying in Washington in order to prevent the 
MFN principle being applied unconditionally without reciprocal access to highly 
regulated markets. This precipitated the postponement of sectoral market access talks 
in the financial and telecommunications industries. 
 
 220 
 
 
 
Part III. TNCs in Setting the Agenda for the WTO: The Case of Investment 
 
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER 6: THE TWO TRACK APPROACH: INVESTMENT AT THE OECD 
AND THE WTO  
 
 
U.S. and EU business preferences and strategies during the 1990s were shaped within 
the context of neoliberal hegemony. As the hegemony was increasingly contested, 
TNCs started acting as pragmatic ‚venue-shoppers‛ by adopting agenda-setting 
strategies towards promoting best policy options that would both escape domestic 
public scrutiny and widespread challenges within civil society, and enforce market 
disciplines to emerging economies. The business case for a multilateral investment 
regime is a prime example supporting this argument which will be further developed 
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in the following two chapters. This chapter aims to examine the period before the 
launch of the Doha Round within which U.S. and EU TNCs deliberated on a collective 
case for building a multilateral investment constitution, but produced diverging 
perspectives regarding its scope and the venue for negotiations. European TNCs were 
the social forces that promoted the negotiation of such a framework at the WTO 
through expanding the legal and normative scope of the trade regime. Nonetheless, 
an alternative case was produced and promoted by the U.S. TNCs. This was to 
negotiate a high-standards investment accord at the OECD among like-minded 
governments. In the mid-1990s a compromise was reached over a ‚two-track 
approach‛ after transatlantic business and government deliberations --putting 
investment simultaneously on the agendas of the OECD and WTO. The negotiations 
for a Multilateral Investment Agreement (MAI) at the OECD failed in 1998 owing to 
the disagreements in inter-government negotiations as well as the controversies 
between governments and TNCs parallel to an emerging counter-movement 
mobilized by NGOs that deepened clashes. On the other hand, the deliberations for 
integrating investment to the WTO started by the creation of a working group at the 
WTO with an educative mandate in 1996 but faltered in tandem with the failure of the 
Seattle Ministerial Conference in December 1999.  Ultimately, an intergovernmental 
consensus was forged at Doha in 2001 to initiate a development round addressing 
developing country concerns as well as certain demands raised by the NGOs. The 
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decision on investment was the continuation of deliberations until the Cancun 
Conference in 2003 where members would reconsider whether to launch the talks on 
investment.  
 
This chapter concentrates on the developments until the launch of the Doha Round 
with a focus on the transatlantic business deliberations regarding the multilateral 
framework for investment. It unfolds in three sections. The first section outlines the 
WTO agenda and developments until the launch of the Doha Round in 2001, and 
gives an outline of the existing international investment rules at various levels. The 
second section discusses the U.S. and European business perspectives and the OECD 
MAI negotiations. The third section provides an overview of the WTO discussions on 
investment until the Doha Ministerial in 2001.  
 
6.1. The WTO after the Uruguay Round and Investment Rules 
 
The post-Uruguay agenda of the WTO was shaped around a debate on the difficulties 
to implement the WTO agreements versus a further expansion of the trade regime to 
new domains with additional constitutional disciplines over the states. Although 
developing countries gradually adopted neoliberal reforms, they were concerned 
about the costs and inadequate flexibilities within the WTO package and pursued an 
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agenda towards strengthening multilateral development provisions. The Doha Round 
was launched after a compromise taking those concerns into account while narrowing 
the negotiation mandate on new norm generation.  On the other hand, developing 
countries became more active in international rule-making for investment whereas 
their preference was to craft new rules in the bilateral setting as this approach allowed 
them to better shape the content in line with their needs.  
 
6.1.1. Towards the Doha Round  
 
The WTO agenda, following its inception, was shaped around outstanding issues 
from the Uruguay Round and debates over the future legal framework of the 
institution. Sectoral talks on services had partial success. The talks on the movement 
of natural persons and the negotiations on maritime transport failed whilst sectoral 
negotiations in high priority areas for the U.S. financial services and 
telecommunications were concluded successfully in 1997. Another significant issue for 
the U.S. was the liberalization of trade in information technology products which 
became subject to plurilateral negotiations which were concluded in the Singapore 
Ministerial Conference in December 1996 (Bridges: 12 December 1996). The Declaration 
on Trade in Information Products (ITA) would result in gradual elimination of tariffs 
in the sector by the year 2000 (Matsushita et al. 2003: 142). On the other hand, the new 
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Dispute Settlement Mechanism (DSM) made a jumpstart with active participation 
from developing countries as both complainants and respondents. The filed disputes 
increased from an average of 6.2 complaints per year during the 47 years of the GATT 
to 36.5 complaints per year for the period from 1995 to 2000 (Park 2004: 535). With 
their rising share in the world trade and economy developing countries have also 
participated in the agenda-setting in an unprecedented level. They are actively 
involved in the debate on further expansion of the WTO legal framework to new trade 
related domains versus a revisiting of the existing rules.   
 
For many developing countries that lacked the necessary institutional, economic and 
human capacity, a significant concern after the conclusion of the Uruguay Round was 
the implementation of the WTO agreements. Implementing the WTO accords such as 
the TRIPS and TRIMS Agreements proved especially more burdensome for many 
developing countries since these accords required substantial domestic legal and 
institutional adjustment through reforms and dedication of administrative resources. 
The TRIPS Agreement created political tensions in many developing countries as it 
required systemic reforms and revisiting patent and health care regimes that 
eventually created a market-based system for pharmaceutical production, pricing, and 
imports with stronger IPR protection (May 2002: 98-101; Watal 2000: 79). On the other 
hand, the TRIMS Agreement envisaged the elimination of investment measures such 
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as local content requirements, trade balancing measures and export restrictions 
heavily used by developing countries (Matsushita et al. 2003: 531-3). Other agreements 
such as the Technical Barriers to Trade and Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures 
required the members to implement new procedures for safety standards in the trade 
of agricultural and manufactured goods by developing adequate technical capacity 
through constructing laboratories, applying custom procedures etc. (Matsushita et al. 
2003: 132-4). Parallel to these cumbersome disciplines, developing countries also had 
to put into effect the market access requirements for trade in goods including 
agriculture and services. In return for making numerous amendments to domestic 
regulations and voting resources to implement new WTO obligations, market opening 
in agriculture and textiles fell short of their expectations. The Agreement on 
Agriculture, which was crucial for developing countries, did not result in radical 
market opening for their products as it failed a complete elimination of domestic 
subsidies as well as border barriers (Jackson 2002: 314-5). Similarly, the agreement on 
textiles and clothing was a disappointment for many countries dependent on exports 
in this sector (Ricupero 2000: 69-70; Malaga and Mohanty 2003).95 Many developing 
countries also voiced their discontent with the weakness of SDT provisions in a 
number of WTO accords for not allowing much needed flexibilities in the 
                                                 
95 The agreement allowed textile-importing developed countries to bind the sector to the WTO 
disciplines in a gradual time schedule of 10 years that would lapse on 1 January 2005 (WTO 
1999a: 65-6). This meant that material  benefits for developing countries would be seen in the 
final phases. 
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implementation of their obligations. As discussed in Chapter 3, the WTO package was 
increasingly regarded as an imbalanced set of gains and losses for developing and 
developed countries. In this context, developing countries voiced their concerns about 
the implementation of existing WTO treaties and called for amendments allowing for 
additional benefits and flexibilities including extension of the phase out periods in the 
TRIPS and TRIMS Agreements (Watal 2000: 78-9).  
 
On the flip side, developed countries opposed the demands to re-negotiate the WTO 
accords while they brought up a number of new ‚trade-related‛ issues to the WTO 
agenda. These included issues such as environment, labour standards, e-commerce, 
government procurement, competition, and investment (Schott 2000: 25-30). The EU 
became the primary sponsor of a Millennium Round idea that would expand the 
scope of the regime to some of those areas while furthering liberalisation in trade in 
goods and services (Deutsch 2001). Hence, starting with its first ministerial conference 
that convened in Singapore in 1996, the debate revolved around whether and how the 
WTO should have treated these new domains. The ministers decided in Singapore to 
take four new issues—investment, competition, government procurement and trade 
facilitation—to the work program for an analytical examination of their integration 
into the trade regime (WTO 1996). Among others, a working group was established 
with an educative mandate to explore the relationship between trade and investment 
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through exchange of views between members. The Millennium Round proposed by 
the EU envisaged the launch of negotiations on the four Singapore issues as well as 
environment (Deutsch 2001). The new issues and other traditionally difficult matters 
such as agriculture, textiles, and antidumping contributed to the collapse of the Seattle 
Conference in 1999, in an atmosphere heated with street protests of countless NGOs 
(Bridges: 3 December 1999). 
 
The Seattle Conference became a turning point for the rise of NGOs as significant 
actors in setting the WTO and trade agendas. The WTO was attacked by a wide 
variety of actors from environmentalists to labour unions and development oriented 
NGOs critical of the democracy deficit of the institution. Although NGOs cannot be 
regarded as a coherent body of actors with a collective agenda, they became critical 
interlocutors in shaping governments positions on a wide range of issues from labour 
concerns and environment to sustainable development. The Millennium Round 
initiative created an incentive for cross-border coalitions with a wide scale 
mobilisation bringing together different stakeholders. In the run-up to the Seattle 
Conference more than 3000 NGOs signed an alternative Seattle Declaration submitted 
by Martin Khor from the Third World Network which proposed a ‚turn around‛ 
instead of a new round, i.e. a review of the existing agreements with a view to detect 
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imbalances and a reform of the WTO decision-making procedure to make it more 
inclusive and transparent before any new initiatives (Bridges: 30 November 1999).  
 
The debate on the agenda of a possible new round continued over an 
‚implementation-new issues‛ axis up until a deal was struck in the Doha Ministerial 
Conference that took place in November 2001. After a two-year preparation period 
effectively taking into account the demands of developing countries and trying to 
ensure the integration of NGOs in the process, WTO members agreed to launch the 
new round of talks--the Doha Development Agenda. This was to emphasize the 
content of the negotiation mandate which was supposedly taking into consideration 
major issues critical to developing countries.  The Doha Ministerial Declarations 
contained a  broad mandate for negotiations regarding development-related concerns 
such as special and differential treatment clauses, TRIPS-related matters 
(i.e.traditional knowledge, folklore and patentability of plant varieties and 
biodiversity), and the ‚implementation‛ of the Uruguay Round Agreements (WTO 
2001d). The Doha package also included a separate Ministerial Declaration on the 
TRIPS Agreement and Public Health aiming towards facilitating access of least 
developed countries to pharmaceutical products essential for epidemics such as 
HIV/AIDS a significant issue for many African states (WTO 2001e). 
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On the other hand, the Doha mandate envisaged market access negotiations in 
agriculture, non-agriculture products and services. Among ‚new issues,‛ only 
environment could be injected into the negotiation package with a restricted mandate 
to examine the relationship between trade and multilateral environment agreements 
(Bridges: 14 November 2001). The Singapore issues were inserted into the package 
with a non-negotiation mandate for the continuation of their examination for future 
action because of strong resistance of certain developing countries such as India 
(Bridges: 14 November 2001). The examination exercise for the four issues would 
continue within relevant working groups for two more years until the Cancun 
Ministerial Conference in September 2003, where the members would decide whether 
the talks would be launched to craft multilateral agreements.  
 
Nevertheless, the Singapore issues as well as the disagreements on the modalities for 
liberalizing agriculture created intense controversies in the run-up to the Cancun 
meeting which eventually caused the summit to adjourn without any decisions.  The 
round could be resumed with a General Council decision that came in July 2004 after 
intensive consultations between the U.S., EU and emerging powers such as China, 
India and Brazil (Bridges: 3 August 2004). The ‚July decision‛ effectively excluded the 
new issues from the WTO agenda while resolving certain controversies on the issue of 
modalities in agriculture.  
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6.1.2. International Rules on Investment 
 
Foreign investment is generally defined either in broad terms covering intangible 
assets such as intellectual property and portfolio investment, or narrowly as Foreign 
Direct Investment (FDI) (Woolcock 2001: 163). Portfolio investment refers to short-
term movement of capital for purchasing securities or debt instruments while FDI 
covers longer term capital movements for operations in a host country (WTO 2002: 4). 
From the early 1980s on, parallel to the integration of global production and national 
production systems, global FDI flows increased at an approximate annual rate of 30 
percent (at a rate larger than the growth of world trade and production) (UNCTAD 
1997: 1). Between 1980 and 1996, the FDI stock increased from $500 billion to $1.5 
trillion mostly concentrated in developed countries (UNCTAD 1997: 1). Developing 
countries attracted 32 per cent of total FDI flows with an amount around $100 billion in 
1995 (For detailed figures see Annex 4).  This trend was an outcome of the changing 
attitude of developing countries towards FDI. According to UNCTAD, in the 1991-95 
period less than 3 per cent of 485 changes to domestic rules regulating FDI were in the 
direction of control whereas the remaining measures were to liberalize and promote 
FDI (UNCTAD 1997: 4). This trend continued throughout the decade (UNCTAD 2002: 
7).  
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International instruments with regard to the regulation of investment generally 
address three sets of issues: liberalisation of barriers to FDI, protection of investment, 
and settlement of disputes among relevant parties (WTO 1998a). International rules 
for the liberalisation of FDI deal with domestic regulations which may be restricting, 
discriminating or distorting international capital flows. Most common restrictions are 
in the form of pre-admission barriers to establishment, post-admission barriers, and 
incentives to attract FDI (Kurtz 2002: 11-19). Pre-admission restrictions are generally 
erected in response to sovereignty concerns of the states and include measures to close 
strategic and sensitive sectors to FDI, quantitative restrictions limiting the number of 
foreign investors in certain sectors of the host country, and certain screening and 
registration procedures (Kurtz 2002: 12). As will be discussed in the following section 
pre-admission barriers became a significant concern for TNCs in accessing developing 
country markets.   
 
On the other hand post-admission restrictions have an economic quality since they are 
employed by host countries to exploit particular economic benefits of foreign 
investment after  the foreign capital enters the market (Kurtz 2002: 13-4). There are a 
wide variety of such measures in the form of joint venture obligations, obligations of 
technology transfer or performance requirements, which are conditions imposed on 
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foreign investors to use domestic products (local content requirements) and to employ 
nationals of the host country. Host countries employ these measures to enhance 
domestic economic growth and development, to support the growth of certain 
industries, and/or encourage inward technology transfer. Likewise investment 
incentives are used to attract FDI by motivating foreign investors to operate in a 
country through fiscal or financial favours. While fiscal incentives are generally used 
by developing countries through reducing taxation, the latter are employed by 
resource rich countries to encourage foreign investors through subsidies, export 
credits or loan guarantees (WTO 1998c: 4-5). Incentives can be distorting since they 
may distort the international allocation of FDI (WTO 1998c: 16-7). Restrictive 
measures in pre-admission can be discriminative among home countries whereas 
barriers in the post-admission phase can cause discrimination among foreign and 
domestic actors as well as among home countries. In this respect, non-discrimination 
through international agreements is ensured by the MFN principle in the pre-
admission phase and by both MFN and NT in the post-admission phase.  
 
Binding international rules on FDI generally contain provisions not only to liberalise 
barriers to FDI either in pre-admission or post-admission phases, but also to protect 
investment once investors start to operate in the host country, and to settle disputes 
between foreign investors (or their governments) and host governments (WTO 1998a). 
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International rules related to FDI are disseminated in numerous accords signed in the 
multilateral, regional or bilateral settings. These rules set down the rights for both 
governments and investors. The history of multilateral investment rules dates back to 
the Havana Charter of the ITO signed in 1948. As outlined in Chapter 3, the Charter 
contained chapters on employment, development, restrictive business practices as 
well as trade and investment measures (Wilcox 1949). On the other hand, the GATT 
contained certain provisions on trade related investment measures inhibiting 
international flow of trade in goods. Yet, these rules did not become effective until a 
dispute case was brought up by the U.S. in 1982 against Canadian Foreign Investment 
Agency (FIRA).96 The U.S. initiative for a new round in the early 1980s included the 
extension of the scope of investment rules within the GATT. The U.S. initially brought 
investment to the agenda of the Consultative Group of 18 in 1981, and it proposed a 
code on investment particularly for performance requirements in the ministerial 
meeting in 1982 (Woolcock 2001: 166). However, this project had limited success 
because of the resistance of developing countries as well as differences among the 
OECD countries. Thus, the Punta del Este Declaration contained a negotiation 
mandate only for trade related investment measures (TRIMs) (See Annex 2 for the 
negotiation mandate).  The U.S. was especially concerned for the elimination of 14 key 
                                                 
96 The U.S. argued that the Canadian FIRA breached the national treatment clause of the 
GATT Article III.4. Although the GATT panel ruled in favour of the U.S., it also concluded 
that such measures could be used by developing countries since the GATT allowed the 
government support for economic development (Jackson 2002: 215). 
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TRIMs including local equity requirements (Woolcock 1991: 66). Developing countries 
like India and Brazil resisted crafting new rules apart from existing GATT provisions 
which could harm their performance requirements in use for development purposes, 
whereas the EC supported by Japan and a number of NICs proposed the elimination 
of only 6 to 8 TRIMs (Woolcock 1991: 67). The negotiation group on TRIMs could not 
produce any consensus text until the Brussels meeting in 1990 (Croome 1995: 284). 
Consequently, the Dunkel draft and the final agreement on TRIMs prohibited a 
number of measures listed in the agreement including local content and trade 
balancing requirements, and foreign exchange restrictions and export requirements 
(Croome 1995: 309; Chase 2004: 5). Apart from the TRIMs Agreement, the WTO 
package also contained certain provisions in the GATS and TRIPS Agreement with 
regard to the delivery of services through commercial presence, i.e. Mode 3 and 
investor protection pertaining to intellectual property (Woolcock 2001: 169-70). Apart 
from the WTO, international instruments to liberalise investment at the multilateral 
level were extensively developed particularly by the OECD. 
 
Since its establishment in 1961, OECD has utilized a number of measures  to protect 
and liberalise investment, and to ensure transparency of domestic regulations in 
conjunction with FDI. These are binding and voluntary instruments aiming to provide 
NT (both before and after establishment); repatriation of profits, dividends, rents, and 
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the proceeds of liquidated investments; transparency of domestic rules; multilateral 
consultation to deal with conflicts; and peer review to provide rollback of existing 
restrictions (OECD 1997: 6-8). The primary tools have been a number of binding codes 
created for the liberalisation of capital movements and current invisible operations 
(Woolcock 2001: 164). These codes of liberalisation initially aimed to ensure 
transparency through notifications of the member states about their restrictions and 
reservations on capital movements (OECD 1997: 7-8). In practice the liberalisation was 
realised progressively through peer reviewing conducted under relevant OECD 
committees (OECD 1997: 8). Once restrictions were lifted in member countries, the 
codes prevented their reintroduction. In addition to these codes, progressive 
liberalisation and non-discrimination are guaranteed also by the 1976 Declaration on 
International Investment and Multilateral Enterprises, and supportive binding 
decisions which guided follow-up procedures including notification, review and 
consultation mechanisms as well as policy monitoring (Woolcock 2001: 165). The 
Declaration is periodically reviewed to create a better investment climate in the OECD 
zone, to help TNCs contribute to economic and social progress, and to deal with 
challenges created by the TNC operations with a view to minimising those challenges 
(OECD 1997: 7). In contrast to the codes, the elements outlined in the Declaration are 
not binding. The attempts to make the National Treatment instrument (NTI) binding 
and enlarge its scope in the negotiations in 1990 and 1991 failed due to the 
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disagreements between the U.S. and the EU on a number of issues (Woolcock 1991: 
64-5). The negotiations for an MAI at the OECD were a continuation of the work to 
make NTI binding and the failure of the agreement partially rested in these long-
standing disagreements which will be discussed later.  
 
On the other hand there are regional frameworks for investment which particularly 
originated in Europe and North America. Starting with the Treaty of Rome, the 
European acquis communautaire gradually liberalised investment regimes in member 
countries, through guaranteeing national treatment and the right of establishment to 
the member countries (Woolcock 2001: 165-6). With the launch of the Single European 
Act (SEA), a de facto liberalisation was accomplished within the common market 
through sector specific directives and competition policy except for monopolies and 
oligopolistic market structures (Woolcock 2001: 166). On the other side of the Atlantic, 
the push for international rules came from the United States. The free trade agreement 
with Canada in 1988 included provisions on national treatment and elimination of 
export and production-based investment requirements (Schott and Smith 1988: 148-9). 
The North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) which extended the U.S.-
Canada FTA to Mexico contained more detailed and high standard provisions for 
liberalisation, investment protection, and dispute settlement. Chapter 11 of NAFTA 
lays down the most detailed and comprehensive international rules pertaining to 
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foreign investment (Kurtz 2002: 19). It contains both MFN and national treatment at 
federal as well as state level, and prohibits the use of performance requirements for 
exports; domestic content, domestic and exclusive sales requirements; and obligations 
to transfer technology (Woolcock 2001: 167). Additionally, Chapter 11 adopts a 
negative-list approach limiting the exceptions in the liberalisation of investment 
(Kurtz 2002: 22). It also contains rules on investment protection such as expropriation 
and dispute settlement procedures for state-to-state disputes and investor-to-state 
conflicts (Kurtz 2002: 23-5). These procedures cover the application of measures such 
as UNCITRAL (UN Center on Investment and Trade Law) and ICSID (International 
Center for Settlement of Investment Disputes of the World Bank) arbitration 
procedures (Woolcock 2001: 167).  
  
In addition to multilateral and regional arrangements, there are numerous bilateral 
agreements on investment either in the form of Bilateral Investment Treaties (BITs) or 
as part of Free Trade Agreements (FTAs). BITs vary in regard to their content and 
scope. They generally cover provisions on the admission and protection of investment 
(WTO 1998a: 3). In most cases, investment is defined in broad terms including 
ownership and intellectual property rights, and contain MFN and national treatment 
provisions (WTO 1998a: 4). Virtually all BITs have dispute settlement procedures 
generally through arbitration with references to the mechanisms of UNCITRAL, 
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ICSID and/or International Chamber of Commerce (ICC) (Woolcock 2001: 171). BITs 
signed by the U.S. contain the most comprehensive rules covering both investment 
protection and liberalisation, and contain provisions of non-discrimination both for 
pre-admission and post-admission phases in contrast to many other treaties that 
mostly apply MFN to the post-establishment stage (Kurtz 2002: 13). Developing 
countries have also been engaged in rule-making for investment to create an enabling 
business environment especially through bilateral agreements. The number of BITs 
between developed and developing countries increased as the attitude towards FDI 
changed positively particularly because it became a desirable source of capital 
especially after the Third World debt crisis of the 1980s which made loan finance more 
costly (Kurtz 2002: 7). According to UNCTAD by early 1997 the number of BITs 
reached 1,310 a majority of which was signed during the 1990s (UNCTAD 1997: 4). 
This number has recently reached more than 2600 (South Centre 2010: 1). Treaties 
concluded from the 1990s on also include South-South accords parallel to the increase 
of FDI flows between developing countries (UNCTAD 1997: 4). In fact, bilateral 
agreements became a widely used tool by developing countries as they provided 
necessary flexibilities to manage FDI flows according to their needs. This point will 
further be elaborated in the third section which outlines developing countries’ major 
concerns and arguments surrounding a potential WTO agreement on investment. 
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Finally, it should be noted that the new generation free trade agreements (FTAs) 
concluded after NAFTA also contain comprehensive WTO-plus rules on investment. 
These agreements were generally signed between developing and developed 
countries although some South-South FTAs also contain investment chapters. The 
legal scope of the majority of U.S. FTAs proved more comprehensive than other 
agreements that came into force as they incurred encompassing WTO-plus provisions 
in investment. According to Estevadeordal et al. (2007: 39) recent U.S. FTAs contain 
four main modalities of investment (establishment, acquisition, post-establishment 
operations and resale) as well as non-discrimination principles and dispute settlement 
as they cover all 17 investment provisions existent in the new generation 
agreements.97  
 
6.2. Transatlantic Business Perspectives on a Multilateral Framework on Investment 
 
U.S. and European business leaders started deliberations on crafting a multilateral 
investment constitution in the early 1990s. There was an agreement on the need for 
such a framework because of the growing importance of investment for their cross-
                                                 
97 These are provisions for establishment, acquisition, post-establishment operation, resale, 
MFN treatment, national treatment, nationality of management and board of directors, 
performance requirements, prior comment opportunity, duty to publish, national inquiry 
point, denial of benefits, minimum standard of treatment, treatment in case of conflict, 
expropriation and compensation, transfers restrictions, investor-state disputes (Estevadeordal 
et al. 2007: 40). 
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border operations and the inconsistent nature and inadequacy of the patchwork of 
rules existing in multilateral, regional and bilateral agreements (Walter 2000: 57). 
Although a business consensus emerged on the need for such agreements, U.S. and 
European TNCs had produced different perspective regarding the scope of the 
framework and the venue of negotiations.  
 
6.2.1. American Perspective on a Multilateral Investment Framework 
 
Facing problems related to their access, operation and protection of their investments 
in lucrative developing country markets, U.S. TNCs started deliberations on a 
multilateral framework for investment rules from the early 1990s. U.S. TNCs had a 
number of policy instruments available to access developing economies mainly in the 
form of bilateral and regional agreements. However, bilateral agreements could not 
have signed with emerging economies in South America and East Asia (Walter 2000: 
57; Walter 2001: 59). A high-standard multilateral accord was a particular demand 
from U.S. service industries which were vocal during the MAI talks through cross-
sectoral bodies such as CSI and sectoral groupings like the Securities Industry 
Association (Walter 2000: 56).98 While cross-sectoral business bodies such as ACTPN, 
                                                 
98 Graham (2000: 34) indicates that the service industries supported the MAI aspiring a faster 
liberalization of sector-specific investment related barriers than the services negotiations at 
the WTO.  
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BRT, and NAM endorsed the idea of a multilateral regime, it was the United States 
Council for International Business (USCIB) which proved to be the most ambitious 
American business actor that pressed for negotiations at the OECD (Walter 2000: 56; 
Graham 2000: 49). USCIB had direct representation at the OECD via the Business and 
Industry Committee (BIAC) which was the body representing business communities 
of member states observing the work of various OECD committees (Walter 2000: 55;  
Smythe 1998: 105).  
 
USCIB floated the idea of negotiating a strong investment instrument in 1991, tapping 
into the opportunity that the OECD launched in its third revision of the National 
Treatment instrument (Beder 2006: 173-175). The OECD was seen as a venue where 
negotiations could be kept low-profile and uncontroversial (Walter 2001: 52). For U.S. 
TNCs, a high standard global constitution should have included four main elements 
(Walter 2000: 57). The first element was non-discrimination both in the pre-admission 
but also in the post-establishment phase which included a  provision for the ‚right of 
establishment.‛ Investor protection was the second area of concern especially to 
guarantee strict constraints on host governments from expropriation through legal 
processes and compensation. The third element was a wide legal scope that would 
cover all aspects of investment operations including transfers of capital and 
managerial staff as well as restrictions on performance requirements. Finally, it was 
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crucial to create a strong enforcement mechanism in the form of an investor-state 
dispute settlement which guaranteed impartial arbitration in cases of breach of these 
rights.    
 
Although U.S. government was concerned about the slow process in the NT program 
of the OECD, it embraced the idea of a more comprehensive instrument for which it 
received the support of OECD ministers in June 1991 (Smythe 1998: 101). Compared to 
the GATT, where developing countries might have resisted new rules prohibiting 
performance measures, it was easier to negotiate high standard business-friendly 
rules among like-minded governments at the OECD (Smythe 1998: 100-101; Walter 
2001: 60). The U.S. government became favourable of the OECD also because it saw 
the opportunity to divide the European block by taking some European governments 
easily on board to forge a more favourable high standard agreement (Smythe 1998: 
104). Indeed, many European states with left-wing parties in government and 
parliaments initially favoured the WTO rather than the OECD (Egan 2001: 87). For the 
U.S. it was not easy to divide the Europeans at the WTO where they were represented 
by the Commission—whereas at the OECD, European states had individual 
representation. However, the launch of the MAI negotiations was postponed until 
1995 because it took longer than expected to convince the Europeans to embark upon 
the talks.  
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6.2.2. European Perspective on Multilateral Rules for Investment 
 
In contrast to the American approach to negotiate a high standard agreement at the 
OECD, Europeans together with the Japanese businesses inclined for a more inclusive 
multilateral pact at the WTO even though it would entail lower standards in line with 
their own BITs (Walter 2001: 60). The European Roundtable of Industrialists (ERT) 
started discussing a better regulatory framework for investment in the early 1990s. A 
particular concern for ERT was to enhance the competitiveness of European industries 
in world markets.99 ERT’s work program included a thorough examination of business 
conditions in developing countries which was conducted by its ‚North-South 
working group‛ formed in 1990.100  ERT produced subsequent reports during the 
1990s analyzing investment conditions in host countries ranking developing countries 
according to the attitude towards foreign direct investment (ERT 1993; 1994; 1996; 
1997 and 2000).  
 
                                                 
99 The creation of the Competitiveness Advisory Group in 1995 was a direct outcome of a 
proposal brought by ERT and endorsed by the European Commission. 
http://www.ert.be/ert_milestones_and_its_chairmen.aspx accessed on December 2010. 
100For a summary of the activities of the working group see 
http://www.ert.be/working_group.aspx?wg=18 accessed on December 2010. 
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Based on data collected from the ‚public domain‛ in two surveys in the 1987-92 and 
1993-6 periods conducted in approximately 28 countries, ERT suggested that there 
was an ongoing improvement in investment conditions in developing countries (ERT 
1996). ERT argued that the speed of market opening was highest in Argentina, India, 
Mexico, Pakistan, Philippines and Thailand with an overall ‚acceleration‛ of 
improvements (ERT 1996: 8, 12). ERT also outlined the drivers of change (ERT 1996: 
13). According to the 1996 report a key driver was ‚the follow-up to the break-down 
of communist ideology and the people living formerly under the communist system 
now looking for wealth and free choice‛ (ERT 1996: 13). Furthermore, it was noted 
that developing countries were competing on rules with the globalisation of markets. 
The report also underlined the role of international agreements such as the WTO 
treaties and NAFTA as well as the promotion of liberal investment rules by the IMF 
and World Bank in this change of attitude. Based on these reports, ERT suggested that 
in many countries the deregulations which were liberalizing FDI inflows were no 
longer deemed as a ‚concession‛ but rather perceived as a means for economic 
development and increasing competitiveness (ERT 1997: 3). 
 
ERT also produced specific policy recommendations to lock in the progress 
suggesting the use of ‚public policy benchmarking‛ in reaching the goals of 
‚contestable markets‛ and an ‚enabling environment‛ (ERT 1996: 7; 1997: 9). The 
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European perspective, thus, differed from the U.S. vision as ERT proposed a gradual 
approach towards locking in the process rather than imposing the agreed upon best 
practices of the OECD countries (ERT 1997: 9). Instead of the idea of creating a free-
standing plurilateral accord, which could later be extended to developing countries, 
European TNCs favoured the WTO where a framework could be negotiated with 
developing countries. In its earliest report in 1993, ERT proposed the creation of a 
‚GATT for investment‛ (ERT 1993: 35). Even after the launch of the MAI negotiations 
in 1995, ERT continued its inclination to create an inclusive legal framework at the 
WTO built upon public policy benchmarking. This was made explicit in its report in 
1997: 
 
The ERT approach for a global agreement within WTO is different from, and in 
many respects complementary to, MAI. It covers a broader range of issues and is 
supposed to help with the process of opening and creating an enabling 
environment. All benchmarks will refer to countries at the same stage of 
economic development, not to OECD. On some aspects, practical experience 
with negotiating and implementing MAI or the peer review mechanism in 
OECD Investment Instruments may be used to help designing the new global 
agreement. However, this should not further delay substantive work on the issue in 
WTO (ERT: 1997: 9 emphasis added). 
 
In this regard, a multilateral framework at the WTO was envisioned to provide higher 
transparency, institutionalize public policy benchmarking and peer review, as well as 
to introduce the MFN principle to all policies to create an enabling environment and 
contestable markets (ERT 1997: 9). It would also cover non-discrimination to foreign 
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investors, notification procedures to lock in progress, instruments for adequate 
competition policy and a number of alternatives for dispute settlement, and contain a 
constructive ‚modus vivendi with regional agreements‛ (ERT 1997: 9).101 After the 
failure of the MAI initiative and the Asian financial crisis, European TNCs became 
particularly concerned about a WTO accord to include pre-establishment phase for 
non-discrimination since most European BITs contained protection provisions and 
post-establishment rules but lacked provisions enabling access in the pre-admission 
phase (UNICE 2003a: 4, UNICE 2003b: 7).  
 
The multilateral vision promoted by European businesses was fully embraced by the 
European Commission. Commissioner Sir Leon Brittan responsible for external affairs 
of the EU explicitly favoured the expansion of the WTO agenda to investment areas in 
his statements in 1994 and 1995 (Brittan 1995a, 1995b). He stressed the idea that the 
WTO could offer an enforceable dispute resolution mechanism and the real barriers 
were not within the OECD zone but in developing countries (Brittan 1995a; Smythe 
1998: 106). The Commission endorsed the OECD talks but together with Canada it 
continued to push for serious discussions at the WTO (Smythe 1998: 105-6). A WTO 
framework would be more flexible than an accord at the OECD and provide market 
                                                 
101 ICC was supportive of the benchmark approach and the WTO venue although it also 
endorsed the OECD negotiations (Maucher 1998). ICC provided expertise to the negotiators at 
the OECD offering its arbitration service as one of the potential venues for investor-state 
dispute resolution mechanism (Balanya et al. 2003: 112).  
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access exemptions for audio visual industry on cultural basis which was a critical 
issue for France (Graham 2000: 21, 31). It also created binding rules both for federal 
and sub-federal governments -a sensitive issue for the Europeans targeting the United 
States (Smythe 1998: 105; Graham 2000: 26-7). Furthermore, the Commission saw the 
potential to negotiate comprehensive investment rules at the WTO as an opportunity 
to extend its authority vis-à-vis member states (Smythe 1998: 104).102 As it will be 
further discussed in the next chapter, the calls of Commissioner Brittan for a 
Millennium Round including investment and other issues were also an expression of 
the multilateralism-first approach adopted by the Commission.  
 
The transatlantic divisions on the content and the venue of the negotiations of a new 
investment accord continued well into the mid-1990s (Graham 2000: 24). The U.S., 
concerned about a potential developing country intransigence that would risk the 
outcomes to reach a high-standard accord at the OECD, initially opposed bringing the 
issue to the WTO during the QUAD meetings where Canada and EU insisted on 
starting a parallel deliberative process at the WTO (Smythe 1998: 109).  While there 
emerged some support for parallel efforts in collective business forums such as ICC 
                                                 
102 Although the Commission had full competence in trade in goods within the Common 
Commercial Policy (CCP) along with the European Council, it had to share the negotiation 
authority with member states in services and IPRs as well as investment (Pedler 2001: 164-5). 
The Commission pursued extended competence on investment including the right to 
negotiate BITs through recent constitutional amendments (Raza 2007: 77).  
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and Transatlantic Business Dialogue (TABD) including both Americans and 
Europeans, USCIB and U.S. government argued that the debates on the venue were in 
fact a ‚sabotage‛ delaying the actual talks at the OECD (Smythe 1998: 106). Canada’s 
April 1996 proposal to the WTO suggesting the formation of a working group to 
examine the issue secured firm endorsement from the EU and ultimately paved the 
way for the Singapore Ministerial decision that set up the working group (Smythe 
2004: 7). The intention of the EC as well as Canada and Japan was to lay down the 
groundwork for future talks at the WTO. The U.S. came to terms with this ‚two-track 
approach‛ promoted by the three but it stipulated that the mandate of deliberations 
should have been educative (Smythe 2004: 10).  
 
6.2.3. The Failure of the MAI and Deliberations for WTO talks  
 
U.S. and European TNCs closely engaged in the OECD process which was launched 
in 1995 and continued with interruptions until the collapse of the process in the fall of 
1998. The mandate for the MAI laid by the OECD Council of Ministers was to 
‚provide for a broad multilateral agreement for international investment with high 
standards for the liberalisation of investment regimes and investment protection with 
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effective dispute settlement procedures.‛103 The target date to complete the talks was 
initially set as 1997. The standards for the MAI would be based on existing OECD 
instruments and norms, and follow the NAFTA model (Kurtz 2002). The negotiations 
were closely monitored by USCIB, which established its own working group on the 
MAI and had regular meetings with U.S. negotiators as well as European business 
groups such as UNICE (Beder 2006: 175; Balanya  et al. 2003: 112). Business groups in 
the OECD countries indirectly participated in the process through BIAC by providing 
the negotiators with their opinions and supportive technical studies.  
 
Differences of opinion among OECD governments came to the surface even before the 
launch of the talks and was a major factor for the failure of the MAI negotiations. 
These differences were consolidated by the time the first MAI draft was released in 
January 1997.104 The bottom line for the Europeans was to maintain the preferential 
treatment of member state companies within the Union through carving out an 
exception within the MAI for MFN and NT commitments for regional economic 
integrations (UNCTAD 1999: 14-5; Graham 2000: 31). On the other hand, despite the 
                                                 
103 Further information about the negotiation mandate, process and other documents relevant 
to the MAI talks can be found on the OECD website at:  http://www1.oecd.org/daf/mai/ 
accessed December 15, 2010.  
104 Graham (2000: 17) contends that an agreement over controversial issues was unlikely since 
this required political concessions that would exceed the authority of the investment 
negotiators who lacked access to higher-level officials and ministers. However, this seems to 
be the case in the early phase of the talks since the MAI captured attention of governments 
and parliaments as the NGO campaign started. 
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European insistence on the application of the MAI to all levels of government, the U.S. 
objected to the implementation of the MAI at sub-Federal level (UNCTAD 1999: 13-4; 
Graham 2000: 26-7). The Europeans were also critical of the extraterritoriality of U.S. 
law via applied sanctions on foreign firms that invest in Cuba, Libya and Iran 
(UNCTAD 1999: 20 Graham 2000: 28-30). Sectoral and country-specific exceptions 
submitted from early 1997 on brought about further tension since those exceptions 
became numerous and open-ended (UNCTAD 1999: 12; Kurtz 2002: 48-9). The most 
controversial exception was the carve-out requested by France and Canada for 
cultural sectors which was not acceptable to the Americans (UNCTAD 1999: 15; Kurtz 
2002: 45). Another carve-out was demanded for taxation by most OECD governments 
unwilling to give up their autonomy as they enjeoyed the flexibilities of the existing 
taxation regime which was built upon bilateral arrangements (UNCTAD 1999: 20-1).  
 
Secondly, in early 1997 an influential anti-MAI campaign was mobilized after the leak 
of the draft MAI text on the Internet by a network orchestrated by the NGOs such as 
Friends of the Earth, Public Citizen, and the Third World Network with support of 
environmentalist, labour unions, consumer groups and other citizen organizations 
(Graham 2000: 35-48; Tieleman 2004: 11-3). The campaigners lashed out the MAI draft 
on multiple fronts criticizing the text for potential erosion of the sovereignty of the 
states and for the creation of a legal context for corporate-led exploitation of labour 
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and environment (Tieleman 2004: 11). A common concern was that the MAI would 
become ‚a charter of rights for *TNCs+‛ and a ‚NAFTA on steroids‛ without 
addressing the responsibilities of corporations (Walter 2001: 62). Arguably, the 
agreement would undermine the democratic rights of public authorities to regulate 
domestic laws and standards on labour rights and environment (Walter 2001: 62). The 
political vacuum drew a heightened public and governmental attention putting the 
MAI under closer domestic scrutiny which, together with existing disagreements 
among OECD member states, eventually led to the postponement of the deadline of 
the talks to May 1998.105 To pacify the outraged opposition member states and the 
OECD launched consultations with NGOs to reconcile their demands and integrate 
these actors into the negotiation process (Tieleman 2004: 15-6 Balanya et al. 2003: 119-
20). The NGOs’ criticisms on the potential destructive impact of the MAI on 
environmental and labour standards pushed the negotiators craft new provisions 
addressing these concerns (UNCTAD 1999: 17-8). However, this attempt became the 
third factor that eventually precipitated new divisions among governments as well as 
the business communities. 
 
The debate on hammering out binding provisions in addition to the non-binding 
language on environmental and labour standards interjected into the preamble of the 
                                                 
105 Neither U.S. Congress nor the general public in the States were adequately informed about 
the OECD talks through media or other means prior to the NGO campaign (Beder 2006: 180). 
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draft text caused outspoken reaction from businesses as well as some governments 
such as South Korea, Mexico, and Australia (Balanya et al. 2003: 115).  BIAC expressed 
its concerns regarding binding provision (Balanya et al. 2003: 118).106 U.S. business 
groups also failed to see any benefits in the MAI as the draft moved further away 
from reflecting their preferences (Graham 2000: 49). The business opposition put the 
governments in a difficult situation as the NGO campaign already made the MAI a 
deal politically hard to sell domestically. Unable to solve mounting differences, the 
negotiators suspended the talks for six months in May 1998 for further consultations. 
However, the negotiations would not be resumed as France announced its 
withdrawal in October 1998 which was followed by Australia and the UK (Balanya et 
al. 2003: 109). Commissioner Brittan gave a speech to the European Parliament about 
the deadlock of the MAI talks confirming his determination to pursue negotiations at 
the WTO in the following words: 
 
The MAI negotiations have already done much to clear the ground on 
investment and to highlight those issues which are of key importance to the 
EU, including civil society. Nonetheless, I have always taken the view that the 
WTO is the best long-term home for this work for which the MAI has already 
provided valuable signposts. In present circumstances the chances of bringing 
the current MAI negotiations to a successful conclusion frankly do not look at 
all promising (Inside U.S. Trade: 22 October 1998). 
 
                                                 
106 According to Balanya et al. (2003: 119) ICC president Helmut Maucher expressed his 
discontent with the MAI draft because of the extra ‚social wording‛.  
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The final draft of the MAI produced on 24 April 1998 contained twelve chapters 
embodied in 145 pages addressing the three key areas, i.e. investment liberalisation, 
protection, and dispute settlement. According to Kurtz, ‚the MAI provisions 
represented almost a facsimile (albeit strengthened in some respects) of the NAFTA 
Chapter 11 model‛ (Kurtz 2002: 46-52). The text contained provisions for a broad 
asset-based definition of investment including portfolio investment beyond the scope 
of NAFTA. Concerning investment liberalisation, MAI provisions laid down 
comprehensive clauses for transparency as well as MFN and national treatment which 
would be applicable to both pre-admission and post-establishment stages of foreign 
investment. The text adopted a top-down negative list approach to liberalisation as in 
NAFTA. It was also stronger than the NAFTA in prohibiting a larger number of 
performance requirements. On investment protection the text formulated detailed 
provisions covering both direct and indirect forms of expropriations. On dispute 
settlement it contained a framework of investor-to-state as well as state-to-state 
procedures.  
 
The MAI experience supports the argument made in Chapter 2 that neoliberal 
hegemony was highly contested from the mid-1990s on with the outspoken criticisms 
expressed against globalisation and neoliberal policies within civil societies. As Egan 
contends:  
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Three sets of conflicts –between OECD member states, between the OECD and 
subordinate social forces, and ultimately between the OECD and important 
elements of multinational capital- reveal the contradictory nature of the 
transatlantic hegemonic bloc (Egan 2001: 91).  
 
In fact, new civil society forces became a factor in deepening, not only the conflicts 
within and among OECD states, but also the differences of opinion within prominent 
elements of multinational capital. As will be further examined in the next Chapter, 
transatlantic TNCs failed to produce a collective policy formula with regard to a 
multilateral agreement and promoted dissimilar perspectives regarding a multilateral 
framework agreement due largely to new domestic and transnational policy setting 
increasingly dominated by new social forces. In fact, as Graham argues the 
transatlantic consensus to negotiate the investment accord at the OECD was indeed a 
‚shaky‛ one and TNCs on either side of the Atlantic avoided engaging in a 
countervailing initiative to save the MAI after NGOs entered the stage (Graham 2000: 
15; 24). The NGO factor became particularly influential in the determination of TNC 
preferences and agenda-setting activities through constraining the legitimate space for 
action both in the MAI and WTO cases. The other factor that pushed U.S. TNCs to 
diverge from Europeans was the growing power and potential opposition of 
emerging economies to an investment regime at the WTO. The following section 
outlines the deliberations on investment in the WTO from the Singapore Ministerial in 
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1996 until the Doha consensus in 2001 and has a particular focus on the opposition 
from developing countries. The role of NGOs and developing countries in setting the 
WTO are examined in the following chapter.  
 
6.3. Early Investment Debate at the WTO 
 
When the investment issue was first raised by the EU and Canada during seminars 
and follow-up dialogues they sponsored in Geneva during 1995 and 1996, the 
developing country’ resistance was not yet entrenched (Smythe 2004: 7-8).  Although 
India and Tanzania reacted negatively to the initiative some countries such as Brazil 
and Mexico seemed somehow supportive of the educative process at the WTO. 
During the discussions within the Working Group on the Relationship between Trade 
and Investment (WGTI) established at the Singapore Conference, India was joined by 
other developing countries in resisting the launch of investment talks. Although these 
countries contradicted the expansion of the trade regime to investment rules, their 
resistance stemmed from a concern that multilateral disciplines would create more 
costs than gains. Their opposition was not against market disciplines per se.  Some 
developing countries such as Brazil, Mexico, Chile, and Costa Rica as well as South 
Korea and Hong Kong took a more supportive position. Overall, developing countries 
became actively involved in this pre-round agenda-setting process contrasting the 
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pre-Uruguay Round services debate with their proposals based on factual data and 
analysis. The investment agenda for the Doha Round was set in this process and 
shaped by the conflicting views of demandeurs in the EU and the hardliners camp 
which was orchestrated by India.  
 
6.3.1. From Singapore to Seattle 
 
The working groups to examine the relationships between trade and investment, and 
trade and competition were established in the Singapore Ministerial in December 1996 
as a last minute compromise. Paragraph 20 of the Singapore Ministerial Declaration 
envisaged that the two working groups would work in cooperation with other 
institutions like the UNCTAD, and the process would be reviewed by the General 
Council. Notwithstanding their opposition to the incorporation of investment to the 
WTO legal framework, many developing countries joined the Singapore consensus for 
the restricted educative mandate of the working group that envisaged the 
examination of different aspects of the relationship between FDI and trade. The 
paragraph reflected this compromise: 
 
It is clearly understood that future negotiations, if any, regarding multilateral 
disciplines in these areas, will take place only after an explicit consensus decision 
is taken among WTO Members regarding such negotiations (WTO 1996). 
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After two years of deliberations, the General Council would decide on how to proceed 
on investment. In this context, the WGTI met periodically until the Seattle Ministerial 
Conference around a checklist of issues agreed by the members (WTO 1997). The 
analytical examination program had four dimensions to explore: 
 
1. Implications of the relationship between trade and investment for 
development and economic growth, 
2. The economic relationship between trade and investment, 
3. Stocktaking and analysis of existing international instruments and activities 
regarding trade and investment, 
4. On the basis of the work on the above-mentioned items,  identification of 
common features and differences, and gaps in the existing international 
instruments; advantages and disadvantages of international rules; rights and 
obligations of host/home governments and investors; and the relationship 
between existing and possible future international cooperation (WTO 1997). 
 
The debate in the WGTI reflected divergent preferences as to the future work of the 
WTO on investment: advocates of investment interpreted existing empirical data to 
evidence the necessity to establish a multilateral framework of investment rules, 
whereas sceptic countries put emphasis on the complexity of issues and need of more 
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profound examination of certain aspects before any kind of consideration for future 
negotiations. The EU, Japan, Canada, Switzerland, South Korea and Hong Kong 
proved to be the most ambitious to direct the WTO agenda to subsume investment 
rules. The United States was also supportive of the educative debates although its 
endorsement for future negotiations proved lukewarm as the OECD talks were still 
underway until late 1998. On the other hand, India, Egypt, Pakistan, Cuba, Morocco, 
Philippines and more generally the ASEAN group produced counter arguments to 
prevent any future mandate to craft a new WTO agreement. These two groups 
represented the two poles of contrasting ideas, with other governments adopting 
more moderate positions during the discussions.  
 
During the debates on the relationship between FDI and trade, the demandeurs 
advanced the view that the relationship is a positive and ‚complementary‛ one 
(WGTI 1997a:  2; 1997b: 4, 8, 11; EU 1997a: 1, 4; 1997b: 2, 5; OECD 1997; 2, 4).107 The 
argument was elaborated with empirical data, academic research and references to the 
submissions of the OECD evidencing positive contributions of FDI to host economies 
by enabling transfer of technology and managerial skills, stimulating export growth 
and diversification, and economic restructuring  (WGTI 1997b: 4; 1997c: 5; 1999a: 4; 
                                                 
107 To evidence the complementary nature of trade and FDI, the EU highlighted the 
proliferation of regional economic integrations that adopted an integrated approach including 
rules both for trade and investment (WGTI 1997b: 7). 
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1998a: 3; WTO 1998b; 1998d; OECD 1998). The EU argued that developing countries 
recognized this positive impact since they left infant industry protection strategies 
behind and adopted a more positive attitude towards FDI (EU WGTI 1998Ap4-5). The 
proponents of a WTO treaty also criticised market interventions in the form of 
incentives and/or performance and technology transfer requirements which were 
arguably distorting investment patterns and trade flows without yielding expected 
outcomes for the host economies (WGTI 1998b: 6; 1998: 4;  1999a; 4; 1999b: 3). The EU 
argued that these regulations needed to be disciplined in order to guarantee a liberal, 
transparent and non-discriminatory investment environment (WGTI 1999a; 3).108  
 
On the other hand, notwithstanding their recognition of the significance of FDI as a 
source of capital and for transfer of technology, the opponents challenged the 
simplistic view on positive contributions of FDI. The hardliners stressed potential 
negative effects of FDI on host economies, specifically on the balance of payments but 
also in relation to trade (WGTI 1997b: 4; 1998a: 6).109 They suggested that the 
relationship between FDI and trade is a multifaceted and complex issue and the 
                                                 
108 The EU argued that investment incentives had only a marginal impact on investors’ 
decisions (WGTI 1998c: 3; 1998d: 4). Since these practices eroded other countries’ 
competitiveness the EU also called for supplementary competition rules (WGTI 1998c: 3, 10; 
1998d: 8; 1999b: 12). 
109 While arguing that the overall impact of FDI was positive, in its position paper Japan 
admitted that FDI may also have certain negative effects on balance of payments in particular 
circumstances (WGTI 1997b: 4; Japan 1997). 
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relationship could be a ‚substitutive‛ one depending on certain conditions in host 
economies (WGTI 1997c: 4; 1998c: 21; 1999a: 10). India and Egypt argued that existing 
levels of economic development, and the domestic entrepreneurial, industrial, and 
technological capacities of economies were factors in determining the benefits (WGTI 
1998a: 6; 1998b: 1; 1999a: 6-7, 15). In this vein, they insisted on the necessity of 
regulating FDI particularly to achieve specific development objectives. Investment 
incentives and certain performance requirements were argued to be useful 
instruments to achieve specific developmental, political and social goals with 
reference to UNCTAD studies (WGTI 1998b: 5-7; 1999a: 9; 1998c: 4-5; ASEAN 1998).  
In this context, India with support from other members (including the ASEAN group) 
contended that each country needed necessary freedom of space to develop a mix of 
policies including performance requirements and incentives to attract and direct FDI 
to selected industries or regions in light of unique needs and preferences (WGTI 
1999a: 3; 1999b: 2). The proliferation of BITs coult be attributed to the flexibility they 
granted to developing countries in pursuing specific development goals while 
creating necessary predictability for foreign investors (WGTI 1998c: 13). 
 
The proponents utilized the examination of the existing international rules regulating 
FDI as an opportunity to promote the case for the proposed multilateral framework 
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for investment.110 The EU and Japan argued that investors sought certainty and 
predictability of investment rules and conditions which were crucial in determining 
the destination of FDI, and that transparency was hampered by an unstable 
patchwork of international rules (WGTI 1997c: 6; 1999a: 21; Japan 1999). According to 
the EU although the WTO partially covered some investment rules these rules lacked 
coherence (WGTI 1998c: 14-15; 1999b: 7). 111 The EU further maintained that BITs were 
a ‚second best‛ option in consolidating investment flows in comparison to a 
multilateral approach whereas any alternative to a multilateral framework was ‚the 
law of the jungle‛ (WGTI 1998c: 24; 1999b: 13). A multilateral accord based on certain 
WTO principles such as non-discrimination and transparency would create a ‚level 
playing field‛ for all participants, enhance competitive conditions through 
                                                 
110 In response to the observation of some developing countries on the necessity to balance 
between the rights and obligations of foreign investors, developed countries pointed out 
existing instruments on corporate behaviour. They did not however support an opinion to 
bring corporate responsibility under a possible multilateral framework for investment. The 
EU argued that responsibilities of corporations were primarily an issue of domestic law 
(WGTI 1999c: 6). 
111 The WTO Agreements have a limited scope: the TRIMs Agreement deals with measures 
affecting trade in goods, and the GATS deals with trade in services. Furthermore, according to 
the EU there existed no rules for investment protection under the WTO, neither rules for 
performance requirements in the GATS but few in the TRIMs Agreement. Many performance 
requirements were still uncovered by the WTO disciplines so this issue should have been 
examined in the WGTI (WGTI 1997c: 8). The EU brought an analogy between subsidies and 
investment incentives and argued that the WTO had disciplines for subsidies with the 
Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (SCM) but this was a partial remedy 
for the distorting effects of incentives since the focus of the Agreement of SCM was limited 
because of the inherent perspective of trade-relatedness (WGTI 1997b: 9: 1998c: 12). The EU 
argued that although investment and trade are increasingly integrated, the effectiveness of the 
rules for international trade was diminished due to the lack of multilateral disciplines as 
shown in the SCM which had limited reach on incentives (WGTI 1998c: 14). 
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disciplining investment distorting practices such as incentives, and through 
sustaining stability by guaranteeing favourable domestic rules (WGTI 1998c: 15, 22; 
1999a:21; 1999b: 12, 14). The EU suggested that the proposed accord would not only 
complement existing WTO rules, but also allow expected flexibility for developing 
countries for pursuing specific policy targets for economic development with certain 
derogations for those countries (WGTI 1998d: 12). Nevertheless, the EU also cautioned 
with the following statement: ‚*t+he degree of flexibility provided *<+ should be 
carefully balanced with the level of stability and predictability of the investment 
climate that the agreement intended to improve (WGTI 1999b: 18).‛ In this vein, the 
EU proposal in June 1999 suggested that the structure of the GATS was a good model 
to balance development objectives and flexibility with non-discriminatory treatment 
of FDI (WGTI 1999b: 18).  
 
Against the arguments for a multilateral framework, the opponents contended that 
predictability could best be sustained through BITs, which also provided members 
with sufficient room of maneuver to pursue development policies through flexibilities 
to regulate FDI according to their unique needs and circumstances (WGTI 1998c: 13; 
1999a: 10).112 India stressed that BITs’ aimed investment protection in the post-
                                                 
112 India put forward that even developed countries did not grant an automatic right to invest 
and utilized exceptions and limitations to non-discrimination in their treaties for both pre and 
post-establishment phases (WGTI 1998a: 16-7). 
 263 
admission phase without according an automatic right of investment in the pre-
admission period, whereas the framework would cover both phases since it derived 
from a desire of market access rather than inhibiting distortions (WGTI 1999a: 11). A 
multilateral agreement would oblige members to liberalise investment and constrain 
freedom of action without guaranteeing a definite increase in FDI flows (WGTI 1998c: 
13, 22; 1999b: 14).113 India further challenged the predictability argument by arguing 
that international agreements were not a major determinant of investment decisions 
citing studies which highlighted the fact that many TNCs were in fact unaware of 
existing BITs (WGTI 1998c: 13).  
 
The debate on the definition of investment painted a better picture about the scope of 
the framework envisaged by the EU and other proponents. These countries indicated 
their preference for a broad definition while questioning the feasibility of adopting a 
narrow definition for investment (WGTI 1998c: 26; 1999a: 18). On one end, the US, 
Japan, Canada, and Norway argued for the advantages of an asset-based definition as 
in the MAI and suggested a broad scope that would include portfolio investment 
(WGTI 1998c: 26). The EU also took a similar position but with some nuance. The EU 
                                                 
113 India claimed to be one of the most open economies to FDI owing to to its BITs which 
contained a broad definition of investment, and accorded MFN and NT at the post-
establishment stage. The expropriation of foreign investments was banned with the exception 
of public purpose considerations and additional rights were ensured for free repatriation of 
capital, profits, and royalties (WGTI 2000b: 11; India 1999).  
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suggested a distinction on the basis of long-term and short-term investment indicating 
that portfolio investment was not necessarily short-term and speculative, and 
proposed a partial application of specific obligations to certain aspects of that 
definition (WGTI 1998b: 19; 1998c: 26; 1999a: 2).114 On the other end, the opponents 
objected to discussions on a broad definition which might even have contained 
intellectual property rights and highlighted that there were significant differences in 
existing instruments that begged further investigation to understand their 
implications (WGTI 1998a: 16; 1998b: 18; 1998c: 21). They also reiterated that the 
mandate of the working group was limited to FDI (WGTI 1998b: 18). Egypt and India 
also criticized the lack of binding international obligations for TNCs towards 
addressing the problems they created through restrictive business practices, transfer 
pricing, cartels and monopolies and other challenges relating to the transfer of 
technology, and underscored the need to balance their rights with binding 
responsibilities (WGTI 1999c: 3-4). The EU responded by arguing that responsibilities 
of corporations were primarily an issue of domestic law (WGTI 1999c: 6). In the run 
up to the Seattle Conference, the hardliners tried to slow down the debates by asking 
for further examination of the relationship between trade and investment. 
 
                                                 
114 For the EU, the definition of investment was contingent upon the quality and purpose of 
the agreement. The EU argued that a broad definition was generally adopted in the 
agreements covering the post-establishment protection of investment since a narrow 
definition would not be sufficient for foreign operators in this phase (WGTI 1998c: 26). 
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6.3.2. From Seattle to Doha 
 
The draft texts for the Seattle Ministerial Conference were prepared by the EU with 
additional support from Switzerland, Japan, South Korea and the candidates for EU 
membership. In this regard, the preparations for the Seattle meeting proved pre-
mature in terms of bridging gaps among the membership compared to the pre-Doha 
Conference process. The revised ministerial draft (WTO 1999c) mandated negotiations 
on investment ‚to further the objectives of the WTO and to complement its rules‛ by 
establishing ‚a multilateral framework of rules on foreign direct investment.‛ The text 
indicated that the negotiations should have addressed ‚investment-distorting‛ and 
‚trade-distorting‛ policies and practices. On investment liberalisation, the draft 
reflected the gradual approach of European businesses and indicated that the 
agreement would sustain non-discrimination, transparency and predictability, and 
operate upon ‚positive commitments‛ of the members towards achieving 
‚progressively a higher level of liberalisation.‛ On other issues such as protection, the 
text merely noted that ‚*c+onsideration shall be given to the possible need for 
provisions on other matters, such as protection of investment and investors’ 
responsibilities, and to existing bilateral and regional arrangements on investment.‛ 
To reconcile the opponents’ views, the text also spelled that the framework agreement 
should have respected ‚the ability of host governments to regulate the activity of 
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investors in their respective territories.‛ A potential agreement would also address 
‚special needs of developing least developed countries‛ with regard to ‚the 
contribution of foreign direct investment to their development and economic growth.‛ 
The framework integrated disputes related to investment into the DSM of the WTO. 
Ultimately, the draft left the scope and definition of the framework agreement to 
future negotiations. Thus, the text revised on 30 November 1999 did not contain any 
notable amendments.  
 
Following the Seattle Conference, members started the preparations for the Doha 
Conference with active participation from developing countries whose concerns were 
put at the centre stage. The WGTI continued its meetings with its educative mandate 
over four items but with a clearer picture on the proposed framework. In this period, 
the EU accepted that the relationship between trade and FDI was a complex one and 
admitted the need of developing countries for broader flexibilities to pursue their 
diverse objectives (WGTI 2000b: 4; EU 2000). Nonetheless the EU also reiterated the 
need to strike ‚a balance between the necessary degree of flexibility, on the one hand, 
and certainty for economic operators, on the other‛ (WGTI 2000b: 5). To accomplish 
both goals, the EU suggested a ‚GATS-type entry level instrument with a positive list 
approach‛ with a stronger accent on the development-friendly nature of the proposed 
framework. In other words, the framework agreement would contain a GATS-type 
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positive list approach with a general MFN rule in both pre-admission and post-
establishment phases and NT for concessions made by the countries (WGTI 2000a: 11, 
14-5; 2000b: 7; 2001: 16).115  The members would have flexibilities through general and 
specific exceptions, whose scope and nature were to be defined in future talks (WGTI 
2000a: 11; 2001: 8). To minimise the administrative burdens on poor economies, 
necessary technical assistance would be provided to facilitate the dissemination of all 
relevant information to foreign investors (WGTI 2001: 19).  
 
On the other hand, the opponents reiterated their views among others that the WTO 
accord would not guarantee an increase in the investment flows but rather restrict the 
space for the parties to employ instruments for other purposes (WGTI 2000b: 7-8; 
2001: 10). In addition, India opposed the framework stressing the cost of notification 
requirements for many developing countries that lacked sufficient human and 
material resources (WGTI 2000b: 16). India was also critical of the gradual approach 
based upon the GATS model which would pave the way for the exertion of pressure 
over developing countries for more ambitious obligations in future (WGTI 2001: 16).116 
                                                 
115 The U.S. maintained its preference for a top-down approach with limited exceptions that 
would also extend protection to the pre-admission phase as in NAFTA and its bilateral 
treaties (WGTI 2000b: 19).   
116 This was opposed also because any attempt to substantiate existing accords with additional 
obligations on performance requirements, incentives, expropriation and compensation would 
arguably have far-reaching impacts on the WTO rules requiring substantial amendments to 
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The failed case of MAI was used as evidence of the lack of a mature basis to negotiate 
multilateral rules for investment (WGTI 2000b: 8). In this context, the preference of the 
opponents was to continue the examination process under the WGTI until a mature 
ground could be established for a more extensive initiative under the WTO, while the 
proponents claimed that the time was ripe for launching negotiations. 
 
Under these circumstances the draft Ministerial texts for the Doha summit contained 
different options for future negotiations. The first draft text for the Doha Ministerial 
Conference that was produced on 26 September 2001 contained two alternatives for 
the future work on investment (WTO 2001a). One alternative was to continue the 
analytical work in the working group until the next ministerial conference (paragraph 
19). The other alternative was the immediate launch of negotiations to establish a 
multilateral framework of rules to ensure ‚transparent, stable and predictable 
conditions for long-term cross-border investment, particularly foreign direct 
investment‛ (paragraph 18). The ‚core elements‛ of the framework were laid out in 
line with the demands of the proponents as ‚scope and definition, transparency, non-
discrimination, pre-establishment commitments based on a GATS-type approach, and 
the settlement of disputes between governments.‛ To satisfy the opponents’ demands 
                                                                                                                                                          
the agreements such as the GATS, TRIMs, and Agreement on Subsidies and Counterveiling 
Measures (WGTI 2001: 15-16). 
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for flexibility the draft stated that the agreement would reflect ‚the interests of home 
and host countries‛ ‚in a balanced manner,‛ and take into account the development 
objectives and regulatory responsibilities of governments by ensuring that members 
would be able to ‚undertake obligations commensurate with their individual needs 
and circumstances.‛ 
 
In tandem with the negotiations between the demandeurs and the opponents the draft 
text was revised two weeks before the Doha Conference on 27 October 2001 (WTO 
2001b). The draft somehow synthesised the previous two options into one blurred 
mandate implying the immediate launch of the investment talks. While the work until 
the next ministerial conference concentrated on ‚the clarification of elements of a 
possible multilateral framework‛, a decision would then be taken on ‚modalities of 
negotiations.‛ This meant that the negotiations would de facto be started at Doha, 
while in Cancun the decision would be made on the modalities of the framework.  In 
this revised draft certain points were emphasised with additional wording.  Instead of 
a ‚GATS-type approach,‛ the text stated ‚a GATS-type, positive list approach.‛ Core 
elements of the framework agreement were extended to ‚development provisions; 
exceptions and safeguards‛ and ‚negotiation modalities, including the question of 
participation.‛ Furthermore, the text stated that the framework should have reflected 
the right of host governments ‚to regulate in the public interest.‛ 
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The text was revised a second time during the Doha Conference (WTO 2001c). This 
draft became the basis of the final Declaration with a mandate for further analytical 
work until the following (Cancun) ministerial conference. The ministers would then 
decide whether to start negotiations on all four Singapore issues. The final text (WTO 
2001d) required an ‚explicit consensus‛ to launch the talks. This condition was added 
as a response to the last minute insistence of India. In the period until the Cancun 
Ministerial, the WGTI would work to clarify the ‚scope and definition; transparency, 
non-discrimination; modalities for pre-establishment commitments based on a GATS-
type, positive list approach; development provisions; exceptions and balance of 
payments safeguards; consultation and the settlement of disputes between Members.‛ 
The process would take into account the interests of host and home countries in a 
balanced manner including development policies and objectives as well as the right of 
host governments ‚to regulate in the public interest.‛ An important aspect of the 
Doha Declaration was its recognition of the need for technical assistance to 
developing countries for capacity-building purposes both for the implementation of 
the obligations from the Uruguay Round agreements and to facilitate participation of 
poor countries in the decision-making in the WTO. In this respect the WTO launched 
a variety of training programs on issues including investment and other Singapore 
issues to support the participation of developing countries in the talks.  
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Conclusion 
 
The challenges to the neoliberal hegemony created a new global political context 
within which trade policies and agendas were constructed and wherein business 
preferences and strategies were shaped. In contrast to the collective vision and 
strategies of transatlantic TNCs towards GATT agenda in IPR and services cases, 
European and American business forces were divided over their perspectives and 
preferences regarding the WTO agenda in the 1990s. The transatlantic consensus on 
putting investment simultaneously on the agendas of the OECD and the WTO was an 
outcome of the concerns of the U.S. TNCs that emerged from this new political 
environment. As discussed, the MAI initiative failed because of a number of factors 
but the mobilisation of a wide range of civil society actors significantly contributed to 
this failure as it politicised the policy debate in the OECD capitals. Similarly earlier 
attempts to launch investment talks at the WTO did not succeed because of the rising 
resistance among developing countries against the expansion of the WTO legal 
framework. This resistance stemmed from the existing WTO disciplines and needed 
flexibilities to pursue domestic development goals rather than an encompassing 
challenge that would suggest an alternative paradigm to free trade. The next chapter 
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examines in further depth the factors that shaped TNC preferences and strategies 
towards setting the WTO agenda with an analysis of the U.S. and European cases. 
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CHAPTER 7: TNCs, RESISTANCE AND FAILURE OF THE INVESTMENT 
AGENDA AT THE WTO 
 
Opting for an inclusive multilateral constitution that would create a predictable 
business environment and a level playing field in developing country markets 
European TNCs promoted the investment agenda at the WTO. However, a number of 
factors intrinsic to the dilemmas created by neoliberal hegemony seriously restricted 
their agenda-setting ability. Neoliberal hegemony, institutions and policies were 
increasingly challenged by a large set of actors in the United States, Europe and 
elsewhere, and created a new context for trade agendas. The European program for a 
multilateral investment agreement was encountered by an NGOs campaign that 
worked to shape WTO members’ policy and preferences against a multilateral 
framework by successfully leveraging the mounting discontent among developing 
countries about the standards set by the WTO accords. More than anything else, this 
new political environment characterised by the contested neoliberal hegemony 
restricted the ability of TNCs to build a strong transnational coalition for an ambitious 
investment program at the WTO.  
 
This chapter examines the context that determined TNC preference and strategy 
formation by looking into the factors at different levels that led to the failure of the 
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investment case at the WTO. The first two sections explore the dynamics of trade 
policy making in the United States and the European Union, and shows the 
difficulties in forging a transatlantic consensus and coalition for an ambitious 
investment agenda at the WTO. The third section probes the TNCs role in agenda-
setting at the WTO by analysing the resistance of developing countries and NGOs. 
The final section outlines TNC strategies in the context of contested hegemony 
comparing them with the case of services.  
 
7.1. The American Business Perspective: A Bilateral Approach for Investment/A 
Narrow Market Access Agenda for the WTO  
 
As the MAI talks stalled from 1998 on, European TNCs -together with the Japanese 
lobbies-favoured launching investment negotiations at the WTO (Walter 2001: 66). In 
contrast, U.S. TNCs were in favour of exploiting bilateral and regional opportunities 
for new rule-making instead of pushing a broad agenda at the WTO. Factors that 
shaped U.S. business preferences included both domestic and external elements. 
Domestically it seemed hard to project an ambitious agenda of rule-making at the 
WTO because of civil society opposition which above all paralyzed bipartisan 
consensus-building on trade policy within the U.S. Congress. On the other hand, 
especially after the collapse of the Seattle Ministerial in 1999, the WTO was perceived 
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as a problematic venue to push for new rule making in investment due to mounting 
resistance among developing countries which became vocal about their 
implementation issues. Hence, U.S. business priorities for the investment agenda at 
the WTO prevented the crafting of a low-standard accord that would risk potential 
gains from rule-making in bilateral agreements. This outcome was a result of the 
inability of TNCs to foster an ambitious collective vision at the transatlantic level, 
which stood in high contrast to the success of services campaign in coalition and case-
building before the Uruguay Round.  
 
7.1.1. U.S. Domestic Policy Environment 
 
Difficulties emerged in connection with the globalization backlash and contested 
neoliberal hegemony constrained the U.S. administration’s options for trade policy in 
general and for the WTO agenda in particular. Both the NAFTA and MAI debates 
illustrated a strong sentiment built within the American society against free trade 
especially on the side of organized labour and environmentalist groups. In her essay 
on U.S. public opinion about trade Ellen Frost proclaims the following: 
 
[w]hat brings environmentalists and labor activists together is concern about 
the behavior of multinational corporations. As they see it, these corporations 
are abandoning workers and communities to pursue profits around the world. 
In so doing they are destroying U.S. jobs, undermining health and safety 
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standards, exploiting foreign workers, and polluting the global environment 
(1998: 71). 
 
It became clear that as American workers were challenged by external competition, 
they  increasingly perceived themselves as the victims of trade opening -which 
arguably threatened jobs and wages at home (Destler 2005: 257).  On the other hand, 
an environmental opposition arose and entrenched with new trade disputes brought 
to the GATT/WTO and NAFTA (Graham 2000: 35-41). The NAFTA ratification debate 
had triggered an NGO campaign orchestrated by environmental actors joined by 
labour groups with concerns about potential negative implications of the treaty for 
employment and nature (Destler 1996: 117-8). Hence, during his election campaign in 
1992, Bill Clinton promised to supplement the NAFTA with additional agreements for 
labour and environment standards (Destler 2005: 260; Mayer 1998: 165). After his 
election, President Clinton launched supplemantery  talks with NAFTA partners to 
hammer out side agreements on labour and the environment. This proved a difficult 
task that entailed multilevel bargaining with different stakeholders including 
grassroots and mainstream institutions as well as business lobbies in addition to the 
Mexican and Canadian governments (Mayer 1998: 165-216). According to Mayer, the 
negotiations and the ratification of NAFTA created a disproportionate political 
reaction domestically as a broad range of stakeholders attached a symbolic meaning 
to the treaty and mobilized with a feeling of fulfilment of a moral obligation rather 
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than a motive of maximisation of certain interests (Mayer 1998: 272). As Mayer 
proclaims, NAFTA had come to stand for stories of greedy corporations, corrupt 
politicians, and foreign interests in a league against workers, family farmers, 
communities, and the environment (Mayer 1998: 272). The MAI only added more fuel 
to the fire by energizing another Internet-driven opposition after the leakage of the 
draft in early 1997 by the Public Citizen (Destler: 2005: 265).  
 
What became particularly problematic for Clinton’s trade agenda was the 
administration’s inability to forge bipartisan consensus on Capitol Hill and to get ‚fast 
track‛ authority from Congress as the trade policy debate was increasingly 
politicized.117 U.S. Congress for the first time refused to renew fast-track authority in 
1993 and did not grant it despite repeated attempts on the part of President Clinton 
(Bergsten 2000: 50). A broad anti-fast track coalition emerged with the coordination of 
the Public Citizen (Destler 2005: 256-61). At a minimum the coalition called for the fast 
track legislation to guarantee the implantation of labour and environment standards 
into new trade agreements with clear enforcement provisions in the form of core 
provisions rather than side agreements alike with the NAFTA’s (Destler 1996: 117-8; 
Destler 2005:  261). The coalition ensured support from most Democrats in Congress 
and made social clauses an inevitable priority for the administration’s trade policy 
                                                 
117 Fast track authority is also called ‚trade promotion authority.‛ 
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(Destler 2005: 260-1). The outcome was a stronger U.S. stance on these issues as seen 
in the WTO’s Singapore and Seattle Ministerials (Schott 2000: 6; Destler 2005: 219). 
Besides, the failure of the Seattle Conference was partially because of the lack of fast 
track power which was denied for the third time in 1997 as well as Clinton’s partisan 
focus and statements about American intentions for potential trade sanctions in future 
against those having lower labour standards (Destler 2005: 273; Soloway and 
Anishchenko 2001: 56). Without doubt, Seattle became a turning point for U.S. trade 
policy-making as well as anti-globalisation which perceived the collapse of the 
conference as a major victory (Destler 2005: 273).  In a Congressional Hearing on the 
Seattle breakdown, Gary Hufbauer of the Peterson Institute qualified this victory as 
the ‚crowning glory‛ of the ‚global backlash forces‛ which successively scored 
significant successes in fast track and anti-MAI campaigns against free trade forces in 
the 1990s (U.S. Congress 2000: 71).  
 
Internal and external challenges to neoliberalism pushed the U.S. administration to 
adopt a narrowly tailored program for the WTO that concentrated on market access 
for domestic constituencies that would support such an initiative rather than new 
rule-making for deeper market integration. In the run-up to the Seattle Conference, 
the U.S. agenda for the new round prioritised further market access in services, 
agriculture and industrial products as well as e-commerce for which it would be easy 
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to mobilize internal support. The U.S. was not enthusiastic about the EU’s program 
for the WTO on investment and competition (Soloway and Anishchenko 2001: 58-9). 
U.S. trade officials became particularly unwilling to launch an ambitious round 
including issues such as textiles where strong domestic protectionist pressures were 
existent, and antidumping and competition policy where changes in U.S. law and 
practices (hence the Congressional blessing) were needed (Schott 2000: 8).118 There 
was no doubt that any trade negotiations that required the United States to amend its 
domestic law would face strong resistance in Congress.  
 
In this context, American TNCs adopted a pragmatic approach as venue-shoppers 
pursuing their sectoral and cross-sectoral interests through feasible policy channels 
available at their disposal. For investment, one possible channel was the sectoral 
negotiations on financial services and telecommunications at the WTO in 1997 which 
became pivotal for U.S. business activism to dismantle sector-specific barriers in 
developing country markets. Individual firms as well as CSI proactively campaigned 
for a successful conclusion of these sectoral talks.119 In fact, these negotiations proved 
                                                 
118 Antidumping was one of the implementation issues where developing countries put a 
heavy weight on and ultimately interjected into the Doha agenda for improved disciplines to 
curb arbitrary use of these measures by developed countries (Soloway and Anishchenko 2001: 
57). 
119 For example, the U.S. Securities Industry Association, which initially endorsed MAI 
negotiations with a particular interest in injecting portfolio investment into the definition of 
investment, focused its attention to the Financial Services Talks in 1997 as the MAI proved 
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less threatening to NGOs and became two of the three victories of Hufbauer’s open 
market forces versus backlash forces in the 1990s (Walter 2001: 67).120 Other available 
channels to pursue new investment gains included the built-in agendas within the 
TRIMS Agreement and GATS for the revision of the implementation of these 
agreements and to launch new services talks in 2000 (Hoekman 2000: 120; Robertson 
2000: 113). Similarly, WTO dispute settlement would provide another instrument 
where host countries could be forced to comply with their WTO obligations which 
included commitments on investment (Brewer and Young 2001: 145-51). Having said 
this, the preferred venues to push new WTO-plus rule-making in investment became 
bilateral and regional channels wherein the United States could flex its muscles to 
craft high standard provisions.  
 
7.1.2. U.S. Bilateral Trade Agenda  
 
After the successful ratification of NAFTA, the Clinton administration set an 
ambitious prospect for preferential agreements which created new opportunities for 
American TNCs to obtain significant investment clauses. NAFTA created a precedent 
                                                                                                                                                          
futile (Walter 2000: 56). As mentioned earlier the establishment of the Financial Leaders 
Group was demanded by the CSI to forge transatlantic business consensus over financial 
services talks at the WTO.  
120 The third victory according to Hufbauer was the conclusion of ITA negotiations at the 
Singapore ministerial (U.S. Congress 2000: 71). 
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for future negotiations as it proved to be a comprehensive accord with stringent rules 
on investment and intellectual property rights, but also with significant gains in 
market access (Hufbauer and Schott 1998: 133). It also evidenced the possibility of 
crafting an ambitious North-South FTA with undeniable benefits for all sides (Mayer 
1998: 5). Following the ratification of NAFTA some developing countries such as 
Chile expressed their willingness to strike a similar deal with the United States (Schott 
2001: 10). Thus, President Clinton launched new initiatives to negotiate NAFTA-like 
FTAs with countries in South America and Asia. In the Miami Summit of the 
Americas in December 1994, the Clinton administration initiated the process for a Free 
Trade Area of Americas (FTAA), which would become a comprehensive regional pact 
including 34 states in the Western hemisphere to be concluded no later than 2005 with 
an ambitious program for market access and WTO-plus rule-making (Hufbauer and 
Schott 1998: 127). An early harvest could be a free trade agreement (FTA) with Chile 
(Hufbauer and Schott 1998: 134). A second low hanging fruit in Latin America could 
be an FTA with Mercosur that would ensure earlier access to lucrative markets of 
Brazil and Argentina (Schott 2001: 11). On the other hand, Clinton targeted access to 
lucrative Asian markets through APEC. The United States hosted the APEC Economic 
Leaders Meeting in 1993 which was followed by the Bogor summit in 1994 that 
produced strong commitments to turn the Asia-Pacific region to an open trade and 
investment zone (Schott 2001: 14; Bergsten 1996: 265). This vision produced by U.S. 
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trade policy under the earlier Clinton administration was applauded by the business 
community which saw preferential access in trade and investments as a viable policy 
option.121 
 
Nevertheless, the Clinton administration could not record meaningful progress in any 
of these initiatives owing to the difficulties that obscured its trade policy agenda. 
Successful campaigns launched by the backlash forces and successive failures to 
renew its fast track authority were illustrative of Clinton’s inability to forge bipartisan 
consensus. According to Destler, with the exception of the Chinese accession to the 
WTO in 2001, the administration could only succeed in completing the initiatives 
previously set off such as the FTA with Jordan in October 2000 (Destler 2005: 237). The 
Republicans that came to power in 2001  became more successful in launching new 
trade initiatives at multiple venues, following the route of the previous Reagan and 
Bush administrations. USTR Robert Zoellick of the Bush administration codified the 
new trade strategy as ‚competitive liberalization‛ which entailed trade agreements 
with willing parties at different venues with a view to creating incentives for the third 
parties to engage in similar deals in order to gain preferential access to the U.S. market 
(Zoellick 2003). The competitive liberalization strategy helped to garner support from 
                                                 
121 For instance, CSI welcomed the conclusion of US-Chile FTA and its investment provisions 
such as national treatment for the establishment and operation of U.S. investors in the 
country, and it praised both Chilean and Singapore FTAs for large freedoms accorded for the 
transfers of capital (CSI 2002 and 2003).  
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both parties at Congress and helped the Bush administration get fast track power in 
2002 (Destler 2005: 298-302). In tandem, the U.S. signed new FTAs with Chile, 
Singapore, Australia and Morocco parallel to the launch of the Doha Round (Destler 
2005: 299-301). To reinvigorate the FTAA process, the U.S. also resumed 4 plus 1 talks 
with Mercosur in September 2001 (Schott 2001: 11). As outlined in the previous 
chapter the legal scope of most of the new American FTAs were more comprehensive 
than other existing deals with regard to breadth of WTO-plus provisions in 
investment.  
 
Nevertheless, the devil in details should not go unnoticed. The standard of all new 
U.S. FTAs proved lower than Chapter 11 of NAFTA.  This is a major outcome of 
another victory of the backlash forces recorded in the Trade Act of 2002 that renewed 
the fast track authority. The Chapter 11 disputes won by TNCs during the 1990s 
caused strong negative reaction in the United States on the side of environmentalist 
groups as well as some government agencies in charge of justice and environment 
who became concerned about investors’ growing claims (Morin and Gagne 2007: 
66).122 Environmentalist groups launched a campaign against the agreement arguing 
that NAFTA gave too much power to TNCs and limited the capabilities of 
                                                 
122 For example Metalclad, a U.S. company, sued the Mexican government which banned it 
from constructing a toxic-waste confinement plant on a field considered dangerous by public 
authorities. The arbitration case was won by the company (McIlroy 2001: 328; Chorev 2007: 
64). 
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governments to take necessary measures to protect the environment. This resulted in 
the adoption of Notes of Interpretation by the NAFTA Free Trade Commission that 
limited the scope of ‚minimum treatment‛ for foreign investors in July 2001 (Morin 
and Gagne 2007: 66-7). On the other hand, the pressures on U.S. Congress to narrow 
the mandate of USTR on negotiating investor rights in the negotiation of future FTAs 
increased (Destler 2005:  262). Consequently, the U.S. legislators constrained the 
mandate of  USTR in the Trade Act of 2002 to negotiate future agreements in a 
manner to ensure that those agreements would not grant ‚greater substantive rights‛ 
to foreign investors than U.S. companies enjoyed under U.S. law (Chorev 2007: 48; 
Morin and Gagne 2007: 66). Although U.S. FTAs contained higher standard 
investment provisions than other agreements in force, the scope of investment 
provisions in recent FTAs proved less comprehensive than those of NAFTA.123  
 
7.1.3. Further Transatlantic Divisions on Investment 
 
Further evidence can be brought to support the argument that U.S. TNCs did not fully 
get on board with the ambitious European business vision for investment negotiations 
at the WTO. After the breakdown of the MAI negotiations European TNCs focused 
their efforts on building a transatlantic consensus over the agenda of the forthcoming 
                                                 
123 For more on the content of investment provisions in recent U.S. FTAs in comparison to the 
European approach see South Center (2010).  
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round to set a broad mandate including negotiations in investment. The efforts took 
place in transatlantic business platforms, particularly in the Transatlantic Business 
Dialogue (TABD). TABD was founded in Seville, Spain in November 1995 to 
coordinate transatlantic economic policies with stronger and more systematic business 
inputs through transatlantic working groups and annual CEO conferences.124 The EU-
US Summit in May 1998 convened in London and produced a leaders’ statement 
including an action plan put in force in November 1998 which contained both 
multilateral and bilateral issues (TABD 1998). In fact the London statement revealed 
the failure of the transatlantic leadership to reach a consensus, both in launching a 
new WTO round and in negotiating investment rules at the WTO. The London 
statement highlighted the necessity of cooperation in investment, competition, public 
procurement and environment issues with initiatives in an ‚appropriate multilateral 
fora‛ (TABD 1998: 19). This was a critical time for the MAI talks which were 
suspended for six months. However, the differences could not be resolved during 
1998 as the TABD CEO Conference in November 1998 issued a statement noting a 
general support for ‚an ambitious and progressive agenda‛ for the WTO without 
                                                 
124 The TABD CEO conferences held in Seville, Chicago (1996), Rome (1997), Charlotte (1998), 
Berlin (1999) and Cincinnati (2000) created a systematic mechanism to introduce European 
and American business perspectives to the leaders gathering in the annual EU-US summits. In 
the United States it is the European American Business Council (EABC) who coordinates 
American business representation, while in Europe UNICE (BusinessEurope) represents 
regional industries. 
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mentioning the initiation of a new round.125 Obviously the Americans were not yet 
ready to completely abandon the MAI and left their European counterparts alone on 
their request for a broad ambitious round including investment (Inside US Trade: 13 
November 1998). The Europeans could secure the American support for the new 
round before the Seattle Conference in late 1999.126 The Berlin CEO Conference in 
October 1999 demonstrated the late-coming consensus over the new round that would 
aim to liberalize trade in services, industrial goods, and agriculture, and include 
negotiations in areas of government procurement, environment and trade facilitation 
(TABD 1999: 35). On investment, transatlantic business community only expressed 
their expectation for ‚pushing forward the process of developing *<+ high standard 
rules‛ at the WTO (TABD 1999: 35). 127 
 
                                                 
125 The TABD CEO Conference report noted the following: ‚Among the areas where 
collaboration will be important, the TABD will look for early progress on services, intellectual 
property rights, industrial tariffs where supported by individual industries, investment, trade 
facilitation, government procurement‛ (TABD 1998: 4 emphasis added).   
126 According to the Corporate Europe Observatory during the Commission’s investment 
consultation meetings with European corporate representatives before Seattle, Commission 
officials stressed that it was important to intensify informal contacts with U.S. business 
groups to secure American support at the WTO. European representatives expressed that 
there still existed some support within American business community regarding the initiation 
of investment talks in Seattle (minutes cited in CEO 2000: 8). 
127 The statement spelled out the rules to ‚enhance market access; provide state of the art 
treatment of investors, protection for their investments and redress for the settlement of 
disputes; and promote transparency, predictability and stability of national investment 
regimes‛ (TABD 1999: 35). 
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In fact, this was a more fragile business consensus than the two-track approach. After 
the collapse of the Seattle meeting, U.S. TNCs continued their lukewarm endorsement 
for potential investment negotiations as they became concerned about the possibility 
of crafting of a low standard WTO accord that would legally or politically sabotage 
higher standard provisions of U.S. bilateral agreements.128 The Americans could only 
agree on the negotiations for a sub-set of investment rules that would be stepping 
stones to a more ambitious accord to be constructed in the long run. Thus, further 
transatlantic business deliberations led a general agreement around American 
conditions on pushing the WTO process to produce a minimum set of rules which 
would not create a challenge to U.S. bilateral standards. The CEO Conference in 
November 2000 recommended WTO members to agree ‚at minimum‛ on provisions 
‚to promote transparency, predictability and stability of national rules and 
regulations governing investment, non-discrimination, and enforcement of existing 
Trade-Related Investment Measures (TRIMS) obligations‛ (TABD 2000). These rules 
would become ‚a basis for enhanced market access, protection from expropriation, 
and redress for the settlement of disputes‛ (TABD 2000; 2001: 12).  This would mean a 
staged approach initially targeting an agreement on modalities during the 
                                                 
128 Based on communication with a U.S. negotiator Corporate Europe Observatory suggests 
that a political threat perception for the Americans was the potential danger of a WTO 
investment accord ‚seducing‛ developing countries to move away from negotiating bilateral 
agreements with the United States. 
http://archive.corporateeurope.org/mai/conquistadors.html#uscomm accessed on November 
25, 2010.   
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preparatory work, then negotiating minimum standards that would set the stage for 
new rules on further liberalization, protection and settlement of disputes in the longer 
term. Since the Doha Ministerial left the decision to launch the talks to the Cancun 
Conference, in 2002 TABD called for a ministerial consensus at Cancun on modalities 
for negotiations on this subset of rules (TABD 2002). This ‚point of departure‛ 
according to transatlantic CEOs would be the basis of a broader deal that was going to 
include market access, investment protection and dispute settlement (TABD 2002: 34). 
In fact, the consensus over a staged approach was a lower denominator than U.S. and 
European TNCs could agree upon. On the other hand, European TNCs continued 
calling for an ambitious Doha package that would go beyond this restricted agenda.  
 
7.2. European Business Case for Investment at the Doha Round  
 
Following the Seattle breakdown European TNCs maintained their multilateral vision 
for making new investment rules and kept supporting the European Commission on 
its Millennium Round initiative. However, their agenda-setting activities remained 
low-profile and concentrated on influencing the position of the European Commission 
through direct lobbying or via regional business bodies. In this regard, agenda-setting 
for investment contrasts with the high profile war of position of service industries 
before the Uruguay Round.  
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7.2.1. EU Trade Strategy and TNCs  
 
The European Commission became a proactive supporter of broadening the WTO 
agenda both as a means to accomplish its Market Access Strategy initiated in 1996 and 
as a vehicle to expand its authority vis-à-vis member states. The Market Access 
Strategy under the leadership of Sir Leon Brittan adopted a ‚multilateralism first‛ 
approach and made the WTO the primary venue for market access and new rule-
making (EC 1996; Pedler 2001: 165; Lamy 2002). The EC maintained a defensive 
position in recent GATT rounds because they were started by the U.S. initiative with a 
desire to dismantle trade distorting measures built by the Europeans –especially in the 
context of the Common Agriculture Policy (CAP) (Woolcock 2000: 392-3; Deutsch 
2001: 40). The Europeans saw the WTO as an opportunity rather than a threat to better 
access to world markets. The campaign for the Millennium Round was illustrative of 
the new approach but also the EU’s desire for leadership in the multilateral trading 
system (Winters 2000: 28). This approach was wholeheartedly embraced by 
Commissioner Brittan as well as his successor Pascal Lamy (Lamy 2002). On the other 
hand, the ambitious agenda set for the new round was also an expression of the 
Commission’s desire to consolidate its authority in Common Commercial Policy vis-à-
vis member states. As mentioned in the last chapter the competence in new issues was 
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shared between the Commission and member states although the Commission was 
the sole negotiator on behalf of the EU (Pedler 2001: 164-5). With the Treaty of Nice  
signed in 2001 and put in force in 2003, the Commission gained exclusive competence 
on services and IPR issues with certain exceptions where members continued to have 
veto power (Raza 2007: 76; Nugent 2003: 410). However, members maintained their 
right to conclude BITs. Since the Commission negotiates international trade 
agreements on behalf of member states multilateral negotiations on investment would 
de facto empower the Commission vis-à-vis member states (Raza 2007: 89). The 
Commission also included comprehensive investment rules especially on the pre-
establishment phase to recently negotiated FTAs; however, these did not contain 
protection provisions which were of members’ authority and used through BITs (Raza 
2007:  89). 
 
On the other hand, the European Commission preferred a broad package for the WTO 
to ensure a balanced outcome through a trade off of issues where some offensive 
gains could be secured in the bargaining process (Paemen 2000: 53-4). Especially 
sectoral negotiations in agriculture which were supposed to start in 2000 put the EU in 
a defensive position because of strong external pressure for concessions requiring 
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amendments to domestic programs.129 The Europeans favoured an extended package 
of issues where give and take could take place in the context of a new round between 
areas of defensive interests where strong internal protectionist pressures existed such 
as agriculture, textiles and clothing, and cultural services, and the areas of offensive 
interest including services and manufacturing, Singapore issues, e-commerce, and 
environment (Paemen 2000; Deutsch 2001: 34, 38). Together with investment, 
competition and government procurement were also crucial to dismantle 
discriminatory regulations against European companies in emerging markets 
(Paemen 2000: 56-7). Hence, in the run-up to the Seattle Conference the European 
Commission sought the launch of the new round which would be negotiated under a 
single undertaking and would last no longer than 3 years (Deutsch 2001: 39). As it was 
revealed in a document prepared for the Article 113 Committee meeting in December 
1998, the Commission sought a broad and general negotiation mandate from member 
states (EC 1998). The European Council gave a negotiation mandate to the 
Commission before the Seattle Ministerial -which covered market access in services, 
industrial products and agriculture, Singapore issues, environment and systemic 
issues (European Council 1999). The Europeans went to the Seattle and Doha summits 
with an authorization that contained a general mandate on investment. The Council 
decision stated:  
                                                 
129 The Agreement on Agriculture had an in-built agenda to resume market access talks in this 
sector in 2000 (Josling 2000: 91). 
 292 
 
The WTO should begin negotiations aiming at establishing a multilateral 
framework of rules governing international investment, with the objective of 
securing a stable and predictable climate for foreign direct investment 
worldwide. Such a framework should focus on foreign direct investment to the 
exclusion of short-term capital movements, and has to ensure the right 
conditions for international investment to be conducive to sustainable 
development, and preserve the ability of host countries to regulate the activity 
of investors on their respective territories, in accordance with basic WTO 
principles, also taking into account the concerns expressed by civil society, 
including those regarding investors' responsibilities. Negotiations should 
address the issues of access to investment opportunities and non-
discrimination, protection of investment, and stable and transparent business 
climate  (European Council 1999). 
 
The Commission, however, needed to build internal as well as international support 
for its Millennium Round initiative. While internally it was essential to mobilize 
stakeholders with offensive interests, internationally it had to take on board the U.S., 
other Quad countries (Japan and Canada) and developing economies. To mobilize 
support for the new round Commission officials worked closely with European TNCs. 
To this aim, an Investment Network was established in the run-up to the Seattle 
summit comprised of around 50 European TNCs to consult on the investment 
priorities of the EU at the WTO (CEO 2002; Balanya et al. 2003: 135). In 1999 and 2000, 
the Commission sent questionnaires to European firms within this network in 
addition to commissioning surveys, which covered around 10000 firms on the 
 293 
continent.130 The results from the questionnaires were then systematically assessed in 
meetings with business representatives (IW 2003). Following the backlash at Seattle, 
Trade Commissioner Lamy systematically integrated European NGOs  into the debate 
in an effort to get their feedback in constructing the EU’s position for the round (Dur 
and Bievre 2007). In addition to an intensive transatlantic traffic to overcome major 
differences, the European Commission adopted a development-friendly discourse to 
build external as well as internal consensus (van Den Hoven 2004: 267-74).131 To 
launch the negotiations in Doha the EU needed to convince not only major economies 
such as India and Brazil but also LDCs and African countries who also became key 
players within the consensus-based decision-making structure. In the run-up to the 
Doha Ministerial, both the EU and U.S. embarked upon initiatives to expand their 
unilateral preference programs especially for LDCs (van Den Hoven 2004: 261-3).132 
Another significant concession was the Doha Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement 
                                                 
130 The survey that was commissioned to TN SOFRES and the Opacity Report, prepared by 
PriceWaterhouseCoopers, showed that the lack of transparency in domestic laws was the 
most significant barrier for a large majority of European companies (EU 2002a: 2).   
131 Bridges reports that USTR’s Charlene Barshefsky gave a press briefing in Seattle to appease 
protesters suggesting that the trade regime should have been placed upon sustainable 
development (Bridges: 1 December 1999). 
132 The Commission launched the Everything But Arms initiative extending duty and free 
access for all LDC products except for armaments (http://ec.europa.eu/trade/wider-
agenda/development/generalised-system-of-preferences/everything-but-arms/ accessed on 
December 1, 2010). A similar gesture came from the U.S. government which committed to 
provide additional preferential access to African countries with the African Growth and 
Opportunity Act initiative that was put into force in May 2000 (http://www.agoa.gov/  
accessed on December 1, 2010). 
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and Public Health which was crafted during the Doha conference (WTO 2001e; Odel 
and Sell 2006: 105-7).  
 
7.2.2. European business agenda for investment 
 
In contrast to the staged approach agreed with Americans in the TABD meetings, 
European TNCs formulated an ambitious set of proposals for an investment 
framework at the WTO. Business opinions were formulated and promoted mainly by 
UNICE with strong support of service industries organized under ESF and with an 
implicit endorsement of ERT. It has generally been argued that the trade policy-
making was relatively isolated from domestic pressures compared to the United 
States (Meunier 2005: 8). In contrast to the American case, European trade policies 
were made with a minimum legislative intervention at the European level since the 
European Parliament had limited authorities to influence the negotiation mandates 
and to monitor the talks, and it was not empowered to ratify the final agreement 
(Meunier and Nicolaidis 1999). Nevertheless, European commercial policies generally 
reflected ‚concentrated‛ interests of sectoral and societal stakeholders organised at 
the EU level (Dur 2008: 38).  Cowles (2001: 160) argues for the ‚Europeanization of 
business-government relations‛ from the mid-1990s on. In addition to the creation of 
ESF, with the encouragement of Commissioner Brittan, large European firms engaged 
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more intensively with the European Commission through direct lobbying and other 
channels. Cowles (2001: 163) postulates that with the creation of TABD large 
European TNCs became ‚the primary interlocutors and partners with the European 
Commission.‛ Similarly, Dur posits that the EU position in the Doha Round reflected 
the economic group interests owing to ‚excellent access to decision-makers‛ (Dur 
2008: 38). In this vein, before the Seattle summit, European TNCs informed the 
Commission through the Investment Network meetings about their desire for a 
comprehensive accord that would deal with discriminatory and unstable law and 
practices. They opposed the creation of binding commitments for labour and 
environment standards.133 While the Commission took these demands into account 
and sought to secure a broad mandate to negotiate ‚high-quality‛ investment rules, it 
framed its proposals at the WTO in a development-friendly fashion. As outlined in the 
previous chapter, the Commission continued and even strengthened its emphasis on a 
GATS-type entry level instrument with a positive list approach considering the 
mounting challenges at the WTO. Although it pressed the Commission to get an 
ambitious outcome UNICE’s statements also underscored developmental aspects of 
the proposed framework. This point will be discussed later.  
 
                                                 
133 This information derives from the Investment Network’s minutes of meetings accessed and 
cited by the Corporate Europe Observatory (CEO 2000: 6-7).  
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The Doha decision not to launch talks in investment was disappointing for European 
businesses (UNICE and ESF 2001). Yet, this did not turn investment to a low priority 
issue for UNICE (UNICE 1999).134 UNICE reiterated the need for equal and fair 
treatment to all investors through promoting similar investment terms everywhere by 
improving the existing system of numerous bilateral investment treaties (UNICE 
2003b: 7). The multilateral framework was needed to ‚codify‛, ‚safeguard‛ and 
‚multilateralize‛ existing rules in bilateral and regional accords and to  ‚upgrade‛ 
them (UNICE 2003a). UNICE’s proposed WTO framework contained four key 
elements (UNICE 2003a, UNICE 2003b: 7): (1) a broad definition, (2) principles such as 
transparency and non-discrimination, (3) market access provisions, and (4) investment 
protection and dispute settlement arrangements.  
 
Within this four-pillar package, however, UNICE prioritized especially the principles 
and market access elements (UNICE 2003a: 6). UNICE was concerned about ongoing 
obstacles to invest abroad in relation to discriminatory rules and standards, but also 
                                                 
134 After the Seattle summit, UNICE pronounced that it would support a WTO round if it 
included negotiations on investment (UNICE 1999). Before the Cancun Ministerial UNICE 
(UNICE 2003a: 1) reiterated the importance of putting investment issue among four high 
priority areas within the round along with market access, trade facilitation and services 
liberalization. UNICE also secured Keidanren’s and ICC’s backing for an ambitious outcome 
from Doha on investment (See for example: UNICE and Keidanren 2003, and ICC 2003a). In 
fact, ICC took a position on investment close to the European businesses rather than the 
Americans. It created a Commission on International Trade and Investment initially chaired 
by Arthur Dunkel, former director-general of the GATT (1980-93), to produce 
recommendations on various WTO issues (Balanya et al. 2003:138). 
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domestic monopolies which had a reputation of effectively hampering market access 
(UNICE 2000). Parallel to the Commission’s positions UNICE recommended the WTO 
framework to go beyond bilateral and regional investment agreements which 
concentrated on post-establishment issues, and to contain a general MFN provision 
for investments in both pre- and post-establishment phases coupled with national 
treatment to all investments already in operation (UNICE 2003a: 4). UNICE favoured 
a negative list approach in contrast to the Commission’s proposal, and the Doha 
mandate for a ‚GATS-type, positive list approach‛ which was believed to be ‚too 
cautious‛ (UNICE 2003a: 4-5). At a minimum, however, UNICE called for a 
framework containing commitments of ‚stand-still‛ and ‚roll-back‛ in order to lock in 
current level of openness and to prevent the creation of new exceptions to the 
agreement in the future (UNICE 2003a: 5).  
 
On investor protection UNICE preferred an accord that would include clear 
provisions against ‚expropriation, nationalisation or any other measure with similar 
effect‛ but also against ‚creeping expropriation‛ which was government acts causing 
the erosion of the original business conditions under which the investment decision 
had been made (UNICE 2003a: 5). UNICE noted that it would monitor future 
negotiations in this track to ensure that the framework would ‚add value‛ to existing 
system of protection by acknowledging and ‚safeguarding‛ bilateral rules (UNICE 
 298 
2003a: 5-6, UNICE 2003b: 7). In other words, the multilateral accord should have 
locked in standards of protection but also it would be tied to dispute settlement 
opportunities existing in bilateral treaties (UNICE 2003a: 5). Although in its public 
statements the Commission ruled out investor-state dispute settlement procedures 
from a WTO framework, UNICE also requested that the framework be formally 
linked to investor-to-state dispute settlement procedures in BITs (such as ICSID, 
UNCITRAL or ICC arbitration), and argued for the creation of a similar mechanism 
within the WTO in the long run (UNICE 2003a). In sum, the European business case 
on the potential WTO accord evolved into a more encompassing instrument instead of 
a framework of sub-set of rules envisioned and agreed on in transatlantic business 
bodies, and previously suggested in ERT reports.   
 
7.3. WTO Negotiations and the Cancun Failure 
 
In addition to their incapability for building a coherent business case and coalition to 
support a multilateral accord at the WTO, European TNCs were also not able to 
generate consent on their case in the WTO negotiations. In fact, their case for a WTO 
investment regime faced mounting resistance between the launching of the Doha talks 
until the failure of Cancun summit in September 2003. The opponents maintained 
their resistance to the inclusion of investment to the Doha negotiation package and the 
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WTO legal framework by producing counter arguments to de-legitimize the business 
case and through expanding their coalition among member states. The impasse in 
agriculture strengthened their resistance by triggering the rise of new Southern 
alliances unwilling to concede on the Singapore issues unless progress was recorded 
in agriculture. Furthermore, the mobilisation of a cross-border counter-movement of 
NGOs and their successful war of position towards influencing the WTO agenda 
constrained the European offensive by pushing the LDCs and African states to revisit 
their interests on the Singapore issues and turn adamantly against investment.  
 
7.3.1. Investment Deliberations at the WTO 
 
Following the new mandate given in Doha, the WGTI continued its work until the 
Cancun Ministerial in September 2003 under the chairmanship of de Seixas Correa, 
Ambassador of Brazil. The analytical work included the examination of development 
provisions, scope and definition, transparency, non-discrimination, modalities for pre-
establishment commitments based on a GATS-type, positive list approach, and other 
issues listed in paragraph 22 of the Doha Ministerial Declaration.  
 
During the debates in the WGTI, the EU stood as the most ambitious proponent of a 
framework agreement which would be built upon the GATS model. According to the 
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EU ‚the GATS *was+ probably one of the most ‘development-friendly’ agreements in 
the WTO system‛ (EU 2002e: 3). The framework would eventually include measures 
to ensure predictability and transparency as well as provisions for non-discrimination. 
As a bottom line, the EU called for a future accord that would ensure predictability 
and transparency which were of utmost significance to investors’ decisions (EU 
2002a). Implementation of transparency provisions would be supported by guarantees 
of technical assistance to developing countries. The framework would extend the non-
discrimination principle in the GATS from investment in services to other sectors (EU 
2002c and 2002d). Hence, MFN treatment would become a general obligation for both 
pre-admission and post-establishment phases. For national treatment, the EU 
proposed a two-tier approach different from the GATS. This was reflective of a broad 
definition of investment as demanded by European businesses which would include 
‚all current and capital transfers‛ to the extent they were ‚related to established 
investments‛ and ‚investments covered by the countries’ sectoral list of 
commitments‛ (EU 2002g: 4-5).135 The EU suggested a basic definition (FDI) for the 
admission phase, but a broader definition for ‚the protection of established 
investment‛ (EU 2002b: 5). In this context, national treatment would become a specific 
obligation for the pre-admission phase in association with market access 
commitments covering only FDI but a general obligation for the post-establishment 
                                                 
135 The U.S. reiterated its preference for the inclusion of portfolio investments to any possible 
multilateral framework of investment (US 2002). 
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phase covering FDI and other forms of capital. On the other hand, the agreement 
would liberalise investment flows through a positive-list approach incorporating 
‚enough flexibility to allow a gradual and progressive liberalisation of FDI, fully 
compatible with any development strategy adopted by WTO members.‛ (EU 2002c: 
4). With stronger acknowledgement of the need for policy space by the developing 
countries, the EU also introduced the notion of ‚flexibility for development‛ (EU 
2002e). In this vein, the members could enjoy flexibilities through general or sector 
and country specific exceptions and derogations to MFN and NT rules.136 Admitting 
to the possible negative impacts of FDI on the balance of payments, the EU also 
suggested certain ‚safeguard‛ provisions to be incorporated into the framework 
‚although within well-defined and internationally accepted criteria‛ (EU 2002g: 2-5). 
Finally, the EU proposed the extension of the WTO’s Dispute Settlement Mechanism 
to investment (EU 2002f: 3 also Japan 1997: 5).  
 
On the other hand, the opponents challenged the views generated by the proponents 
by reaffirming their position and producing new reasons to prove the lack of 
substantial basis to start negotiations. India continued to lead the opposition with the 
most detailed submissions. It also garnered support from African nations such as 
                                                 
136 Other suggested flexibility provisions contained ‚lower levels of commitments; 
asymmetrical phased implementation timetables; exceptions from obligations in certain areas; 
flexibility in the application of –and adherence to- disciplines‛ (EU 2002e: 7). 
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Zambia, Tanzania, and Kenya as well as Malaysia, Sri Lanka and some Caribbean 
countries. India was critical of a GATS-type approach that would incorporate 
investment to the trade regime. It suggested that ‚inclusion of commercial presence 
under GATS *<+ does not, in any way, justify the inclusion of ‘investment’ under 
‘goods’ in the WTO‛ (India 2002b). India contended that trade norms were not 
applicable to the flows of capital since the definition of investment within the GATS 
was an ‚enterprise-based‛ definition, i.e. bringing the service provider and consumer 
in contact as a mode of service delivery (India 2002b). National treatment was 
arguably a requirement in all binding international instruments and solely applied in 
the post-establishment phase; however, the GATS did not have a notion of ‚pre-
establishment national treatment‛ (India 2002c). Discrimination was necessary among 
different kinds of investment because of the mobility of foreign investment compared 
to domestic investment (India 2002b). India also challenged the applicability of trade 
norms from a theoretical point of view by arguing that such logic would have worked 
and benefited both host and home countries only if perfect economic conditions 
existed in the world market (India 2002a).137 Moreover, India questioned why trade 
                                                 
137 India indicated that because domestic distortions and/or market failures which prevailed 
domestic economies, an application of the global capital efficient markets paradigm was 
wrong and any assumption that it necessarily had a welfare improving impact on financial 
liberalisation was false. In an imperfect world developing countries needed adequate 
flexibility to regulate FDI to ensure its benefits to growth and development. While necessary 
flexibility was ensured with BITs, a potential future MFI would not guarantee increase of FDI 
inflows in addition to the loss of policy space (India 2000 and 2002a). 
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norms were proposed for the movement of capital but not labour (India 2000 and 
2002a). Regarding transparency, India reiterated the opponents’ preference for BITs 
and their support for the view that FDI flows depended on many factors (India 2000). 
Finally, the opponents suggested opening the debate on the responsibilities of foreign 
investors. To this aim, a joint proposal was submitted by China, Cuba, India, Kenya, 
Pakistan and Zimbabwe on the obligations of investors and home governments 
calling for a discussion on a ‚binding code of conduct‛ which could be enforced by 
home countries (China et al. 2002). China’s sponsorship was surprising since it had 
not taken a clear position against investment in the previous debates (Smythe 2004: 
22).  
 
In this context, there was no convergence of positions between the demandeurs and 
the opponents. In tandem with the discussions in the WGTI, the preparations started 
for the Cancun Ministerial Conference. The First draft ministerial declaration was 
issued two month before Cancun on 18 July 2003 (WTO 2003a). Parallel to laborious 
talks it was revised one week before the conference on 24 August 2003 (WTO 2003b). 
The text contained two options for investment. One option suggested launching 
negotiations to lay down the modalities of the framework and the other indicated the 
lack of consensus to start the talks. The negotiations, if started, would cover basic 
elements of the framework. These included: scope and definition; transparency; non-
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discrimination, i.e. MFN and NT with limited exceptions; pre-establishment 
commitments based on a GATS-type, positive list approach that would include 
exceptions and balance of payments safeguards. Furthermore, the framework also 
included provisions to settle disputes between members; special and differential 
treatment measures which covered a set of flexibilities for transparency obligations 
and commitments on MFN and NT as well as transition periods ‚as necessary.‛ The 
framework contained rules clarifying its relationship with other WTO agreements as 
well as existing bilateral and regional accords. In a manner demonstrative of the 
division between the proponents and hardliners, the text suggested two alternatives 
for the scope and definition of investment which referred to ‚long-term cross-border 
investment, particularly FDI‛ and ‚Foreign Direct Investment.‛ The draft made 
reference to the Doha statement that the framework would take into account interests 
of host and home countries in a balanced manner, as well as development policies, 
objectives and the right of host governments ‚to regulate in the public interest.‛ The 
draft modalities for the framework would be made ready by 30 June 2004. 
 
The revised draft text was released by the Conference chairman on the third day of 
the Cancun Conference, 13 September 2003 (WTO 2003c). The text mandated the 
initiation of the talks in government procurement and trade facilitation but not in 
competition. The text contained a conditional mandate for investment. It envisaged 
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the Members firstly ‚intensify the clarification process‛ and then work ‚to elaborate 
procedural and substantive modalities.‛ The work continued under a new Working 
Group in Special Session and produced ‚modalities that would allow negotiations on 
a multilateral investment framework to start.‛  The negotiations were launched after 
the adoption of the modalities text by the General Council, and would continue until a 
future date to be determined. This future date was tied with other chapters of the 
Doha round and would overlap with the deadline of the modalities negotiations in 
agriculture and market access in non-agricultural products. Nevertheless, the 
negotiations over the text did not produce a consensus and the Conference was closed 
with no decision.  
 
7.3.2. Anti-Investment NGO Campaign  
 
Concurrent with the debates in the WTO Working Group, the policy debate continued 
outside the negotiation rooms with a proactive NGO participation. In his essay on the 
Cancun breakdown, Jagdish Bhagwati (2004) argued that NGOs pressed harder for 
their case against investment negotiations than the lobbies of European and Japanese 
businesses. Indeed NGOs became influential in setting the WTO agenda before and 
after Seattle by organizing public campaigns against the Millennium Round and on 
specific WTO issues such as sustainable development, GATS negotiations, and access 
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to medicines as well as investment. NGOs’ active interest and involvement in the 
WTO agenda pushed negotiating governments and business groups to adjust their 
strategies by taking into account NGO inputs, reactions, and actions in one way or 
another. The NGO activism on investment was triggered on the eve of Seattle as the 
issue was put on the agenda of the WTO for the proposed round.  Before the 
Conference, a number of NGOs built a loose transnational coalition upon previous 
networks established during the anti-MAI campaign with the goal of opposing the 
negotiations of MAI-like investment rules at the WTO as they called it ‚MAI shell 
game‛ in a jointly signed public letter (Smythe 1999). Although the European 
Commission tried to incorporate NGOs’ inputs into its own agenda-setting process 
before the summit, it could not manage the process in a transparent way to gain their 
confidence.138  
 
Following the Seattle Conference the European Commission embarked upon a Civil 
Society Dialogue in order to incorporate NGOs into the policy debate (Dur and Bievre: 
2007). Nonetheless, it could not prevent the rise of a pan-European network organized 
                                                 
138 For instance in January 1999, the Commission circulated a revised version of the above-
mentioned position paper it submitted to the 113 Committee in December 1998 to NGOs (EC 
1998, 1999). The revised draft lacked some points in the formal submission which dubbed 
controversial elements of the MAI, and included supplementary language on environment 
and development (EC 1999). According to Balanya et al., the Commission officials responded 
to the criticisms stating that ‚especially on investment, the ideas are moving very fast.‛ (Notes 
on EC-NGO dialogue meeting, Brussels 28 January 1999 cited in Balanya et al. 2003: 135, 243) 
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against its Millennium Round initiative. A pan-European network called ‚Seattle to 
Brussels‛ was created by 99 NGOs from 19 European countries that sent an open 
letter to Trade Commissioner Pascal Lamy in May 2001 strongly criticizing the 
Commission for prioritizing the interests of TNCs rather than farmers, small scale 
producers and other stakeholders; and for the nontransparent and exclusive nature of 
public consultations.139 The NGOs requested the Commission to halt its initiative for 
the new round particularly opposing the inclusion of competition and investment 
issues.140 The Doha compromise did not mitigate NGO activism which continued with 
a focus to prevent a decision launching investment negotiations in Cancun. 
 
NGOs worked as a counter-hegemonic force critical of the very foundations of the 
neoliberal normative framework by effectively challenging the legitimate basis of the 
case for a WTO accord on investment. As Reich (2010: 2-3; 57) puts forward, NGOs 
have poorer resources compared to TNCs and OECD governments but they have a 
moral advantage, i.e. the ability to legitimize or de-legitimize policies and policy 
proposals. Premised upon the normative case that underpinned the anti-MAI 
campaign the NGOs particularly challenged the proposed constitutional framework 
                                                 
139The letter is publicly available on http://www.twnside.org.sg/title/lamy2.htm accessed on 
December 12,  2010.  
140 The letter employed a threatening language stating: ‚The concerns of developing countries 
need to be taken into consideration. If not, the next WTO Ministerial in Qatar could turn out 
to be another Seattle.‛ Ibid. 
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which would further empower market forces at the expense of the states. The WTO 
agreement was perceived as a global accord that granted new rights to TNCs without 
addressing their responsibilities. To exemplify this point, in September 2002 ninety-
nine European NGOs issued a joint statement asking the EU to withdraw its 
proposals that would restrict ‚governments’ right to regulate public interest‛ and 
instead suggested to the EU to address the lack of enforceable multilateral rules 
governing the behaviour of TNCs within the United Nations (S2B Network 2002; 
Murphy 2007: 12). A particular description of this authority shift according to NGOs 
was potential erosion of the policy space of developing countries and the creation of 
new disciplines which would constrain the use of autonomous instruments in serving 
poverty reduction and sustainable development (Murphy 2007: 10-11). This was a 
valid argument also raised by opposing governments as discussed before. The 
argument challenged the legitimacy of the case for investment which was framed in a 
development-friendly fashion to fit into the development discourse underpinning the 
Doha Round. The NGO challenge from 1998 on pushed the proponents (including 
TNCs) to craft more convincing arguments to emphasise that the WTO agreement on 
investment would not undermine the goals of development.  
 
To craft the case as an instrument for economic development, the European 
Commission not only emphasized the flexibilities of the proposed accord with its 
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GATS-based model but also named it a ‚multilateral Investment for Development 
Framework‛ (EU 2003). Similarly, UNICE underscored the idea that FDI is a vehicle 
for sustainable development, and pronounced its conviction that the WTO accord 
would ‚provide an important framework to maximise the opportunities and benefits 
of international investment‛ (UNICE 2003b: 7), UNICE 2003a: 6). FDI would arguably 
allow developing countries to address their development concerns within the 
proposed framework through safeguarding ‚the rights of governments to determine 
appropriate policies in the public interest‛ (UNICE 2003b: 7).141 According to UNICE 
the framework would allow ‚opt-outs‛ or ‚exceptions‛ as well as specific time frames 
for full compliance of developing countries to the agreement (UNICE 2003a: 2). 
Moreover, the Corporate Europe Observatory claims that with lessons from the MAI 
in mind European TNCs also refrained from directly opposing potential social and 
environmental clauses in the framework as a tactic to get the NGO support (CEO 
1999). Along these lines, UNICE publicly pronounced that  
 
                                                 
141 UNICE and ESF also signed on a Joint Business Charter for Cancun with business bodies in 
Africa and South America emphasizing mutual desire to overcome disagreements in Cancun 
with an agreement to launch negotiations in investment ‚without prejudice to the eventual 
outcome.‛ The statement was signed by UNICE, ESF, Keidanren, PanAfrican Confederation 
of Employers (PEC), Australian Services Roundtable, Australian Chamber of Commerce and 
Industry, National Confederation of Industry (CNI) of Brazil, Production and Commerce 
Confederation (CPC) of Chile, Mexican Confederation of Employers – COPARMEX, and 
Confederation Generale des Entreprises du Maroc (CGEM) of Morocco (UNICE et al. 2003). 
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A multilateral framework on investment should not limit a government's right 
to regulate nor encroach on areas of policy such as labour or environmental 
standards which are being dealt with on their own merits in appropriate fora 
(UNICE 2003a: 5).  
 
A more specific concern of opponents and NGOs was that a WTO accord would de-
legitimize effective tools to deal with speculative capital flows as experienced in the 
1997 Asian crisis. In fact, after Seattle UNICE had to push back on the framework it 
proposed, as it no longer promoted a broad definition including portfolio investments 
or short-term capital flows although it suggested to keep the scope as broad as 
possible (UNICE 2003b: 7).142 As outlined above, the Commission avoided including 
portfolio investment in its submissions while insisting on a broad scope for 
investment. UNICE was also receptive to the opponents’ argument that there was no 
automatic relationship between FDI and economic growth. UNICE stated that 
‚*r+esearch and experience indicate that increased inward investment flows can help 
promote development, if the appropriate framework is in place.‛ (UNICE 2003a: 2 
emphasis added). The WTO investment framework would bring about an ‚enabling 
environment‛ and an ‚appropriate legal framework‛ and thus it could ‚help a 
country attract FDI‛ (UNICE 2003a: 6). It would ‚encourage a favourable investment 
climate‛ and support ‚*a+ppropriate domestic policies and pro-competitive reforms‛ 
                                                 
142 Moreover, UNICE was also receptive to the idea of incorporating certain protective 
measures to the proposed framework in the form of balance of payments safeguards to be 
employed only ‚in cases of severe monetary emergencies‛ on a non-discriminatory and 
temporary basis (UNICE 2003a: 3). 
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which were ‚key to attracting FDI‛ (UNICE 2003b: 7). This view was again challenged 
by the hardliners and by NGOs that cited academic literature and studies produced 
by the World Bank and UNCTAD in their statements and publications.143 As argued 
by NGOs, governments could liberalize their investment regimes either unilaterally or 
bilaterally without a multilateral accord and with broader flexibilities to re-regulate in 
case the policies they adopted did not fulfil the goals.144 There is no doubt that NGOs 
became more influential than TNCs in setting the WTO’s investment agenda both by 
de-legitimizing the proposed case from a normative point of view and by producing, 
disseminating, and channelling research and analysis challenging the arguments for a 
framework agreement on investment. 
 
7.3.3. Cancun endgame 
 
In addition to the NGO factor, the fate of investment at the WTO was also determined 
by the broader negotiation dynamics. The emergence of new coalitions among 
developing countries and the impasse in agriculture had direct impact on the talks in 
investment before and during the Cancun Conference. In fact, agriculture proved to 
                                                 
143 For example, a briefing by the World Development Movement and Friends of the Earth 
(2003: 7-8) put together empirical proof supporting the argument that investment rules in BITs 
and GATS did not result in an automatic increase in FDI flows. Akin to the arguments of the 
hardliners, it was noted with evidence that the key determinants of FDI flows to the poorest 
countries are economic and infrastructural.  
144 For instance see World Development Movement and Friends of the Earth 2003 p.19. 
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be the hardest nut to crack in the Doha package. The negotiations after the deal in 
Doha proved highly controversial because of disagreements especially between the 
EU and the Cairns Group -the coalition of large exporters of agricultural products. 
The EU was under pressure to further reform its domestic farm programs. It could 
only partially succeed in improvements to the CAP with radical, albeit late-coming, 
steps taken under the leadership of European Commissioner for Agriculture, Franz 
Fischler, in 2003 (van Den Hoven 2004: 267-74). While the EU, as a conventional user 
of domestic subsidies was under the spotlight, it was joined by the United States in 
2002. The U.S. Farm Bill in 2002 became critical to the WTO talks as the Americans 
with new domestic subsidies put in force by Congress distanced from the liberals 
league led by the Cairns Group and somehow joined with the EU and other 
conservative players (Narlikar 2003: 189; Narlikar and Tussie 2004: 962; Destler 2005: 
250). The U.S.-EU joint proposal in agriculture right before the Cancun Ministerial 
created a burst of anger on the side of the Cairns Group as well as many other 
developing countries as it was perceived to set serious limits on the reform agenda 
and prospective liberalization. Neither the U.S. nor the EU could prevent the 
emergence and consolidation of a block of developing countries comprised of China, 
Brazil, India and others calling for radical cuts for trade distorting subsidies globally. 
These countries formed the Group of 22 before Cancun (Bridges: 10 September 2003; 
Narlikar and Tussie 2004: 949-50). This group was joined by a Group of 33 which 
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requested special treatment for their sensitive products to protect their sensitive 
sectors from the surge of subsidized Western products. Finally, a group of four 
African cotton producers launched the Cotton initiative with a call for the global 
elimination of subsidies in this sector immediately (Bridges: 10 September 2003; 
Narlikar and Wilkinson 2004: 456-7). 145 
 
Growing tensions over agriculture and harsh debates on the Singapore issues would 
open new cracks in the fragile transatlantic business consensus. U.S. business bodies 
continued their preference over a staged approach before and after the Doha 
Conference. A USCIB letter to Assistant USTR Joseph Papovich in October 2001146 and 
U.S. National Free Trade Council’s recommendations for the Doha Round147 confirm 
                                                 
145 The cotton initiative of Benin, Burkina Faso, Mali and Chad was also launched with 
dedicated NGO support. The leading NGO has been the Ideas Centre in Geneva, Switzerland. 
http://www.ideascentre.ch/cotton.html accessed on November 11, 2010. 
146 The USCIB letter recommended ‚a ‘staged’ approach, whereby elements common to the 
WTO – transparency, national treatment (after entry) and TRIMs enforcement – would be 
negotiated in the first phase.‛  It qualified the following rules as ‚more difficult‛ and to be 
handled ‚in a second stage of negotiations‛: national treatment on entry, expropriation, 
dispute settlement, and transfers of profits. 
http://www.uscib.org/index.asp?documentID=1856 accessed on November 15, 2010.  
147 The NFTC report, ‚Vision 2005: Free Trade and Beyond: Recommendations for the Doha 
Development Agenda,‛ recommended the WTO to concentrate on ‚a subset of issues where 
consensus on a high standard can be reached‛ spelling "transparency, national treatment, and 
the right of establishment.‛ The NFTC also advised the improvement and effective 
implementation of existing WTO rules on investment such as the TRIMs Agreement (NFTC 
2002: 22). 
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this persistent stance.148 In the run-up to the Cancun Conference, this lukewarm 
support to the investment talks at the WTO started to disappear. Mounting concerns 
to save the Doha Round with significant market access gains pushed any remaining 
U.S. business demands for investment to the backburner. Joint statements that 
brought together transatlantic businesses as well as others called for a successful 
Ministerial towards concluding the Doha Round and highlighted the importance of 
market access chapters of the round (ERT and BRT 2003; ICC 2003b). In May 2003, 
U.S. Business Round Table argued against a pre-mature push for negotiations in 
investment that would not ensure a high level of protection, and cautioned that 
investment could undermine the progress in other issues in the Doha Round (BRT 
2003).  
 
Concomitantly, the hardliners in Geneva ensured the expansion of their coalition 
parallel to the controversies over farming. As discussed in the previous chapter, from 
1996 to 2001 India gathered support of a group of countries such as Pakistan, Egypt, 
Morocco, and Cuba in its opposition to the inclusion of investment to the new round. 
Although these countries suceeded in avoiding the start of the talks in Doha, they 
could not succeed in preventing the continuation of the WTO work in the Singapore 
                                                 
148 Showing the embracement of the U.S. business approach by the government, USTR’s 
Papovich proclaimed that the U.S. endorsed the elements in investment negotiations such as 
transparency and non-discrimination but it would prefer more difficult issues such as 
expropriation to be left to later negotiations (International Trade Daily June 20 2002). 
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issues. Key developing countries such as China and Brazil remained on the fence 
about watching the progress in other chapters of the Round. However, the game 
turned from a battle between the demandeurs and opponents to a broader conflict as 
LDCs and the African Group countries that coalesced around a G-90 gradually joined 
the ranks of opponents in Cancun (Narlikar and Wilkinson 2004: 457). The hardliners 
also ensured the support of some G-22 members such as China.  
 
At an earlier stage during the Cancun Conference, a group of ACP and LDC countries 
sent a letter to Minister for lntemational Trade of Canada Pierre Pettigrew who was 
appointed as the facilitator to the Singapore issues working group indicating that 
there was no consensus to launch the talks in any of the four issues (Bridges: 14 
September 2003). As the tension increased in agriculture, the opposition camp 
extended its reach with the declaration of  a group of countries including China, India, 
Malaysia, Nigeria and Bangladesh as well as India stating that there was no explicit 
consensus to start negotiations in investment and the other three issues (Bridges: 12 
September 2003). On the other hand, some other countries took a more moderate 
position such as Morocco, which implied its support for these topics in tandem with 
some Latin American countries’ endorsement which was contingent upon progress to 
be recorded in other areas (Bridges: 12 September 2003). In this heated atmosphere, the 
Americans proposed the ‚unbundling‛ of the four issues and starting talks only in 
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government procurement and trade facilitation (Bridges: 13 September 2003). 
Meanwhile India, this time joined by 70 countries, repeated the lack of a mature basis 
to launch the talks, and the European camp started to break down. Reportedly, 
Sweden, the Netherlands, Belgium and Ireland expressed that investment was no 
longer a national priority (Bridges: 13 September 2003). The revised draft text released 
by the Conference chairman (WTO 2003c) attracted a strong reaction from the EU as it 
left investment out of the package for which the talks would immediately start 
(Bridges: 14 September 2003). The text was also unsatisfactory for India which was 
critical of the lack of the wording of ‚explicit consensus‛ for a potential future 
decision to initiate negotiations in investment as well as for NGOs some of which 
found it ‚scandalous‛ (Bridges: 14 September 2003). Green room consultations 
continued until the last day, during which the EU had to come to terms with the 
unbundling of the Singapore topics by accepting to leave competition and investment 
out of the round (Bridges: 15 September 2003). However, this eleventh hour move did 
not save the conference. The proposal was acceptable neither for Korea and Japan 
who insisted on opening the talks in all four issues, nor for India and other opponents 
including the African Union who opposed all topics (Bridges: 15 September 2003). 
Consequently, the Conference Chair Mexican Foreign Minister Luis Ernesto Derbez 
adjourned the summit without releasing a consensus declaration. 
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The failure in Cancun resulted in the interruption of the Doha Round for months until 
a General Council Decision was taken in July 2004. In the meantime, efforts continued 
out of the WTO to re-launch the round, which made it clear that there were no 
convergence of minds on the three Singapore issues including investment. Only on 
trade facilitation, a topic in which almost all member countries had some stake, there 
was some desire to initiate negotiations. The ‚July package‛ (WTO 2004) dropped 
investment, competition and government procurement from the agenda with a 
statement noting that these issues ‚will not form part of the Work Programme set out 
in [the Doha] Declaration and therefore no work towards negotiations on any of these 
issues will take place within the WTO during the Doha Round.‛ 
 
7.4. Transatlantic Business Preference and Strategies in the Context of Neoliberal 
Hegemony   
 
In contrast to the business campaigns for services and IPR before and during the 
Uruguay Round, transatlantic business preferences and strategies were crafted within 
the context of contested neoliberal hegemony. The transformation of the trade regime 
and the rise of a regulatory trade agenda drew a wide set of civil society actors into 
the policy debates at domestic and transnational levels in the 1990s who challenged 
business strategies towards further de-authorization of the states vis-à-vis market 
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forces. Similarly, developing countries proactively challenged the regulatory trade 
agenda with rising concerns on Uruguay Round accords and with an outspoken 
emphasis on the negative impacts of the suggested market integration program for 
their economic development. This context shaped TNC trade preferences and 
strategies and constrained the formation of a collective business formula on the 
content of a potential constitution for investment rules and the venue of negotiations 
while inducing TNCs to act as pragmatic ‚venue-shoppers.‛149 Both at the OECD and 
WTO, the intergovernmental talks were highly politicized with an unprecedented 
level of NGO mobilization challenging the investment case from normative and 
empirical grounds. Business strategies to further transform the trade regime through 
the incorporation of investment rules can be contrasted with the services case in a 
number of ways, especially illustrating the role of hegemonic context in determining 
transatlantic business strategies.  
 
Lack of a Cohesive transatlantic business coalition and Policy network 
 
Unable to produce a shared vision, transatlantic TNCs failed to build up a strong 
transnational business coalition around a collective case for investment as in the 
                                                 
149 Similar to U.S. business preference for bilateralism, European TNCs also called for 
preferential agreements for investment after the failure in Cancun. See UNICE statements 
UNICE (2003c) and 2006. 
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services and IPRs campaigns. While there emerged a strong transatlantic TNC 
mobilization for the Doha Round in general, collective business pressure was stronger 
for the market access elements in the negotiation package. The mounting domestic 
opposition to the free trade agenda in the United States was one factor shaping U.S. 
business preferences and weakening a potential transatlantic business coalition for a 
comprehensive investment program at the WTO. While Europeans assured, albeit 
lukewarm, support from Americans for a subset of issues in their investment project, 
the political tension on the Singapore issues escalated before Cancun led further 
erosion of the American endorsement.  Availability of bilateral and regional options 
upon the NAFTA model became another divisive factor. As shown above American 
TNCs opted for bilateral and regional channels to achieve high standard rules to 
restrain government intervention to business activities. Both Clinton and Bush 
administrations were willing to launch new NAFTA-like initiatives with a heightened 
bargaining power in bilateral setting than at the WTO. The American competitive 
liberalization strategy would also ensure bipartisan support.  
 
European TNCs, especially after Seattle Conference, remained low-profile in their 
promotion of the investment issue as it became highly politicized with the 
involvement of a wide range of civil society actors already mobilized against the MAI. 
After investment was pushed onto the WTO agenda it was closely monitored by 
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NGOs who set off a counter-campaign. Against this background, European TNCs did 
not create a transnational policy network for investment per se either in the form of an 
epistemic community as in the GATS case, or a narrower business-government 
network as in the TRIPs case. It was NGOs rather than TNCs who actively led the 
policy debate over investment which took place within a broader setting compared to 
the IPR and services cases with active participation from civil society. In this context, 
the investment case was not projected by the strategic leadership of certain business 
executives who could have worked to build up a transatlantic business coalition or 
network.  
 
Difficulties in setting trade agendas as NGOs enter the stage 
 
In a context where the gap between social masses and political leadership was 
broadened, confidence towards politics, politicians and democratic accountability of 
neoliberal institutions were eroded, NGOs became influential elements of trade 
policy-making and agenda-setting on bothsides of the Atlantic. This is evident in the 
cases of the fast-track debates in the United States as well as in the MAI and Seattle 
deadlocks. On these occasions, NGOs became high-profile players capable of 
activating political and social stakeholders across borders. Consequently, the 
investment agenda of the WTO was set not solely by negotiating governments and 
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business inputs but also by NGOs. Analysts point out that the agenda-setting ability 
of NGOs rests in their strategic use of ideas and available political opportunities as 
seen in the cases of TRIPS and GATS campaigns (Sell and Prakash 2004; Murphy 2007: 
10). 
 
The TRIPS and GATS cases were constructed by TNCs which constituted founding 
elements of an emerging historic bloc that produced the neoliberal hegemony as a 
policy formulation in response to the crisis emerged in the 1970s. These cases were 
formulated within a normative framework of free trade and neoliberalism to solve a 
set of problems including the competitiveness and trade deficits of the United States, 
systemic problems of the GATT, and economic growth problems. Similarly, NGOs 
succeeded in engaging in agenda-setting in the investment case as well as other cases 
at the WTO such as the access to medicines campaign through defining a policy 
problem and a solution in line with the interests of governments within a new moral 
and normative framework associated with ‚sustainable development‛ (Murphy 2007: 
10).150  The anti-investment campaigners promoted a case based on the problems 
created by NAFTA and warned against potential risks of an investment treaty for 
                                                 
150 In fact, the Doha Ministerial Declaration on the TRIPs Agreement and Public Health was 
the outcome of a successful initiative launched by NGOs such as Health Action International, 
Medecins Sans Frontieres, Third World Network who joined forces for facilitating the legal 
access of LDCs to generic drugs. (Sell and Prakash 2004; Odell and Sell 2006: 92-8).  
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developing countries which would arguably legally empower TNCs and narrow the 
policy space of governments for development (Murphy 2007: 11, 15). The solution 
offered was the prevention of the launch of investment talks at the WTO.  
 
Negotiation dynamics and NGOs 
 
Compared to the TRIPS and GATS negotiations, the investment case was discussed in 
a political setting expressive of a new configuration of power in the trading system 
where emerging economies are able to exert their influence more forcefully in shaping 
the multilateral agenda and the negotiation processes. The Doha consensus 
represented recognition of the new power and negotiation dynamics surfacing at 
Seattle and afterwards as it required developed countries to give significant 
concessions to developing countries. The case of investment resembles the services 
talks more than the IPR negotiations during the Uruguay Round, since consent more 
than coercion came to play to get developing countries on board. The consent of 
developing countries was solicited through a discussion process within the WTO 
working group as well as through training programs launched after Doha which 
altogether entailed a strong educative dimension (Smythe 2004: 23-4; ). There is no 
evidence of use of unilateral trade instruments to forge consensus on launching talks 
in investment per se before and during the Doha Round similar to the unilateral U.S. 
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actions in the form of Special 301 cases against the hardliners during the Uruguay 
Round. In fact, as previously discussed the European business case for investment 
from the beginning was premised upon the enhanced acknowledgement of the 
benefits of FDI in developing countries and the improvement of business environment 
in the Southern markets. Although investment was discussed within a working group 
at the WTO its failure was directly associated with the broader bargaining dynamics 
of the Doha Round.  
 
The failure to reach an explicit consensus on launching talks in investment was in part 
because of the lack of progress in other chapters of the Round, especially in 
agriculture. The stalemate in agriculture triggered the emergence of new Southern 
coalitions. While there existed a strong India-led opposition including a dozen 
countries between 1996 to 2001, this coalition expanded before and during the Cancun 
Conference with the joining of G-90 including LDCs and the African Group countries. 
While the impasse in agriculture was influential in the confrontation, these countries 
did not perceive clear gains but actually saw certain risks in embarking upon talks in 
new issues (Murphy 2007: 15-6). Furthermore, they lacked capacity to negotiate new 
chapters as limited resources were needed for higher priorities within the Doha 
package. Such clear re-positioning against investment is a clear indication of the lack 
of emergence of a widespread consensus over the case built by European businesses 
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and other demandeurs. NGOs became particularly influential in this re-positioning 
with their close contacts with the negotiators and through providing analysis via 
websites such as ‚Investment Watch,‛ and several high-profile international meetings, 
conferences and workshops in Geneva and Africa (Murphy 2007: 11-2). In addition to 
legitimizing their views on the potential risks of an investment treaty through 
empirical evidence, NGOs succeeded ‚to fuse their normative ambitions with states’ 
interests, in order to affect the decision-making at this ‘states-only’ institution‛ 
(Murphy 2007: 12, 16).  
 
Conclusion 
 
The context of contested neoliberal hegemony created a new global political 
environment within which trade policies and agendas are made and business 
preferences and strategies are shaped. In contrast to the collective vision and 
strategies of transatlantic TNCs towards GATT agenda in IPR and services cases, 
European and American business forces were divided over their perspectives, 
preferences, and strategies regarding the WTO agenda in the 1990s. The investment 
case illustrates the limits to the transformation of the trade regime as the WTO was 
put at the centre of systemic pressures critical of furthering the neoliberal agenda 
through new rule-making. Transatlantic business forces faced significant difficulties in 
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forging consensus within the neoliberal historic bloc on a collective vision and 
strategy in regards to trade policies in the presence of the resistance in global civil 
society which had undermined the legitimacy and prevented the expansion of the 
neoliberal agenda. The WTO experience with investment shows that the resistance 
can be mobilized not only at the domestic level in the OECD capitals, but also at a 
transnational scale with the counter campaigns launched by NGOs. NGOs have been 
able to act as moral agents capable of setting the trade agenda and restricting the 
room for manoeuvre for the TNCs in pursuing corporate interests through trade 
policies. This context of contested hegemony pushes TNCs to act pragmatically to 
channel their resources and strategies to alternative trade policy venues where 
meaningful gains can potentially be secured. Consequently, bilateral and regional 
platforms turn to the hubs of new rule-making where TNCs quest for better access 
and protection.   
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CHAPTER 8- CONCLUSION 
 
8.1. Hegemony, World Orders, and International Regimes  
 
This dissertation aimed to apply a neo-Gramscian theoretical framework to 
understand the transformation of the trade regime from the GATT to the WTO. The 
analysis was conducted through contextualising regime transformation within the 
world order by taking into account global material and ideational changes. 
 
In light of certain inadequacies of the mainstream approaches, a neo-Gramscian 
framework to analyse the transformation of the trade regime was suggested in 
Chapter 2. As discussed in the Introduction, for the power-based school of thought (as 
applied by neorealist scholars) international regimes emerge and undergo certain 
changes as a function of the dissemination of state power within the international 
system. They are deemed to be created by hegemonic states and considered as entities 
having no autonomous roles on interstate cooperation, rather they are viewed as a 
mirror reflecting the dissemination of power within the international state system. 
Similarly, for interest-based theories, international regimes are tools of interest 
maximisation facilitating bargaining among the states who arguably have pre-
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determined interests and identities through certain regulative rules and practices. 
These conventional theories take into account non-state actors regarding the extent to 
which they influence the power, role and interests of the states internally as the states 
are ontologically taken as the unitary constituents of a predetermined states system.  
Inherent rationalism in the traditional regime theories prioritises the analysis of 
material factors of state behaviour and hinders an entire conceptualisation of the 
ideational aspects of preference formation as well as the normative content of the 
regimes. In contrast to the conventional theories, constructivist and neo-Gramscian 
perspectives regard international regimes as autonomous intersubjective entities 
encapsulating the internationalisation of political authority with their normative 
content that identifies the context for legitimate state action. Although they share the 
ontological premises (such international regimes as intersubjective entities) of 
constructivist scholars, neo-Gramscian scholars have not focused on regimes. 
However, as applied in this dissertation, it is possible to adopt a constructivist 
perspective for an employment of a neo-Gramscian reading of the changes in trade 
regime. Although they are under-conceptualised by constructivist scholarship, this 
perspective can be further broadened by elaborating on the linkages between 
international regimes and material reality. For neo-Gramscian scholars international 
regimes are intersubjective entities implanted in historical structures and they 
embody ideas and power configurations inherent to those structures. It is the 
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Gramscian concept of hegemony which ties together the social forces that are the 
agents of historical change, world orders and associated international regimes. 
 
Hegemony in its Gramscian usage defines the consensual aspect of the exercise of 
political power and the ethical framework for political action within a given domestic 
order. Social forces gaining dominance within economic bases translate their 
supremacy in the political sphere inclusive of both ideas and institutions through a 
war of position pursued within civil society. While these forces may recourse to the 
coercive tools of the state to acquire consent of subordinate groups, hegemony 
becomes stronger to the extent that the exercise of power is legitimized and consent is 
given voluntarily. To this aim, actors that strive to build hegemony or intellectual and 
moral leadership through developing comprehensive ideological formulas that would 
ensure economic growth and respond to the needs of the society, and by negotiating 
those formulas with other actors in the society. These formulas facilitate the 
continuation of the dominant position of hegemonic forces in the production sphere 
and also ensure economic development of the society. Thus, as outlined in Chapter 2 
social forces produce hegemony through waging a war of position by building 
coalitions and convincing subordinate actors through negotiation. This negotiation 
process sometimes requires compromising immediate interests. The coalitions built by 
hegemonic forces with different class fractions and social actors are called historic blocs 
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which are tied together by comprehensive ideological formulas that are the ethical 
glue defining the rights and responsibilities of hegemonic actors. In other words, 
hegemony determines the limits to the legitimate use of political authority, and there 
is a correlation between the degree of hegemony and social order. Hegemony of 
ruling actors is never complete and can be contested by other social forces that can 
wage counter wars of position. ‚Organic crisis‛ defines extreme situations where 
hegemony is contested within civil society to a degree that hegemonic ideas, 
institutions and actors are challenged, and intellectual and moral leadership (as well 
as the ethical glue holding social actors together) is lost.  
 
Consensual use of legitimate authority is also the principal criterion in distinguishing 
a hegemonic order from a non-hegemonic one in the international realm. Hegemony 
in the global context creates an ethical framework of authority relations between 
actors including states and non-state agents at various levels. The coherence between 
power configurations, ideas and international institutions is determined by the 
hegemonic formation of the world orders. Hegemony can be deemed absent when 
global politics reflect power based confrontations and clashes in ideas, and when civil 
society and international institutions express clashes and controversies between 
different social forces. International regimes and institutions reflect dominant power 
configurations and ideas of a given world order. International regimes work to 
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institutionalise hegemonies through diffusing hegemonic norms. They contain both 
historically conditioned and relatively unchallenged intersubjective ideas, and 
collective images -the ideas held only by a group of individuals.   When the hegemony 
of ruling actors and their comprehensive ideological framework is contested, 
international regimes turn to terrains of conflicting collective images.  
 
For neo-Gramscian scholars, U.S. hegemony was a construct of social forces that 
gained ascendancy in the production space dominated by the Fordist capital 
accumulation. It was built around a historic bloc of capitalist and labour class 
fractions as well as ruling elites over a compromise on a ‚corporate liberal‛ 
ideological framework. U.S. hegemony rested on a commitment to provide global 
economic growth and development through trade and investment especially of goods 
of the Fordist mode of production that was facilitated with institutions endorsing 
economic multilateralism. While promoting economic liberalism and multilateralism, 
the corporate liberal framework acknowledged the legitimate role of the states in the 
economic realm and justified Keynesian policies towards ensuring domestic 
adjustment and employment. The United States as the hegemonic state and allied 
powers supported international regimes reflecting the collective social purpose of 
‚embedded liberalism,‛ which was necessarily a reflection of the corporate liberal 
hegemonic compromise. Post-war economic regimes endorsed the multilateral 
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liberalisation of trade and money flows but also left sufficient space for states to 
intervene in markets to ensure social welfare objectives such as employment. 
Nevertheless, the American historic bloc and the corporate liberal ideological 
framework disintegrated with the authority crisis that emerged parallel to the 
economic downturn in the 1970s. Hegemonic actors, institutions and policy formulas 
failed to create welfare and address economic stagflation.  
 
In the coming decade, a new hegemonic order was built by social forces which arose 
from the globalisation of economic production and the emergence of the post-Fordist 
mode of capital accumulation. Transnational capital fractions consolidated in TNCs 
and operated in knowledge and technology-intensive sectors—which constituted the 
fundamental pillars of a new transnational historic bloc bringing together capitalist 
classes and ruling elites in core capitalist countries. This bloc projected a neoliberal 
ideological framework redefining world wide authority relations and signified a shift 
of authority from the states to markets and market actors. Neoliberal hegemony rose 
over the enhanced structural power of transnational capital concentrated in the ‚G-7 
nexus‛ and provided transnational capital with the ability to set policy agendas.  In 
other words, the neoliberal ideological framework is distinct from corporate 
liberalism in that it recognizes the enhanced legitimate authority of markets and a 
reduced regulatory role for the states to facilitate market operations and deeper global 
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integration. Consequently, states assumed strict disciplines and became accountable 
to markets while gradually losing their authority to pursue certain economic policies 
including welfare instruments (as previously operated by governments) to distribute 
economic resources and supply public health and environmental services.  Neoliberal 
hegemony and the neoliberal form of states spread to developing countries and 
transition economies through international institutions, and bilateral and unilateral 
mechanisms and measures. Neoliberal hegemony operates through new 
constitutional mechanisms to lock in market norms and reforms at the international 
level with supra-state judicial mechanisms, free trade agreements, and regional 
economic integration arrangements. However, neo-Gramscian scholars point out that 
neoliberal hegemony was increasingly contested since the early 1990s with the rise of 
social movements against globalisation and neoliberal policies and institutions. Some 
scholars even argue that the neoliberal hegemony entered an authority crisis as the 
legitimacy of the states, institutions and policies is challenged within civil societies.  
 
8.2. Hegemonic Transformation of the Trade Regime: From the GATT to the WTO 
 
The GATT regime emerged in 1948 and reflected the corporate liberal framework in 
its normative content. It projected the legitimate social purpose by deeming border 
measures in specified circumstances as legitimate tools to realise certain Keynesian 
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social objectives. The GATT functioned to assure nondiscriminatory liberalization of 
international trade especially in consumer durables of Fordist mode of production 
while it provided sufficient exceptions and safeguards for governments to pursue 
protective adjustment policies. The normative content of the GATT regime remained 
unchanged until the launch of the Uruguay Round in 1986, although it went through 
a norm-governed evolution. As argued in Chapter 3, the changes within the regime 
during the Uruguay Round can be identified as a hegemonic transformation since 
these modifications reflected the transformation in the world order, i.e. the changes in 
the production sphere, in political power configurations, and the ideological 
framework.  
 
The WTO was created to regulate international trade which was increasingly 
characterized by cross-border flow of goods and services of post-Fordist production 
parallel to economic globalization, the emergence of cross-border value chains and 
growing intra-firm trade. The GATT was an instrument for shallow or negative 
integration whereas the WTO operates to sustain positive or deep integration through 
harmonizing domestic regulations concerning the operation of markets. The GATT 
was designed to serve reducing border barriers especially between developed 
countries whereas developing countries were not active participants of the trade 
regime. With the rise of Japan, Europe and later newly industrialized economies, 
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reciprocity became a norm increasingly emphasized by the United States. As 
developing countries gained competitiveness and took a growing share in world 
trade, concerns of free-riding put them under the microscopes of the U.S. and other 
advanced economies. Throughout the Uruguay Round, developing countries assumed 
the role of reciprocal trader as they left protectionist models of growth, adopted 
neoliberal policies, and actively engaged in trade talks to secure their access to the 
markets. Consequently, the WTO accords reflected a collective desire to discipline 
border and intra-border state measures affecting international trade almost in all 
sectors of goods and services and included additional responsibilities to ensure fair 
competition through rules on domestic subsidies, technical standards and IPR 
protection. Member states, including the U.S., also acknowledged the enhanced 
authority of the WTO to enforce those disciplines with a supra-national Dispute 
Settlement Mechanism. In other words, the WTO is the embodiment of a new social 
purpose characterising the institutionalisation of neoliberal hegemony through new 
constitutional accords and mechanisms codifying the reconfiguration of global 
authority relations.  
 
The emergence of the WTO entailed a norm-transforming quality—demonstrating the 
shift in the social purpose in tandem with the replacement of corporate liberalism 
with neoliberal ideological framework. The erosion of the embedded liberal vision 
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and associated paradigmatic shift from borders towards domestic policies were reflected 
in a re-formulation of the fundamental norms of the GATT (such as non-
discrimination and liberalisation). The GATS was particularly instrumental in the re-
designation of these norms. Similar to goods, the GATS considers services tradable. 
According to the agreement, international trade in services occurs not only through 
cross-border movement of service products, but also through other ‚supply modes‛ 
requiring the mobility of service providers, consumers or capital (in the form of FDI). 
The GATS broadened the scope of protectionist measures by reformulating the 
liberalisation norms in its market access provisions. This applied to the measures 
restricting different supply modes. Barriers to market access include several 
regulatory measures inhibiting the cross-border provision of services such as banking 
and the consumption of services like education in other countries. They also may take 
the form of restrictions to commercial presence through FDI, and measures 
preventing temporary movement of natural persons such as architects to provide 
services abroad. Traders under the GATS are not only exporters and importers of 
goods, but also service providers such as teachers, and legal persons including firms. 
In this regard, non-discrimination was reformulated in a manner to cover both 
services and service suppliers including individuals and companies. The GATS is a 
global constitution which imposes strong disciplines to prevent protective state 
measures inhibiting access to markets, but it envisages a long term gradual approach 
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for market opening. It adopts the principle of progressive liberalisation and a positive 
list approach through distinguishing the norm of most favoured nation as a general 
commitment from national treatment and market access (which are specific 
commitments to be applied to sectors negotiated among parties). These adjustments to 
fundamental norms and principles took place in an intersubjective framework that 
was gradually shaped by emerging consensus around the new social purpose 
reflective of the spread of neoliberal hegemony. The evolution of the intersubjective 
framework of the trade regime brought about a new ‚generative grammar,‛ which 
modified the collective meanings produced under the GATT. The analytical lenses 
provided by neorealism and neoliberalism would hardly capture the intersubjective 
quality of the trade regime’s hegemonic transformation.  
 
This normative transformation could have continued if WTO members had decided to 
launch the talks for a multilateral investment agreement as proposed by the European 
Union and other demandeurs. The proposed framework agreement for investment 
would further expand the legal scope of the WTO through developing rules on 
investment covered by TRIMS and TRIPS Agreements and the GATS. International 
instruments on investment out of the WTO generally address issues of protection of 
investment and investors, liberalisation of the barriers to FDI, and settlement of 
disputes among relevant state and non-state parties. Since the creation of the NAFTA, 
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many free trade agreements have contained WTO-plus provisions addressing these 
issues. The multilateral framework proposed by TNCs and other demandeurs was 
expected to generate further disciplines upon member states with provisions on 
transparency, investment protection especially against various forms of expropriation, 
investment liberalisation and settlement of disputes. The advocates of the framework 
suggested a broad definition for investment to ensure enhanced rights for TNCs’ 
operations and cross-border mobility of capital. The proposed framework was to 
liberalise investment flows by enlarging the scope of non-discrimination and market 
access with pre-admission provisions through narrowing the sovereign rights of the 
states to screen and monitor investment and related capital inflows. MFN and 
national treatment principles would apply selectively to pre-admission and post-
establishment phases of investment with the individual commitments of member 
states. In this vein, the intersubjective meanings of the regime were reformulated to 
broaden the scope of protectionism with enlarged definitions of barriers to trade and 
the meaning of international trade to encompass cross-border movements of different 
forms of capital.  
 
Nonetheless, the transformation of the trade regime stalled because of the 
contradictions that emerged within the realm of civil society in the form of a backlash 
against globalization and challenges against neoliberal hegemony. Market norms 
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penetrated into the states both as a result of the transformation of the trade regime 
and other new constitutional mechanisms, and undermined the established mechanics 
of relations between the states and social actors. Growing resistance in civil society 
against globalisation, neoliberal institutions and policies is evidence of the erosion of 
the legitimacy of hegemonic actors and institutions. A particular expression of this 
challenge to neoliberal hegemony is the crisis of trade agenda and policies that began 
in the mid-1990s. Opposition against the NAFTA, MAI, and the WTO, and civil 
society coalitions in the United States against the renewal of the fast track authority 
are manifestations of the growing discontent about the neoliberal trade agenda. Since 
the emergence of anti-globalisation campaigns, the WTO has been criticized for its 
behind-the-border regulatory program, and scrutinized for its lack of transparency in 
decision-making and the subsequent lack of democratic accountability and legitimacy. 
The collapse of the Seattle Ministerial in 1999 was a critical turning point and showed 
the scale of opposition and the ability of NGOs to mobilize across borders and around 
networks. As contended by some observers, NGOs act as moral agents and are able to 
de-legitimize neoliberal policies and policy proposals. NGOs mobilized against the 
MAI and potential investment negotiations at the WTO became instrumental in the 
failure of both initiatives. At the heart of their opposition were concerns about the 
further empowerment of market actors vis-à-vis states and the potential implications 
of the proposed agreements for environment and labour standards.  
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8.3. TNCs as Social Forces of Regime Transformation 
 
8.3.1. The Case of Services 
 
This dissertation suggests that TNCs were the major social forces responsible for both 
the construction of the neoliberal world order and the transformation of the trade 
regime. As social agents of neoliberal hegemony, TNCs took a proactive role in 
determining the normative transformation and the social purpose underlying the 
trade regime. Globalisation of economic production created material conditions for 
such a role through integrating markets in production chains and escalating 
competition. Regulatory barriers to access markets and operate in host countries 
pushed TNCs in the 1970s to develop corporate strategies for a better business 
environment that would help reduce operation costs and facilitate investments. 
Through their demands on better IPR enforcement and deregulation, TNCs in 
knowledge and capital intensive industries such as pharmaceuticals, chemicals, 
microelectronics, financial and telecommunications services became the driving force 
that initially shaped the trade agenda of the United States and then of other OECD 
countries. The TRIPS Agreement and the GATS came into existence after IPRs and 
services were inserted in the GATT agenda in the early 1980s. This was a result of the 
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business campaigns launched by TNC coalitions which pursued an aggressive 
agenda-setting strategy after allying around a set of policy formulas. 
 
As examined broadly in Chapter 4, ideas regarding the tradability of services and 
liberalisation of services within a trade policy framework were raised by only a group 
of Anglo-American experts until the mid 1970s. The new framing was adopted by 
some American business leaders especially in the financial sector who then pushed for 
activating U.S. trade policy instruments for the dismantling of regulatory barriers in 
external markets. A ‚collective image‛ of tradability of services became instrumental 
in the creation of a small coalition of TNCs who campaigned for legal recognition of 
services as a trade issue in the period between 1973 and 1979. The new conceptual 
framing in trade terms with notions of comparative advantage, market access, non-
tariff barriers, and protectionism created scientific justification for such recognition. 
TNCs succeeded in incremental gains in U.S. trade law in 1974 which provided a 
precedent for further benefits in the 1979, 1984 and 1988 amendments to the law. 
Parallel to constitutional changes, a broader business coalition was built up in 1979 
with a longer term goal for incorporating services to the GATT system. This 
dissertation argues that business leaders from financial services sector launched a war 
of position in the Gramscian sense to set the GATT agenda. The business campaign 
contained strategies of case-building, education of policy-makers and broader public 
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and coalition-building with actors in private sector, government agencies, academia 
and media. At the heart of the campaign laid the motive to change the established 
mind-set of ‚trade in goods‛ with a new paradigm of thinking inclusively about 
services. Case-building strategy encapsulated the development of a comprehensive 
policy formula suggesting the tradability of services as an objective fact and 
emphasising the economic importance of service sectors for the U.S. economy, 
employment and world trade. The case for services was framed as a hegemonic policy 
formula in the normative texture of neoliberalism, concurrent with free trade 
discourse and as a solution to growing protectionism. The business case suggested 
that services could be liberalised through an across the board application of GATT 
norms and negotiation practices, and that this would help attenuate the growing trade 
deficits of the United States.  Case-building and education activities -coupled with an 
active engagement in knowledge production through sponsoring new research and 
conferences- in the U.S. and abroad helped services coalition gain intellectual and 
moral leadership with growing receptiveness of their case in academia and public 
discussion. The TNC-led services coalition took the form of a transnational policy 
network through dissemination activities in Europe and elsewhere through reaching 
out to business leaders, policy-makers, academics and journalists abroad.  
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As a consequence of this proactive agenda-setting campaign and constitutional 
recognition, the Reagan administration took the initiative to put services on the GATT 
agenda beginning in 1982. Before and during the Uruguay Round, TNCs successfully 
created a domestic constituency and ensured Congressional support for USTR’s push 
for new round including services. With TNCs’ campaign in European capitals and the 
U.S. government’s initiative at the OECD, a consensus was gradually forged in the 
North about the tradability of services during the mid-1980s. Nevertheless, with the 
participation of European bureaucracies in the debate there emerged differences of 
opinion on the across-the-board application of GATT norms and concerns about the 
elimination of certain regulations which served social objectives. Similarly, as 
demonstrated in Chapter 5, the ambitious liberalisation prospective of U.S. TNCs was 
challenged by developing countries who allied with Europeans for a gradual 
approach to market opening. All the same, the launch of the services talks in 1986 was 
a great victory considering the fact that the U.S. proposal in 1982 had been opposed 
by the bloc of the ‚Group of 77,‛ led by India and Brazil on the basis that the GATT 
lacked legal competence to negotiate the deregulation of services.  The arguments of 
resistant governments that services and intellectual property were ‚non-trade‛ issues 
beyond the scope of the GATT gradually seemed anachronistic and could no longer 
be upheld as legitimate as the negotiations came to a close.  
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A significant factor in the insertion of services into the GATT legal and normative 
framework was the constructive participation of developing countries to the 
consensus building process in the course of multilateral deliberations. In fact, the early 
Southern coalition against services began to dissolve before the Uruguay Round and 
quickly deteriorated during negotiations parallel to the evolution of developing 
countries’ interests and attitudes towards the services case. The change of attitudes 
positively correlated with the growing embracement of the role of reciprocal trader 
because of material changes that turned many developing countries important service 
providers and participants to supply chains. With the diffusion of neoliberal 
hegemony, many of these countries moved away from import substitution and shifted 
toward adopting market-based reforms and, thus, became eager for concessions in 
order to gain reciprocal access to Northern markets in services as well as other sectors. 
In addition to the TNC campaign to disseminate the new thinking through education 
activities in Geneva and other channels, developing country negotiators were also 
exposed to new thinking about services during the negotiations. Although they 
initially took the services case from a defensive point (due mainly to the lack of 
knowledge and inability to assess their competitiveness in trade terms) they gradually 
recognized the benefits of services liberalisation and framed their preferences within 
the trade and negotiations contexts. Developing countries proved active in shaping 
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the negotiation process. They contributed to the creation of the GATS as a flexible tool 
that would open markets in a gradual manner with caveats created for social and 
development objectives and sector specific arrangements. Integration of services 
became a critical juncture in the GATT history as it induced a proactive involvement 
of developing countries to the regime also by engaging in new types of coalitions. 
Although the United States coerced developing countries to dissolve the hardliners’ 
block before the launch of the Uruguay Round, the need for punitive actions after the 
negotiations started disappeared since developing countries increasingly perceived 
certain benefits. At an early stage in the talks, developing countries became more 
willing to negotiate the agreement as far as it was designed to satisfy their interests. 
Consequently, the GATS reflected a collective desire to open markets through taking 
into account certain sectoral, social and development needs raised parallel to a re-
assessment on the side of developing countries. In this regard, the GATS case 
contrasts with the negotiations of the TRIPS agreement where coercion was exerted 
through the active use of unilateral trade sanctions by the United States. It can be 
contended that the GATS proved to be a product of hegemonic consensus of a wide 
range of actors and that the GATS did not simply project a predetermined outcome of 
existent power structures as it would be argued by neo-realists. The negotiations also 
show that the interest perceptions and identities of developing countries evolved 
along the process–a fact that contrasts with the neoliberal postulations taking 
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international regimes as bargaining platforms of state agents which presumably 
participate in negotiations with predetermined identities and interests.  Finally, the 
dissertation illustrated in Chapter 5 that the ability of the TNC coalition to influence 
the agenda-setting gradually diminished after the launch of the round as the debate 
moved to Geneva and took place in a multilateral setting actively dominated by trade 
and non-trade bureaucrats.  As the outlook of the GATS moved from a promising 
compact that would lead to an immediate opening for crucial service industries, the 
United States lost its enthusiasm in the run up to the Brussels Conference in 1990. The 
U.S. then embraced negotiation tactics and turned the MFN principle into a 
bargaining chip to ensure positive market access commitments from significant trade 
partners. This was also a consequence of the growing pressure from U.S. based TNCs 
who were concerned about guaranteeing access to those markets. At the end of the 
day, the collective image of tradability of services was embraced by the participants of 
the trade regime and changed the intersubjective meanings inherent to the regime.  
 
8.3.2. The case of Investment  
 
As analysed in Chapter 6 and 7, the case of investment poses significant demarcations 
from the services case. Although U.S. and European TNCs produced a collective 
vision for the creation of a multilateral constitution from the early 1990s on, their 
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attempts at the OECD and the WTO were doomed to fail. The push for further 
transformation of the trade regime through the interjection of an investment accord 
into the WTO came from the eastern side of the Atlantic. European TNCs were the 
social forces which, together with other demandeurs, produced a case for the WTO. 
Yet, they could not bring U.S. TNCs on board for a comprehensive multilateral trade 
agenda. U.S. TNCs generated an alternative case to negotiate a high-standard accord 
at the OECD among like-minded governments that could then be extended to 
developing countries. Transatlantic business and government deliberations ended up 
with a fragile compromise on a two-track approach that envisaged the initiation of 
Multilateral Investment Agreement (MAI) negotiations at the OECD and an educative 
deliberation process at the WTO. The MAI talks adjourned in the Fall of 1998, leaving 
the WTO as the only venue to negotiate a multilateral treaty. The European call for a 
Millennium Round, including a broad package of issues for rule-making, did not 
receive a warm welcome either from the United States or from developing countries. 
The Seattle Ministerial Conference in 1999 collapsed owing to controversies 
surrounding the future agenda of the WTO and the mandate of the forthcoming 
round. A consensus among member states was forged in 2001 over a Development 
Round in Doha which mandated the continuation of the educative deliberations in 
new (Singapore) issues until the next WTO ministerial that convened in Cancun. The 
Cancun Conference also crumbled without any decisions as a result of the impasse on 
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four Singapore issues as well as agriculture. In July 2004 investment as well as 
competition and government procurement were completely taken off of the Doha and 
WTO agendas. The case of investment substantiates the central thesis of this 
dissertation -that changes to international regimes are constrained by historical 
material and ideational conditions intrinsic to the hegemonic formation of the world 
orders. In fact, the ability of TNCs to set the WTO agenda was restrained by a number 
of factors inherent to the contradictions that emerged in the neoliberal hegemony as of 
the early 1990s. In terms of agenda-setting these factors can be analysed in three 
groups. 
 
Firstly, the failure of both attempts at the OECD and the WTO to negotiate an 
investment agreement was partially a consequence of the controversies among state 
and non-state actors within the transnational historic bloc. MAI talks expounded the 
differences between the United States and other OECD member governments on the 
content of the draft especially in regards to the exceptions and carve-outs for certain 
sectors and policies. The rise of an anti-MAI campaign and NGOs’ demands for 
binding rules for labour and environmental standards and their critiques against 
further empowerment of investors vis-à-vis states became factors in deepening these 
differences. The attempts to compromise on NGO demands attracted negative 
reactions from TNCs, which resulted in a loss of enthusiasm and, indeed, wore away 
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the business desire to engage in a counter-initiative to resume the talks after the 
adjournment of the negotiations in 1998. Similarly, the U.S. and European 
governments produced two different perspectives with regard to the future agenda of 
the WTO and the content of a potential investment accord. The Clinton administration 
favoured a narrowly defined market access agenda supported by U.S. businesses 
while the European Commission pushed for a Millennium Round including a wide 
set of new issues for future rule-making. These differences, coupled with other 
concerns and demands from developing countries, precipitated the imminent failure 
in Seattle.  
 
In addition to differences in the trade strategies produced by the U.S. and EU, 
transatlantic TNCs were unable to construct a strong and coherent transatlantic 
business case and coalition for investment negotiations at the WTO. From the 
beginning U.S. TNCs favoured a high-standard accord and initially pushed for the 
OECD, and after the postponement of MAI talks they endorsed preferential trade 
arrangements as a venue for rule-making. They cautioned that potential WTO 
negotiations could produce a low standard accord which would legally endanger U.S. 
FTAs under consideration or negotiation. On the other hand, the European TNCs, 
together with Japanese businesses, initially favoured a low-standard but inclusive 
investment treaty that could be negotiated with developing countries at the WTO. 
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European businesses assessed the positive trend and improvements in the business 
environment in key developing countries as a point of departure, and supported a 
WTO accord that would bind these improvements. After the failure in Seattle in 1999 
and the launch of the Doha talks in 2001, European TNCs lobbied the European 
Commission to push for an ambitious WTO framework. The proposed accord would 
have a broad scope for the definition of investment, and contain provisions ensuring 
transparency, protection and non-discriminatory liberalisation including pre-
establishment provisions. Differences of opinion remained prevalent although the 
U.S. and European businesses reached a fragile consensus over a ‚staged approach‛ 
that would arguably ensure high standard outcomes from potential WTO investment 
talks for a subset of rules including transparency, non-discrimination and 
enforcement of existing Trade-Related Investment Measures (TRIMS) obligations. 
Other core provisions such as enhanced market access, investment protection and 
dispute settlement were supposed to be left to future talks. However, as shown in 
Chapter 7, neither U.S. nor European TNCs pushed hard for this collective business 
case. While European business groups continued for a more ambitious outcome, the 
Americans withdrew their lukewarm support in the run-up to the Cancun 
Conference. As they saw increasing tensions on agriculture and Singapore issues, U.S. 
business groups called for removing investment from the WTO talks in 2003. To sum 
up, the fundamental elements of the transnational historic bloc, i.e. TNCs, were 
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divided in their preferences and could not generate a strong collective vision or 
coalition as they did in the case of services. 
 
Secondly, the emergence of counter-hegemonic forces contesting neoliberal hegemony 
was a major factor in deepening controversies within the transnational historic bloc 
and obstructing the generation of a cohesive policy formula for a multilateral WTO 
accord. Environmentalists, labour unions, development NGOs and other civil society 
actors critical of neoliberalism actively involved in trade agenda-setting in core 
capitalist states during the 1990s. Domestic and multilateral trade agendas became 
scenes for confrontation within which a broad range of stakeholders struggled to 
shape policies. The crisis of the trade agenda was expressed in the NAFTA, MAI and 
fast-track debates in the United States, wherein the administration faced significant 
difficulties in forging bipartisan consensus in U.S. Congress. Consequently, 
environmental and labour standards were put on the front burner of President 
Clinton’s trade policy agenda, whereas these issues were contested by developing 
countries. In this context, U.S. TNCs adopted pragmatic strategies for setting the trade 
agenda and started to act as ‚venue-shoppers,‛ i.e. they promoted the most feasible 
policy options among a menu of possibilities that would escape domestic public 
scrutiny and challenges within civil society, and enforce market disciplines to 
emerging economies. On the other hand, with the rise of the Internet in the 1990s 
 351 
NGOs became as mobile as capital through transnational networks. NGOs 
undoubtedly contributed to the breakdown of the MAI talks and the Seattle 
Ministerial Conference on account of their cross-border mobilisation and coordinated 
vocal campaigns. In this context, the investment debate at the WTO was shaped by 
inputs from an anti-investment coalition that resurrected the networks that had 
mobilised against the MAI. Especially after the Seattle breakdown, the European 
Commission attempted to engage NGOs in the decision-making process by launching 
a systematic consultation mechanism. Instead of challenging the NGOs by launching a 
high-profile education campaign and network-building endeavour (as in the case of 
services), European TNCs focused their energies on influencing the Commission’s 
agenda by direct forms of lobbying and through channels such as the Investment 
Network created by the Commission to incorporate business views. Nonetheless, it is 
clear that NGOs gained a moral advantage within civil societies and pursued a high-
profile war of position narrowing the manoeuvre space of TNCs. 
 
Thirdly, the challenge against the expansion of the neoliberal agenda for the WTO 
was also emerging out of the block of advanced capitalist states. The resistance from 
developing countries at the WTO did not take the form of a counter-hegemonic 
program suggesting an alternative paradigm to the neoliberal hegemony such as the 
promotion of a closed market agenda with infant industry strategies. Conversely, 
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developing countries endorsed an open market agenda responding to their market 
access demands in sectors including agriculture, textiles, industrial products and 
services. The rise of the neoliberal state in developing countries and associated 
reforms either through the implementation of the WTO agreements or in the form of 
bilateral arrangements and unilateral measures had led to the liberalisation of their 
markets. The dominant concern of developing countries was the perceived imbalance 
of the WTO package in terms of benefits and losses. They complained about the 
difficulties they faced in implementing their obligations due mainly to the capacity 
constraints and gradual loss of their autonomy in pursuing development policies 
internally. Consequently, before any kind of expansion of the WTO legal framework 
to new domains, developing countries argued for the improvements to the existing 
accords that would allow certain flexibilities to implement market reforms. In other 
words, they were not against the WTO disciplines per se and were actually supportive 
of the strengthening of some disciplines for developed countries to prevent arbitrary 
and extensive use of unfair practices such as antidumping measures and agricultural 
support programs. In this regard, the Doha Round launched in 2001 reflected a 
carefully crafted compromise that balanced development concerns with further 
market access negotiations.  
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In contrast to the services case, developing countries participated actively in the pre-
round agenda-setting in investment with their submissions and proposals based upon 
factual data and research. A group of countries orchestrated by India argued against 
any new WTO disciplines, whether in investment or other new areas, that would 
further erode government autonomy to pursue development policies. The opponents 
produced well-crafted counter-arguments to prevent the launch of investment talks. 
Notwithstanding their acknowledgement of the benefits of FDI for their economies, 
the hardliners contended that the proposed multilateral accord would not lead to an 
automatic rise of FDI flows, rather it would dismantle sovereign capabilities to 
monitor and control capital flows according to their needs, and would bring about 
burdensome obligations to ensure transparency. They indicated their preference for 
bilateral investment treaties since BITs provided necessary flexibilities while helping 
to create a business friendly environment. Nonetheless, the India-led opposition 
against the investment agenda at the WTO was not capable of completely removing 
the issue from the WTO agenda up until the Cancun Conference. Many developing 
countries such as Brazil and China remained indifferent about investment as they 
were concerned about the progress in other crucial areas of the Doha Round such as 
agriculture. The controversies surrounding the agriculture modalities before the 
Cancun Conference resulted in new forms of developing country coalitions including 
G-22 -which comprised power houses such as China, Brazil and India, and other issue 
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specific groupings. The lack of progress in agriculture turned countries on the fence 
against investment and other Singapore issues. In addition, the anti-investment 
coalition was further broadened with the joining of African states and Least 
Developed Countries before and during the Cancun meeting. In the re-positioning of 
resource poor countries, NGOs played a significant role as they actively engaged in 
agenda-setting in Geneva and Africa. These campaigners waged a war of position 
constitutive of coalition-building and education activities as exemplified in the 
business campaign for services. Strikingly, NGOs worked as a counter-hegemonic 
force critical of the very foundations of the neoliberal normative framework by 
effectively challenging the legitimate basis of the case for a WTO accord on 
investment. An aggressive education campaign towards developing country 
negotiators through the dissemination of research and analysis aimed to mobilize 
African governments against the initiation of the investment talks by emphasising 
potential negative impacts of a WTO accord in investment. 
 
Through a neo-Gramscian reading of the transformation of the trade regime from the 
GATT to the WTO this dissertation intended to show that changes to international 
regimes can not be fully captured without taking into account the material and 
ideational quality of and changes in the world orders. International regimes as 
inherent constellations of material capabilities and consistent ideas of a particular 
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order emerge, evolve and transform in connection with the shifts in the world order. 
The social forces that create world orders are also the driving force of the changes in 
international regimes. They take part in the regime change not only through a direct 
internal exercise of power over the states and promoting their interests upward, but 
also through shaping the very ideational context within which the states build up 
their identities, interests, rights and obligations.  The hegemonic quality of the world 
order is also determinative of the ability of hegemonic forces to shape the normative 
content of international regimes.  
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ANNEX 2: Punta Del Este Declaration  
GENERAL AGREEMENT ON TARIFFS AND TRADE (GATT) 
PUNTA DEL ESTE DECLARATION  
Ministerial Declaration of 20 September 1986  
 
Ministers, meeting on the occasion of the Special Session of the CONTRACTING 
PARTIES at Punta del Este, have decided to launch Multilateral Trade Negotiations 
(The Uruguay Round). To this end, they have adopted the following Declaration. The 
Multilateral Trade negotiations will be open to the participation of countries as 
indicated in Parts I and II of this Declaration. A Trade Negotiations Committee is 
established to carry out the negotiations. The Trade Negotiations Committee shall 
hold its first meeting not later than 31 October 1986. It shall meet as appropriate at 
Ministerial level. The Multilateral Trade Negotiations will be concluded within four 
years.  
PART I  
NEGOTIATIONS ON TRADE IN GOODS 
The CONTRACTING PARTIES meeting at Ministerial level, 
Determined to halt and reverse protectionism and to remove distortions to trade; 
Determined also to preserve the basic principles and to further the objectives of the 
GATT; 
Determined also to develop a more open, viable and durable multilateral trading 
system; 
Convinced that such action would promote growth and development;  
Mindful of the negative effects of prolonged financial and monetary instability in the 
world economy, the indebtedness of a large number of less developed contracting 
parties, and considering the linkage between trade, money, finance and development; 
Decide to enter into Multilateral Trade Negotiations on trade in goods within the 
framework and under the aegis of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade.  
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A. Objectives  
Negotiations shall aim to: 
(i) bring about further liberalization and expansion of world trade to the benefit 
of all countries, especially a less-developed contracting parties, including the 
improvement of access to markets by the reduction and elimination of tariffs, 
quantitative restrictions and other non-tariff measures and obstacles;  
(ii) strengthen the role of GATT, improve the multilateral trading system based 
on the principles and rules of the GATT and bring about a wider coverage of 
world trade under agreed, effective and enforceable multilateral disciplines;  
(iii) increase the responsiveness of the GATT system to the evolving 
international economic environment, through facilitating necessary structural 
adjustment, enhancing the relationship of the GATT with the relevant 
international organizations and taking account of changes in trade patterns and 
prospects, including the growing importance of trade in high technology 
products, serious difficulties in commodity markets and the importance of an 
improved trading environment providing, inter alia, for the ability of indebted 
countries to meet their financial obligations;  
(iv) foster concurrent cooperative action at the national and international levels 
to strengthen the inter-relationship between trade policies and other economic 
policies affecting growth and development, and to contribute towards 
continued, effective and determined efforts to improve the functioning of the 
international monetary system and the flow of financial and real investment 
resources to developing countries.  
B. General Principles Governing Negotiations  
(i) Negotiations shall be conducted in a transparent manner, and consistent 
with the objectives and commitments agreed in this Declaration and with the 
principles of the General Agreement in order to ensure mutual advantage and 
increased benefits to all participants.  
(ii) The launching, the conduct and the implementation of the outcome of the 
negotiations shall be treated as parts of a single undertaking. However, 
agreements reached at an early stage may be implemented on a provisional or 
a definitive basis by agreement prior to the formal conclusion of the 
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negotiations. Early agreements shall be taken into account in assessing the 
overall balance of the negotiations.  
(iii) Balanced concessions should be sought within broad trading areas and 
subjects to be negotiated in order to avoid unwarranted cross-sectoral 
demands.  
(iv) The CONTRACTING PARTIES agree that the principle of differential and 
more favorable treatment embodied in Part IV and other relevant provisions of 
the General Agreement and in the Decision of the CONTRACTING PARTIES 
of 28 November 1979 on Differential and More Favourable Treatment, 
Reciprocity and Fuller Participation of Developing Countries applies to the 
negotiations. In the implementation of standstill and rollback, particular care 
should be given to avoiding disruptive effects on the trade of less-developed 
contracting parties.  
(v) The developed countries do not expect reciprocity for commitments made 
by them in trade negotiations to reduce or remove tariffs and other barriers to 
the trade of developing countries, i.e. the developed countries do not expect the 
developing countries, in the course of trade negotiations, to make contributions 
which are inconsistent with their individual development, financial and trade 
needs. Developed contracting parties shall therefore not seek, neither shall less-
developed contracting parties be required to make, concessions that are 
inconsistent with the latter's development, financial and trade needs.  
(vi) Less-developed contracting parties expect that their capacity to make 
contributions or negotiated concession or take other mutually agreed action 
under the provisions and procedures of the General Agreement would 
improve with the progressive development of their economies and 
improvement in their trade situation and they would accordingly expect to 
participate more fully in the framework of rights and obligations under the 
General Agreement.  
(vii) Special attention shall be given to the particular situation and problems of 
the least-developed countries and to the need to encourage positive measures 
to facilitate expansion of their trading opportunities. Expeditious 
implementation of the relevant provisions of the 1982 Ministerial Declaration 
concerning the least-developed countries shall also be given appropriate 
attention.  
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C. Standstill and Rollback  
Commencing immediately and continuing until the formal completion of the 
negotiations, each participant agrees to apply the following commitments: 
Standstill 
(i) not to take any trade restrictive or distorting measure inconsistent with the 
provisions of the General Agreement or the Instruments negotiated within the 
framework of GATT or under its auspices;  
(ii) not to take any trade restrictive or distorting measure in the legitimate 
exercise of its GATT rights, that would go beyond that which is necessary to 
remedy specific situations, as provided for in the General Agreement and the 
Instruments referred to in (i) above;  
(iii) not to take any trade measures in such a manner as to improve its 
negotiating positions.  
Rollback 
(i) that all trade restrictive or distorting measures inconsistent with the 
provisions of the General Agreement or Instruments negotiated within the 
framework of GATT or under its auspices, shall be phased out or brought into 
conformity within an agreed timeframe not later than by the date of the formal 
completion of the negotiations, taking into account multilateral agreements, 
undertakings and understandings, including strengthened rules and 
disciplines, reached in pursuance of the Objectives of the Negotiations;  
(ii) there shall be progressive implementation of this commitment on an 
equitable basis in consultations among participants concerned, including all 
affected participants. This commitment shall take account of the concerns 
expressed by any participant about measures directly affecting its trade 
interests;  
(iii) there shall be no GATT concessions requested for the elimination of these 
measures.  
Surveillance of standstill and rollback 
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Each participant agrees that the implementation of these commitments on standstill 
and rollback shall be subject to multilateral surveillance so as to ensure that these 
commitments are being met. The Trade Negotiations Committee will decide on the 
appropriate mechanisms to carry out the surveillance, including periodic reviews and 
evaluations. Any participant may bring to the attention of the appropriate 
surveillance mechanism any actions or omissions it believes to be relevant to the 
fulfillment of these commitments. These notifications should be addressed to the 
GATT secretariat which may also provide further relevant information. 
D. Subjects for Negotiation 
Tariffs 
Negotiations shall aim, by appropriate methods, to reduce or, as appropriate, 
eliminate tariffs including the reduction or elimination of high tariffs and tariff 
escalation. Emphasis shall be given to the expansion of the scope of tariff concessions 
among all participants. 
Non-tariff measures 
Negotiations shall aim to reduce or eliminate non-tariff measures, including 
quantitative restrictions, without prejudice to any action to be taken in fulfillment of 
the rollback commitments.  
Tropical products 
Negotiations shall aim at the fullest liberalization of trade in tropical products, 
including in their processed and semi-processed forms and shall cover both tariff and 
all non-tariff measures affecting trade in these products. 
The CONTRACTING PARTIES recognize the importance of trade in tropical products 
to a large number of less developed contracting parties and agree that negotiations in 
this area shall receive special attention, including the timing of the negotiations and 
the implementation of the results as provided for in B(ii). 
Natural resource-based products 
Negotiations shall aim to achieve the fullest liberalization of trade in natural resource-
based products, including in their processed and semi-processed forms. The 
negotiations shall aim to reduce or eliminate tariff and non-tariff measures, including 
tariff escalation. 
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Textiles and clothing 
Negotiations in the area of textiles and clothing shall aim to formulate modalities that 
would permit the eventual integration of this sector into GATT on the basis of 
strengthened GATT rules and disciplines, thereby also contributing to the objective of 
further liberalization of trade. 
Agriculture 
The CONTRACTING PARTIES agree that there is an urgent need to bring more 
discipline and predictability to world agricultural trade by correcting and preventing 
restrictions and distortions including those related to structural surpluses so as to 
reduce the uncertainty, imbalances and instability in world agricultural markets. 
Negotiations shall aim to achieve greater liberalization of trade in agriculture and 
bring all measures affecting import access and export competition under strengthened 
and more operationally effective GATT rules and disciplines, taking into account the 
general principles governing the negotiations by: 
(i) improving market access through, inter alia, the reduction of import 
barriers;  
(ii) improving the competitive environment by increasing discipline on the use 
of all direct and indirect subsidies and other measures affecting directly or 
indirectly agricultural trade, including the phased reduction of their negative 
effects and dealing with their causes;  
(iii) minimizing the adverse effects that sanitary and phytosanitary regulations 
and barriers can have on trade in agriculture, taking into account the relevant 
international agreements.  
In order to achieve the above objectives, the negotiating group having primary 
responsibility for all aspects of agriculture will use the Recommendations adopted by 
the CONTRACTING PARTIES at their Fortieth Session, which were developed in 
accordance with the GATT 1982 Ministerial Work Program, and take account of the 
approaches suggested in the work of the Committee on Trade in Agriculture without 
prejudice to other alternatives that might achieve the objectives of the negotiations. 
GATT Articles 
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Participants shall review existing GATT Articles, provisions and disciplines as 
requested by interested contracting parties, and, as appropriate, undertake 
negotiations. 
Safeguards 
(i) A comprehensive agreement on safeguards is of particular importance to the 
strengthening of the GATT system and to progress in the Multilateral Trade 
Negotiations.  
(ii) The agreement on safeguards;  
o shall be based on the basic principles of the General Agreement;  
o shall contain, inter alia, the following elements: transparency, coverage, 
objective criteria for action including the concept of serious injury or 
threat thereof, temporary nature, degressivity and structural adjustment, 
compensation and retaliation, notification, consultation, multilateral 
surveillance and dispute settlement; and  
o shall clarify and reinforce the disciplines of the General Agreement and 
should apply to all contracting parties.  
MTN Agreements and Arrangements 
Negotiations shall aim to improve, clarify, or expand, as appropriate, Agreements and 
Arrangements negotiated in the Tokyo Round of Multilateral Negotiations. 
Subsidies and countervailing measures 
Negotiations on subsidies and countervailing measures shall be based on a review of 
Articles VI and XVI and the MTN Agreement on subsidies and countervailing 
measures with the objective of improving GATT disciplines relating to all subsidies 
and countervailing measures that affect international trade. A negotiating group will 
be established to deal with these issues. 
Dispute Settlement 
In order to ensure prompt and effective resolution of disputes to the benefit of all 
contracting parties, negotiations shall aim to improve and strengthen the rules and the 
procedures of the dispute settlement process, while recognizing the contribution that 
would be made by more effective and enforceable GATT rules and disciplines. 
Negotiations shall include the development of adequate arrangements for overseeing 
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and monitoring of the procedures that would facilitate compliance with adopted 
recommendations.  
Trade-related aspects of intellectual property rights, including trade in counterfeit goods 
In order to reduce the distortions and impediments to international trade, and taking 
into account the need to promote effective and adequate protection of intellectual 
property rights, and to ensure that measures and procedures to enforce intellectual 
property rights do not themselves become barriers to legitimate trade, the 
negotiations shall aim to clarify GATT provisions and elaborate as appropriate new 
rules and disciplines. 
Negotiations shall aim to develop a multilateral framework of principles, rules and 
disciplines dealing with international trade in counterfeit goods, taking into account 
work already undertaken in the GATT. 
These negotiations shall be without prejudice to other complementary initiatives that 
may be taken in the World Intellectual Property Organization and elsewhere to deal 
with these matters. 
Trade-Related investment measures 
Following an examination of the operation of GATT Articles related to the trade 
restrictive and distorting effects of investment measures, negotiations should 
elaborate, as appropriate, further provisions that may be necessary to avoid such 
adverse effects on trade. 
 
E. Functioning of the GATT System  
Negotiations shall aim to develop understandings and arrangements:  
(i) to enhance the surveillance in the GATT to enable regular monitoring of 
trade policies and practices of contracting parties and their impact on the 
functioning of the multilateral trading system:  
(ii) to improve the overall effectiveness and decision-making of the GATT as an 
institution, including, inter alia, through involvement of Ministers;  
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(iii) to increase the contribution of the GATT to achieving greater coherence in 
global economic policy-making through strengthening its relationship with 
other international organizations responsible for monetary and financial 
matters.  
F. Participation  
(a) Negotiations will be open to:  
(i) all contracting parties,  
(ii) countries having acceded provisionally,  
(iii) countries applying the GATT on a de facto basis having announced not 
later than 30 April 1987, their intention to accede to the GATT and to 
participate in the negotiations. 
(iv) countries that have already informed the CONTRACTING PARTIES, at a 
regular meeting of the Council of Representatives, of their intention to 
negotiate the terms of their membership as a contracting party, and  
(v) developing countries that have, by 30 April 1987, initiated procedures for 
accession to the GATT, with the intention of negotiating the terms of their 
accession during the course of the negotiations.  
(b) Participation in negotiations relating to the amendment or application of GATT 
provisions or the negotiation of new provisions will, however, be open only to 
contracting parties.  
G. Organization of the Negotiations  
A Group of Negotiations on Goods (GNG) is established to carry out the programme 
of negotiations contained in this Part of the Declaration. The GNG shall, inter alia: 
(i) elaborate and put into effect detailed trade negotiating plans prior to 19 
December 1986;  
(ii) designate the appropriate mechanisms for surveillance of commitments to 
standstill and rollback;  
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(iii) establish negotiating groups as required. Because of the interrelationship of 
some issues and taking fully into account the general principles governing the 
negotiations as stated in B(iii) above it is recognized that aspects of one issue 
may be discussed in more than one negotiating group. Therefore each 
negotiating group should as required take into account relevant aspects 
emerging in other groups;  
(iv) also decide upon inclusion of additional subject matters in the negotiation;  
(v) co-ordinate the work of the negotiating groups and supervise the progress 
of the negotiations. As a guideline not more than two negotiating groups 
should meet at the same time;  
(vi) the GNG shall report to the Trade Negotiations Committee.  
In order to ensure effective application of differential and more favourable treatment 
the GNG shall, before the formal completion of the negotiations, conduct an 
evaluation of the results attained therein in terms of the Objectives and the General 
Principles Governing Negotiations as set out in the Declaration, taking into account all 
issues of interest to less-developed contracting parties.  
PART II 
NEGOTIATIONS ON TRADE IN SERVICES  
Ministers also decide, as part of the Multilateral Trade Negotiations, to launch 
negotiations on trade in services. 
Negotiations in this area shall aim to establish a multilateral framework of principles 
and rules for trade in services, including elaboration of possible disciples for 
individual sectors, with a view to expansion of such trade under conditions of 
transparency and progressive liberalization and as a means of promoting economic 
growth of all trading partners and the development of developing countries. Such 
framework shall respect the policy objectives of national laws and regulations 
applying to services and shall take into account the work of relevant international 
organizations.  
GATT procedures and practices shall apply to these negotiations. A Group of 
Negotiations on Services is established to deal with these matters. Participation in the 
negotiations under this Part of the Declaration will be open to the same countries as 
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under Part I. GATT secretariat support will be provided, with technical support from 
other organizations as decided by the Group of Negotiations on Services. 
The Group of Negotiations on Services shall report to the Trade Negotiations 
Committee. 
IMPLEMENTATION OF RESULTS UNDER PARTS I AND II 
When the results of the Multilateral Trade Negotiations in all areas have been 
established, Ministers meeting also on the occasion of a Special Session of 
CONTRACTING PARTIES shall decide regarding the international implementation of 
the respective results.  
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ANNEX 3: U.S. Trade in Goods and Services - Balance of Payments (BOP) Basis 
 
June 10, 2010 
Value in millions of dollars 
1960 thru 2009 
  
Balance Exports Imports 
Period 
Total 
Goods 
BOP 
Services Total 
Goods 
BOP 
Services Total  
Goods 
BOP 
Service
s 
1960 3,508 4,892 -1,384 25,940 19,650 6,290 22,432 14,758 7,674 
1961 4,195 5,571 -1,376 26,403 20,108 6,295 22,208 14,537 7,671 
1962 3,370 4,521 -1,151 27,722 20,781 6,941 24,352 16,260 8,092 
1963 4,210 5,224 -1,014 29,620 22,272 7,348 25,410 17,048 8,362 
1964 6,022 6,801 -779 33,341 25,501 7,840 27,319 18,700 8,619 
1965 4,664 4,951 -287 35,285 26,461 8,824 30,621 21,510 9,111 
1966 2,939 3,817 -878 38,926 29,310 9,616 35,987 25,493 10,494 
1967 2,604 3,800 -1,196 41,333 30,666 10,667 38,729 26,866 11,863 
1968 250 635 -385 45,543 33,626 11,917 45,293 32,991 12,302 
1969 91 607 -516 49,220 36,414 12,806 49,129 35,807 13,322 
1970 2,254 2,603 -349 56,640 42,469 14,171 54,386 39,866 14,520 
1971 -1,302 -2,260 958 59,677 43,319 16,358 60,979 45,579 15,400 
1972 -5,443 -6,416 973 67,222 49,381 17,841 72,665 55,797 16,868 
1973 1,900 911 989 91,242 71,410 19,832 89,342 70,499 18,843 
1974 -4,293 -5,505 1,212 120,897 98,306 22,591 125,190 103,811 21,379 
1975 12,404 8,903 3,501 132,585 107,088 25,497 120,181 98,185 21,996 
1976 -6,082 -9,483 3,401 142,716 114,745 27,971 148,798 124,228 24,570 
1977 -27,246 -31,091 3,845 152,301 120,816 31,485 179,547 151,907 27,640 
1978 -29,763 -33,927 4,164 178,428 142,075 36,353 208,191 176,002 32,189 
1979 -24,565 -27,568 3,003 224,131 184,439 39,692 248,696 212,007 36,689 
1980 -19,407 -25,500 6,093 271,834 224,250 47,584 291,241 249,750 41,491 
1981 -16,172 -28,023 11,851 294,398 237,044 57,354 310,570 265,067 45,503 
1982 -24,156 -36,485 12,329 275,236 211,157 64,079 299,391 247,642 51,749 
1983 -57,767 -67,102 9,335 266,106 201,799 64,307 323,874 268,901 54,973 
1984 
-
109,072 
-
112,492 3,420 291,094 219,926 71,168 400,166 332,418 67,748 
1985 
-
121,880 
-
122,173 294 289,070 215,915 73,155 410,950 338,088 72,862 
1986 
-
138,538 
-
145,081 6,543 310,033 223,344 86,689 448,572 368,425 80,147 
1987 - - 7,874 348,869 250,208 98,661 500,552 409,765 90,787 
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151,684 159,557 
1988 
-
114,566 
-
126,959 12,393 431,149 320,230 110,919 545,715 447,189 98,526 
1989 -93,141 
-
117,749 24,607 487,003 359,916 127,087 580,144 477,665 102,479 
1990 -80,864 
-
111,037 30,173 535,233 387,401 147,832 616,097 498,438 117,659 
1991 -31,135 -76,937 45,802 578,344 414,083 164,261 609,479 491,020 118,459 
1992 -39,212 -96,897 57,685 616,882 439,631 177,251 656,094 536,528 119,566 
1993 -70,311 
-
132,451 62,141 642,863 456,943 185,920 713,174 589,394 123,780 
1994 -98,493 
-
165,831 67,338 703,254 502,859 200,395 801,747 668,690 133,057 
1995 -96,384 
-
174,170 77,786 794,387 575,204 219,183 890,771 749,374 141,397 
1996 
-
104,065 
-
191,000 86,935 851,602 612,113 239,489 955,667 803,113 152,554 
1997 
-
108,273 
-
198,428 90,155 934,453 678,366 256,087 1,042,726 876,794 165,932 
1998 
-
166,140 
-
248,221 82,081 933,174 670,416 262,758 1,099,314 918,637 180,677 
1999 
-
264,239 
-
336,310 72,072 965,885 698,034 267,850 1,230,123 1,034,345 195,779 
2000 
-
378,780 
-
446,233 67,453 1,070,597 784,181 286,416 1,449,377 1,230,413 218,964 
2001 
-
364,393 
-
421,980 57,586 1,004,896 730,277 274,618 1,369,289 1,152,257 217,032 
2002 
-
420,524 
-
475,345 54,821 977,470 696,268 281,202 1,397,994 1,171,613 226,381 
2003 
-
494,183 
-
541,544 47,361 1,019,897 728,258 291,639 1,514,080 1,269,802 244,278 
2004 -
609,345 
-
665,631 
56,286 1,158,576 819,870 338,707 1,767,921 1,485,501 282,420 
2005 -
714,176 
-
783,801 
69,625 1,281,186 909,016 372,171 1,995,362 1,692,817 302,546 
2006 -
759,240 
-
839,456 
80,216 1,452,783 1,035,868 416,916 2,212,023 1,875,324 336,700 
2007 -
702,099 
-
823,192 
121,093 1,648,665 1,160,366 488,299 2,350,763 1,983,558 367,206 
2008 -
698,802 
-
834,652 
135,850 1,839,012 1,304,896 534,116 2,537,814 2,139,548 398,266 
2009 -
374,908 
-
506,944 
132,036 1,570,797 1,068,499 502,298 1,945,705 1,575,443 370,262 
U.S. Census Bureau, Foreign Trade 
Division.             
NOTE:  (1) Data presented on a Balance of Payment (BOP) basis.  Information on data sources and methodology 
are available at www.census.gov/foreign-trade/www/press.html.     
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ANNEX 4: Foreign-Direct-Investment Inflows and Outflows, 1983-1995 (Billions of 
Dollars and Percentage) 
 
  
 
 Developed countries Developing countries Central and Eastern 
Europe 
All countries 
Year Inflows Outflows Inflows Outflows Inflows Outflows Inflows Outflows 
   Value (billion dollars)    
1983-1987 58.7 72.6 18.3 4.2 0.02 0.01 77.1 76.8 
1988-1992 139.1 193.3 36.8 15.2 1.36 0.04 177.3 208.5 
1990 169.8 222.5 33.7 17.8 0.30 0.04 203.8 204.3 
1991 114.0 201.9 41.3 8.9 2.45 0.04 157.8 210.8 
1992 114.0 181.4 50.4 21.0 3.77 0.10 168.1 203.1 
1993 129.3 192.4 73.1 33.0 5.59 0.20 207.9 225.5 
1994 132.8 190.9 87.0 38.6 5.89 0.55 225.7 230.0 
1995 203.2 270.5 99.7 47.0 12.08 0.30 314.9 317.8 
   Share in total (per cent)    
1983-1987 76 95 24 5 0.02 0.01 100 100 
1988-1992 78 93 21 7 0.77 0.02 100 100 
1993 62 85 35 15 2.70 0.09 100 100 
1994 59 83 39 17 2.60 0.24 100 100 
1995 65 85 32 15 3.80 0.09 100 100 
   Growth rate (per cent)    
1983-1987 37 35 9 24 -7 68 29 35 
1988-1992 -4 3 15 16 298 46 1 4 
1993 13 6 45 52 46 99 24 11 
1994 3 -1 19 17 7 179 9 2 
1995 53 42 15 22 106 -45 40 38 
 
 
Source:  UNCTAD-DITE, World Investment Report 1996.  Investment, Trade and International 
Policy Arrangements (Sales No. E.96.II.A.14). Reproduced from UNCTAD (1997). 
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ANNEX 5: Investment in WTO Ministerial Declarations/Drafts 
 
 
1. Seattle Ministerial Conference Revised Ministerial Draft (WTO 1999c), 19 October  
 
 [Investment] 
(See also paragraph 56) 
41. [Taking into account the work already undertaken in the WTO Working Group on 
the Relationship between Trade and Investment, negotiations shall aim to establish a 
multilateral framework of rules on foreign direct investment, to further the objectives 
of the WTO and to complement its rules, so as to enhance the contribution of 
international trade and investment to economic growth and development, and to help 
create a stable and predictable climate for the treatment of foreign direct investment 
world-wide. 
The framework should: 
(a) contain provisions on scope and definition; 
(b) be based on WTO principles of non-discrimination, while respecting the ability of 
host governments to regulate the activity of investors in their respective territories; 
(c) ensure transparency and predictability of domestic investment regimes, and the 
dissemination of information in this respect; 
(d) address as an integral part of the framework the special needs of developing and 
least developed country participants with respect to the contribution of foreign direct 
investment to their development and economic growth; 
(e) provide for negotiated, positive commitments by participants regarding access to 
investment opportunities in their territories, with a view to achieving a progressively 
higher level of liberalization; 
(f) address investment-distorting and trade-distorting policies and practices; 
(g) take account of, and ensure consistency with, relevant WTO provisions related to 
investment; and 
(h) provide for the applicability of the WTO dispute settlement mechanism to resolve 
disputes between governments. 
Consideration shall be given to the possible need for provisions on other matters, such 
as protection of investment and investors' responsibilities, and to existing bilateral 
and regional arrangements on investment.] 
 
 
[The Relationship between Trade and Investment] 
(See also paragraph 41) 
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56. [The Working Group on the Relationship between Trade and Investment shall 
pursue its present mandate, building on work undertaken to date. Further work 
should focus on issues of interest to developing countries, in particular, the effects of 
foreign direct investment, positive and negative, on the development objectives of 
host countries, the obligations of foreign investors to host countries, and the 
obligations of home countries in respect of disciplines on their investors. The Working 
Group shall report to the Fourth Session of the Ministerial Conference on the results 
of its work [with its findings, and its recommendations].] 
 
2. Drafts for the Doha Ministerial Conference 
 
First Draft, (WTO 2001a), 26 September 2001 
 
RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN TRADE AND INVESTMENT 
18. We agree to negotiations which shall aim to establish a multilateral framework of 
rules to secure transparent, stable and predictable conditions for long-term cross-
border investment, particularly foreign direct investment. The framework shall reflect 
in a balanced manner the interests of home and host countries, and take due account 
of governments' regulatory responsibilities and economic development objectives. It 
shall include as core elements provisions on scope and definition, transparency, non-
discrimination, pre-establishment commitments based on a GATS-type approach, and 
the settlement of disputes between governments. The special development, trade and 
financial needs of developing and least-developed country participants shall be taken 
into account as an integral part of the framework, which shall enable Members to 
undertake obligations commensurate with their individual needs and circumstances. 
The negotiations shall pay due regard to other relevant WTO provisions and to 
existing bilateral and regional arrangements on investment. 
We commit ourselves to ensure that appropriate arrangements are made for the 
provision of technical assistance and support for capacity building both during the 
negotiations and as an element of the agreement to be negotiated. 
OR 
19. The Working Group on the Relationship between Trade and Investment shall 
undertake further focused analytical work, based on proposals by Members. A report 
on this work shall be presented to the Fifth Session of the Ministerial Conference. 
 
 
 
First Revised Draft (WTO 2001b), 27 October 
 
RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN TRADE AND INVESTMENT 
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20. In the period until the Fifth Session of the Ministerial Conference, work will focus 
on the clarification of elements of a possible multilateral framework to secure 
transparent, stable and predictable conditions for long-term cross-border investment, 
particularly foreign direct investment, and to contribute to the expansion of trade. 
Core elements are: scope and definition; transparency; non-discrimination; modalities 
for pre-establishment commitments based on a GATS-type, positive list approach; 
development provisions; exceptions and safeguards; consultation and the settlement 
of disputes between Members; and negotiating modalities, including the question of 
participation.  
 
The framework should reflect in a balanced manner the interests of home and host 
countries, and take due account of the development policies and objectives of host 
governments as well as their right to regulate in the public interest. The special 
development, trade and financial needs of developing and least-developed countries 
should be taken into account as an integral part of the framework, which should 
enable Members to undertake obligations and commitments commensurate with their 
individual needs and circumstances. Due regard should be paid to other relevant 
WTO provisions. 
 
Account should be taken, as appropriate, of existing bilateral and regional 
arrangements on investment. At the Fifth Session, a decision will be taken on 
modalities of negotiations in this area. 
We commit ourselves to ensuring that appropriate arrangements are made for the 
provision of technical assistance and capacity building throughout, and as an element 
of the outcome. 
 
Second Revised draft (WTO 2001c), 13 November 2001 
RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN TRADE AND INVESTMENT 
20. [Recognizing the case for a multilateral framework to secure transparent, stable 
and predictable conditions for long-term cross-border investment, particularly foreign 
direct investment, that will contribute to the expansion of trade,] we agree tat at the 
Fifth Session of the Ministerial Conference a decision will be taken on whether to 
launch negotiations in this area. 
21. In the period until the Fifth Session, further work in the Working Group on the 
Relationship Between Trade and Investment will focus on the clarification of: scope 
and definition; transparency; non-discrimination; modalities for pre-establishment 
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commitments based on a GATS-type, positive list approach; development provisions; 
exceptions and balance of payments safeguards; consultation and the settlement of 
disputes between Members. Any framework should reflect in a balanced manner the 
interests of home and host countries, and take due account of the development 
policies and objectives of host governments as well as their right to regulate in the 
public interest. The special development, trade and financial needs of developing and 
least-developed countries should be taken into account as an integral part of any 
framework, which should enable Members to undertake obligations and 
commitments commensurate with their individual needs and circumstances. Due 
regard should be paid to other relevant WTO provisions. Account should be taken, as 
appropriate, of existing bilateral and regional arrangements on investment. 
22. We recognize the needs of developing and least-developed countries for enhanced 
support for technical assistance and capacity building in this area, including policy 
analysis and development so that they may better evaluate the implications of closer 
multilateral cooperation for their development policies and objectives, and human 
and institutional development. To this end, we shall work in cooperation with other 
relevant intergovernmental organizations, including UNCTAD, and through 
appropriate regional and bilateral channels, to provide strengthened and adequately 
resourced assistance to respond to these needs. 
Doha Ministerial Declaration (WTO 2001d), 14 November 2001 
 
RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN TRADE AND INVESTMENT 
 
20. Recognizing the case for a multilateral framework to secure transparent, stable and 
predictable conditions for long-term cross-border investment, particularly foreign 
direct investment, that will contribute to the expansion of trade, and the need for 
enhanced technical assistance and capacity-building in this area as referred to in 
paragraph 21, we agree that negotiations will take place 
after the Fifth Session of the Ministerial Conference on the basis of a decision to be 
taken, by explicit consensus, at that Session on modalities of negotiations. 
 
21. We recognize the needs of developing and least-developed countries for enhanced 
support for technical assistance and capacity building in this area, including policy 
analysis and development so that they may better evaluate the implications of closer 
multilateral cooperation for their development policies and objectives, and human 
and institutional development. To this end, we shall work in cooperation with other 
relevant intergovernmental organisations, including UNCTAD, and through 
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appropriate regional and bilateral channels, to provide strengthened and adequately 
resourced assistance to respond to these needs. 
 
22. In the period until the Fifth Session, further work in the Working Group on the 
Relationship Between Trade and Investment will focus on the clarification of: scope 
and definition; transparency; non-discrimination; modalities for pre-establishment 
commitments based on a GATS-type, positive list approach; development provisions; 
exceptions and balance-of-payments safeguards; consultation and the settlement of 
disputes between Members. Any framework should reflect in a balanced manner the 
interests of home and host countries, and take due account of the development 
policies and objectives of host governments as well as their right to regulate in the 
public interest. The special development, trade and financial needs of developing and 
least-developed countries should be taken into account as an integral part of any 
framework, which should enable Members to undertake obligations and 
commitments commensurate with their individual needs and circumstances. Due 
regard should be paid to other relevant WTO provisions. Account should be taken, as 
appropriate, of existing bilateral and regional arrangements on investment. 
 
3. Drafts for the Cancun Ministerial Conference 
 
First Draft (WTO 2003a), 18 July 2003 
 
Investment 13. Taking note of the work done by the Working Group on the 
Relationship between Trade and Investment under the mandate we gave at Doha, and 
the work on the issue of modalities carried out at the level of the General Council, we 
[adopt by explicit consensus the decision on modalities of negotiations set out in 
document <+ 
*decide that <+. 
Competition 14. Taking note of the work done by the Working Group on the 
Interaction between Trade and Competition Policy under the mandate we gave at 
Doha, and the work on the issue of modalities carried out at the level of the General 
Council, we [adopt by explicit consensus the decision on modalities of negotiations set 
out in document <+*decide that <+. 
 
 
First Revised Draft (WTO 2003b), 24 August 2003 
 
Investment 13. [Taking note of the work done by the Working Group on the 
Relationship between Trade and Investment under the mandate in paragraphs 20-22 
 412 
of the Doha Ministerial Declaration, we decide to commence negotiations on the basis 
of the modalities set out in Annex D to this document.] 
[We take note of the discussions that have taken place in the Working Group on the 
Relationship between Trade and Investment since the Fourth Ministerial Conference. 
The situation does not provide a basis for the commencement of negotiations in this 
area. Accordingly, we decide that further clarification of the issues be undertaken in 
the Working Group.] 
 
Annex D 
Relationship between Trade and Investment 
1. The objective of the negotiations shall be to establish an agreement to secure 
transparent, stable and predictable conditions for [long term cross-border investment, 
particularly foreign direct investment][foreign direct investment], that will contribute 
to the expansion of trade, and the need for enhanced technical assistance and 
capacity-building in this area. Any agreement will reflect in a balanced manner the 
interests of home and host countries, and take due account of the development 
policies and objectives of the host government as well as their right to regulate in the 
public interest. 
2. Paragraphs 45-51 of the Doha Ministerial Declaration shall apply to these 
negotiations. 
3. The Chair of the Negotiating Group on Investment shall hold the Group’s first 
meeting within one month from the date of this decision. The Chair of the Negotiating 
Group shall conduct the negotiations with a view to presenting a draft text by no later 
than [30 June 2004]. 
4. On the basis of paragraph 22 of the Doha Ministerial Declaration and the work done 
thus far under the Working Group on the Relationship between Trade and 
Investment, the multilateral framework shall include the following elements: 
- Scope and Definition ([long-term cross-border investment, particularly FDI][Foreign 
Direct Investment]); 
- Transparency; 
- Non-discrimination (MFN and NT with limited exceptions); 
- Pre-establishment commitments based on a GATS-type, positive list approach; 
- Exceptions and balance-of-payments safeguards; 
- Consultations and the settlement of disputes between Members (investor to state 
dispute settlement mechanisms shall not be included); 
- Special and Differential Treatment for developing and least-developed country 
Members including flexibility regarding transparency obligations, commitments (NT, 
MFN and pre-establishment commitments) and transition periods, as necessary; 
- Provisions as necessary to clarify the relationship between this Agreement and 
relevant WTO provisions; 
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- Provisions to clarify the relationship between this Agreement and existing bilateral 
and regional arrangements on investment; 
- Other issues that participants may wish to put forward. 
5. Recognizing the needs of developing and least-developed countries for enhanced 
support for technical assistance and capacity building, including policy analysis and 
development so that they may better evaluate the implications of closer multilateral 
cooperation for their development policies and objectives, and human and 
institutional development, we shall work in cooperation with other relevant 
intergovernmental organizations, including UNCTAD, and through appropriate 
regional and bilateral channels, to continue to provide strengthened and adequately 
resourced technical assistance and capacity building to respond to these needs during 
the negotiations and after their conclusion.  
 
Second Revised Draft (WTO 2003c), 13 September 2003 
 
Investment 14. We note with appreciation the valuable work that has been carried out 
in the Working Group on the Relationship between Trade and Investment under 
paragraphs 21 and 22 of the Doha Ministerial Declaration. 
In accordance with relevant provisions of the Doha Ministerial Declaration, we 
commit ourselves to provide strengthened and adequately resourced technical 
assistance to developing and least-developed countries to respond to their needs for 
enhanced support in this area. 
We agree: 
 to intensify the clarification process called for in paragraph 22 of the Doha 
Declaration, covering the elements listed in that paragraph as well as other elements 
raised by Members, including the elements identified in 
WT/MIN(03)/W/4; 
 to convene the Working Group in Special Session to elaborate procedural and 
substantive modalities on the basis of paragraphs 20, 21 and 22 of the 
Doha Declaration, and other elements raised by Members. We reiterate that the 
special development, trade and financial needs of developing and least developed 
countries should be taken into account as an integral part of any framework, which 
should enable Members to undertake obligations and commitments commensurate 
with their individual needs and circumstances. Consideration should be given to the 
relationship of the negotiations to the Single Undertaking; 
 modalities that will allow negotiations on a multilateral investment framework 
to start shall be adopted by the General Council no later than [date ]1. 
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“July Text” First Draft (JOB(04)/96 ), 16 July 2004 
 
Para.1.f.  
 
Relationship between Trade and Investment, Interaction between Trade and 
Competition Policy and Transparency in Government Procurement: the Council 
agrees that these issues, mentioned in the Doha Ministerial Declaration in paragraphs 
20-22, 23-25 and 26 respectively, will not form part of the Work Programme set out in 
that Declaration and therefore no work towards negotiations on any of these issues 
will take place within the WTO during the Doha Round. 
 
July Text Second Draft (JOB(04)/96/Rev.1), 30 July 2004 
 
Para.1.g.  
Relationship between Trade and Investment, Interaction between Trade and 
Competition Policy and Transparency in Government Procurement: the Council 
agrees that these issues, mentioned in the Doha Ministerial Declaration in paragraphs 
20-22, 23-25 and 26 respectively, will not form part of the Work Programme set out in 
that Declaration and therefore no work towards negotiations on any of these issues 
will take place within the WTO during the Doha Round. 
 
July Text Final (WTO 2004),  2 August 2004 
 
g.   
Relationship between Trade and Investment, Interaction between Trade and 
Competition Policy and Transparency in Government Procurement:  the Council 
agrees that these issues, mentioned in the Doha Ministerial Declaration in paragraphs 
20-22, 23-25 and 26 respectively, will not form part of the Work Programme set out in 
that Declaration and therefore no work towards negotiations on any of these issues 
will take place within the WTO during the Doha Round. 
 
 
 
 
